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ABSTRACT
By the end of the First World War the Ottoman Empire had been defeated and 
was in a state of disintegration. The Mudros Armistice which ended the war 
between the Ottoman Empire and the Allies in October 1918 was the final stage of 
this process; the Treaty of Sevres which followed the Armistice confirmed it.
However, the National Independence Movement which emerged in Anatolia 
from the ruins of the Empire rejected the proposed peace terms and set itself up as 
an alternative government based at Ankara. It drew up the National Pact which set 
out the desiderata of the Nationalists, and it won a decisive victory over the Greeks 
who landed in Anatolia in 1919. This military victory made a peace conference 
imperative and enabled the Turks to negotiate peace terms with the Allies on an 
equal footing. The peace treaty which was signed at Lausanne on July 24, 1923 
finalised the Turkish Peace Settlement, putting an end to the centuries-old Eastern 
Question.
The object of this dissertation is to examine the motives and strategies of 
Britain and Turkey at the Lausanne Conference in their efforts to obtain the peace 
terms best suited to their interests. The focus throughout is on the factors 
influencing the attitude of the delegations, the instructions they received from their 
respective foreign ministries and the formulation of their strategies.
The thesis consists of six chapters. The introductory chapter presents a brief 
account of events prior to the Conference.
Chapter II deals with the historical background by giving a summary of the 
political and military events leading up to the Conference.
Chapter III gives an account of the strategies of Britain and Turkey and aims to 
assess the respective strength and weakness of the two parties prior to the 
Conference.
Chapter IV examines the negotiations between Britain and Turkey during the 
first phase of the Conference. The central axis of this examination is the Turco- 
British strategy which shows the critical shift in the policy of the Turks following 
their realisation that peace could not be made unless they came to terms with Britain.
Chapter V investigates the events following the breakdown of the Conference to 
the re-opening with the second phase. It covers the measures taken by both sides to 
be in a stronger position vis-a-vis each other in preparation for the second phase of 
the negotiations.
Chapter VI discusses the negotiations and the final settlement, concentrating 
mainly on the strategies of both sides in the second phase of the Conference.
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IINTRODUCTION
" ....International diplomacy is a type of 
nightmare chess match, played amidst blinding 
fog, in which the pieces change shape or melt 
away, players mysteriously transform 
themselves, rules abruptly alter in mid-move, 
and no one is quite sure what the prizes are. 
Yet this need not discourage. It is the constant 
fluctuation, the infinite range of possibilities, 
that make diplomatic history so stimulating a 
subject. This is its special excitement, that it 
presents problems to which there are many 
possible solutions and equally many ways of 
arriving at those solutions." Clayton, G. D., 
Brita in  an d  the Eastern Question:  
Missolonghi to Gallipoli. London, 1971, 
pp. 246-247.
The Ottoman Empire, which participated in the Great War on the side of the 
Central Powers, was defeated by the Allies and compelled to sign the Armistice of 
Mudros in October 1918. Following the Armistice the Allies worked out, in line 
with their war-time secret agreements, the details of the peace treaty which was 
signed by the Ottoman delegation in August 1920 at Sevres. The Treaty of Sevres 
was the Allied solution to the centuries-old Eastern Question but not the final one.
The end of the War witnessed not only the disappearance of the Ottoman 
Empire from the political arena but also the emergence of Britain as the dominant 
Power in the Middle East. Britain, as a victor with a vast amount of newly acquired 
territories, extended its commitments in Mesopotamia, the eastern Mediterranean 
and India, all of which formed the key stones of the Imperial strategic system 
following the war years. Within this geographical area Turkey became of crucial
1
importance to Britain as far as military, political and strategic factors were 
concerned. Britain could not afford to have Turkish affairs settled without its direct 
and active participation. Therefore, soon after the Armistice Britain took the leading 
role in settling Turkish affairs, which resulted in the signature of the Treaty of 
Sevres of 1920, the 'death warrant' of the Ottoman Empire.
This partition plan, however, encountered difficulties when a Turkish 
Nationalist Movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal emerged in Anatolia 
and grew swiftly into a major power forcing Britain and its Allies to revise their 
position. The envisaged plan suffered another blow when the Nationalist 
Movement, now at war with the British-backed Greece, gained a significant victory. 
The Mudania Convention, which followed the Greek defeat, was sufficient for 
Britain to realise that unless peace negotiations started immediately it would be 
impossible to secure its own vital interests. The Lausanne Peace Conference was 
thereupon convened providing a platform upon which age-old accounts could be 
settled. But it took five years altogether from the initial Mudros Armistice to 
complete the general peace settlement, and it was not until July 24, 1923 that the 
final peace treaty was signed at Lausanne. With the coming into force of the treaty 
on August 6,1924, peace was at last formally established in the region.
The Lausanne Conference was the culmination of a long and troublesome 
struggle which started with the Declaration of Amasya on June 21-22, 1919, a 
document incorporating views expressed by Mustafa Kemal on the necessity of 
ensuring the sovereignty and independence of Turkey; these views were 
subsequently endorsed by Nationalist Congresses held in Sivas and Erzurum as the 
National Pact of Turkey. With the decisive victory of the Turkish forces over the 
Greek army, the first stage of the National Struggle had been won. With the 
Mudania Convention, which followed the further successful advances of the 
Turkish army right up to Chanak, the second part of the long battle was
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accomplished: it put an end to hostilities and opened the way to the Lausanne peace 
negotiations.
At Lausanne the third stage began, namely that of diplomacy; that is, the 
transferral of the initiative from the soldiers to the diplomats. Once diplomacy took 
over, the nature and the conduct of relations between Britain and Turkey 
dramatically changed, and the Conference proved a suitable platform for the 
establishment of a policy of reconciliation. As Evans rightly observed, Turkey had 
much to gain from a negotiated settlement and the restoration of normal relations 
with Europe and much to lose if it stood on its military victory and defied Europe. 
On the other hand, Turkey had much to offer, from economic privileges to influence 
in a strategically important area of the world. The Allies could deny to Turkey the 
benefits of a restoration of relations, economic aid, and such additional stability as 
would be afforded by a recognition of the Nationalist regime.'1 Rational and 
pragmatic thinking as well as a realistic assessment of the circumstances determined 
the course of the negotiations and encouraged the two parties towards a gradual 
rapprochement.
Despite its crucial place in the history of International relations in general, 
and that of Turkey in particular, the Lausanne Peace Conference of 1922-1923 has 
rarely been the subject of scholarly investigation. The current state of work dealing 
with the Conference is not altogether satisfactory, as it does not go beyond what has 
already been said and is often a repetition of the same ideas in different forms. Apart 
from the continuous output of hasty monographs and conference papers, academics 
from Turkey and abroad seem content to treat this subject as a chapter in a book or 
by tossing off an article on it for a magazine or a newspaper.
*. Laurence Evans, United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey. 1914-1924. (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins Press, 1965),. p. 376.
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The few scholarly investigations in English are by Busch, Dockrill and 
Goold, Howard, Evans, and Sonyel. Busch's Mudros to Lausanne: Britain's 
Frontier in West Asia, 1918-1923 is an authoritative work dealing with British 
diplomacy during the period concerned as it makes good use of British archival 
material. Howard's The Partition o f Turkey: A Diplomatic History 1913-1923 is 
an informative study of the issues discussed at the Conference. Dockrill and 
Goold's Peace Without Promise: Britain and the Peace Conferences, 1919-1923 
investigates British policy towards the entire peace settlement after the First World 
War and examines at length the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the events 
leading up to the Conference, of which it gives a brief account. Evans' United 
States Policy and the Partition o f Turkey 1914-1924 considers the diplomacy of the 
Great Powers in the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and its significance for 
American foreign policy. It also deals briefly with the role of the United States in the 
Lausanne negotiations. Sonyel's Turkish Diplomacy 1918-1923: Mustafa Kemal 
and the Turkish Nationalist Movement, while examining Nationalist diplomacy from 
Mudros to Lausanne, gives a brief but thorough account of the negotiations at 
Lausanne. All these works, along with Helmreich's From Paris to Sevres: The 
Partition o f the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference o f1919-1920, are useful 
as background reading and as general reference works for the period.
The major works in Turkish are Bilsel's two-volume Lozan, and a 
publication by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turk Dis Politikasinda 50 Yil: 
Lozan; 1922-1923 . A third work, Kurkcuoglu's Turk-Ingiliz Iliskileri may also be 
mentioned as providing useful background to the Conference; one of its chapters 
deals specifically with the Straits and the Mosul questions, which were the two main 
interests for Britain at Lausanne.
In all of these works, discussion of the Lausanne Conference is limited in 
scope and generally restricted to little more than a chapter. While the proceedings
4
and protocols reflecting the official side of the Conference have been examined, the 
factors influencing the attitude of the delegations, the instructions they received from 
their respective foreign ministries, and the process of formulation of their strategies 
remain to be investigated. These gaps in empirical information and lack of a deeper 
analysis need to be addressed in order to obtain a fuller and truer picture of this 
important international e v e n t . 2
Although a number of works concerning specific aspects of the Conference 
have been produced, no exhaustive attempt has been made to investigate the 
evolution of diplomatic strategies between Turkey and Britain. This dissertation 
represents the first full-length scholarly account of the Lausanne Conference, and in 
particular the first work to present an analysis of negotiating strategies and 
diplomatic relations between the two countries based on Turkish and British primary 
sources.
The primary aim is to provide a chronological and documentary account of 
Anglo-Turkish diplomatic strategies during the Conference; to direct attention to 
particular incidents and trends that illustrate the changing nature of relations between 
Great Britain and Turkey; and subsequently to assess the significance and 
consequence of the Conference with regard to Turkish and Middle Eastern History. 
The focus throughout is on what went on behind the closed doors of the 
Conference, how the parties formulated their strategies and what factors affected the 
way these strategies were carried out.
The dissertation consists of six chapters. The introductory chapter presents 
a brief account of events prior to the Conference as well as discusses sources used 
during research and the perspective taken in the analysis of the subject.
Kemal Oke, The Lausanne Conference, 1922-23: Themes and Sources in the Archives of Great Britain' 
Ataturk Turkivesinde Pis Politika Sempozvumu. 1923-1983. (Istanbul: Bogazici Universitesi Yayinlari, 
1984), p.70.
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Chapter II deals with the historical background by giving a summary of the 
political and military events leading up to the Conference.
Chapter III explains the grounds that made an Anglo-Turkish 
rapprochement necessary, and also the questions to be settled before the 
Conference.
Chapter IV gives an account of the strategies of Britain and Turkey and 
examines the negotiations between them during the first phase of the Conference. 
The central axis of this examination is the Turco-British strategy which shows the 
critical shift in the policy of the Turks following their realisation that peace could not 
be made unless they came to terms with Britain.
Chapter V investigates the events from the breakdown of the Conference to 
its re-opening with the second phase. It covers the measures taken each side in order 
to gain a stronger position vis-^-vis the other in preparation for this second phase of 
the negotiations.
Chapter VI discusses the negotiations and the final settlement, 
concentrating mainly on the strategies of both sides in the second phase of the 
Conference.
It should be noted that unless otherwise specified, all the correspondence 
cited are telegrams. The research material consists of all British official documents 
and private papers in public archives and of all Turkish documents available at the 
moment. Because of their comprehensiveness and availability, British archival 
resources constitute the major part of the primary sources of the dissertation. The 
Conference was the subject of a vast deal of private and public correspondence and 
official documents; all of these are to be found in British archives, and the majority
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of them are open to public consultation. Foreign Office,3 Cabinet Office, War 
Office and Colonial Office documents, together with the private papers of the Prime 
Ministers and the Secretaries of State reveal the policies pursued at the highest level. 
The Command Papers and Parliamentary debates have also provided much 
information on British policy at the time of the Lausanne Conference.
By contrast, Turkish archives are still practically inaccessible. The Turkish 
Foreign Ministry documents which are available only cover the period prior to 
1914, and the documents beyond that date are for the most part uncatalogued, lying 
in a chaotic disarray of bundles and bags. Much archival material about military- 
strategic issues of the period is available, but documents on the policy-making 
process at the highest level are rarely accessible. Nevertheless, several published 
Turkish documents have helped to throw some light on the issues treated in this 
work, and have in some cases been useful in filling gaps in the information available 
from British sources.
3. FO records kept in the PRO are an indispensable source of information on the Lausanne Conference. 
The documents catalogued under the title of "The Eastern Conference: Lausanne” consist of fifty-three 
files and cover the correspondence between the British delegation at Lausanne and Whitehall.
nBACKGROUND TO THE CONFERENCE
The Eastern Question and the European Solution
On the eve of the Lausanne Conference, the Eastern Question, an 
expression used to indicate the problems created by the decline and gradual 
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, had been a focal point of European and British 
diplomacy for over a hundred years. 1 The heartland of the Ottoman Empire, Asia 
Minor, along with Constantinople and the Straits and Turkey-in-Europe beyond the 
capital, had been traditionally at the core of the Eastern Q u e s t i o n . ^  The root of the 
matter was the inability of the Ottoman Empire to maintain its territorial integrity. 
The more the economic and strategic interests of the Great Powers in the Empire 
grew and the ensuing rivalries became visible, the more firmly the Eastern Question 
became established as a priority on the agenda of international relations. Real peace 
and stability were further away than ever, since the decline of the Ottoman Empire 
opened up too many possibilities of advantage to too many rival powers. Thus the 
Question, for a century and a half, remained the most lasting and intractable of all 
diplomatic questions. As Anderson argued, most of the major crises from 1856 to 
the outbreak of World War in European politics were due to 'a possible, a probable,
Michael L. Dockrill and J. Douglas.Goold; Peace Without Promise. Britain and the Peace Conferences. 
1919-23. (London: Bastford Academic and Educational, 1981), p. 132.
Dockrill and Goold; Peace Without Promise, p. 181: On the subject see: Anderson, M. S., The Eastern 
Question. (London: Melbourne, 1966); John Marriot; The Eastern Question: A Historical Study in 
European Diplomacy. ( Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940); Gerald D. Clayton., Britain and the Eastern 
Question: Missolonehi to Gallipoli. (London: University of London, 1971); Malcolm E. Yapp., The 
Making of the Modem Near East. 1792-1923. (London: Longman, 1987), pp. 47-97; Alan Palmer., The 
Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire. (London. 1992).
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or an actually threatening partition of the Ottoman territory’.^ The Crimean war, the 
1878 Congress of Berlin and the Great War all illustrate different Powers’ attempts 
to settle the Eastern Question. The Great War was but the culmination, so far as 
Turkey was concerned, of this long process of dissolution. 'Not only was the 
problem inescapable,’ as Clayton stated in his analysis of the Question, ’but it was 
also apparently i n s o l u b l e . ^  The Powers' irreconcilable aims, and their unsuccessful 
efforts to agree on a partition of the Empire in a series of bargains, prolonged the 
solution of the problem and continued to affect the nature of international relations 
for a long time to come. As Albrecht-Carrie' aptly put i t : 'Had it not been for the 
inability of the Powers to agree on a division of the Ottoman Empire, "the sick man 
of Europe" would have died sooner than he did.'^ But their rivalries made the fate 
of the question for a century or more the most permanent of all the sources of 
international conflict and the most intractable of all European political problems.
In the early years of the twentieth century, diplomatic complications in the 
Eastern Question which arose from the decline of the Ottoman Empire resulted in 
important and rather rapid developments towards their solution. Following the First 
World War, the disappearance of the Habsburg Empire, the destruction of German 
influence, and the change of regime in Russia had made the rivalries of the Great 
Powers more 'limited and innocuous than at any time for the last century and a 
half .6 This appearance of equanimity was, however, quite deceptive. The 
indefinite nature of the whole situation and the prolonged uncertainty as to how to 
partition the Empire seemed to take a more decisive path after the defeat Turkey 
suffered in the First World War. Following the Armistice of Mudros of 1918,7
3. Harrv Howard.. The Partition of Turkey. (New York: Fertig, 1966),. p. 19.
4. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, p. 9.
R. Albrecht-Carrie., Twentieth-Centurv Europe. (London: Methuen, 1973), p. 14.
Anderson. The Eastern Question, p. 388.
T Cmd. 53,1919. Terms of Armistice Concluded between the Allied Governments and the Governments 
of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey.'; Sir Frederick Maurice., The Armistices of 1918 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1943), pp. 85-87; Gwyne Dyer., The Turkish Armistice of 1918' Middle East 
Studies. 8, (1972), pp. 143-178, 316-348; D. I. Shuttleworth., Turkey From the Armistice to the Peace'
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which technically meant Turkey's surrender to the Entente, all Ottoman possessions 
came under Allied occupation. The Paris Conference beginning in January 1919 
witnessed a bitter struggle between the Powers as to the ultimate fate of the Ottoman 
territories. Once more the Eastern Question was not only to prove a stumbling block 
on the road to world peace but it was also to give rise to grave difficulties between 
the Great Powers so that the drawing-up of terms of peace was seriously impeded 
by a series of acrimonious inter-Allied disputes. Their difficulties were increased, 
moreover, by the suspicion with which they increasingly tended to regard each 
other's activities in the Near E a s t . 8  Therefore the controversy emerging from a 
divergence of views and clash of interests 'not only disturbed and threatened the 
orderly processes of the Peace Conference, but actually prevented a settlement of the 
Near Eastern question at Paris.'^
The Allies made another attempt after February 12, 1920 in London to 
produce a solution to the long-lasting Eastern Question. During the discussions 
which lasted until April 10, the Supreme Council endeavoured to find a solution 
acceptable to all parties. After much discussion accord was reached on the main 
questions regarding the partition of the Empire. By the time the Supreme Council 
reconvened at San Remo on April 18, 1920 most of the basic decisions regarding
Journal of the Central Asian Society. 11, (1924), pp. 51-67; Yusuf Hikmet Bayur., Yeni Turkive 
Devletinin Harici Sivaseti. (Istanbul: Milli Mecmua Basimevi, 1934),. pp. 22-30; Ali Turkgeldi., 
Mondros ve Mudanva Mutarekelerinin Tarihi. (Ankara: Guney Matbaacilik, 1948); Tevfik Biyiklioglu., 
Turk Istiklal Harbi: Mondros Mutarekesi ve Tatbikati. (Cilt I, Ankara, 1962); Gwynne Dyer., The 
Turkish Armistice of 1918.1- The Turkish Decision for a Separate Peace' and Turkish Armistice of 1918. 
II-Lost Opportunity: The Armistice Negotiations o f Moudros' Middle Eastern Studies. 8 (1972), pp. 143- 
178, 313-348.
The term 'Near East' has been used in the text to denote an area comprising of Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey 
and the Levant (the eastern coast of the Mediterranean and its hinterland).
Henry H. Cumming., Franco-British Rivalry in the Post-War Near East; The Decline of French 
Influence. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1938), p.75. Because the Great Powers were so busy with 
their European peace terms, (January to June 1919 in Paris, April 1920 at San Remo, July 1920 at Spa, 
January 1922 in Cannes, May 1922 in Genoa) they failed to attribute at the beginning of 1919 the 
importance to the Turkish settlement that it later acquired.
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the Turkish Peace Treaty had already been made, and a nearly complete draft of the 
treaty was in existence.^
The draft treaty, which eventually was to be signed by the Ottoman 
Government on August 10 at Sevres, ^  was drawn up on the model of all the 
previous treaties which had been made between victors and vanquished since the 
1918 Armistice. The Ottoman government felt it had no option but to sign the treaty 
which in fact passed a sentence of death upon the Empire. Damat Ferit, the Grand 
Vizier, stated that a 'reasonable man saw there was no alternative to signature except 
destruction'.^ Sultan Vahdettin’s policy was to accommodate the Allies, 
particularly the British, in the hope of a lenient treaty. However, his appeal to the 
King of England 'to intervene with other Entente Powers in order to alleviate the 
severity of the treaty in those of its clauses which are incompatible with independent 
state and to save from (? partition), at least (? the) Turkish speaking provinces', did 
not help improve the situation.^ No articles were discussed or negotiated. The 
treaty was entirely contrary to the policy of the integrity and independence of 
Turkey, the policy of preserving a compact territory and defensible frontiers. Not 
only did it detach territories of enormous extent from Turkey, it also imposed upon 
the territory left to the Turks a strict Allied supervision. If Turkey failed to observe 
the provisions of the treaty, the Allies could modify these provisions.
Paul C. Helmreich., From Paris to Sfevres. The Partition of the Ottoman F.mpire at the Peace 
Conference of 1919-1920. (Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1974), p. 291.
* f  Cmd. 964 (1920) Treaty of Peace with Turkey signed at Sfcvres, August 10, 1920; Helmreich, From 
Paris To S&vres pp. 314-337; G. F. Abbott., Greece and the Allies 1914-1922. (London: Methuen, 
1922), p. 221; Edward Reginald Vere-Hodge., Turkish Foreign Policy 1918-1948. (Geneva. 1950), pp. 
21-22; Sir Reader Bullard., Britain and the Middle East. From Earlier Times to 1963. (London: 
Hutchinson, 1964), pp. 81-82; J. C. Hurewitz., Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East. A Documentary 
Record: 1914-1956. (Vol. II. New York: Van Nostrand, 1956), pp. 81-87.
12. W032/5737 File No. 0152/5520, July 23, 1920, Admiral de Robeck to the War Office.
13. Ibid.
In a private meeting held with Admiral John Michael de Robeck, British High Commissioner in Istanbul, 
the Sultan also pressed his points regarding Turkey's need for help and support from Britain rather than 
the joint assistance of the Allies: We had been bom up by the hope that we could rely on British 
assistance in the future. Turkey was sore stricken and her wounds were deep. She needed the helping hand 
of a friend, if she were to survive.1 Robeck Papers, August 23, 1920, De Robeck to Curzoa
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Although Istanbul was allowed to remain as the capital under Turkish 
sovereignty, the Straits would be under the control of an international commission 
and were to be open both in peace and in war to vessels of commerce or of war. A 
large area around the city of Izmir was to be administered by Greece, after which it 
was to be incorporated into Greece if a local parliament and plebiscite so decided. 
Turkey renounced in favour of Greece its sovereign rights over the whole of Thrace 
(Trakya) and the islands in the Aegean Sea, namely Imbros and Tenedos, and 
agreed the Dodecanese should be given to Italy. While Armenia was recognised as a 
free and independent state with its boundaries determined by the arbitration of U.S. 
President Woodrow Wilson, a scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly 
Kurdish areas was envisaged, securing for the Kurds the right to appeal for 
independence to the Council of the League of Nations. All the Arab provinces of the 
Empire were surrendered, and under the Tripartite Agreement^ Qf the same date, 
August 10 1920, the Empire was divided into zones of influence, Syria, Palestine 
and Mesopotamia being placed under the mandates of France and Britain. 15 
Moreover the capitulatory regime^ would continue to exercise a profound effect on 
all aspects of Ottoman life.
With the presentation of this treaty to the Ottoman government, the Allies 
believed they had finally reached a solution to the Eastern Question. The survival or 
total destruction of the Empire now depended upon whether the treaty would be
*4 Cmd. 963, (1920) Tripartite Agreement Between the British Empire, France and Italy respecting 
Anatolia. Signed at Sevres, August 10, 1920; Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East pp. 87- 
89.
Cmd. 1176, (1921) Draft Mandates for Mesopotamia and Palestine as submitted for the Approval of 
the League of Nations.
16. For centuries the Ottoman Empire had granted financial and judicial concessions to foreigners. While 
the judicial capitulations placed foreigners outside Turkish civil law and made them subject to the laws of 
their respective countries, the financial capitulations made foreign business firms independent of Turkish 
control and exempted foreigners from taxes. After the outbreak of the First World War the Ottoman 
government unilaterally abolished the capitulations. The Allies refused to recognise this action and 
sought to reimpose the capitulations in the Treaty of Sevres. The National Pact, however, had called for 
their abolition, and this was to be a vital issue at Lausanne. For the history of the Capitulations see: 
Cmd. 1814, XXVI, Memorandum read by the Turkish delegate at the meeting of December 2, 1922 of the 
Commission on the regime of Foreigners. Annex, pp. 471-480; Bilsel, Lozan. II, pp. 28-127; Nasim 
Sousa., The Capitulatory Regime of Turkey. Its History. Origin and Nature. (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
1933); Philip M. Brown., The Capitulations' Foreign Affairs. 1 (June 1923), pp. 71-80.
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signed. The rising Nationalist movement in Anatolia put an effective brake on this 
quick solution; as a consequence of this unrest, although under pressure from the 
Allies the Ottoman government signed the treaty, the Assembly did not ratify it. The 
Treaty was bound to cause repercussions in Turkey. It discredited the Istanbul 
government and helped to increase the popularity of the Nationalists who practically 
had the support of the whole ofTurkey in their categorical protests that the Istanbul 
delegation did not, in any way, represent the Turkish people and had no authority to 
conclude a treaty on behalf of Turkey. They expressed their determination to fight in 
order to avert its realisation; their alternative to this treaty was the National Pact 
(Misak-i Milli).
British Policy towards the Turkish Question
Traditional British policy towards the Ottoman Empire had been to maintain 
the independence and integrity of the Empire. Strategic concerns had been the prime 
motives behind the policy: The Straits, the route to India and the Persian Gulf which 
Britain had long considered to be within its sphere of influence, Cyprus and the 
Suez Canal, and keeping Russia out of the Mediterranean to avoid a threat to 
Britain’s eastern empire. The relations between the Ottoman Empire and Britain, 
which had been very close during the nineteenth century, began to cool somewhat 
towards the end of the century. The Ottoman Empire’s participation in the First 
World War on the side of the Central Powers led Britain to reconsider completely its 
traditional policy. Britain's strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean could no 
longer be maintained by preserving and supporting the Ottoman Empire as the latter 
was now an enemy power. Britain consequently reversed its policy and sought the 
partition of the Ottoman Empire.
Secret discussions about the partition of the Ottoman Empire began as early 
as 1915. During that year the Istanbul Agreement of March 18,1915 was concluded
13
between Britain, France and Italy, who all agreed to Russia's possession of Istanbul 
and the Dardanelles. The Treaty of London, of April 26, 1915 recognised Italy's 
demands in the Dodecanese and pledged it a share in the eventual disposal of 
Anatolia. The Sykes-Picot Agreement concluded between Britain and France on 
May 16, 1916 provided for wide British and French spheres of influence in the 
Arab territories of the Empire. The agreement of St. Jean de Maurienne of April 17, 
1917 gave a sphere of influence to the Italians in the Aegean and the Mediterranean 
coastline of Anatolia. Finally, by the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917 
Britain favoured the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. ^  In less than two 
years of war, Britain's policy regarding the territorial integrity of the Ottoman 
Empire was thus totally reversed. Following the Mudros Armistice of 1918, the 
occupation of various parts of Turkish territory and the encouragement of the Greek 
occupation of Izmir in May 1919, by virtue of a decision by the Supreme Council 
based technically on clause 7 of the Armistice, 18 were clear indications of the 
complete reversal of nineteenth century British policy of support for the existence 
and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. 19
During the period under consideration British foreign policy was conducted 
by Conservative or National governments. British policy towards the Middle East 
immediately after the War was directed by the Marquees Curzon of Kedleston (Lord 
Curzon), Acting Foreign Secretary from January 1919 and Foreign Secretary proper 
from October that year, and by the Cabinet Eastern Committee which he had
*7 For the text of the treaties see: Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East pp. 11-12, 18-22, 
25-26.
Article 7 gave the Allies the right to occupy any strategic part of the Ottoman Empire in the event of 
a situation arising which affected their security.
17  Helmreich, From Paris to Sfevres:. p p . 86-106; F. S. Nortbedge., The Troubled Giant: Britain Among 
the Great Powers. 1916-1939. (London: London School of Economics: G. Bell, 1966), p. 131; W. N. 
Medlicott., British Foreign Policy Since Versailles. (London: Methuen, 1940), p.49; Anderson, The 
Eastern Question, p.364; Dockrill and Goold, Peace Without Promise, p p . 190-199; E. H. Carr., 
Britain: A Study of Foreign Policy from the Versailles Treaty to the Outbreak of War. (London: 
Longmans, Green, 1939), pp. 50-53, 130-133.
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initiated.20 The key to Curzon’s Middle Eastern policy was his firmly held belief 
that British imperial interests in the Middle East could only be ensured by the 
'destruction of Turkey as an expansionist power and as the centre of Pan-Islamic 
feeling.'21 Expelling the Turks from Constantinople (Istanbul) was also part of this 
p o l i c y . 2 2  Curzon's desire was shared by Lloyd George, who throughout his 
administration retained an anti-Turkish bias.
The opposition to Curzon came from the India Office and the War Office. 
In the India Office, Edwin Montagu, the Secretary of State for India, strongly 
objected to Curzon on the grounds that such treatment of Turkey might offend 
Muslim feelings in India and subsequently cause unrest Similarly Sir Henry Wilson 
was critical of Curzon's stance and suggested that in order to achieve peace in the 
Middle East Britain 'should make love to the Turks'. Wilson thought it vitally 
important to get the Turks on the British side and he strongly criticised the Cabinet 
policy of backing the Greeks in preference to the Turks and the suggestion that the 
Empire was 'much safer with a hostile Turkey’. He described this attitude as 'an 
astonishing frame of mind to be in' and urged the Cabinet to establish friendly 
relations with Mustafa Kemal and Nationalist Turkey.23 in 1920 it was apparent 
from Wilson's letters that the government and the army held different opinions on 
Turkey.24 Wilson insisted that rapprochement with Turkey was necessary,
20 For further information about how British policy towards the Middle East was formulated by various 
departments see: Helmut Mejcher., 'British Middle East Policy 1917-1921: The Interdepartmental Level1 
Journal of Contemporary History. 8 (1973), pp. 81-101.
2*. Keith Jeffery., British Armv and the Crisis of the Emnire. 1918-1922. (Manchester. Manchester
University Press, 1984), pp. 40-41.
22. CON12798 Memorandum, (1920). Protest erf Lord Curzon against Cabinet Decision to retain the 
Turks at Constantinople. See also: Elizabeth Monroe., Britain's Moment in the Middle East. (London: 
Chatto and Windus, 1981), p.33.
23. Keith Jeffery (ed.)., The Wilson Letters. The Military Correspondence of Field Marshall. Sir Henry 
Wilson. 1918-1922. (Avon. 1985), Nos.: 154, 159, 168 See also John Robert Ferris.. The Evolution of 
British Strategic Policy. 1919-1926. (London, 1989), p. 102.
24. Jeffery, Wilson Letters. No. 164.
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otherwise they would have 'a rough time in Mesopotamia, Palestine and
Constantinople'.^
Despite urgent warnings from India and the War Office the British 
government was reluctant to modify its policy, and it took much longer for the 
British than for the French and Italians to realise that a strong power was emerging 
in Anatolia, and that in the changed circumstances following the First World War, 
they would not have the means to impose an imperialist policy on Turkey. This is a 
new Turkey' commented Major-General Charles Townshend criticising the attitude 
adopted by the government, 'with new aspirations and a wonderful spirit for self 
sacrifice and liberty; this does not seem to be understood in England'.^
It was only after Woodrow Wilson’s refusal^ of an American mandate 
over Istanbul and the Straits that the British government began to lose interest in the 
idea of expelling the Turks from Istanbul. British policy was revised and an 
alternative plan was formulated: that of maintaining the Sultan in Istanbul and of 
imposing on him the terms of peace which would satisfy the interests of Britain.^ 
However, the lack of consensus between the Cabinet, the War Office and the India 
Office, and the diverse and conflicting interests of the Allies which surfaced during 
the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 made it impossible for Britain to settle the 
Turkish question at Paris. Fresh talks were held between Britain and France in 
December to establish policy-guidelines for the coming London Conference of 
February 20 where the partition of Anatolia was further discussed and the 
occupation of Istanbul was decided.
2S. Ibid. No. 159.
26 F0371/7946/E9114/3288/44, July 27, 1922, Memorandum; Townshend's enthusiastic remarks 
about Turkey and the Turks did not receive a warm welcome in British political circles where he was 
criticised for favouring the Turkish side. Rumbold called him 'the sort of English counterpart to Pierre 
Loti or Claude Farrare’. F0800/253 Tu/22/18.
2^. The United States had not been involved in the wartime treaties and was not bound by them and its 
insistence on self determination conflicted with these agreements. Therefore Wilson suggested that the 
peace settlement should be made under the aegis of the League of Nations.
28. Medlicott. British Foreign Policy, p p . 49-50.
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After almost a month of debate, on March 16 General Wilson, British 
Garrison Commander at Istanbul, with the support of an English dominated force, 
occupied Istanbul. Britain was now militarily and politically in a better position to 
enforce peace terms in line with its policy considerations. However the final details 
had yet to be worked out. The San Remo Conference of April 24 1920 provided a 
platform upon which Britain furthered its objectives by obtaining Mesopotamia and 
Palestine and concluding an oil agreement with France by which it secured a share 
of the economic spoils of the Ottoman Empire. On May 11, 1920, the terms of the 
treaty which three months later was signed at S&vres, were officially transmitted to 
the Ottoman government. Britain saw the treaty as the last stage in the realisation of 
its long planned objectives, Turkey regarded it as the beginning of a lengthy and 
troublesome struggle which would finally attain the aims it sought.
Turkish Response: The Nationalist Movement
The two years between the Armistice of Mudros and the Treaty of S&vres 
witnessed the steady growth of a Nationalist Movement in Anatolia. In 1920 this 
movement transformed itself into the Grand National Assembly sitting at Ankara 
and with representatives from many parts of the country.^ Following its 
inauguration in April 23,1920 the Assembly elected Mustafa Kemal^O as President
29 The Assembly which was opened on April 23 under the personal guidance of Mustafa Kemal declared 
itself to be temporarily invested with all powers, both executive and legislative, and it deputed its 
executive power to a Council of Commissioners, of which Mustafa Kemal himself, as president of the 
Assembly, became ipso facto the head. Thus did the ’Ankara Government' came into being. The Grand 
National Assembly claimed to be the sole exponent of the will of people, and it formally denied the right 
of any other authority to take decisions or enter into agreements involving the destiny of Turkey. 
Nevertheless, for more than two years, there existed two governments in Turkey, a de facto government 
at Ankara, and the government of the Sultan, which the Allies treated as the de jure government, at 
Istanbul. The latter merely existed in virtue of the Allied occupation and gradually sank into greater 
impotence and finally, on November 4, three days after the decree of the Grand National Assembly 
abolishing the Sultanate, Tevfik Pasha, the last of the long succession of Grand Viziers, resigned his 
office, and Istanbul became a simple administrative district of the new Turkish state.
30 In May 1919, only a few days after the Greek landing in Izmir, Mustafa Kemal (later Ataturk, the 
founder of the Republic) arrived at Samsun on the Black Sea with the title of Inspector General of the 9th 
Army Corps. From there he began his mission to form a National Movement against the Greek invasion. 
On his career and role in the Turkish Nationalist Movement see: Lord Kinross., Ataturk. The Rebirth of a 
Nation. (London, 1990); Sevket Sureyya Aydemir., Tek Adam: Mustafa Kemal. 1922=1938. (Cilt III, 
Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1981); Bilal Simsir., Ingiliz Belgelerinde Ataturk 1919-1938. (Ankara: Turk
17
and Commander-in-Chief, appointed a Cabinet and adopted the National Pact- a 
document which had been drawn up during the Congresses^ 1 in Erzurum (July 23- 
August 6) and Sivas (September 4-11 ) and which became the fixed basis of 
Nationalist foreign policy. It consisted of six articles which laid down the principles 
for the maximum sacrifice which could be made in order to achieve a ‘just and 
lasting peace'. It called for Turkey’s complete independence within its new 
boundaries. Article I recognised that the destinies of the territories populated by an 
Arab majority should be determined by the free votes of the inhabitants, and 
declared that the territories inhabited by an 'Ottoman Muslim majority' were 
i n d i v i s i b l e .^ ^  The Pact affirmed the necessity of safeguarding the security of 
Istanbul and envisaged the opening of the Straits to the commerce of the world. It 
also confirmed the rights of the minorities as defined in the treaties concluded 
between the Allies and the other countries who had been defeated in the War. 
Finally, it repudiated every suggestion of foreign control in Turkey's political, 
judicial and financial affairs in order that Turkey's national and economic 
development should be rendered possible. The National Pact was to become the
Tarih Kununu Yayinevi, 1973); Bernard Lewis., The Emergence of Modem Turkey. (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1961); H. C. Armstrong., Grev Wolf. (London: A. Barker, 1937); Tevfik 
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Istiklal Harbimiz. (Istanbul, 1960); Tayyip Gokbilgin., Milli Mucadele Baslarken. (Ankara: Turk Tarih 
Kurumu, 1959); Ali Fuat Cebesoy., Milli Mucadele Hatiralari. (Istanbul: Vatan Nesriyat, 1953); Falih 
Rifki Atay., Cankava. (Istanbul. 1969); Dagobert Mikusch., Mustafa Kemal. (London. 1931); Erik Jan 
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Mahmud Gologlu., Erzurum Kongresi. (Ankara: Tekin Yayinevi, 1968); Salahi, R. Sonyel., Turkish 
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32 xhe Mosul Vilayet, with its largely Kurdish population fell .within this definition.
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fixed basis of Nationalist foreign policy and Turkish desiderata in the Lausanne
Conference .33
The Greek landing in Izmir on May 1919 gave the Nationalist Movement 
enormous impetus and enabled its leaders to canalise their activities and weld the 
movement into a formidable instrument. The Greek occupation of Smyrna has 
stimulated a Turkish patriotism probably more real than any which the war was able 
to evoke' commented Admiral John Michael de Robeck, Commander-in-Chief, 
Mediterranean in his letter to Curzon, 'and that patriotism has enabled Mustafa 
Kemal to raise a force which, if he decides to resist the peace terms, might cause the 
Allies considerable embarrassment' 34 The events leading to their final victory over 
the Greeks started with the Amasya Declaration of June 18-22 1919, by which the 
Nationalists decided to establish a resistance movement and set up a government in 
Anatolia 35 The Amasya Congress constituted a landmark in the Nationalist 
Movement by proclaiming, for the first time, the independence and indivisibility of 
the people of Anatolia. It led the way to the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses whereby 
the movement established itself more firmly and challenged the Istanbul government 
and the Allies.
33. Eleanor Bisbee., The New Turks-Pioneers of the Republic 1920-1950. (Philadelphia: University of 
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The occupation of Istanbul, the capital, on March 16,1920 by the Allies, in 
which mainly British forces were employed, caused outrage among the Nationalists. 
As Cumming aptly put it: The Greek aggression at Smyrna probably did more than 
any other factor to hasten the nationalist movement in Turkey, and the British action 
in occupying Constantinople may readily have added the finishing touches’ 
Mustafa Kemal vigorously protested calling it the ’last blow' which was directed 
against the ’sovereignty and political freedom of the Ottoman nation* and which 
struck at 'sacred principles such as the sense of freedom, of nationality and of 
country* as well as the principles of 'modem society and human c o n s c i e n c e . ' ^
Soon after the occupation the Nationalists intensified their efforts to 
establish the Grand National Assembly, which refused to accept the ’foreign 
slavery* imposed upon it by the Allies and was determined to fight for full 
independence. The Assembly, which opened on April 23, 1920 in Ankara, 
consisted of the deputies of the Ottoman Parliament who had escaped arrest 
following the occupation of Istanbul by the Allies and of deputies elected from the 
non-occupied territories of Turkey. After the election of Mustafa Kemal as the 
President of the Grand National Assembly and the adoption of the National Pact, the 
Nationalists felt stronger politically. It was now time to change this political power 
into a military one. The unsuccessful attempts of Britain and its Allies to revise the 
treaty in January at Paris and in February at London ended all hopes of reaching a 
compromise by diplomatic means and brought the possibility of a military offensive 
by the Nationalists. The first and the second battle at Inonu, on January 10 and 
March 31,1921, were followed by a decisive battle at Sakarya on August 23, 1921
36 Cumming, Franco-British Rivalry, p. 125; Feroz Ahmad., The Making of Modem Turkey. (London: 
Routledge, 1993), p. 48; David Stevenson., The First World War and International Politics.( Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 300; Smith, Turkey, pp. 28-29; Major-General Sir Charles Townshend., 
Great Britain and the Turks' Asia. 22 (December 1922), pp. 949-953.
3^. M. Kemal Ataturk., Speech. (Leipzig: Ucdal Pub. Co., 1929), p. 360.
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by which the Nationalists were finally able to check the Greek advance and force 
them to withdraw to the line of the Afyon-Eskisehir railway.
However, prior to the Sakarya battle the Nationalists had come to the 
conclusion that before they deployed their forces on the Greek front they needed to 
seek alliances and cultivate good relations with different countries: France and Italy 
in the West, Russia and the Muslims in the East. The Ankara government was fully 
aware that in order to protect its limited national interests against possible 
encroachments and maintain its independence and sovereignty against the Greeks it 
needed support, and that support seemed likely to be forthcoming from the French 
and Italians. The French, obsessed by the fear of Muslim troubles in their North 
African colonies and resentful of the British control of the Straits and British 
hegemony throughout the Middle East, and the Italians, dissatisfied with their gains 
from the treaty, were both prepared to have the S&vres treaty modified. They were 
also quick to realise that a strong power was emerging in Anatolia and that in the 
changed circumstances following the First World War, they would not have the 
means to impose an imperialist policy on T u rk e y A l o n g  with the help of military 
victory, the enhanced prestige of the Turkish armies and awareness of their 
counterparts, the Nationalist Foreign Minister Bekir Sami was able to secure a 
diplomatic success by coming to a preliminary agreement with the French and 
Italians securing an immediate cessation of hostilities in return for the French 
evacuation of Cilicia, full recognition of Italian interests in Adalia in return for an 
immediate evacuation of Italian troops, and an Italian promise of diplomatic support 
at the forthcoming conference. The agreement of March 11, 1921 between Bekir
38 Stephen E. Evans., The Slow Rapprochement; Britain and Turkey in the Age of Kemal Ataturk 1919-
1938. (London: The Eathen Press, 1982), p. 64; Evans, United States Policy, pp. 351-355.
The General Staff was also of the opinion that 'except on matters where British interests are vitally 
concerned, there can now be little chance of imposing any conditions upon Turkey, with whom the terms 
of the new Treaty, unlike those of other treaties with the enemy, will probably now have to be 
negotiated1. F0371/7952/El 1359/10102/44 (2), October 1922, 'Memorandum by the General Staff on 
the Proposed New Treaty between the Allies and Turkey.'
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Sami and Briand, the French Premier, was followed by another agreement with 
Count Carlo Sforza, the Italian Foreign Minister, on March 12,1921.
Italy, far from being satisfied by the post-war settlement, accused Britain 
and France of having violated the pledges made to Italy in the Treaty of London of 
1915 and the St. Jean de Maurienne agreement of 1917, on the basis of which she 
had fought the war on the side of the Allies. The Tripartite Agreement, in which 
Britain pledged to Italy the guarantee of certain economic rights in Southern 
Anatolia, was not enough to prevent an Italo-Turkish collaboration. Benitto 
Mussolini seemed determined to a degree which might sacrifice Allied unity to get 
some kind of consolation prize for Italy’s contribution to the Allied cause during the 
War. In return for Turkey’s recognition of Italy's right of economic exploitation, the 
Italian government undertook to give effective support to the demands of Ankara 
with regard to the return to Turkey of Thrace and Izmir, and withdrew their troops 
earlier in June following their agreement with Ankara.^^
Turkey's attempts to create a friendly atmosphere in which it could 
confidently further its resistance movement were not only limited to its Western 
links. Probably the greatest asset of the Ankara government on foreign policy was 
the close accord which had been maintained with Russia.1^  Turkey's national 
independence war and the new Nationalist government was warmly welcomed by 
the Soviet Union, which regarded it as a victory for Turkey, as well as for 
t h e m s e l v e s . 4 1  As George V. Chicherin, Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign
39 Ataturk. Speech, pp. 498- 499; Sonyel. Turkish Diplomacy, pp. 101-105; Gotthard Jaeschke., 
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Affairs, saw it, 'in the struggle against foreign invasion and the creation of a 
national government by Mustafa Kemal the Soviet Republic served as a political and 
moral beacon in the life-and-death of these people.’^  Ankara felt the urge for and 
the necessity of closer links with the Bolsheviks and on March 16, 1921 signed a 
treaty of friendship which confirmed the official cordiality existing between the two 
countries. Despite its suspicion of Russian motives Turkey could not afford to allow 
its political 'accord' with Russia to disintegrate in the face of expected British 
opposition. The guiding spirits of both sides attached the utmost value to continued 
co-operation and desired to avoid anything in the nature of a rupture. The relations 
between Ankara and Moscow were at the time in the nature of a manage de 
converumce. The Russians realised that the unsettled state of affairs in the Near East 
was detrimental to Allied interests and was a source of anxiety to the Allies. It was 
in the interest of the Soviet government that hostilities in Anatolia should be 
prolonged. They were willing with this object to furnish arms, munitions, and 
money for, as frequently pronounced, 'the joint struggle against the Imperialism of 
the West'.43 On the other hand, the Ankara government, deprived of the possibility 
of procuring a steady supply of materials from Europe, had necessarily to turn to 
Russia. So long as Turkey had need of Soviet money and military equipment, the 
Russian alliance was the key stone of Ankara's foreign policy. Ankara, however 
continued to pursue a policy of great caution towards Russia. It never abandoned its 
liberty of action, and in its dealings with Russia friction was never wholly absent. 
Despite the currents of suspicion and lack of confidence, the official attitude overall 
continued to be amicable up until the Lausanne Conference, when Turkey steered 
itself clear from the results of over-close collaboration with Russia. The fact remains 
that in her diplomatic dealings Turkey, with a degree of success, oscillated between 
Russia and the West.
42 Ibid. No. 43.
F0371/7947/E4988/4988/44, Confidential 11940, Turkey Annual Report 1921.
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The Nationalists also managed to keep on cordial terms with the Muslim 
world, which could give at least moral or sometimes diversionary support against 
the other two worlds with which they dealt. During the 1919 War of Liberation, the 
Grand National Assembly's appeal for support seemed to be successful in 
upholding the Caliphate against the Christian world and encouraged the Nationalists 
to extend their efforts in the direction of establishing formal alliances with the 
Muslim world. The treaty of March 1, 1921 with Afghanistan^ was a clear 
manifestation of a desire to form an alliance 'against attacks by an Imperialistic 
power’. By this treaty the Turks recognised the independence of Afghanistan in 
return for Afghan recognition of the leadership of Turkey and each country 
undertook not to conclude any treaty or convention injurious to the interests of the 
other party. Though Mustafa Kemal never committed himself to any pan-Islamic 
cause, he realised that breaking ties with a potential ally could create difficulties at a 
critical juncture. He was well aware that the tremendous support he enjoyed from 
the Muslims of India during the liberation war had constituted a complementary if 
not a determining factor in his victory against the Great Powers. It was an element 
which he could not afford to ignore in his policy considerations.
The Ankara government, whose position was strengthened following its 
diplomatic and militaiy achievements, was now ready to deliver a major blow to the 
Allied ranks by concluding a decisive agreement with the French government. On 
October 20, 1921 Franklin- Bouillon, French Senator and the former President of 
the Foreign Affairs Commission in the Senate, and Yusuf Kemal, the Turkish
44 The relations of the Nationalists with Afghanistan were regulated by the Treaty of Alliance concluded 
between the representatives of the two countries at Moscow on March 1, 1921. The treaty was ratified by 
Ankara on July 21, 1921, but ratification by Afghanistan was delayed until October 1922. In the 
meantime, each country sent diplomatic representatives to the capital of the other and the friendship and 
solidarity of the two peoples were publicly proclaimed. But most important of all, in the treaty, the 
spiritual leadership of Turkey was recognised by a Muslim country which scored a real success for Ankara 
over the Istanbul government. F0371/7947/E4988/4988/44, Turkey. Annual Report, 1921; CON 
11940/426; FO371/9176/E10937/10937/44, Turkey. Annual Report, 1922; CON 12315/729; Vere- 
Hodee. Turkish Foreign Policy, pp. 30-31.
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Foreign Minister who replaced Bekir Sami, signed the Ankara a c c o r d , .45 also 
known as the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement. The accord was highly significant since 
it was the greatest Nationalist diplomatic victory to date. Not only did it signal the 
recognition of the de facto Ankara government by a Western Power, it was also the 
first open and public breach in the Allied front in the Near East. The breach was 
never repaired. Though the unity of the Allied Powers was repeatedly proclaimed 
and reaffirmed, it was never more than superficial, and constantly failed to stand the 
test when any strain was imposed on it.46
Turkey's hitherto successful efforts to establish closer links with its war­
time opponents failed, however, when it approached Britain in March 1922. Despite 
its constant assurances of a desire for an understanding with Britain, Turkey was 
unable to receive a positive response. Foreign Minister of the Ankara government, 
Yusuf Kemal, in an meeting with Curzon, explained that there was no 
incompatibility between the interests of Turkey and those of Britain and that Turkey 
asked no more than the fulfilment of the National Pact. Curzon, however, was not 
prepared to compromise and the negotiations proved inconclusive. Although 
Mustafa Kemal was convinced that there was little chance of coming to terms with 
Britain, he nevertheless decided to send yet another mission to London before he
4 N. tflug., 'Milli Mucadele'de Turk-Fransiz Munasebetleri' Havat Tarih Mecmuasi. 10 (1972), pp. 23- 
29; Sabahattin Selek., Anadolu Ihtilali. II (Istanbul, 1966), pp. 282-293; Yahya Akyuz., Turk Kurtulus 
Savasi ve Fransiz Kamuovu. 1919-1922. (Ankara; Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1988), pp. 278-285; Cumming, 
Franco-British Rivalry, p p . 141-142.
The British were alarmed at the friendship between the Turks and the French. Different voices from 
different parts of the Empire were united against the possible consequences of this agreement and the 
rising tide of anti-French feeling was reflected in their remarks. From the British army headquarters in 
Istanbul, General Harington wrote to Wilson that he was 'worried and angry about France making a 
separate agreement with Turkey'. The French do not seem to be playing straight with us in their dealings 
with the Kemalists' commented Haldane, who at the time was General Officer Commanding in Chief in 
Mesopotamia. Wilson was even more critical of the agreement and accused Lloyd George of not having 
the 'slightest intention of doing anything except backing the Greeks and losing India and Egypt.' 
Jefferv. The Wilson Letters. Nos. 188. 200, 224.
The controversy between England and France over the Franklin-Bouillon agreement originated from the 
fact that with this agreement France established economic and political influence over the new 
nationalist government. As Cumming rightly pointed out, the French, pursuing their own aims and 
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launched his counter-offensive on the Greek front. Led by Fethi Okyar, the Minister 
of the Interior, to London in August 1922 this mission was intended to continue 
from where Yusuf Kemal had left off. Mustafa Kemal expressed Fethi Okyar's 
objectives in the following lines:
'I have decided to launch soon the counter- offensive.
But my purpose is to prove to my own country and to the 
world that we still want peace, if it can be obtained on the 
terms of the National Pact. We know that the British will 
refuse such terms, but world opinion must be openly 
informed about our case. This is the sense of your London 
mission. Another objective is to gain time and deceive the 
English and the Greeks into thinking that we are still trying 
to reach agreement with them/47
Several attempts by Fethi Okyar to see Curzon ended in failure although he 
was seen by various Foreign Office officials, namely Ronald Lindsay and William 
Tyrell. After a short while the Nationalists became convinced that the mission was 
far from achieving its objective, that is the cessation of hostilities and conclusion of 
peace. The Ankara government was left with no choice but to adopt a military 
solution, and the counter-offensive began on August 26, 1922. Having established 
its position and struck a blow against the Eastern policies of the Allies, the Ankara 
government was now able to concentrate its efforts in the pursuit of two objectives: 
To expel the Greeks from Anatolia and to obtain the principles of the National Pact.
Greek Defeat: The Turning Point
The Greek occupation of Izmir in 1919 altered the course of Middle Eastern 
history and completely reversed the post-war situation in the Near East. It brought 
about war between the Greeks and the Turks, ended all hope of Allied co-operation
47 Osman Okyar., Turco-British Relations in the Inter-War Period: Fethi Okyar's Mission to London' 
Four Centuries of Tufco-Briiish Relations. Studies in Diplomatic. Economic and Cultural Affairs. 
(Beverley: Eothen, 1984), (e& by W. Hale and Ali I. Bagis) p. 71.
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in the Middle East, and contributed more than any other factor to the rise and the 
success of Mustafa Kemal and Turkish nationalism.^
The military resistance of Turkey, enabling Britain to conduct its partition 
plan, produced the collapse of the Greek army in Asia Minor in September 1922 and 
jeopardised the military position of the Allies in the Near East. The Turkish advance 
into Izmir and the neutral zone around the Straits led Britain to revise its policy. The 
Commander-in Chief in the Mediterranean was aware of the gravity of the situation. 
'It is urgently necessary that negotiations be opened with Turkish (? forces) in 
Smyrna,' he wrote in a secret telegram sent to the Admiralty on September 8, 1922. 
'But the Greek authorities are unwilling...This is the only chance in my opinion of 
preventing catastrophe in (? Sm yrna).^
But not everyone agreed about the actions to be taken. 'Kemalism would 
receive an enormous accession of prestige in Islamic countries,' wrote Andrew 
Ryan, political adviser in the British Embassy in Istanbul, on February 1922 in a 
memorandum. Therefore no stone should be left unturned to discourage the Greeks 
from evacuating Asia Minor precipitately, an appeal being made to the interest of the 
Christians in Asia Minor and their own interests in Thrace; and every effort should 
be made to accelerate a general settlement of which the eventual evacuation of Asia 
Minor would form part'.^O
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Ryan’s view however was not shared by the General Staff. The crisis 
appears to be approaching’ pointed out Earl of Derby, the Secretary of State for War 
in a memorandum of July 28, 1922. ’It is the opinion of the General Staff that, 
standing alone, the British troops have an impossible task if attacked either by the 
Greeks or Turks; the task is not much lightened even if the French and Italians give 
their whole-hearted support with their available troops on the spot’.^l He added that 
an ’assurance’ should be obtained from both the French and Italians that they would 
give to General Charles Harington their 'unqualified support' in any operations, 
whether against Greeks or Turks, that he might be compelled to undertake. Horace 
Rumbold, British High Commissioner in Istanbul, stated his opinion in a telegram 
to the War Office on September 14,1922, in which he asserted that this was the 
best moment to put forward proposals for a conference since such a conference 
would at least give them 'breathing s p a c e ' . ^ 2
While the crisis was approaching Britain found itself more and more 
isolated in its policy towards the Turkish Question. Britain was aware that the 
French were not the most reliable partners. W e cannot trust the French one inch in 
the present situation,' wrote Rumbold in a secret telegram to the War Office, 
expressing his concern.^ Highly accurate Intelligence Reports supported 
Rumbold's suspicion. 'In French circles generally, considerable satisfaction is 
expressed in regard to the Greek defeat' stated a report dated September 13, 1922 
'and there is a widespread conviction that this will lead to a collapse of British 
policy in the Near East, which, with the triumph of M. Poincar6 in the matter of 
Reparations^, will eventually lead to the fall of Lloyd George, and the general 
triumph of French policy throughout Europe'.^ It was also stated in the report that
5 *. W032/5659 No. 0145/1160, July 28, 1922, General Staff Report on the Situation in Anatolia.
52. W0106/1505 File No. 82, September 14, 1922, Rumbold to the War Office.
55. ibid.
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Kemalist representatives in Rome had received a communication from Ankara to the 
effect that the Nationalist Government had received from Colonel Mougin an 
assurance that 'France was prepared to supply the Kemalist army with any war 
material which might be required, however long the campaign against the Greeks 
might last'.
Another Secret Intelligence Report^ of September 12,1922 confirmed the 
suspicion of British officials about the French position. According to the report, 
Ankara delegates were assured by Briand, the former French premier, that 'France 
would prevent Constantinople (Istanbul) from falling into the hands of the British, 
or of the Greeks' whom he characterised as the "vassals of the British". Briand also 
stated that, 'should the Greeks attempt to march on Constantinople he would place 
the French troops in Syria at the disposal of the Turks'. In this connection, when 
Turkish official Fethi Bey inquired of the Quai d’Orsay officials as to the extent to 
which the Ankara government could count on the promise of the former premier, he 
received an assurance that 'France would abide by her word, whether seconded by 
Italy or not, and that she had no intention of compromising the strong position 
which she held towards the Moslem world, or of falling into the error, which she 
had committed in 1882, of allowing the British to acquire Egypt and the Canal, 
which would be repeated if Great Britain obtained a mastery over Constantinople or 
the Straits, either directly or through the Greeks.’
As far as the Italian attitude was concerned the situation, once again, 
seemed to be in favour of the Turks. 'Whole sentiment is enthusiastically pro- 
Turkish', wrote Sir Ronald Graham in a secret telegram sent to the Foreign Office 
on September 12. There was 'complete unanimity in demanding that the Italian 
government should dissociate itself from British policy which is stigmatised as 
refusal to face facts... The press', he continued, 'makes it clear that public opinion
W0106/1505 No. 862, September 12, 1922, SIS Report, Eastern Summary.
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might favour a diplomatic middle course but would scarcely tolerate Italian 
participation in active measures against Turkey'.^7 Graham himself was openly 
critical about the Greeks, calling them 'useless as guardians of the Straits', and 
sought an alternative answer to the Russian threat by suggesting that 'the Turks 
could be trusted to execute mandate faithfully and to put up defence against 
Bolshevik or any other kind of Russia,'^
It was clearly apparent that there was a diversity of views within British 
ruling circles as to the policy to be followed. The natural outcome of this diversity 
manifested itself in the interaction of the parties involved; relations between the war 
time allies, already strained by differences on Greek policy, continued to cool and 
came near to breaking point over the Chanak affair.
Chanak: Unwanted Crisis
When the final victory came with the recapture of Izmir, Mustafa Kemal's 
popularity with the army, and consequently the strength of his position in Ankara, 
was undeniably enhanced. Although the British Cabinet became concerned that any 
withdrawal in the face of Mustafa Kemal's troops would cause irreparable loss of 
prestige on the Allied side, this position was not supported by the French and 
Italians, so that no effective help was likely to be forthcoming from them.^9 All 
semblance of Allied unity disappeared on September 19th, when French troops, 
followed by the Italians, withdrew their detachments from Chanak and the Asiatic
5^ WO106/1505 Secret, September 12, 1922, Graham to the War Office.
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shore of the Bosphorus, thus leaving the British to face the Turks should they made 
the attempt to cross the demilitarised z o n e s . 6 0
Of the Allied Powers, Britain was now isolated in its Turkish policy and it 
was about to suffer the consequences at Chanak.61 Owing to premature publicity 
and failure to consult their governments in advance, the Dominions were also 
unenthusiastic and even uncooperative. After an exceptionally stormy scene in 
Paris, serious accusations were exchanged between Raymond Poincard, the French 
Prime Minister, and Curzon. 'I have never seen so deplorable or undignified a 
scene', wrote Curzon upon Poincare's behaviour 'behaving like a demented school 
master screaming at a guilty school boy .'62 in a letter to Crewe he would describe 
him as a man 'whose mind and nature were so essentially small, or whose temper 
was under such imperfect control'.63 pQr a few weeks Anglo-French relations 
reached a pitch of bitterness which resulted in the breakdown of their precarious 
unity. Nevertheless, the presence of a Greek army in Thrace, combined with British 
determination to mobilise the strength of the Empire, made possible the British stand 
at Chanak.
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The Chanak Crisis could be assessed as a means of testing each other's 
determination. The correspondence reveals that neither the British nor the Turks 
were willing to convert open hostilities into a war. Throughout the crisis Britain's 
aims were to preserve as much as possible of the Treaty of Sevres, to retain its 
freedom to use the Dardanelles and to maintain British prestige. For the British it 
was an operation carried out to save face. W e do not wish the position to arise of 
British troops alone being in Chanak and forced to evacuate, either after being called 
upon to do so by some public declaration on part of Kemal’ wrote the War Office in 
their secret telegram of September 11 to General Harington in Istanbul 'or after a 
military threat on his p a rt '.^  As early as the summer of 1922, General Charles 
Harington, the Commander-in Chief of British troops in Turkey, was already of the 
opinion that from the financial and military point of view it was not practical to be in 
occupation of Istanbul. In his letter of June 3 to General Cavan, Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, while questioning the role and usefulness of the Allied 
forces of occupation, he set forth some very powerful arguments in support of his 
wish to withdraw, which was heartily supported by Cavan. 'As a purely military 
position', he concluded 'we are too weak to enforce our will, and we are too strong 
merely to show the flag.'.^S
However, Prime Minister Lloyd George was inclined to think that any 
display of weakness to the matter would cause irreparable damage to British 
prestige. 'If we stated under no condition would you resist and Mustapha Kemal 
sees it, if you give that impression abroad, believe me, it is very bad', he declared 
on September 21. 'One chance of stopping the war', he added, 'is for Mustapha 
Kemal to know that we are not going to be turned out of the Straits. If he knows 
that he won't go there...If he believes that the nation is divided on the subject and 
that he is getting encouragement to go on, he will be very likely to pursue a warlike
64 WO106/1505 Secret, September 11,1922 , War Office to General Harington.
63. W032/5738 Hie No. 0152/6106, June 13, 1922, Cavan to Curzon.
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policy'.66 Upon Lord Charles Hardinge's proposal for the mutual evacuation by the 
British and Turks of the neutral zone, the Prime Minister was adamant that if they 
were to retire from Chanak Britain would be in a 'very weak position' and would 
have made a 'concession which would render it very difficult for the Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs to maintain the British position at the forthcoming
conference'.67
Since the Cabinet believed that Britain could achieve its aims only through 
the presence of force, it was willing to run the risk of war to do so despite the fact 
that it did not want war. Therefore it was not surprising to see the Cabinet decision 
on September 29 ordering General Harington that 'unless the Turks withdrew at 
once from the neutral zone around Chanak' all the forces at his disposal - naval, 
military, aerial - were to attack .68 The belligerent and uncompromising instructions 
of the Cabinet originated from the fear expressed by the Duke of Devonshire, the 
Secretary of State for Colonies, that 'there could be no greater blow to British 
prestige than the hurried evacuation of Chanak in face of Turkish t h r e a t s ' 6 9 .  
Moreover, it was precisely General Harington who requested authority to deliver 
such an ultimatum and the Cabinet came to believe that the Chanak would fall unless 
this were done. The Cabinet was convinced that the Turks were under severe 
pressure by the Russians to attack Chanak at once. There is absolute proof from 
usual secret sources that utmost pressure is being brought by Soviet representative 
at (?Angora) to induce M. Kemal to attack neutral zones ,Rumbold  informed the 
War Office in his telegram of September 28,1922.
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The Cabinet knew that they did not have much time to deliver the ultimatum 
which was believed to be the only option to prevent the Turks from advancing. 
Despite the fact that all indications (such as the disapproval of public opinion, the 
opposition of Indian Muslims, the question of Mosul, the lack of Allied unity) were 
against taking such a decision, it was insisted that the ultimatum should be 
delivered. In the General Staffs consideration Britain's position was a 'gigantic 
bluff. It was ready to take the risk since the Cabinet realised that British forces 
could not prevent Turkish ones from rapidly seizing Istanbul, Britain’s greatest 
diplomatic asset. Had Chanak fallen Britain would have lost men, prestige and the 
ability to use the Dardanelles. Britain's main interest at that time was the 
establishment and maintenance of the freedom of the Straits, and only to secure that 
object was she prepared to use force. 'If necessary Britain was prepared to fight', 
wrote Ferris, 'but its real aim was to show resolution so as to deter war and to force 
the Turkish nationalists to the negotiating table. This was the best possible policy 
and one which Bonar Law's government adopted’.^ 1
As for Turkey, it was a display of her military strength and of 
determination which Ankara believed would put it in a stronger position in the 
coming peace negotiations at Mudania and eventually at Lausanne. Mustafa Kemal 
felt very strongly the necessity to secure the peace immediately in order to be able to 
proceed with his projects for internal reconstruction which he had long been 
planning. It was an urgent question for him since he was facing severe criticism 
from the Grand National Assembly for stopping the advance of the victorious army 
at C h a n a k . 7 2  General Harington, with the calm confidence of a man who knew the
Ferris. The Evolution of British Strategic Policy, p.l 19.
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situation on the spot, was well aware of the fact that Mustafa Kemal did not want* 
to attack the British and believed that a conference with him would be advisable. 
The intentions of the Turks were understood to be conciliatory.^ Mustafa Kemal 
had already moved to remove the misunderstandings on September 13th by his letter 
to the British government asserting that Turkey was not at war with Britain; he later 
told General Maurice Pelle in Izmir that he wanted no more than the National Pact 
and wished to avoid conflict with the Allies. In his message to General Harington 
on September 28, he declared that he had issued orders to the commander at the 
front for his troops at Chanak to enter again the localities they were occupying, but 
that they were to avoid provoking any incident. 'In the event of your allowing the 
withdrawal of the forces at present on the Asiatic side, following the example of the 
French and Italian troops,' Mustafa Kemal continued, 'I am ready to give orders 
forthwith to our forces which are on the shores of the Straits to retire slightly and to 
content themselves with the re-establishment of a civil and police administration'.^
Mustafa Kemal's decision not to attack the neutral zone was not only 
limited to a desire for an immediate peace. The reluctance of the Soviets to be 
involved directly in the conflict on the side of the Turks also played a significant 
role. Shortly after the launching of the Turkish offensive Ankara had sent an urgent 
communication to Moscow on the subject of Russian intervention. However, it 
failed to invoke active Soviet assistance in the matter. The absence of definite 
promises of Russian military assistance was primarily due to a distrust of Turkish 
motives, with regard to the relations between Ankara and Paris, and with regard to 
pan-Turkish or pan-Islamic schemes detrimental to Russian interests.Secondly, it
M. Kemal. whose desire for peace was absolutely sincere." W0106/1506, October 1, 1922 Secret, 
Hardinge to the War Office.
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was due to differences of opinion among Soviet leaders and fear that active Russian 
intervention would nullify the effects of Soviet endeavours to obtain recognition 
from the Western Powers by diplomatic means.^The question will remain open to 
speculation as to whether the outcome would have been different in the event of a 
favourable reply had been received.
In the meantime, Rumbold and Harington, with this assurance that no 
offensive was likely to be forthcoming from the Turks, held back the ultimatum and 
proceeded with their own negotiations with them and were assured that the Ankara 
government intended to reply to the Paris note of September 23 76 (inviting the 
Turks to a conference on the affairs of the Near East) within a few days. But to 
induce Mustafa Kemal to accept, a sop had to be provided: the three Allied 
governments declared that they were prepared to admit the restoration of Thrace, as 
far as the Maritza (Meric) river, and Adrianople (Edime) to Turkey, provided that 
during the peace negotiations the Turks did not invade the neutral zones and on the 
understanding that, with a view to the maintenance of peace, certain zones in 
Turkish territory would be demilitarised in order effectively to assure the freedom of 
the Straits and the protection of the minorities. On October 1 the Turks agreed to 
meet the Allies at Mudania (Mudanya), a small port on the Sea of M a r m a r a . 7 7
The object of the conference was to bring the Greco-Turkish hostilities to 
an end and to fix a line behind which the Greek army in Thrace was to retire. 
Negotiations had not proceeded very far before it became apparent that there were 
very fundamental disagreements between the two sides on the question of Thrace.
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Turkey proceeded to demand that the whole of Eastern Thrace, including Karagatch 
(Karaagac), a suburb of Adrianople, should be handed over in full sovereignty to 
Turkey at once, without awaiting the decision of the Peace Conference, and should 
be evacuated by all the Allied commissions and contingents within thirty days. The 
Allied unity which was newly established by Curzon's second visit to Paris on 
October 6 undoubtedly served to defeat the Kemalists' demands for the immediate 
occupation of Istanbul and Eastern Thrace; however, Turkish sovereignty over 
Istanbul and the Straits, still in British hands, was recognised. Finally, after days of 
tension and threat of war, the crisis was over and on October 11, agreement was 
reached.
Later, in a despatch to the War Office General Harington expressed his 
’appreciation' of the way in which Ismet Pasha (Ismet Inonu), the Turkish General, 
had carried out the negotiations. Though reserved at first,' he added, 'from the 
moment his suspicions were removed our relations became quite friendly'.^ Thus 
the Mudania Conference, which opened on October 3, resulted in the Convention 
being signed on October 11, and coming into force at midnight on October 14. In 
addition to terminating the Turco-Greek war, the Mudania Convention laid down 
that the Greek troops should retire within a period of fifteen days behind the River 
Maritza, the right bank of which should be occupied by the Allied contingents so as 
to form a buffer until the final conclusion of peace. The Greeks were to be 
withdrawn from Eastern Thrace within a period of thirty days after the evacuation of 
the troops and their place was to be taken by the Turks. The Allies were to control 
the transfer of authority and ensure the maintenance of order. The conclusion of the 
Convention put an end to a situation full of dangerous possibilities and brought 
peace, if not the peace.
78. WQ32/5743 File No. 0152/6411, Harington to the War Office. October 20, 1923.
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These days of late September and early October were crucial ones for the 
peace of Europe. Britain’s position and intentions were based on the principle of 
Allied unity, appealing definitely for French support, since it was clear that no 
peaceful solution of the Eastern Question was possible unless England, France and 
Italy were in agreement. However, Curzon's visit to Paris to confer with Poincard 
and Count Sforza proved of little success. Poincard defended the French withdrawal 
from Chanak on the grounds that the French government had never been a party to 
French military action south of the Straits and that the French commander in 
Istanbul had acted "ultra vires". The position of the French government was that 
though the warning to Mustafa Kemal was serious, it was not an ultimatum, and 
that it was both ’a moral and physical impossibility for France to resist the Turks if 
they advanced, and that French public opinion would not admit of a shot being fired 
against Turks’. ^  However, despite the heated nature of the Franco-Italo-British 
conversations, some progress was made towards an accord and after discussions 
which lasted for several days and were at times acrimonious, Allied unity was 
patched up on the basis of a compromise. The Mudania conference, however, held 
in accordance with the Paris decision, found French and British policy still at cross 
purposes and the manifold problems involved were settled only with the greatest 
difficulty.^
British opinion was inclined to think that the presence of Franklin-Bouillon 
was to blame for the difficulty of the negotiations. The agreement strengthened the 
Ankara government politically, for not only had that government recovered the 
Province of Cilicia, but most importantly it had made a treaty with one of the 
principal Allied Powers. ’Franklin Bouillon's personal influence and intervention 
with Mustapha Kemal,’ stated Hardinge, British ambassador at Paris, in a private 
and secret telegram to the Foreign Office, 'have been prejudicial to British interests.
79, WO106/1503 Secret, Hardinge to the War Office, September 20, 1922.
80. Cumming. Franco-British Rivalry, p. 181.
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In his anxiety to be set up as a peace maker he has probably offered Turks more 
than Great Britain and perhaps even France is prepared to g i v e ' .81 In the words of 
George Glasgow, political correspondent for L'Europe Nouvelle, ’British 
uneasiness arose from the fact that nothing was known as to the status or 
instructions of Franklin B o u i l l o n ' . 8 2  That scene over Chanak had left its 
ineradicable memories, and the Entente Cordiale had become the Rupture Cordial,83 
It was thus in a state of mutual distrust and foreboding that France and Great Britain 
faced the opening of the long-deferred peace conference to settle their problems in 
the Near East 84 in the face of so many political uncertainties, it seemed obvious 
that Turkey could not declare victory and Britain could admit defeat once it was 
decided that a state of war did not exist between Britain and Turkey.
In terms of international relations the Chanak Crisis had two significant 
outcomes: First, it revealed how delicate and flimsy Allied unity was, and, second, 
being a contributory cause to the fall of Lloyd George, it raised hopes for a long- 
lasting peace in the Middle East The Chanak failure contributed to the fall of Lloyd 
George and led to the Mudania Convention of 11 October 1922, which in turn led to 
the Treaty of Lausanne.
The fall of Lloyd George and the break up of the coalition government 
were, in Mediicott’s words, 'the direct results of anxieties engendered or 
symbolised by the Chanak C r i s i s ’. ^  Four days after the Mudania Convention came 
into force, on October 19, Conservative MPs meeting at the Carlton Club decided 
to withdraw their support from Lloyd George's coalition. Bonar Law's letter to the
W0106/1506, September 25, 1922, Hardinge to the Foreign Office; Mss Eur FI 12/199. 200a, 
November 6, 1921, Hardinge to Curzon.
82, Msg, Eur. FI 12/199; 200b November 12,1922, Hardinge to Curzon.
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Allan Wingate, 1958), p. 49; Cumming, Franco-British Rivalry, pp. 141-161; For early war period, see: 
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85. Medlicott. British Foreign Policy, p.42.
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Times on October 6 was a reflection of his and his colleagues' profound anxiety 
about the government's foreign policy, which they thought highly perilous. It was 
by implication a warning that Bonar Law was not prepared to support a policy of 
intervention abroad on issues which had no direct connection with British interests. 
In other words, although he was ready to support the government for defying the 
Turks single-handedly at Chanak, he viewed with great doubt the wisdom of the 
policy which had made such action necessary .86 We cannot act as the policemen of 
the world,' he wrote in his letter 'the financial and social condition of this country 
makes that impossible’. ^
The Chanak crisis had confirmed them in their distrust of his policies and 
fear of his methods. Lord Curzon, his Foreign Secretary and his severest critic 
during the crisis, had already resigned over his 'irresponsible' speech delivered at 
Manchester, on October 14, during which the Prime Minister, to quote Ronaldshay 
was, 'in the highest spirit and the most bellicose mood'.88 The eve of a peace 
conference in which a victorious and self assertive Turkish government had to be 
coaxed to a reasonable settlement and to which the French must also be a party was 
an ill-chosen moment to denounce the barbarous excesses of the Turks and the 
perfidy of the French govemment.89 'On the evening of a conference at which I 
should probably be charged with the task of making peace with a victorious Turkish 
army and an exultant Turkish nation,' wrote Curzon, 'he [Lloyd George] based his 
entire defence of the recent action of H.M.G. upon the desire to save Constantinople 
and Thrace from the bloody shambles of a Turkish massacre. He openly flouted the 
Turkish people. He once again flouted the French.1^  Coming on top of many other
Robert Blake.. The Unknown Prime Minister - The Life and Times of Andrew Bonar Law 1858-1923 . 
(London: Eyre and Spottiswood, 1955), p.448; Lord Beaverbrook., The Decline and Fall of Llovd 
George. (London: Collins, 1963), pp. 200-226.
8T FD800/240 Ryan Papers; A. J. P. Taylor., English History. 1914-1945. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1965 ) p. 192.
88 Earl of Ronaldshay., The Life of Lord Curzon. Vol. Ill, (London: Ernest Benn, 1928), p314.
89 William Me Elwee.. Britain’s Locust Years. 1918-1940. (London, 1962 ), p. 80.
90. Leonard Mosley., Cnrzon. the End of an Epoch. (London: Longmans, Green 1960), p. 240.
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unpopular acts both at home and abroad, the crisis was too much for the 
Conservative Party and, unable to maintain his majority without Conservative 
support, Lloyd George resigned that same day, October 19.
To sum up, British miscalculations in their estimate of the respective 
strength of the Turks proved to be the first in a series of similar errors of judgement. 
British policy towards Turkey for four years after the Mudros Armistice, in 
Dockrill's words, 'contributed to a string of failures'll The unsuccessful Smyrna 
(Izmir) landing, the abortive Treaty of Sfevres, the ineffective mediation attempts 
between the Greeks and the Turks, and the crisis at Chanak were the main 
contributing elements to these failures. Anglo-Turkish relations between the 
Armistice of Mudros and the Armistice of Mudania were marked, to quote Evans, 
'by mutual distrust of each other's ultimate intentions'.^ But with the replacement 
of Lloyd George by Bonar Law the outlook seemed more promising than ever. The 
minimum of interference at home and of disturbance abroad'^ was Bonar Law's 
election manifesto. He promised to enter into a new period of 'peace and 
tranquillity'.
Well before the Lausanne Conference, it was clear that Lloyd George's 
successor, Bonar Law, intended to follow a different policy from that of his 
predecessor. By opposing Chanak he had shown his disapproval of Lloyd George's 
policy and all the indications showed that in the conduct of foreign affairs a policy 
of non-interference was to be followed. The election campaign was fought over 
Britain's over-stretched, over-burdened foreign commitments. With the fall of 
Lloyd George, philhellenism disappeared as an element in British policy, which was 
now much more Middle Eastern than European-centred. As Nicolson put it, Curzon
91. Dockrill and Goold. Peace Without Promise, p. 247.
92. Evans, The Slow Rapprochement, p. 63.
93. Blake. The Decline of Power, p. 103.
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was always ’a bad E u r o p e a n ' . ^  i n  contrast to Lloyd George, who had little 
knowledge of Asiatic problems, Bonar Law considered a drastic and decisive 
settlement with Turkey to be Britain's most urgent imperial necessity. Hence, the 
departure of Lloyd George meant that prospects of a new Anglo-Turkish friendship 
were considerably improved.
As for the Turkish Nationalists, by the Mudania Convention they had 
secured Eastern Thrace and forced the Allies to make important concessions and to 
treat with the Ankara government - a matter of vital importance to the Nationalists - 
as the real government of Turkey. The Convention also paved the way for a general 
peace conference at Lausanne at which questions of a most complex nature that 
concerned the primary interests of many nations would be negotiated. At the 
Mudania negotiations Turkey's object was to be in as strong a position as possible 
from the military point of view by the time the peace conference met. Its strategy 
was to drive a hard bargain on every question to be discussed and to drive the three 
allies into three different comers, so that it would seem that only their relative 
strength in European politics would be the final factor in the Near Eastern Question. 
However, the diversity of problems made it extremely hard for Turkey to balance its 
diplomacy between the conflicting desires of the hostile camps. The departure of the 
Greeks from Anatolia and Eastern Thrace and the disappearance of the Istanbul 
government united the whole of Turkey under the authority of the Ankara 
government. All opposition was for the moment disarmed. Thus Turkey set out at 
the negotiating table at Lausanne to realise the National Pact through diplomatic 
negotiations to which the military action at Chanak had put a temporary stop.
94 Harold Nicolson., Curzon. The Last Phase. 1919-1925. A Study on Post-War Diplomacy. (New York.
1974), p. 88.
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Ill
PRELUDE TO THE CONFERENCE
Reluctant Opponents: Britain and Turkey on the Eve of the 
Conference
Britain Seeks 'Tranquillity'
In the aftermath of the war, the British policy of establishing exclusive 
control in the former Ottoman territories depended on whether 'Britain could 
continue to dominate the region militarily and if the strength of Russia could be 
crippled and that of Turkey shattered'. 1 None of these conditions proved possible. 
The economic effects of the Great War eroded the very foundation of British 
military strength, Soviet Russia became a major threat to British interests, and the 
Turkish nationalist revival in Anatolia resulted in the collapse of the entire Sevres 
settlement. Trends like the rising nationalism in its colonies and unexpected 
developments like United States isolationism^ contributed greatly to existing 
difficulties. After the failure of the peace conferences Britain's nightmares about 
Europe suddenly seemed to be nearing reality. The United States' withdrawal from 
European involvement, a power vacuum in Eastern Europe, the alienation of 
Germany and Russia and - for a very short period of time - the domination of 
Europe by France were the main contributing elements to this a n x i e t y .3
f  Ferris.. The Evolution of British Strategic Policy, p. 102.
2. David Dimbleby and David Reynolds.. An Ocean Apart: The Relationship between Britain and America 
in the Twentieth Century. (London: BBC Books, 1988), pp. 57-73.
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43
The period under consideration was one of the less stable in British 
political history. In less than two years Britain witnessed three general elections,4 
and the Irish question dominated British politics ^ The post-war economic boom 
was short-lived, and in the 1920s the economic situation, presenting the constant 
threat of depression and mass unemployment, turned into a grave political 
constraint. This, to quote Beaverbrook, ’severe and disastrous industrial depression 
with widespread unemployment on a scale unprecedented'^ was only a part of the 
problem faced by Britain. In addition, the cost of continued global Great Power 
status provided constant difficulties for the different British governments.^ Britain 
became conscious that the Empire was overextended and it lacked the resources to 
defend it. Its armed services were 'too weak to support its foreign policy' yet 'too 
expensive to suit its financial one'.^ The co-ordination of the diplomatic, military 
and financial elements of British strength in order to support its aim as a great power 
proved to be a difficult task. As Hayes aptly put it, the British policy in the period
Dictators. A Survey of Post-War British Policy. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1938), pp. 82-
84.
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Transition. The Twentieth Century. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), pp. 177-186.
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under consideration was ’pragmatic in concept if unrealistic in execution, being an 
attempt to match the commitments of 1919 to the facts of the post-war world'.  ^
Britain's failure to balance its aims and means made it extremely difficult to further 
its foreign policy; by 1920 its military capacity in the Near East had declined, while 
the power of the Nationalists had risen.
Since political survival depended on national economy measures, military 
spending was among the first expenditures to be cut, leaving Britain limited in her 
options. In other words, due to war-weariness and economic weakness domestic 
affairs took precedence over Imperial matters. The immediate and substantial 
scaling-down of Britain's global responsibilities was a priority for the Empire's 
rulers. In Bartlett's words 'strained resources as well as the gradual triumph of 
common sense ensured that the policy of war imperialism did not long outlive the 
war. There was neither the money, nor the men, perhaps not even the will for 
Britain militarily to underwrite either Curzon's grandiose plans for a pax-Britannica 
in the Middle East*', wrote Jeffery realistically, 'or Lloyd George's misconceived 
confidence in the Greek ability to act as a counterpoise to a resurgent Turkey', H 
The War Office was well aware of the difficulties of the country’s military situation. 
As far as the Near Eastern problem was concerned Britain had two options: 'to 
make friends with Turks’ or 'to use the big stick. We can't use the big stick, even if
Hayes, The Twentieth Century, p. 212.
10. Bartlett. British Foreign Policy, p. 31.
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we wanted to do so, as we have not got the troops available, so we must tiy and 
make f r i e n d s ’. 1 2  All indications pointed in one direction: Reducing British 
commitments as quickly as possible in order to satisfy the domestic demand for 
economy, and in doing so 'running risks' or ’piling up commitments’, was the last 
thing Britain needed.^
The Reparation issue - a practice of requiring compensation for war 
damage - was another concern for Britain which caused friction between Britain and 
France, and gained momentum with Germany’s announcement in July 1922 that it 
could not meet its obligations which had been revised and scaled down at Cannes. 
In view of the breach with France, Bonar Law was 'most anxious that Curzon 
should not commit the government to an armed conflict with Turkey, in which 
Britain might be completely isolated’. ^  This would also be a big blow to Law's 
policy of ’tranquillity’.
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The inter-Allied debts, or more particularly the problem of the British debt 
to America, was another dimension of the economic difficulties that Britain had been 
experiencing. It was a further complication in Anglo-American relations and just as 
Reparations had destroyed Anglo-French collaboration this question was to bedevil 
relations with the United S t a t e s .  16 The United States was not interested in 
Reparations but was interested in repayment of the loans it had made to its Allies. 
While the United States took the view that there was no connection between the 
Allied debts and those of Germany, the Allies insisted that the two obligations were 
related and their ability to repay their American debts was dependent upon their 
collection of reparations from Germany. The tension which resulted from the 
Americans' claims for settlement of the war debts to them, irrespective of debt 
settlement to Britain by France, Italy or Russia, was compounded when it became 
clear that Britain and the United States were unlikely to reach an agreement in the 
short term. Bonar Law was convinced that the debt settlement without 
corresponding payment by Europe of its debts to Britain would produce grave 
consequences for the British economy. But despite his serious attempts to tackle the 
problem, the settlement of the issue was left to his successor Baldwin.
Among the reasons why Britain found peace with Turkey desirable was the 
Muslim factor. The British Empire included a vast population of Muslim 
inhabitants, which made itself felt as an important policy consideration. As early as 
1919 Montagu, a stern opponent of Lloyd George's pro-Greek policy, strongly 
argued that the Indian Muslims were an important factor which Britain had to take 
into account. He was concerned that the government's policy could cause unrest 
among the Muslims of India, who were concerned for their 'brothers' in Turkey. It 
was well known that Turkey, during the War of Liberation, had enjoyed the
16 For more information on the Inter-Allied Debts, see: Orde, British Policy, dp . 77-96; Anthony 
Haigh., Congress of Vienna to Common Market. British Foreign Policy 1815-1972. (London, 1973), 
pp. 89-94.
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admiration and support of the Indian Muslims, who believed that Turkey was 
successful in upholding the Caliphate against the Christian world. Throughout the 
Greco-Turkish crisis the Muslims of India followed events very closely and 
expressed their anxiety about British policy. The defeat of the Greeks seriously 
damaged British prestige, which had already been much diminished in Eastern 
countries in consequence of the harsh terms imposed on Muslim Turkey by the 
Treaty of Sevres and of British partiality for Greece since the Armistice. The 
Viceroy, in a secret telegram of September 1922 to the Secretary of State for India, 
expressed his fear of possible ’violent repercussions throughout the Islamic world* 
regarding the state of feeling in India due to the critical situation in the Near East and 
emphasised the necessity of establishing friendly relations with the Nationalist 
government. ’From India’s standpoint’, added the Viceroy, ’the essential thing is 
the restoration of the old cordial relations between Great Britain and Turkey'. ^
The General Staff also considered that Britain had much to gain from a 
friendly Turkey, since the loyalty of her Muslim subjects was very much dependent 
on the way she treated Turkey. In a memorandum of 1922, General Townshend 
was to direct attentions to the 'Mohamedan menace to England’ and suggest a 
moderate approach towards Mustafa Kemal, who, he wrote, had been ’refrained 
[sic] from attacking England by means of this great weapon of Islam*. He also 
stated that Mustafa Kemal was no longer inclined to follow the same line and was 
quite prepared to use this weapon if he failed to get peace. ^  Thus it was probable 
that a peace with Turkey which would improve Britain’s relations with it would go 
far in diminishing British anxieties as to the military situation in India and in the
1 IRO L/PS/11/211, April 5, 1922, Secretary of Bihar Jameatulama to the Registrar; IRO L/PS/11/211; 
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Near East generally. The Muslim factor played an important role and Britain could 
not afford to ignore it in its diplomatic dealings with the Ankara government.
Public opinion was another major consideration that the Conservative 
Government had to take into account in the formulation of its Near Eastern policy. 
Bonar Law himself, as a believer in peace, was convinced that British public 
opinion was opposed to a renewal of the war. He represented the great majority of 
the population who sincerely believed that what Britain needed was ’peace and 
tranquillity’ as opposed to a renewal of hostilities. The nation wants peace so 
badly,' wrote Nevile Henderson, Acting High Commissioner in Istanbul, in a 
private letter to Rumbold, 'that neither it nor Bonar Law want to take even the slight 
risk of war which the preparation for war would entail\20 'There was much 
opposition in the country and no enthusiasm for any ventures abroad in the House 
of Commons, Press or Army', 21 wrote Lord Beaverbrook, echoing Henderson's 
view.
Apart from the widespread desire for peace, the public remained convinced 
that the cost and consequences of a war would be undesirable, even if the nation 
were victorious. As Bartlett emphasised in his analysis of twentieth-century British 
foreign policy, Britain, preoccupied by the rising expectations of large sections of 
the population, as well as by die grievances of the unemployed and poor, preferred 
not to encumber itself with an expensive foreign policy. 'Fears of serious unrest at 
home and of an electoral backlash if popular expectations were not fulfilled were a 
major influence on ministerial thinking in these years'.22 At a time when the 
discontent of public opinion was at its height, Britain, given her past experience and
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Britain 1914-1945. The Defining of Faith. (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 62-86; Kennedy, The 
Realities Behind Diplomacy, pp. 240-243; DBFP, No. 329.
22. Bartlett, British Foreign Policy, pp. 33-34.
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her current circumstances, was not left with much choice but to follow the current 
tendency and endeavour to reduce the cause of friction.
Given the considerations stated above it was imperative for British interests 
in general that the Lausanne Conference should come to a successful end. Britain 
could hardly afford a major military adventure in the Middle East, in view both of 
domestic difficulties and the international situation. Therefore diplomacy became the 
only means of reaching a settlement as far as Britain was concerned. Curzon was 
obliged to find a peaceful solution to the Turkish question rather than risk a new war 
with incalculable consequences for Britain.
British Objectives Require a United Allied Front
The need for an Allied front at Lausanne had been recognised by Britain 
soon after the Turkish victories over the Greeks. Britain could not afford any 
serious disagreement between the principal Allies at the Conference. Believing that it 
was necessary to restore Allied unity to make the Turks accept Allied terms, Curzon 
suggested a preliminary meeting between Poincare, Mussolini and himself in order 
to formulate a concerted p o l i c y .23 Curzon was well aware of the fact that he had to 
be very careful in his French policy and steer a middle course, though with the 
utmost reluctance. The success of his policy depended very much on the support of 
the French. ’Our sole chance of success in the exceedingly difficult situation which 
confronts us in the Near East', he stated in September 1922, ’appears to lie in our 
keeping France in line, and in my being able to come to some sort of agreement with 
Mr P o i n c a r e ' . 24 He had already set out the essential points in a memorandum 
mainly based on the March and September p r o p o s a l s ,25 and he made it clear to
23. For Curzon's argument see; FO. 839/4 No. 37; November 20, 1922, Curzon to the Foreign Office, 
FO. 424/255; CON 12330/195, October 14, 1922, Curzon to Hardinge.
24. CAB24/138, CP 4194, September 17, 1922, Memorandum. ’Conference on Inter-Allied Debt 
Reparation1.
25. F 0371 /9079/E5519/1 /44, May 29, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 570; 
F0371/7892/E9735/27/44, September 22, 1922, 'British Secretary’s note of a Conference between the
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Poincar€ that unless an agreement was reached and maintained on these points he 
would not be at the conference.^ Having realised that Curzon would not come to 
the conference at all unless the French government agreed to show a common front 
on all the main issues, Poincare at length accepted in principle the memorandum 
setting forth the points on which British government considered a prior agreement to 
be essential, and gave an assurance that complete accord would be preserved in 
resisting any impossible Turkish claims. When Curzon met Poincar£ on November 
18th, the French had already agreed to Britain's position on the demilitarisation of 
the Straits, the Syria-Iraq frontiers, Western Thrace, and the occupation of 
Constantinople until the treaty was ratified. In a general way the French also agreed 
on indemnity and other financial clauses, including the confirmation of pre-war 
concessions.
Hardinge informed the War Office that Poincare contemplated the 
conference with 'the utmost apprehension'. In his view, it was absolutely essential 
for the British government to preserve a united front on all questions that might 
arise, owing to the demands and attitude of the Turks, which had become quite 
'insupportable'.^ Although Poincare seemed willing to give his support officially, 
British political circles were sceptical about the credibility of such support outside 
the conference. In a private letter to Eyre Crowe, Permanent Under-Secretary of 
State, on November 20, Hardinge stated that although the French would give their 
support to the British in the conference, Poincar£ would fight 'tooth and nail’ with 
them outside the c o n f e r e n c e . ^  The British were convinced that the outcome of the 
Reparation Conference was very much linked to the support which the French 
would provide for Britain. Only after the discussions in Paris did the signs of
French President of the Council and the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, held at the Quai 
d'Orsay, 11 am. Wednesday, September 20, 1922'; DBFP, XVIII, No. 41.
26 Sonvel. Turkish Diplomacy, pp. 189-190; also see Nicolson. Curzon. pp. 314-315.
2T WO106/1444, No. 1127, November 5, 1922, Hardinge to the War Office,
28. F0800/386, Rus/22/5, Private letter, November 20, 1922, Hardinge to Crowe.
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strains that overshadowed the Anglo-French alliance disappear and soon after a 
communique was published confirming the agreement on all matters to be discussed 
in the Conference.
After his meeting with Mussolini at Terriet on November 19th and 20 th^  
Curzon was convinced that Mussolini was strongly in favour of the Entente on the 
basis of equal rights, but his support clearly depended on what the Italians could get 
as a substitution for the Tripartite Agreement of 1920. Mussolini strongly felt that 
the Italians had been, ’put off with vague promises in the past' while her allies had 
acquired valuable territories which were a source of 'wealth and power' to them, 
and now the time had come to put these vague promises into action,^ According to 
Curzon, Italy, having practically lost the Tripartite Agreement, and being unlikely to 
retain the greater part of the Dodecanese, had nothing to show to the world as the 
Eastern reward of her victory in the war. In his view, Mussolini knew 'next to 
nothing of the subjects' or was 'startlingly ignorant of external affairs'. Curzon's 
general impression was that the Italians would not 'give much trouble provided that 
they (could) get some advantage which they (could) parade to their countrymen.^ 1 
These advantages were to be the Dodecanese Islands and the economic concessions.
Britain also recognised that a solid front against Turkey required American 
co-operation. The United States’ interest in economic matters and its determination 
to protect American interests through its 'Open Door' policy32 caused mixed
29 On Terriet Curzon had sent a message to Poincarl stating that Mussolini wished to avoid Lausanne 
because he had been put out of the city by the police on his last visit. Nicolson., Curzon. p. 288-89; 
Grew. Turbulent Era, p. 487 .
30. F0839/14, No. 36, FO371/7915/E13063/27/44, November 22, 1922, Curzon to Crowe; F0839/32 
No. 312; Curzon Papers, Mss Eur 112/285, No. 13; DBFP, XVIII, No. 213.
31. F0839/4; F0424/255; F0371/7916/E13333/27/44, CON12330/671, November 27, 1922
'Memorandum by Sir Eyre Crowe1; Curzon Papers, Mss Eur FI 12/285, No. 13, November 21, 1922, 
Curzon to the Foreign Office.
3 2. Shortly after the conference commenced on November 25, Child, American Chief Delegate felt the 
need to clarify to the Conference 'Open Door' policy. The United States,' he pointed out, 'has no desire to 
take any action which might embarrass the Allied Powers in the proper effort to secure peace. It desires 
nothing which need conflict with the interests of other countries, if the principle of commercial 
opportunity for all nations is recognised at the outset. The United States has no intention of seeking for
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feelings in British circles. 'A complete understanding with the United States on the 
Near East would strengthen our hands immensely in dealing with exaggerated 
pretensions from Angora as well as with French and Italian jealousies’, wrote 
Alexander Waugh, British Consul-General in Istanbul, in a memorandum of 1922. 
’But in order to succeed the negotiations must be frank, open and kept from 
commercial and financial intrigues’. ^  Rumbold however, was sceptical about 
securing American co-operation. Referring to Waugh’s memorandum in a 
confidential letter to Oliphant he pointed out 'Americans will not readily - even for a 
time - adopt a self-denying ordinance, by which I mean, refrain from seeking 
commercial advantages until, at any rate, peace has been reached with Turkey'.34 
Britain tried to avoid provoking the United states needlessly, but not at the price of 
compromising British interests. After a final conversation with Poincare and 
Mussolini which took place in Curzon's room on November 20, 1922,35 Curzon, 
who tried very hard to remove the existing differences and find a common ground, 
was eventually successful in aligning the interests of Britain, France and Italy, at 
least at the start of the negotiations.
In order to secure vital British interests in the Turkish peace settlement 
there had to be a new modus vivendi among the Allies. Curzon was convinced that 
Britain could only use its advantageous position as long as Allied unity remained 
intact. Once he secured the united front he moved on to define the objects of the 
British stance at Lausanne in two categories.
itself or its nationals a position of special privilege but it desires to protect its rights and to assure the 
Open Door'. FRUS, (1923) II, No. 19; Grew, Turbulent Era, pp. 481-485.
33. F0800/253 Tue/22/8, January 25, 1922, Rumbold to the Foreign Office, Oliphant Papers.
34. Ibid.
35. F0839/4, November 21, 1922, Curzon to the Foreign Office; DBFP, XVIII, No. 193, 204; Leeper 
Papers, LEEP 1/5, November 20, 1922 (Allen Leeper's Diary); Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, pp. 362-363; 
Nicolson. Curzon .p.288 ; Alan Cassels.. Mussolini's Early Diplomacy. (Princeton. 1970). pp. 21-23; 
C. J. Lowe., & F. Marzari., Italian Foreign Policy. 1870-1940. (London, 1975), pp. 185-188.
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"CATEGORYA. (ESSENTIAL)
1. Western Thrace. Adherence to the understanding 
arrived at the March discussions that the position in 
Western Thrace shall not be altered and that the Turkish 
demands for a plebiscite shall be refused.
2. Frontier of Western Thrace to be the frontier ceded by 
Turkey to Bulgaria under the Turco-Bulgarian Treaty of 
September 1915. (This agreement may be subject to 
possible creation of a neutral zone to provide railway access 
for Bulgaria to the Aegean.)
3. Freedom of the Straits. This principle is accepted by 
all the Allies (Note of September 23rd). The actual manner 
in which it is to be applied remains for discussion. The 
Allied Governments should maintain a firm accord as to the 
demilitarisation of certain zones on the Dardanelles, 
Marmora and Bosphorus, and as to the inspection of these 
areas under conditions to be determined.
4. Capitulations. Adherence to the March resolutions 
with certain modifications which His Majesty’s 
Government will be prepared to suggest to their allies.
5. The Islands in the Aegean. To be ceded by Turkey to 
the allies to be disposed of in the manner agreed to by the 
latter.
6 . Frontiers of Syria and Iraq. To be maintained except 
in so far as the Mandatory Powers may be disposed to 
consider or to propose local rectification.
7. Mandated Territories in Syria, Iraq and Palestine. No 
change to be admitted.
8 . Allied Graves. The Allies to insist upon a transfer of 
the ownership of the soil to them.
9. Indemnities. A Turkish indemnity to be demanded as 
proposed in the March resolutions. The exact figure to be 
determined by agreement between the allies. The Turkish 
demand for an indemnity from Greece to be refused.
10. The Mudania Convention. To be strictly enforced 
and all Turkish violations of it to be firmly resisted.
11. Constantinople position. No withdrawal of Allied 
troops, until ratification of the New Treaty of Turkey 
(September note).
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CATEGORY B (MOST DESIRABLES
1. Protection of Minorities. As regards Minorities in 
Asia adherence so far as is still possible to resolutions of 
March, and as regards Minorities in Europe strict adherence 
to terms of September agreement.
2. Turkish Military Forces. General adherence to terms 
of March resolutions. If a relaxation of these is conceded, 
this should not apply to the Turkish army in Europe which 
should be strictly limited in numbers.
3. Financial Clauses. These should remain for 
discussion between the Allied experts.
4. Economic Clauses. Insistence upon recognition by 
Turkish Government of Allied pre-war concessions, and 
annulment of Turkish repudiation contracts since the 
Armistice. The methods to be discussed by the Allied 
experts. "36
Britain's aims were far from compatible with those of Turkey. On 
November 1,1922 Curzon explained to the Cabinet that the Sevres issues would be 
the first to be considered, followed by a wider discussion of the Straits.^ 
Economic and financial clauses, along with the limitation of Turkish military 
sources and the protection of minorities, represented the 'most desirable' objectives. 
Among those objectives, Ottoman debts, the Capitulations and concessions were the 
issues in which the French seemed most interested, while the Italians concentrated 
mainly on the Dodecanese Islands, Capitulations and Cabotage. In short, Curzon, 
while trying to maintain Allied unity, aimed to restore British prestige in the East 
and in particular to ensure the freedom of the Straits, win Mosul for Iraq, which 
was under the British Mandate, and drive a wedge between Angora and Moscow.38 
In order to achieve these objectives, Britain, fearing an immediate direct threat and
36. CAB23/32, November 14, 1922, Curzon to Hardinge, Appendix I; F0371/7913/E12653/27/44, 
November 14, 1922, Curzon to Hardinge; F0371/7913/E12653/27/44, November 14, 1922, Curzon to 
Graham; DBFP , XVIII, No. 192, 193.
37. CAB23/32 Annex IV.
3®. Dockrill and Goold, Peace Without Promise, p.237; Nicolson, Curzon. p. 282.
55
involvement in the wars of others, followed a deterrence strategy so as ’to keep 
what it held’.39
However, the General Staff had a different approach towards the Turkish 
question. Shortly before the Lausanne Conference started, a secret memorandum on 
the forthcoming conference revealed the General Staffs view on the recent 
developments in Turkey. It stated that due to the creation of a national spirit in 
Turkey the situation in the Near East had fundamentally changed since the Treaty of 
Sevres, as shown in the recent successes of the Turkish army. These developments 
showed that Britain could no longer treat Turkey as a conquered nation to which it 
was possible to dictate any terms it wished. The General Staff expressed the opinion 
that a strong Turkey was not necessarily a danger to the British Empire. The 
memorandum stressed that the Turks could attack no vital points in the British 
Empire (neither Iraq nor Palestine could be considered as such): Therefore ’so long 
as our relations with them are friendly, it is to the advantage of Her Majesty's 
Government to strengthen them, in a military sense, rather than the reverse. 
Fate...had located them in one of the most coveted areas in the world and if we are 
to have peace in the Near East, they must be strong enough to defend it'.^O
Despite the different approaches of the General Staff and the Foreign Office 
to the Turkish problem, the British policy which had traditionally been 
'inductive, intuitive and quite deliberately opportunist’l l  remained the same in 
essence and had yet to face one of its major challenges in the case of the Turkish 
Settlement’. The Turks are not just in the same position that they were when the 
Treaty of Sevres was drawn up,' wrote Joseph Grew, the American observer at the 
Conference, 'they are coming, not hat in hand, but with a victorious army behind
Ferris. The Evolution of British Strategic policy, p. 183: Earl Ronaldshav The Life of Lord Curzon. 
{London, 1928). Ill p. 225.
40 WO33/1016, October 19, 1922, Memorandum by the General Staff on the Proposed New Treaty 
between the Allies and Turkey.
41. Ferris, The Evolution of British Strategic Policy, p. 43.
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them. That makes a lot of difference.’ 42 The question was how long and to what 
extent Britain could keep its Allies in line without seeing them make separate 
agreements with Turkey. Thus at the outset of the Conference Curzon felt the 
necessity of providing compensation for the Allies, i.e. diplomatic support for 
France in the reparation question, economic gains for Italy in the former Ottoman 
territories, and acknowledgement of the United States' ’open door' policy which, in 
reality, meant American entiy into the Middle East. Therefore it would not be wrong 
to say that the main strength of Britain on the eve of the Conference was clearly 
based on its diplomatic position vis-a-vis its Allies and the ability to maintain its 
position by fulfilling its promises. Most of the time Curzon was successful in 
maintaining 'the facade of Allied unity', which, if not genuine, was crucial to the 
success of the Conference 43
Turkey Seeks Peace and Stability
Turkey had reversed the course of events by defeating the Greek forces 
backed by the Allies, especially Britain, and practically secured a stronger position 
by being victorious. Of the nations defeated in 1918, only Turkey had been able 
within a few years to achieve such a result. However, Turkey was about to come to 
the end of its resources and had its own difficulties. During the last ten years Turkey 
had been involved in four major wars: The Italian War of 1911-2, the Balkan Wars 
of 1912-13, the Great War of 1914-1918 and the Greco-Turkish War of 1919- 
1922. Due to war-weariness, the economic resources of the country were stretched 
to the limit; prolonged mobilisation of the Army and military operations which had
42 Grew. Turbulent Era, p. 486.
43. Nicolson. Curzon pp. 290-293: F0371/7915/E13149/27/44, November 19, 1922, Meeting of the 
Allies at Terriet, DBFP. XVIII No. 206; F0839/32; F0371/7965/E13737/13003/44, November 29, 
1922, Curzon to the Foreign Office.
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begun in the spring of 1921 and continued until the Mudania Armistice proved 
costly. The need for economic reconstruction and development was paramount. 44
Moreover Turkey was held responsible for the debts of the decaying 
Ottoman Empire, which had been in a state of permanent insolvency, and had had to 
be supported by continual loans from European governments interested in Ottoman 
survival. 45 The Turkish aim at the Conference was to establish a long- term plan 
for the liquidation of the enormous debt in such a way that the economic life of the 
new state would not be crippled in the process. Therefore, the Lausanne Conference 
provided a good opportunity for a new start, a modem Turkey. For this purpose 
Turkey desperately needed the financial help of the Allies in general and the British 
in particular. Despite all its success, Turkey could hardly stand alone and the 
tendency towards Britain was stimulated by the belief that Britain was the country 
most capable of being useful to Turkey in an economic recoveiy. Within this context 
Turkey needed western capital and investment and desired amicable terms with the 
Allies. The Lausanne Conference would be a failure if it only served further to 
widen the breach between Turkey and the Western Powers. Turkey's need for 
economic recovery was to play a great role in the determination of Turkish policy at 
Lausanne.
For Turkey, the peace conference was purely and simply a continuation of 
the war of independence, which was now to be waged on the diplomatic front until
4 4  The British ,who were well aware of this, would exploit this Turkish weakness to the very end. 
During the negotiations Curzon did not hesitate to use the economic aid as a threat against Turkey and on 
several occasions emphasised the connection between the signature of the treaty - unequivocally on 
British terms - and financial aid. 'Ismet knows' he wrote in February 1923, once the treaty has been 
signed the help of England will be given.' (DBFP, XVIII, No. 380, February 9, 1923, Curzon to 
Henderson; F0371/7965/E13599/13003/44; FO371/9134/E1303/217/44) In the face of American 
offers to help to bring the Turks into line Curzon had no doubt what course had to be followed. The best 
assistance that US government can offer is to follow the sound line taken by Mr. Child more than once in 
my presence with the Turks, namely to tell them that unless and until they signed the treaty American 
sympathy is arrested and American aid will not be forthcoming.' (DBFP, XVIII, No. 379, February 9, 
1923, Curzon to Geddes; FRUS, 1923, No. 327 pp. 951-953; F0839/17 Nos. 1057, 1058; Curzon 
Papers, Mss Eur FI 12/285.)
4~*. Vere-Hodge, Turkish Foreign Policy, p. 44; N. Bilal Simsir.. British Documents on Ataturk (1919- 
19381 (Vols. I, II, II, IV, Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1975).
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the National Pact was fully recognised by the Allies. Turkish diplomacy rested, of 
course, on the military successes which allowed bargaining from a position of 
comparative strength. Making good use of fragile Allied solidarity and of 
antagonism between Russia and the West were the options waiting to be used. But 
above all what Turkey needed was stability and peace, as Mustafa Kemal later put it, 
'at home and abroad’.4^ It did not need further territorial gains beyond the National 
Pact, but to recover from the disastrous consequences of many years of war. A 
great incentive to united resistance and endurance had disappeared when the Greeks 
were driven out of Izmir. Friendship with the Soviet Union had hitherto been a 
valuable asset in Turkish policy, but it now needed to be reconsidered in accordance 
with more pressing policy requirements.
Besides the economic difficulties, on the eve of the Lausanne Conference 
the political situation at Ankara was not altogether stable and the internal dissensions 
which had as far as possible been pushed into the background in view of the 
external threat had already begun to surface. Not every member of the Grand 
National Assembly (GNA), including some of the Ministers, was comfortable with 
the role played by Mustafa Kemal after the termination of active military operations. 
They were particularly uneasy about his involvement in the political questions and 
intimated to Mustafa Kemal that his military functions had come to an end and the 
political questions belonged exclusively to the Council of Ministers. Mustafa Kemal 
however, was not impressed by such arguments, as the Turkish victories over the 
Greeks had enhanced his popularity with the army and consequently strengthened 
his influence in the GNA. On his return to Ankara he successfully defended the 
attitude adopted by Turkey before and after the Chanak crisis despite the pressure
46 Ataturk’un Tamim Telgraf vc Bevannameleri .Vol. IV. 1917-1938.(Ankara: Turk Inkilap Tarihi 
Enstitusu, 1964) p.560.
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and criticisms from the GNA because of the halt to the advance of the victorious 
army without the full realisation of the National Pact.47
The opposition, which expressed itself mainly in the form of the 'Second 
Group’,48 did not disappear and the divergence of opinions became especially 
visible when the question of the delegation to be sent to the Peace Conference was 
placed on the agenda. Rauf Orbay, the Prime Minister, Yusuf Kemal, the Foreign 
Minister, and Riza Nur, the Minister of Public Health, appeared to be the most 
likely choice for the delegation. In his memories Rauf Bey reveals that he was not 
enthusiastic about going to Lausanne since other countries were to be represented by 
their Foreign Ministers. Therefore, such a mission should naturally be given to 
Yusuf K e m a l .49 According to Mustafa Kemal 'Rauf Bey himself did not feel equal 
to his task’ and a delegation led by him could not have any success on such a vital
issu ed
Mustafa Kemal’s choice did not lie with the Prime Minister but with 
someone whom he could trust: Ismet Pasha, the victor of the Mudania Convention, 
who had proved to be a determined, patient and tough negotiator, although as a 
professional soldier throughout his life he had had no diplomatic experienced At
41. T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabitlari. Cilt, 3 pp. 860-872; 920-930.
48 The opposition was run by various deputies in the Assembly and it came to be known as the 'Second
Group'. It had its organ a paper called the Tan' which was started in Ankara under the editorship of Ali 
Sukru Bey, a former naval officer and a deputy for Trabzon. The 'Second Group' represented itself by its
name not as a distinct party, but as a group forming a part of Mustafa Kemal's own Defence of Rights
organisation. Its principal component parts were the remnants of the Committee of Union and Progress 
and Monarchists of the type of Sukru Efendi (Hoca) who published in January 1923, a pamphlet openly
denouncing the abolition of the Sultanate.
For further information see: Ismail Arar., Ataturk'un Izmit Basin Toplantisi. (16-17 Peak 1923). 
(Istanbul, 1969), p.39-44; Erik Jan Zurcher., Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic. The 
Progressive Republican Party 1924-1925. (Leiden: Brill, 1991), p. 23; Ismet Inonu..Hatiralar. (Ankara: 
Bilgi Yayinevi, 1987), p. 100; Nursen Mazici., Belgelerle Ataturk Doneminde Muhalefet. 1919-1926. 
(Istanbul: Dilmen Yayinevi, 1984), pp. 53-71; Tunaya, Turkive'de Sivasi Partiler 1859-1952. (Istanbul, 
1952), pp. 537-539; Feridun Kandemir., Sivasi Darginliklar. II. (Istanbul, 1952), pp. 119; Smith,
Turkey: Origins of the Nationalist Movement, pp. 82-84; CON12359/425
49. Rauf Orbay., "Rauf Bey'in Hatiralari", Yakin Tarihimiz. (Cilt, II, Istanbul, March 1962 - January 
1963).
50. Kemal. Speech, pp. 570-571.
5 f  The head of the Turkish delegation, Ismet Pasha, had had a purely military career as a professional 
soldier. He himself was very much aware of the fact that he was an 'amateur diplomat' and the difficulties
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Mustafa Kemal's request, Yusuf Kemal resigned and Ismet Pasha became Minister 
of Foreign Affairs on October 26 1922.^2 After a long and heated debate on 
November 2, 1922, the Assembly confirmed the appointment of the Turkish 
delegation headed by Ismet Pasha, who, addressing the Assembly, stated that he 
would be guided by the National Pact at the Conference.^ He was accompanied by 
Riza Nur, the Minister of Health, and Hasan Saka, the Minister of Finance. Rauf 
Bey was not included in the delegation. The elimination of Rauf Bey, some argued, 
was the first step to the tense relations between the government and the delegation at 
Lausanne. Not every member of the GNA regarded the selection of the delegation as 
the best choice. Riza Nur recalled in his memoirs the resentment he felt about severe 
opposition from the 'Second Group1 to his constant appeal to them that Turkey 
would be in a much stronger position at the Conference if the delegation obtained 
the full support of the Grand National Assembly .54 The question of the selection of 
the delegation clearly displayed the existence of opposition in the GNA against
he had experienced at Lausanne had very much to do with his lack of diplomatic experience. The 
diplomats who wanted to take advantage of my situation', stated Ismet Pasha in his memoirs, 'would put 
their proposals forward in a way that would suit the rules and methods of diplomacy. Whereas I, as an 
amateur diplomat with an army background, found myself suffering from the disease of expressing my 
opinion with short and dry statements in the face of these demands'. (Inonu, Hatiralar. p.87) Grew, the 
American observer at the Conference expressed his observations about Ismet Pasha in the following 
lines: 'He talks more in the manner of a military man than a diplomat and apparently thinks in the same 
channel'. (Grew, Turbulent Era, p. 502) Rumbold, despised him for not being 'a la hauteur of his task' and 
the Turkish delegation for not having 'a single really big experienced and capable man'. (F0839/22 No. 
59) However, not everyone shared the same view. 'He is a master of detail,' wrote Harington who carried 
out the Mudania negotiations with Ismet Pasha. 'He examines every sentence most carefully, and from 
first to last never accepted anything without first seeing whether there was any catch in it', and he 
concluded with a warning, 'it wants very extreme patience to deal with a man like that... Ismet will be 
perfectly clear and logical, but he will adopt some sort of attitude to try and get the definite yes or no'. 
(Curzon Papers, Mss Eur FI 12/2266, ff. 254-255, October, 1992)
Ismet Pasha's inexperience in diplomacy reflected itself in his telegTams too. These telegrams are written 
in the style of military reports. In Simsii's words they were 'short, blunt and dry statements compared to 
the Ottoman diplomatic correspondence which was sophisticated, eloquent, and elegantly expressed. 
Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I. 1922-1923. (Ankara, 1990), p. XVI.
52. Kemal, Speech, p.571; Jaeschke, Turk Kurtulus Savasi Kronoliiisi. Cilt II, p. 4.
55. However, the British were cautious towards Ismet Pasha's election as head of the Turkish delegation. 
"This is not reassuring', wrote Rumbold on October 28, 1922, It portends sabre rattling at Conference as 
Ismet's attitude at Mudania was most intractable'. FO371/7907/E11757/27/44; Inonu, Hatiralar.. p.47: 
Gencosman, Ihtilal Meclisi . p.329; Gonlubol and Sar, Ataturk ve Turkive'nin Pis Politikasi. pp. 29- 
36; S. I. Aralov., Bir Sovvet Diplomatinin Turkive Hatiralari. (Istanbul: Burcak Yayinevi, 1967), pp. 
184-185.
54. Nur, Riza,, Havat ve Hatiratim. (Cilt. Ill , Istanbul, 1968), p. 964.
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Mustafa Kemal and his supporters and this opposition would be more frequently 
pronounced especially after the failure of the first phase of the Conference.
In the light of the difficulties mentioned above, an immediate peace was 
highly desirable; not only would it put an end to the existing economic difficulties 
but it also would ease the unstable internal political situation by pacifying the 
opposition. Moreover Mustafa Kemal was convinced that the old social, religious 
and political structure of Turkey needed drastic reform and his reform programme 
could only be materialised with the conclusion of a satisfactory peace which would 
disarm the opposition to political change.
The Turkish Objective: Nothing but the National Pact
The Lausanne Conference was unique among post-war conferences in that 
it was the only one in which the Allies met the defeated enemy on anything like 
equal terms ,^5 and which reflected an acceptance of the negotiating position of 
those whom the Allies considered the defeated party. Turkey aimed at proving that it 
was not the defeated Ottoman Empire that had signed the Sfcvres treaty, but was 
rather a new state which had fought for its independence and did not come to 
Lausanne as a supplicant. The Turkish delegates’ aim at Lausanne was to add a 
diplomatic victory to the military victory which had been achieved in the field. Their 
stand-point was the Mudania Convention, signed by the Nationalists, whereas the 
Western Powers tended to rely on the Armistice of Mudros, which had been signed 
by the defeated Ottoman Empire. In order to strengthen its negotiating position 
Turkey was, first of all, to rely on its military position. At almost every opportunity, 
Ismet Pasha made it clear to the Conference that he was not the representative of the
Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, p. 365; Richard T. B. Langhome., The Treaty of Lausanne(1923) and 
the Recognition of Modem Turkey: The International Context'. Symposium on the Foreign Policy of 
Ataturk's Turkey (1923-83). Proceedings. (Istanbul, 1984), p. 117.
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defeated Ottoman Empire but that of a victorious Turkey determined to negotiate 
peace on equal terms.
In addition to this, Turkey went to Lausanne to secure its prime objective: 
The National Pact, which came to represent the Nationalists' requirements and 
formed the basis of all negotiations with the Allied powers. The Nationalists 
proceeded to the Conference with a very definite programme: The complete 
scrapping of the Treaty of S&vres, a plebiscite for Western Thrace, the restoration of 
Mosul, the freedom of the Straits, but provided that the independence of Turkey and 
the safety of Istanbul were ensured, no military restrictions, no minority provisions, 
other than those in the European treaties, no financial and economic control, no 
Capitulations but the full sovereignty and independence of Turkey; in short, the 
National Pact in its entirety. Instructions from the Cabinet were another delicate 
issue that the Turkish delegation had to bear in mind during the course of the 
discussions. They were as follows:
1. The Eastern Frontier. No Armenian Homeland to be 
admitted. Negotiations to be broken off if Allies insisted.
2. The Frontier of Iraq. Suleymaniye, Kerkuk and 
Mosul to be claimed and new instructions to be asked from 
Ankara concerning newly-emerged situations.
3. The Frontier of Syria. Efforts to be made to improve 
it along the following route: Re'si Ibn Hani-Harim- 
Muslimiye-Meskene-Firat-Derizor-Col-Musul.
4. The Islands fthe Aegean!. Policy to be determined in 
the course of negotiations. Islands to be claimed on account 
of their proximity to the Dardanelles. Fresh instructions to 
be requested from Ankara should difficulties arise.
5. The Frontiers of Thrace. Efforts to be made to secure 
1914 frontier.
6 . The Frontiers of Western Thrace To be determined in 
conjunction with the National Pact (i.e. plebiscite).
7. The Straits and Gallipolli Peninsula. No foreign 
military force to be admitted. Ankara to be informed in 
advance if negotiations to be broken off.
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8 . The Capitulations. Under no circumstances the 
Capitulations to be accepted. Delegation have every 
authority to break up the negotiations should the need 
arises.
9. Minorities. To be solved by the mutual exchange of 
population.
10. Ottoman Public Debt. To be distributed among the 
successor states. Greece's debt to be renounced in return 
for its recognition of reparations. Failing that the question 
to be postponed for twenty years.
11 • Army and Navy No limitation to be accepted.
12. Foreign Institutions. To be subject to Turkish Law.
13. The Succession States Article 1* of the National 
Pact to be applied.
14. The Rights of the Islamic Institutions and 
Foundations to be determined under the guidance of 
previous agreements. $6
These instructions defined Turkey's national goals very clearly. On two of 
them, the Capitulations and the possible establishment of an Armenian state, Turkey 
was determined to the point of risking the possibility of war. If the need arose, 
Ismet Pasha had full authorisation to break off the negotiations without consulting 
Ankara since the Nationalists on many occasions publicly proclaimed that they 
would only make peace on the basis of the National Pact, which stood for the 
complete economic, financial, and juridical independence of Turkey within the 
territories inhabited by a majority of Turks.
The realisation of the National Pact, and nothing but the entire Pact, and the 
recognition by the Allies of the Government of Ankara as the sole representative of 
Turkey were the sole considerations by which the Nationalist government was
56, Simsir. Lozan Telgraflari I. p. XIV.
*. Article 1 runs as follows: The destiny of Ottoman territory under foreign occupation and peopled by 
an Arab majority at the time of the signing of the Armistice on October 30, 1918 should be determined 
by a plebiscite of all inhabitants. All such territories inhabited by an Ottoman Muslim majority, united 
in religion, in race, and in aspirations, are imbued with feelings of mutual respect, concern, and 
devotion, and form an invisible whole.1
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guided. To what extent the Turkish delegation managed to fulfil the principles laid 
down in the National Pact was yet to be seen.
Questions to be Settled before the Conference
The first issue was where the negotiations should take place. In order to 
obliterate the difficulties of communication between Ankara and the Turkish 
delegation, as the conference site the Grand National Assembly suggested Izmir, a 
town which was also the symbol of Turkish victory. The British considered the 
matter from a different angle: In a telegram to the War Office on October 11,1922, 
Rumbold pointed out the popular belief that the Turks were not only victorious 
against the Greeks but also against the Allies. This impression', he wrote, 'will be 
strengthened if the Conference were held in a Turkish town’. He maintained that 'to 
consent to such a proposal would go far in admitting that a Greek defeat meant an 
Allied defeat'. Rumbold had another reason to object to Turkish soil; 'If precedent 
were followed,' he warned, 'a Turk might claim to be president and moreover the 
question of position of the Constantinople government will be raised in a more acute 
f o r m . C u r z o n  entirely agreed with the 'weighty reasons' stated by Rumbold and 
ruled out any idea of holding a peace conference on Turkish soil. Such proposal 
was 'wholly unacceptable' since it would hurt the feelings of Greek statesman 
Eleuthere Venizelos.58 After lengthy discussions through telegraphic 
correspondence, with the assurance that the necessary steps would be taken to 
facilitate as much as possible communication between Lausanne and Ankara, the 
neutral site of Lausanne was accepted by the Turks.
The selection of Lausanne as a conference place however created 
considerable difficulties for the Turkish delegation regarding communications. As
57. WO106/1426, No. 865, October 11, 1922, Rumbold to the War Office.
58. FO371/7903/E11024/27/44, October 13, 1922, Curzon to Hardinge; DBFP, XVIII, No. 123; 
F0424/255; CON12330/381; DBFP, XVIII No. 121, October 12, 1922, Curzon to Hardinge.
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the negotiations progressed the Turkish side found it increasingly difficult to cope 
with the newly emerging situation; it realised the inadequacy of 25-30 pages of 
instructions and frequently had to ask the Nationalist government for new 
instructions. Hence the exchange of telegrams increased tremendously and reached a 
point where the telegrams sent from Ankara to Lausanne were greater in number 
than the ones issued from Lausanne to Ankara. These telegrams caused great 
tension between Ismet Pasha and the Prime Minister, Rauf Bey. In order to avoid 
the communication difficulties Rauf Bey suggested the Kostence (Constanta) line 
while Ismet Pasha favoured the Eastern line on the grounds that it was reliable, 
faster and that the telegrams were not corrupt as in the case of the Kostence line.^9 
Due to delays and incomplete and corrupt telegrams, both sides bitterly complained 
about not getting replies in time; consequently, Ismet Pasha chose, on more than 
one occasion, to send direct telegrams to Mustafa Kemal in order to be able to get a 
quick reply which was crucial in terms of preparations for the next session. Ismet 
Pasha's direct communication with Mustafa Kemal, which left the Prime Minister 
Rauf Bey in isolation, had a great effect on the deterioration of Ismet Pasha’s 
position vis-a-vis the Turkish Cabinet.^
The selection of Lausanne also put the Turks in a disadvantageous position 
from the intelligence point of view. Numerous human intelligence reports gave very 
accurate account of the Turkish negotiating standpoint. But the most important role 
as far as the Conference was concerned was played by the signal intelligence. The 
intercepted Turkish telegrams contributed a great deal to the British assessment of 
the Turkish position during the negotiations. Winston Churchill, who was a great 
believer in the vast benefit of intelligence in international relations, stated that he 
attached 'more importance to them as a means of forming a true judgement of public
59. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I. p. XV, No.270. January 4, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; No. 287. 
January 6, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.
bO. Orbay , ’Rauf Orbay'in Hatiralari1 YakinTarihimiz. Cilt II, p. 53.
6 6
policy in these spheres than to any other sources of knowledge at the disposal of the 
State/ Curzon agreed. After emphasising the importance of the information 
gathered by clandestine means, and the assessment based upon it, which statesmen 
weigh when they make their decisions, Churchill concluded: The deciphered 
telegrams of foreign governments are without doubt the most valuable source of our 
secret information respecting their policy and a c t i o n s . ' ^  In this respect the 
Lausanne Conference represents ’one of the most interesting case studies of the use 
and value of secret intelligence.'^
Whitehall was extremely well-informed as to the position in other 
countries and in the course of negotiations there can be little doubt that London 
knew a great deal more about what was happening in Turkey than Turkey did of 
what was taking place on the Allied side. The effect of intelligence on Curzon’s 
policy, by providing a novel and valuable source of information and making his 
work easier throughout the Lausanne Conference, was certainly the crucial if not the 
determining factor contributing to his ’skilful diplomacy’. Since the Eastern line, 
which was used by the Turks, was under British control these intercepted telegrams 
gave the British the opportunity to assess Turkey's negotiating position. The 
intercepted Turkish telegrams supplied to the Foreign Office were regularly studied 
by Curzon, who learned of the difficulties facing Ismet Pasha in Lausanne and the 
Nationalist government in Ankara. Therefore Curzon was well aware of the fact that 
Ismet Pasha was caught between the terms acceptable to the Conference and those 
desired by the Ankara government. He also knew exactly how far he could push 
matters, since he had first-hand information about at which point the Turkish
b l.  Christopher Andrew and Jeremy Noakes (eds.) Intelligence and International Relations. 1900-1945. 
(Exeter University of Exeter, 1987), p. 16. For further information see: C. M. Andrew., Secret Service. 
The Making of the British Intelligence Community. (London: Heinemann, 1987); David Dilks., 
'Appeasement and Intelligence' Retreat From Power. Studies in Britain's Foreign Policy of the Twentieth 
Century. Vol. I, 1900-1939. (ed. by David Dilks), (London: Macmillan, 1981), p. 139.
62. Keith Jeffery and Alan Sharp., 'Lord Curzon and Secret Intelligence' Intelligence and International 
Relations, p. 115.
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delegation was instructed to break off negotiations. Not only did Curzon learn about 
Turkey's position but he also gained information from these telegrams about the 
other power's policies, which put him in a stronger position and enabled him to 
form counter-policies. It would be unrealistic to say that the possession of good 
intelligence by itself enabled him to form his policy but it certainly helped a great 
deal towards the decision making process. Given the information and data the 
British side had, it would not be an exaggeration to say that they had complete 
superiority over the Turkish side, which was very poorly prepared. The archival 
material shows that Britain had also elaborated counter arguments against the likely 
proposals of the Turkish side as part of its thorough preparation.
A substantial contribution was also made by British Intelligence during the 
second half of the Lausanne negotiations, so much so that Rumbold, who was the 
chief negotiator for Britain, would comment: The information we obtained at the 
psychological moments from secret sources was invaluable to us and put us in the 
position of a man who is playing Bridge and knows the cards in his adversary's 
hand '63 Moreover, during the first part of the Conference the British delegation 
had the 'distinct advantage of being able to read a large proportion of the Turkish 
delegation's private correspondence'.^ The information which was obtained from 
the Secret Intelligence Service ’did not guarantee that the British negotiators would 
be successful in obtaining all their objectives, but it did mean that on certain 
occasions they could cut their losses and know when not to push the conference to a 
breach'.65 Turkey lacked completely such advantages at the negotiations and was 
thus easily forced into making concessions which it could not avoid without 
breaking up the Conference. It could well be argued that if Ismet Pasha had had the 
inside knowledge as to how the United Allied Front which Curzon arranged in Paris
63 F0800/253, Tu 23/54; Gilbert, Sir Horace Rumbold. p. 290; Busch, Mudros to Lausanne p. 382.
64. Jeffery and Sharp., 'Lord Curzon and Secret Intelligence. Intelligence and International Relations.
p. 108.
63. Jeffery and Sharp., 'Lord Curzon and Secret Intelligence', p. 115.
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was 'tentative* the course of the negotiations and the outcome of the Conference 
could have been different.
The second issue to be settled was the question of Turkish representation at 
the Conference. Since the appointment of Bekir Sami Bey as the first Foreign 
Minister of the Ankara Government in 1920, the diplomatic representation of 
Turkey had been a controversial issue not only between Istanbul and Ankara but 
also among the Allies. The Lausanne Conference was to end the confusion in a quite 
dramatic way. Controversy arose as to whether the Istanbul government could be 
represented separately, and over Ankara's intention of making its acceptance of an 
invitation contingent upon the exclusion of the Istanbul government. When the 
Allies invited both governments to the Conference, Ankara did not fail to act, and in 
a letter to the British, Italian and French governments, Ahmet Muhtar, the Minister 
of Defence, described the Istanbul government as a 'political group established at 
Constantinople with no legal, political right to call itself a government'.^
In a special meeting of the GNA Ismet Pasha argued against the invitation 
of the Istanbul government on the grounds that such an invitation would upset the 
situation created by the Mudania Armistice Convention. The Istanbul government 
tried to reach an understanding with Ankara for joint action on the basis of 
recognition of the role Ankara had played but without formally abdicating its own 
position. In a telegram to Mustafa Kemal on October 17, Grand Vizier Tevfik Pasha 
was of the opinion that 'victory that had been gained had done away with any 
conflict and dualism between Istanbul and Ankara, and that national unity had 
thereby been assured’. He suggested joint action at the Conference, a suggestion 
which he reiterated with his direct appeal to the Presidency of the Assembly on 29
66, Kenneth Bourne & D. C. Watt, (eds.); British Documents on Foreign Affairs (BDFAV Turkey. Iran, 
and the Middle East. 1920-1921. Vol. II, No. 71; For more on this matter see: F0371/7947/E 
4988/4988/44 and CON 11940/426 Turkey. Annual Report 1921.
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October.^ However, Ankara was determined to solve the problem once and for 
all.
On 1 November, three weeks before the Lansanne Conference convened, 
the Grand National Assembly adopted a resolution that the office of Sultan had 
ceased to exist, that under the fundamental law the Caliphate was vested in the 
house of Osman but that the Caliph must be elected by the Assembly, and that the 
Turkish State was the support on which the caliphate rested. It announced that the 
GNA was the sole sovereign body in Turkey, that the people recognised no other 
government, and that the Istanbul government had ceased to exist from 16 March 
1920.^8 This action was to put an end to the duality which had existed in Turkey 
since the establishment of the GNA in 1920.
Not surprisingly, the actions of the Ankara government were heartily 
supported by the Soviets, with which the government was on the best of terms, 
though conflicting opinions were held in Anatolia as to how far a Bolshevik alliance 
could be maintained without swallowing Bolshevism itself, a thing repugnant to all 
but an insignificant minority. Nevertheless, the Nationalists as a whole had 
throughout acted on the principle that Bolshevik activity could not fail to bring grist 
to the Ankara mill. Chicherin sent a message on 3 November congratulating the 
Assembly on overthrowing a 'despotic, monarchical autocracy' which had acted 
against the interests of the people and had reduced the country to subjection to 
Western Powers.69 The Allies proved to have no intention of opposing the change 
of authority in Turkey. The British government recognised the Ankara government 
as the only representative of the people of Turkey and claimed 'no right to intervene
67 Kemal, Speech, p. 575 ; Orbay, 'Rauf Orbay'in Hatiralari' Yakin Tarihimiz: W0106/1506 No. 
35a, October 1, 1922, Rumbold to the War Office.
68. For the text of this historic resolution see: F 0371/9176/E10937/10937/44; CON 12315/729 
Turkey. Annual Report, 1922; FO371/7910/E12311/27/44; F0371/7953/E11817/10102/44; Kemal, 
Speech, p. 577-578; Orbay, Rauf Orbay'in Anilari. Yakin Tarihimiz. (Cilt II, Istanbul March 1962 - 
January 1963); Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 30, ff. 58-60.
69. WO106/1444 No. 1118, November 5, 1922, Peters (Moscow) to the War Office.
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in the domestic affairs of Turkey not affecting any treaty rights’.^ ® The question of 
representation was thus solved by the abolition of the Sultanate and the resignation 
of the Istanbul government. The abolition of the Caliphate, however, had to wait 
until after the Lausanne Conference.
Once the Istanbul government was out of the political arena, the third 
question came on to the agenda: The controversy surrounding the opening date of 
the Conference. There appeared to be substantial difficulties concerning the 
Lausanne Conference opening as agreed on November 13th. The Turks were 
anxious to get the Conference started as soon as possible since the government was 
under increasing pressure and criticism at home for halting the advance of the 
victorious army. Therefore an immediate peace was invaluable as far as internal 
difficulties were concerned. Curzon's wish to postpone the opening date of the 
Conference in the light of the impending election in Britain irritated the Turkish 
government. On 8 November, on the occasion of conveying Ankara’s message of 
dissatisfaction to the British delegation in Istanbul, Ismet Pasha was reported to 
have complained that every day’s delay made it harder for them because of internal 
affairs. 'Whether he meant the Bolshevik grip or the increase of feeling against the 
Nationalists', Rumbold continued, 'I could not discover'.71
In view of the information as to present attitude of the Grand National 
Assembly and the Turkish army, Rumbold was particularly worried that the 
adjournment of the Conference might seriously endanger the maintenance of the 
armistice. On 12 November he advised, together with the other Allied High 
Commissioners, that the conference meet as soon as possible and that a definite date 
be fixed immediately.^ Nonetheless, a delay was inevitable and Rumbold advised
70 W0106/1444 No. 1112, November 4, 1922, Secret Foreign Office Despatch; DBFP, XVIII No. 159.
71. WO106/1444 No. 1153, November 8, 1922, General Harington to the War Office.
72. F0371/7912/E12581/27/44, November 11, 1922, Curzon to Graham; DBFP, XVIU No, 180.
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Ismet Pasha to postpone his departure until a final decision as to the date of the 
opening of the Conference was reached.^ Although Ismet Pasha in his memoirs 
underlined the fact that he had not been informed as to the adjournment, Rumbold's 
account indicates quite the opposite. Ismet Pasha, despite being informed of the 
adjournment on 8 November by Rumbold, proceeded to Lausanne on the grounds 
that the Ankara government had received no official notification of the adjournment 
of the Conference, and that he ought to be at Lausanne on the date originally 
indicated.^ His action was, according to him, designed to pacify the opposition at 
home by indicating that peace was on the way rather than by 'placing the Allies in 
the wrong' as Rumbold contemplated.
The postponement of the Conference was considered undesirable not only 
for its possible political repercussions, but also because of military considerations. 
In a secret telegram sent to the Admiralty on October 12th, the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Mediterranean was also in favour of an immediate start of the Conference and 
expressed his concern about the delay. In support of his argument he wrote, "Apart 
from the expense of maintaining large naval and military forces in these waters it is 
certain that as the occupation of Thrace proceeds and the winter comes on, so the 
desire of the Nationalist Army to occupy Constantinople will increase... with the 
British force reduced by a Brigade in Thrace a threat to Constantinople would create 
a veiy awkward situation".^
Whatever difficulties may have been involved prior to the negotiations, 
matters were much compromised by the postponement of the Conference. Not only 
did it antagonise Turkey, but it also irritated Britain's allies, rendering all 
collaboration once more impractical. Curzon initially failed to get the support he
73. WO106/1444 No. 1136, November 6, 1922, War Office to Rumbold.
74. F0371/7912/E12313/27/44, November 8, 1922, Hardinge to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII No. 168; Inonu, 
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expected from Poincare and Mussolini in the name of unity. Poincar6, having 
declined responsibility for the effect the news of the postponement might have upon 
the Ankara government and Turkish public opinion, was convinced that every day’s 
delay increased the difficulties in the way of concluding peace and might well lead to 
a resumption of hostilities. In his note of November 7 to Hardinge, PoincarS 
expressed his concern in the following lines: ’[The Turks] are coming to believe that 
they will only obtain by force of arms the advantages which they feel now to be 
within their grasp'.76 Italy shared Curzon's view and considered the difficulties 
raised in his letter ’substantial’. They were ready to take joint action but felt 'bound 
by promise to be ready by November 13th,’ and could ’at a pinch honour 
it.’"77.They nonetheless hoped that the Turks would ask for a postponement
The Turks were, however, far from asking for a postponement as they 
were under severe political pressure at home. In order to prevent any embarrassment 
to the Allies, Poincare stepped in by inviting Ismet Pasha to France for a week. This 
move alarmed Curzon, who feared that Turkey and France would come to an 
agreement between themselves. Curzon's fear was unfounded; Ismet Pasha 
explained in his memoirs that the sole reason for his welcoming of Poincare's 
invitation was to find out if the Allies’ desire for peace was g e n u i n e .78 in the end, 
due to French intervention, the problems of postponement were overcome without 
further controversy. The 'undesirable consequences’ implied in Ismet Pasha's 
communique urging an immediate start to negotiations did not follow.
76. WO106/1444 No. 1170, November 7, 1922, Hardinge to the War Office; DBFP, XVIII No. 164- 
168.
77 WO 106/ 1444 No. 1126, November 5, 1922, Graham (Rome) to the War Office.
7 .^ Inonu, Hatiralar. p. 50-51; Nevertheless, the Foreign Office was not at all pleased at Ismet's Pasha’s 
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After the settlement of these three questions examined above, the way was 
now open for the negotiations at Lausanne. Britain and Turkey, determined to 
conclude a peace, though for different reasons, sat at the conference table to discuss 
the terms of the peace. The outcome of the Conference no longer depended on the 
good-will of the two sides but on the success of the formulation of their strategies 
and of their tactical skills. The first phase of the Conference would provide an 
excellent platform where upon each side could effectively implement their strategies 
in order to secure a more favourable settlement.
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IV
THE CONFERENCE: FIRST PHASE
(November 20, 1922 - February 4, 1923)
The Opening Manoeuvres
The Conference which gave birth to the Treaty and ultimately to the 
foundation of the Turkish Republic convened in Lausanne on Tuesday 20 
November, 1922 with Turkey on one side and Britain, France, Italy, Japan, 
Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania on the other. The basis of the Conference was the 
necessity of concluding peace between Greece and Turkey and at the same time of 
ending the state of war which existed technically between Turkey and those Allies 
with which it had been at war since 1914. The United States and Russia also 
participated in the Conference insofar as it concerned their interests. 1 The delegation 
of the United States, which went to Lausanne to present the American position and 
to protect American interests in the Near East, was present at all discussions though 
it did not enter into any engagement or sign any documents. 2
Evans. United States Policy, pp. 376-417. Child, the United States delegate, explains the purposes of 
US participation in the Conference, see: Foreign Relations of the United States. FRUS, (1923), vol. II, 
No. 226; William O. Scroogs., ’American Interests at Lausanne' Foreign Affairs. 10 (1932), pp.688- 
690.
Russia was invited to the conference at the request of the Turks with a view to enlisting Russian support 
in the face of expected British opposition.
2. FRUS, No. 7; Parliamentary Papers, Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-1923; 
Cmd.1814, (1923) p .ll; Child, A Diplomat Looks at Europe. Chapter IV.
The Department of State was to summarise the position of the United States as follows: *While it is 
neither natural nor desirable that we should participate in the peace conference or become involved in the 
negotiations regarding policies or aims in which we have no share it is essential that the Department 
should be constantly in command of adequate information, keen for the protection of American interests,
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Amongst the countries represented at Lausanne, the concept of "equality” 
was something to which Turkey attached the greatest importance and about which it 
was particularly sensitive. In almost every correspondence the phrase ”on the basis 
of equality" occurred. In this way, Turkey was trying to get the message across that 
even the slightest desire on the part of the Allies to treat it less favourably than the 
other delegations was not acceptable. Ismet Pasha was very much concerned that the 
Turkish delegation should participate in the Conference 'on the same footing of 
equality’ as the other powers and was not prepared to accept any arrangement 
contrary to this principle. Turkish sensitivity about equality had manifested itself 
even before the opening of the Conference when Ismet Pasha realised that Turkey 
had been placed at the same table with the small states, far away from the victors of 
the war. He protested against what he felt was an intentional slight and managed to 
secure a more favourable seating arrangement^ This was not the last time the head 
of the Turkish delegation felt compelled to assert the equal standing.
The second incident occurred at the opening ceremony of the Conference. 
Having learned that Curzon would deliver an unscheduled speech following the 
Swiss President’s address of welcome, Ismet Pasha decided to do the same. After 
Curzon's response of a complimentary character, Ismet Pasha, unexpectedly, 
advanced to the stage and addressed the delegates, emphasising the new position of 
Turkey as a free and independent stated Despite having been toned down
ready to throw the full weight of our influence to obtain assurances for the freedom of the Straits and the 
protection of minorities, candid as to our views and in a position at any suitable time to make the 
separate agreement which at some time must be made with the Turkish Government recognised by the 
Powers. No point of advantage should be forfeited, no just influence lost, no injurious commitments 
made. We should maintain the integrity of our position as an independent power which had not been 
concerned with the rivalries of other nations which we have so often made the Near East the theatre of 
war...’ FRUS, 1923, II, p. 887-888 .
3.; Further evidence of Turkey's sensitivity about the issue of equality was to be seen at a later stage of 
the conference when M. Kemal sent a telegram to Ismet Pasha indicating his satisfaction about the 
seating arrangement at a dinner given by Garroni, in which Turkey was placed at the same table as 
Britain, France and Italy, apart from the small states.
4. For Ismet Pasha's speech see: Cmd. 1814 (1923) p. 4; Sevket Sureyya Aydemir., Ikinei Adam. Cilt I. 
(1884-1938) p.227; Aydemir., Tek Adam, p. 105; SehaL. Meray., Lozan Baris Konferansi: Tutanaklar. 
BeleelerTAnkara: Ankara Universitesi Basimevi, 1969), Takim I, Cilt I, p. VI; Roderic H. Davison., 
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beforehand at Poincare's suggestion, Ismet Pasha's speech caused great 
dissatisfaction among the British delegation. According to Curzon Ismet Pasha's 
attitude was indicative of the spirit in which the Turkish delegation were 
approaching the Conference and foreshadowed 'trouble at every turn'.^ 
Nevertheless Ismet Pasha's intention, contrary to Curzon's conviction, had been to 
show to the Conference that he and Curzon stood on an equal footing even if it 
might not be the kind of speech expected at a ceremonial session. However, Ismet 
Pasha's determination to make his weight felt at the Conference remained limited to 
his unscheduled speech.
The third occurrence was even more serious. According to the rules a 
Swiss citizen was to preside over the Conference since it was held on Swiss 
territory. However, as the Swiss government had renounced the presidency, in the 
course of conversations in Paris it had been proposed that the presidency should be 
exercised in strict rotation by the Powers who had organised the Conference, 
namely, Britain France and Italy. When Ismet Pasha learned that the rotation of the 
presidency was limited to France, Italy and Britain he argued that this rotation 
'should also include Turkey on the grounds that the latter had also, in the first 
instance, invited the powers to meet at Smyrna; the position of an inviting power 
could also apply to h e r ' . 6
While Ismet Pasha's protests fell on deaf ears, Curzon, using his skill and 
experience, had already successfully used the rotation for his own ends. He 
suddenly announced that it would fall to the 'senior' representatives of the powers 
that had organised the Conference to preside at the meetings following the opening 
ceremony. The criteria of that seniority were not to be questioned by other 
delegates. As regards the question of the presidency of the commissions, he once
5. F0839/5 No. 15; November 29, 1922, Curzon to Crowe. DBFP, XVIII, No. 209;
6. Cmd.1814, Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923. Records of Proceedings and 
Draft Terms of Peace. Turkey (1923) p. 8.
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more established his authority and stated that the responsibility for the Conference 
rested on those Powers which had convoked it and that, therefore, it belonged to 
them to direct the debates of the commissions. Ismet Pasha's second attempt to get a 
Turkish delegate appointed as secretary-general of the Conference was successfully 
ruled out by Lord Curzon, who pointed out that the request was 'contrary to all 
precedents' and proposed Rene Massigli, the French delegate, leaving no chance for 
Ismet Pasha to object. It was a fait accompli that Ismet Pasha never expected.
In contrast to his adversary, Curzon was an experienced statesman. His 
masterly use of language is clearly detectable in his 'picturesque telegrams', as 
described by William Tyrell.7 'He talks well,' wrote Joseph Grew, the second 
American delegate, in his memoirs, 'with a beautiful choice of words and 
expressions'.^ His great knowledge of the East, and his ability and skills as a 
negotiator unquestionably gave him a tremendous advantage over his counterpart, 
so much so, that at the outset of the Conference, on the grounds of his experience 
and authority, Curzon took charge of all important territorial and military 
commissions, despite strong protests from Ismet Pasha, and thus was able to 
control the time table of the Conference. They have sent me, a soldier,' Ismet 
Pasha remarked to an English journalist, 'to fight a Bismarck, one of your greatest 
statesmen’.9
After the opening speech by the President of the Swiss Confederation at the 
Casino de Montbenon, the meetings were held in the Hotel du Chateau d'Ouchy, 
where English, French and Italian were chosen as the official languages and 
commissions and sub-commissions were set up for the issues to be discussed. The 
first of the three main Committees would deal with territorial issues and be presided
7  F0800/243, (private letter), December 7, 1922, Tyrell to Crowe.
Grew, Turbulent Era, p.491; Inonu, Hatiralar. p. 75.
7  Grace Mary Ellison., An Englishwoman in Angora. (London: Hutchinson, 1923), pp. 305, 308.
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over by Lord Curzon himself, while the second and third Committees would 
examine the Capitulations and Minorities under the presidency of Marquis C. 
Garroni and economic and financial matters chaired by Pierre Eugdne C. Barrere.
When Barr&re requested that the three commissions should not sit 
simultaneously, so that all the delegates could take part in the debates, Lord Curzon 
quickly grasped the opportunity to propose that the Territorial Committee should be 
the first to sit and that the Conference should wait before embarking on the work of 
the other two commissions until the first had made some p r o g r e s s .  10 By doing so 
he obtained the important advantage of being in charge of the organisation and the 
agenda of the Conference. He was able to conduct a policy of his own as to the 
organisation and agenda of the Conference since he was better qualified by 
knowledge and experience than any of the delegates in politics.
Once in the Conference he continued to control the negotiations, overriding 
Ismet Pasha's objections to the draft of procedure, drawn up by the Allies, 'with 
velvet words but steam roller methods'. 11 When he reported to the Foreign Office, 
Curzon was to describe objections of the Turks as of a 'very trivial character 
intended to establish their claim to complete equality or to satisfy their national 
p r i d e ’. 12 As Grew rightly observed Ismet Pasha represented 'a victorious nation 
but he was being regarded as a vanquished enemy; his delegation was being given 
no consideration whatever in the organisation of the conference’. ^  Ismet Pasha, 
not being able to get any presidency of the three commissions or the secretariat of 
the Conference and failing to obtain that the Turks be allowed three instead of two 
delegates, lost the first round. It has been argued that Curzon's handling of the
10. Cmd.1814, p. 12.
I*. Grew. Turbulent Era, p. 491.
12 . FO371/7965/E13003/13003/44, November 21, 1922, Curzon to Crowe; DBFP, XVIII, No. 211. 
13. Grew. Turbulent Era p.492.
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Conference was to be one of the ’classic examples of expert d i p l o m a c y ’ l l  This 
was clearly the case regarding the opening stage of the Conference. At the outset of 
the Conference, Curzon, having obtained control of the procedure, secured a victory 
over Ismet Pasha and was now in a position to conduct the negotiations in line with 
his diplomatic strategy.
The Formulation of Strategies
Britain Rests on Allied Unity
Allied unity constituted a cardinal principle of Britain's Near Eastern 
policy. As this formed the basis of Curzon’s strategic policy, the British diplomat 
made every attempt to preserve a united allied front; it was absolutely vital for 
Curzon to achieve this harmony in order to defend British interests. Although no 
such unity of view existed among the Allies in regard to questions which had to be 
settled in Lausanne, he managed to secure at least the facade of it. Disagreements, 
which in the earlier stages of the Conference had simmered beneath the surface, at a 
later period boiled up into active controversy from time to time. Such disagreements 
were due not only to personal, political and military rivalries but also to real 
differences of conviction as to the nature of peace treaty with Turkey. The events of 
the last months of 1922 had left behind them specific issues around which 
disagreement inevitably tended to crystallise. In view of a possible failure to reach a 
common peace at Lausanne, Curzon was critical of his colleagues. The enemies 
whom I have to contend with and defeat' he wrote to Lindsay on January 31st, ’are 
not at Angora, but at Paris and R o m e ' . l ^  The question of how far the so-called
14 Nicolson. Curzon. p. 282.
15. F0839/17; F0371/7969/E14471/13003/44, December 26, 1922, Curzon to Crowe;
FO371/9062/E1240/1/44, January 31, 1923, Curzon to Lindsay; DBFP, XVIII, No. 293, 357; Mss Eur 
FI 12/285, Curzon Papers.
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solidarity among the Allies would stand the test of Turkish insistence was to be 
answered as the negotiations progressed.
After having obtained control over procedure, Curzon was able to bring the 
questions (i.e. territorial questions) under discussion first in which Britain was 
primarily interested and over which the Allies could display a solid front, while the 
Turks were in a relatively weak position. The first sixteen meetings of the 
Conference were held under the name of the Territorial Committee - since the 
progress of the first Committee was to determine the work of the second and the 
third Committees - whereas Barrere’s Committee met six times, and Garroni’s only 
five. In other words, the Conference should wait before embarking on the work of 
the other two commissions until the first had made some progress. This meant that 
unless Curzon secured British interests in a satisfactory way - that is, an 
international regime of the Straits under British control, and retention of the rich oil 
regions of Mosul - the Conference would slow down and not be able to make 
progress on issues concerning other parties.
The most striking example of this strategy was to be seen over the Mosul 
question, which lay at the heart of the British claims. It was well known to the 
British that the question of Mosul would constitute one of the principal obstacles to 
the establishment of peace in the Near East. On November 6, two weeks prior to the 
Conference, Rumbold wrote to Curzon that the 'Question of Mosul will be test of 
Turkish attitude in immediate future... Unless I am much mistaken Kemalists will 
press strongly for its retrocession.'^ Curzon was particularly well aware of the fact 
that Mosul was going to be the crux of the Conference.^ But it was only when he
F0800/157, November 6, 1922, Rumbold to Curzon, Curzon Papers.
F0839/16 No. 229, January 24, 1923, Curzon to Lindsay; F l l2/295, January 25, 1923, Curzon to 
Balfour, Curzon Papers.
The Turks have always regarded Mosul as an integral part of the district, a fraction of the mother 
country, so that this issue was for the Turks before and above everything 'territorial'. Furthermore the 
Turks had, from the outset, maintained that the occupation of Mosul by the British troops was illegal 
since on October 30, 1918, the day when the Armistice of Mudros was signed, Mosul was in Turkish 
hands. The town of Mosul was occupied by the British after that date and without fighting. Curzon's
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realised that it had reached a deadlock that he established his strategy to slow down 
the Conference and make other issues difficult to settle. ’In view of undesirability of 
giving impression that Mosul is only or even main obstacle to conclusion of peace,' 
wrote Balfour to Curzon in January 1923, 'reference could be made to Turkish 
obstinacy on other questions and previous refusal of Turks to avail themselves of 
good offices of League.'^
That is precisely what Curzon had in mind in his dealings with the Turks. 
He followed his strategy by being an ardent supporter of the Allies' claims on 
matters which were of secondary importance to British interests and by making 
unreasonable proposals that were bound to be refused by the Turks. He knew 
perfectly well that when he telegraphed to Ankara the negotiations would stir the 
Grand National Assembly and stiffen the Turkish delegation's position. 'Curzon, 
by his methods starts a train of consequences,' commented A. Washburn Child, the 
American observer, in his memoirs, 'which forces the Turkish delegation to be 
more obstinate than e v e r ' .  19 Curzon, then, would remark upon the 'intransigent 
attitude' of the Turks and endeavour to gain the sympathy of world opinion.^ On 
several occasions he played the same game, telling Ismet Pasha that unless Turkey 
came into line with the Allies' proposals, international public opinion would judge 
where the responsibility lay. 21
Apart from securing absolute unity between the Allies, Curzon's main 
concern was to avoid any rupture over the questions primarily concerning Britain. 
He planned his strategy in such a way that the possible reason for breaking up the 
Conference was to be shifted to a controversy in which British interests were not
argument about that was that the news of the Armistice reached Mosul on November 1. In addition, the 
strategic importance of Vilayet and the rich oil reserves were the factors which contributed to the dispute. 
18. F0371/9062 /E1090/1/44, January 27, 1923, Balfour to Curzon.
19 Child.. A Diplomat Looks at Europe, p. 98
20. F0839/36. No. 316, December 3, 1922, Curzon to Crowe.
21. FO371/7967/E14370/13003/44, December 2, 1922, Curzon to Crowe; DBFP, XVIII, No. 286; 
F0839/17 No. 154.
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solely or mainly affected. When it became apparent that deadlock was inevitable 
over the question of Mosul, he used the minority and humanitarian question as a 
'bed upon which to fall' in case a rupture came on the subject. Towards the last 
stages of the first phase of the Conference, Curzon’s strategy became known to his 
allies, who began to suspect that the bed upon which to fall was the Capitulations. 
'Rumours go around that Curzon will break on Mosul but will make it appear that 
this rupture comes on capitulations,' remarked Child, referring to the atmosphere 
surrounding the Conference Hall. As the Conference progressed Child’s judgement 
of Curzon’s tactic would become more precise. 'I have no doubt,' he declared, 'that 
he is really fishing for a breach on capitulations in case he cannot dispose of the 
Mosul question’. ^
Ismet Pasha was not unaware of Curzon’s tactic. In an interview given to 
Le Matin he maintained that from the moment the British delegation realised that the 
Turks would not give way on the question of Mosul, the discussion of the 
Capitulations became embittered.^ The question of the Capitulations, which 
restricted the sovereignty exercised by a state, within the limits of its territory, over 
persons and property, was of vital importance to the Turkish delegation and as 
Ismet Pasha pointed out to Child in a private conversation of November 27, they 
would be 'a serious hindrance' to the negotiations.^
From the outset of the Conference, even well before the negotiations were 
due, Curzon, equipped with the information provided by intelligence reports, was 
fully aware that the issue of the Capitulations was one of the two over which the 
Turkish delegation had the authority to break off the negotiations without consulting 
Ankara. He also knew that the position of the Allies with political, economic,
22. Child., A Diplomat Looks at Europe, p. 114.
23. F0371/7968/E14597/13003/44, December 30, 1923, Crewe to the Foreign Office; F0424/255 No. 
862.
24 FRUS, (1923) II, No. 25; Grew, Turbulent Era, p. 502.
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financial and judicial interests in Turkey would be equally affected by the 
Capitulations. 'In view of general situation created by the renascence of Turkey as a 
not negligible military power, and the practical impossibility for Great Britain to 
enforce upon her any demands not supported by the Allies in earnest,' wrote E. 
Graham Forbes Adam, First Secretary in the Foreign Office Eastern Department, in 
a memorandum of January 1923, 'our policy at the conference ought to be to restrict 
our demands to the barest minimum and leave the burden of fighting the Turkish 
pretensions as much as possible to France and Italy. For even France and Italy will 
have in their own interests to stand up for something, notably in the field of 
capitulations, finance and e c o n o m i c s . ' ^
By proposing that the demands concerning the Capitulations be thrown at 
the Turks, whose well-expected response would be a categorical refusal, not only 
would Curzon shift the controversy to another dimension by avoiding rupture and 
possible resumption of hostilities on the questions mainly interesting Britain, but he 
would also display a solid Allied front against the Turks and place Turkey in an 
awkward position by advertising as much as possible the Turks' 'obstinacy'. After 
an unsuccessful appeal to Ismet Pasha over the Capitulations, Curzon would refer to 
his usual method once more and blame Ismet Pasha for being intransigent. 
'Impossible people,’ he wrote to the Foreign Office, 'who seemed to combine the 
intelligence of an undeveloped child with the indurated obstinacy of the m ule.'^
The continued occupation of Istanbul, which Curzon held as a trump card 
in the negotiations, proved 'a useful lever to get the Turkish delegates to expedite 
the proceedings of the conference' in so far as the Allies were concerned. Contrary 
to the War Office wishing for an evacuation 'the sooner the better,' Curzon was 
adamant that it would be in the interest of Britain not to evacuate the city until the
25 F0371/7907/E11785/27/44, January 23, Memorandum by Forbes Adam.
26. F0839/17 No. 210; FO371/9059/E726/1/44, January 15, 1923, Curzon to Crowe; DBFP, XVIII, 
No. 327; Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, p. 380.
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signature was secured. ’I suppose Foreign Office realises that when evacuation has 
been completed the last means of exercising pressure upon Turks...will have 
g o n e '.27 Rumbold would follow the same line as his predecessor in the second 
part of the Conference. He would make it clear to Ismet Pasha that it was not 
possible to discuss the question of evacuation until the treaty was either about to be, 
or had already been, s i g n e d . 2 8  Despite Ismet Pasha's constant appeals for an 
immediate evacuation, neither Curzon nor Rumbold was prepared to alter his 
position unless he secured a satisfactory settlement.
Curzon was to describe Britain's tactics as 'complicated in application but 
simple in meaning'. He would try first to bargain and obtain what he wanted, 
failing that, to leave his Allies 'to dabble in further negotiations' while he 
'aggravated the situation or played the role of a peace maker' between t h e m . 2 9  The 
British strategy at the Conference was feasible so long as the Allied front survived 
and its survival depended on how far the Turkish delegation could go to satisfy the 
Allied demands. In order to obtain maximum concessions from the Turkish 
delegation, Curzon had to press hard but without causing the break up of the 
negotiations.
Turkey Aims to Neutralise Britain
The Turkish strategy at Lausanne was based upon the arrangements by the 
GNA.30 Turkey's standpoint could be summarised in three points: The Turkish 
Empire had ceased to exist; in consequence, the Treaty of Sevres and all other 
treaties concluded by the Empire with any other state had become null and void; and
27. FO371/9079/E5440/1/44, May 29. 1923, Minute; F0371/7973/E 13120/27/44, November 23, 
1922, Curzon to Crowe; DBFP, XVIII, No. 218.
28 F0371/9079/E5132/1/44, May 19, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon.
29. Eliding and Fisher, Soviet Russia and the West. No. 43
30. T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabitlari, Cilt III, pp. 1304-1325; F0371/7964/E13341/13003/44, 
November 10, 1922, Secret Intelligence Report, No. 968.
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the new Turkish State had never been at war with the Allies but only Greece, and 
the peace treaty, properly speaking, was only necessary so far as Greece was 
concerned. In regard to the Allies and other Powers, 'the Turkish delegates were to 
endeavour to start, as it were, with a clean slate, completely disregarding all anterior 
relations between Turkey and foreign powers, except as regards the various treaties 
and agreements concluded by the Grand National Assembly'. Moreover, the 
Turkish delegates were also 'to take every advantage of differences of opinion and 
rivalries' between the powers and 'conclude separate treaties with them,’ the same 
phrase used by Ismet Pasha later in his memoirs. 'Further corroborative information 
from the informants' was also included in the report about the attitude of the Turkish 
delegation on the specific points in question.
The most important advantage Ismet Pasha enjoyed was the weakness of 
Allied unity. It was a unity of vague promises engineered by Curzon and accepted 
by others in return for British support on issues about which they were most 
concerned. At the outset of the Conference he established his strategy of destroying 
Curzon's unity of promises by offering reasonable concessions. The initial Turkish 
strategy was to enter into separate arrangements with the Allies and then to enter into 
struggle with Britain. Ismet Pasha was quite prepared to make concessions to the 
Allies with a view to securing their neutrality, if not their actual support. But as the 
negotiations progressed he was compelled to revise his strategy since he came to 
believe that even the whole of Turkey would not be enough to satisfy the Allies, 
who were far from supporting the Turkish case against Britain. He thus became 
convinced that in order to achieve a rapid peace it was essential to come to terms 
with the British first, for once an agreement had been reached with them it was 
highly unlikely that the Conference would break down on the issues concerning 
other Allies.^ 1 'Before the Conference started,' Ismet Pasha recalled in his
Inonu. Hatiralar. p.73-74.
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memoirs, ’we were convinced that our relations with the French, which had already 
been ameliorated, would further improve, whereas the entire difficulty would come 
from the British side. At the outset of the Lausanne Conference the British 
government was constantly making every effort to secure unity among the Allies - a 
move which we had expected, but in practice British efforts proved to be far more 
successful than e x p e c t e d . ' ^
Ankara’s determination for peace with England was to be reiterated at every 
opportunity, and the necessity for reconciliation between England and Turkey was 
to be emphasised as an invaluable asset for the peace. When interviewed by the 
Manchester Guardian in November 1922, shortly before the opening of the 
Conference, General Refet Pasha (Refet Bele), a stalwart of the Nationalist 
movement who had recently been appointed governor of Eastern Thrace by the 
GNA, stated that Turkey needed the friendship of England and that England’s 
interests did not clash with those of Turkey. Although they had differences of 
opinion over the question of Mosul, Western Thrace and the Capitulations, which 
were seen as a gross violation of Turkish sovereignty, Turkey’s attitude on the 
Straits question was ’identical with England's.’ Nevertheless, in spite of these 
comparatively peaceful declarations there were also signs of extreme nervousness as 
to the question of Mosul. ’Mosul is Turkish and we want it back,’ continued Refet 
Pasha. 'Here is England's opportunity. She could win our friendship with one 
stroke if she gave Mosul to us without bargaining. And if she were to give us 
Mesopotamia as well she would win not only our friendship but that of all Islam.' 
Recalling the unpleasant consequences of the former British government's policy, 
Refet Pasha was cautious. ’We do not know what the new English government will 
be like, but with generosity, understanding and clear logical thinking it will win our
3 2  ib id . p.84.
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friendship and establish peace in the Near East. Treat us fairly, and we shall be your
friends.'33
The Turks seemed to have made every effort to convince the British that 
their prime objective was to make peace with Britain. In December, shortly after the 
beginning of the Conference, Robert Gilbert Vansittart, Curzon's Private Secretary, 
wrote to Rumbold: 'My impression is that the Turks were waiting and hoping for 
one thing and one thing only, an absolute proof of the willingness of the British to 
be friends with them again. The issue in Turkish mind is Great Britain or Russia. I 
believe if they got that proof they would not hesitate to throw over the R u s s i a n s . ’^  
Henderson's telegram to Rumbold supported Vansittart’s argument. 'A good deal 
of anti-English stuff is being censored out of the press,' he reported, 'though more 
than I like to see still remains. It is quite clear that the Turks regard England as the 
only factor to reckon with at the peace conference.'*^
The uncertainty of Britain's real future intentions, as well as the Turks' 
distrust of Curzon because of his connection with the former government, however, 
made the Turks hesitate. They regarded Curzon as unconvinced of the desirability of 
good Anglo-Turkish relations. The lack of any friendly gesture on the part of Britain 
might serve the continuation of close collaboration between Turkey and Russia. 
Curzon was very much concerned about the possible consequences of such a 
friendship. On the second day of the Conference, November 21st, to Curzon’s 
question as to how long the Turco-Russian friendship would last, Ismet Pasha 
replied: 'Forever.'^
33. F0371/7908/El2062/27/44; For Rauf Bey's speech delivered at the Grand National Assembly on 15. 
12. 1922, showing the earnest desire for peace, see: F0371/7918/E14124/27/44.
34, F0800/157, December 12, 1922, Vansittart to Rumbold; Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 30, ff. 130-136 
33, Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 30, ff. 120-124, December 11, 1922, Henderson to Rumbold; ff. 130- 
136, December 12, 1922, Henderson to Rumbold.
3^. Simsir, Lozan Telpraflari I. No. 14. November 21, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.
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Nevertheless, it did not take long for Ismet Pasha to change his view. 
During the Straits discussion, when Ismet Pasha realised that the only way to peace 
was through Britain, he altered his strategy and favoured the British thesis on the 
Straits question, despite the fact that Soviet proposals corresponded most closely to 
the Turkish point of view and that the Soviets supported Turkey on the Mosul 
question.
There were other considerations influencing the strategy change on the part 
of Turkey. Turkey needed peace, and in order to secure peace it first needed 
Britain’s support, which depended on arriving at a compromise over the questions 
of Mosul and the Straits. Second, the main ground for anxiety for Turkey’s future 
lay in its capacity to deal with economic questions in a reasonable fashion.
Mustafa Kemal had a realistic conception of the need for economic 
reconstruction and development, and his public speeches at the end of 1922 and 
early in 1923 gave evidence of his desire to satisfy this need, and a conviction that 
this could only be achieved by encouraging the influx of foreign capital; more 
precisely, by establishing good relations with the West. In that respect the 
Manchester Guardian's interview with Refet Pasha was a significant one, conveying 
Ankara's message. ’We shall need English, French and American capitalists and 
technical advisers and experts. We intend to invite them to help in building up our 
new state'. The essence of the message was couched in the following sentence: 
Turkey would do as Britain desired if latter accepted National Pact which 
comprised Turkey's minimum d e m a n d s . ' ^  i n  a private conversation with 
Henderson, Refet Pasha once again made it clear that the only thing Turkey needed 
from Britain was a sign: an 'expression of willingness to accept National Pact which 
was based on Wilsonian principles.' Although Turkey was 'honestly' and 
'sincerely' desirous of peace it could not accept less than the National Pact. As Refet
37 F0371/7917/E13726/27/44, Manchester Guardian, Interview with Refet Pasha.
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Pasha pointed out in the same interview, 'If her representatives at Lausanne or her 
leaders at Angora attempted to do so they would be repudiated and o v e r t h r o w n . ' ^  
Turkish support for either the British or Russian proposal on the Straits question 
was to determine the course of the Conference, Curzon's success or failure, and the 
future of Turco-Russian relations.
Development and Proceedings
Progress without Breakthrough
After the first plenary session on November 21, 1922, the Conference, 
having organised and adopted rules of procedure, started its complicated task by 
discussing the frontiers of Thrace on November 22 under the presidency of 
Curzon's Territorial and Military Commission. According to the original 
programme of the Conference, the Mosul question was to be discussed first. 
However, Curzon, having skilfully used his position as chairman of the Territorial 
and Military Commission, re-organised the Conference agenda and started the 
negotiations with the discussion of the Thracian border. Also, on November 26, a 
day before the Mosul question was scheduled for discussion in the Territorial 
Commission, Curzon had a private conversation with Ismet Pasha and persuaded 
him to discuss the matter outside the Conference, with a view to reaching a private 
agreement. Curzon's tactic was to keep disputed points for private discussions and 
avoid public disagreement in the Conference so as to obtain a better deal and prevent 
any embarrassment before the international c o m m u n i t y T h i s  effort could be 
assessed as a success for Curzon, as one of the strongest Turkish theses was 
postponed. Moreover, from the very start he was able to maintain the facade of so-
38 F0424/255 No. 735, December 6, 1922, Henderson to Crowe.
39. F0371/7967/E14272/13003/44, December 20, 1922, Curzon to Crowe; DBFP, XVIII, No. 284; 
F0839/22 No. 21; Leeper Papers, LEEP 1/5, November 26, 1922, (Allen Leepers Diary).
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called Allied unity on a subject where grave differences of opinion existed. Curzon 
left the settlement of the Question suspended and put another issue on the agenda, 
the one with which he would be able to demonstrate the solidarity of the Allies and 
of the Balkan states, and the one where the Turkish thesis had weak points: Thrace.
The Question of Thrace was, in Busch’s words, 'an opening skirmish' of 
little real importance to Britain's Asian policy, but it did emphasise the effectiveness 
of Curzon's s t r a t e g y . 4 ^  Not only did he succeed in uniting the Allies behind the 
British thesis, but he also secured the full support of the Balkan states, Greece, 
Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Ismet Pasha’s argument was that the frontier of 
T h r a c e ^ l  claimed by Turkey - from the Black Sea to the Maritza river - was that 
defined by article 7 of the Treaty of Constantinople, dated April 29,1913. Having 
ceded Western Thrace and the hinterland stretching from Adrianople to Demotika to 
the Bulgarians in the course of the Balkan Wars and the First World War, Turkey 
did not have strong ground in the face of the Greek claim that they had taken 
Western Thrace from the Bulgarians and not from the Turks. The Allies, on the 
other hand, recommended a thirty-kilometre demilitarised zone from the Black Sea 
to the Maritza river, to which Ismet Pasha would consent only on the conditions that 
the Allies gave guarantees for its inviolability and that there would be no foreign 
supervision over the territory. Ismet Pasha also demanded a plebiscite for Western 
Thrace^ where a Turkish majority was incontestable; this alarmed the Balkan
40. Busch, Mudros to Lausanne:, p. 366.
4 V The Maritza river divided Thrace into two sections, namely Eastern Thrace and Western Thrace. 
Eastern Thrace, under the Treaty of Sevres, was given to Greece, but with the Mudania Convention the 
Allies agreed that the province should be restored to Turkey. Western Thrace, by the conclusion of the 
Balkan Wars (1912-1913), was ceded by Turkey to Bulgaria under the Treaty of Bucharest; two years later, 
in 1915, an additional portion of Western Thrace, namely Karagatch and Demotika, had to be ceded to 
Bulgaria, under German pressure, as a price for its entry into the war. By the end of 1919, however, 
Bulgaria in line with the peace treaty signed at Neuilly, ceded Western Thrace to the Allied Powers. 
Almost a year later, on August 10, 1920, the Allies with the Thracian Treaty, transferred the province to 
Greece, though this treaty was never ratified. See: Cmd. 1814, pp. 40-61; Nur, Havat ve Hatiratim. pp. 
1009-1012; Inonu. Hatiralar. p.63-68: Simsir. Lozan Teleraflari I. No. 19. November 22, 1922, Ismet 
Pasha to Rauf Bey; No. 21. November 23, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.
42. Cmd. 1814, XXVI, p. 25-28; DBFP, XVIII, No. 215; Inonu, Hatiralar. p. 63-64; Simsir, Lozan 
Telgraflari I. No. 19. November 22, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; Grew, Turbulent Era, pp. 494-495; 
Nicolson. Curzon. pp. 293-298.
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states, which were convinced that once the plebiscite was carried out the frontiers of 
Turkey would stretch up to the west of Maritza river.
Ismet Pasha had not expected the exhibition of so firm an Allied front and 
of a determined 'Balkan Bloc' in the very first round. In a telegram of November 22 
to Ankara, he reported that he had little hope of securing the plebiscite in Western 
Thrace or the frontiers of Eastern Thrace as laid down in the Treaty of Bucharest of 
1913, but that he was optimistic about gaining Karagatch. He was convinced that 
he could follow a flexible policy since the Thracian question was not regarded as 
'essential' at Ankara. Rauf Bey’s telegram of November 26-27 informing Ismet 
Pasha of the approval of the Council of Ministers of the line taken by him was 
evidence of Turkey's flexible approach.^ 'Whatever happens,' Ismet Pasha wrote 
in his telegram to Ankara, 'I will not let the negotiations break up for the sake of 
these p o in ts .^
What Ismet Pasha did not expect was the solid Allied front strengthened by 
the Balkan block. Curzon threatened Ismet Pasha by pointing out 'the unwisdom of 
coming into collision not merely with inviting Powers, who were united, but with 
the solid block of Balkan S ta te s .^  In his words, that meant 'much more than the 
mere fact of Allied unity; it meant a terrible risk for those who declined to recognise 
the value and importance of this unity. It meant that those who might challenge it, 
and in the long run fight against it, would be provoking a contest of a one-sided 
character in which they could not hope to succeed,'^ To Ismet Pasha it underlined 
the fact that a more conciliatory approach was needed and that in order to be able to 
show a strong hand at the coming part of the negotiations for crucial issues, small
43. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I. No. 34. November 26/27, 1922, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha.
44 ibid. No. 19. November 22, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.
45. DBFP, XVIII, No. 226, November 26, 1922, Curzon to Henderson; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I. 
No.31, November 26, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.
46. Cmd. 1814, p. 92.
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sacrifices could be made. The Thracian frontier, thus, was to be the first breach in 
the National Pact.
The fate of the Aegean Islands^? was also to be discussed on the same 
day, November 25, at the sixth meeting of the Territorial and Military Commission 
held in the afternoon. Ismet Pasha's policy was to secure the recognition of Turkish 
sovereignty over the islands of Imbros and Tenedos on account of their proximity 
to the mouth of the Dardanelles, and the demilitarisation of the main group of 
islands lying between the above group and the Dodecanese, currently in the hands 
of the Greeks. These islands could serve as a basis of operations. The very object of 
the proposed measures was to make it impossible for Greece to prepare offensive 
operations against Turkey on these islands. It was therefore essential to demilitarise 
them. The abrogation of Greek sovereignty over the main group of islands and the 
institution of a form of autonomy were, as Curzon stated, 'a tiy-on'. Ismet Pasha 
also knew that his argument concerning the Dodecanese islands, which were ceded 
to Italy in 1912 by the Treaty of Ouchy, would not be a strong one and would 
probably be dismissed without difficulty by Curzon. But he would not take a chance 
as to the Islands of Imbros and Tenedos and Samothrace, which were of vital 
importance from the point of view of the security of Turkey. In reply to Curzon's 
argument about the ethnic character of these islands, Ismet Pasha lost no time in 
exposing the double standards of the Allies. He pointed out that 'in a matter so 
essential' the ethnic character could not 'outweigh geographical and political 
considerations of the highest importance'. He placed his finger upon the weak point 
of Curzon's argument by referring to the discussion of Thrace during which the 
superiority of geographical and political necessities over ethnic considerations had 
been asserted despite the overwhelming Turkish majority. Thus, Ismet Pasha
47 During the Balkan Wars Greece had seized all the Aegean islands from Turkey, except Rhodes and the 
Dodecanese islands which were at the time under Italian occupation. By the Treaty of London of May 30, 
1913, Greece was confirmed in possession of these islands with the exception of Imbros and Tenedos 
which were restored to Turkey, but with the S&vres Treaty Greece also obtained Imbros and Tenedos.
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managed successfully to have the official decision concerning the sovereignty of 
these islands deferred until discussion of the Straits question. He insisted that the 
question of these islands was closely bound up with that of the Straits and hoped to 
get the full support of the Russians in the course of the forthcoming negotiations.
On the other hand, Curzon, who had given no consideration to the Turkish 
delegation in the organisation of the Conference, was to suggest that the Economic 
Commission under the presidency of M. Barr&re could begin its work on the 
afternoon of the 27th November, the day the frontiers of Syria and Iraq were to be 
discussed. Therefore the Territorial and Economic Commissions would work 
concurrently but not simultaneously, providing the opportunity for Curzon to 
control the agenda of the Conference. That would give him the opportunity to exert 
pressure upon Ismet Pasha in the event of an unsatisfactory settlement of the Straits. 
In the case of failure to reach a satisfactory result concerning British claims, he 
would have the means of exerting pressure upon Ismet Pasha by vigorously 
supporting the Allies’ demands in economic matters which did not primarily concern 
Britain.
In the meantime Ismet Pasha carried on a series of private conversations 
outside the Conference. On November 27, a day before the Mosul question was 
scheduled for discussion in the Territorial Commission, he met Curzon in private 
and discussed the matter in detail. That was when he realised that the issue would 
cause great difficulty and possibly lead to the break-up of the Conference. In the 
face of Ismet Pasha's demand for the restoration of Mosul to Turkey on ethnic, 
political, economical, historical, geographical and military and strategical grounds, 
Curzon’s reply was categorical: 'I cannot and will not’. However, he was 
sympathetic towards Ismet Pasha's inquiry about the possibility of Ankara's 
participation in the Turkish Petroleum Company, calling it 'not an unreasonable
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request which was well worthy of examination*. Curzon believed that 'if Turks can 
be given a share in oil, their demand for Mosul will probably be dropped'/^
On the same day Ismet Pasha met Barr&re; he complained about the 
unfriendly and unexpected attitude of the French over the Question but was assured 
that what was displayed was the official approach and should be seen in that light. 
After being reassured by Barrere, Ismet Pasha had a private conversation with 
Grew, during which Ismet Pasha gave his assurance that Turkey would show that 
'nothing in her laws and legal system could worry foreigners as to their full 
protection'; Ismet Pasha also committed himself to giving a reassuring statement in 
regard to the protection of America's religious, philanthropic, and educational 
institutions in Turkey. The Prime Minister's telegram to Ismet Pasha informing him 
about Turco-American co-operation on the above-mentioned matter was a good 
example of such intentions on the part of A nkara.^  Ismet Pasha’s subsequent 
effort on November 29 to win American support by suggesting a new treaty 
between the two countries did not produce the wished-for result and Child turned 
down the offer on the grounds that the United States would make no commitment at 
that stage of the Conference.^ Thus Turkey took a further step in the interval and 
gave the oil concession, known as the Chester C o n c e s s i o n ,51 to the Americans with 
the hope of getting their backing on Mosul.
While the work of the Territorial Commission was on its way the 
Economic and Financial Commission under the presidency of M. BarrSre began its
48. F 0 3 7 1 /7 9 6 4 /E 1 3 2 8 6 /13003/44 , Novem ber 27, 1922, Curzon to Crowe; 
FO371/8003/E13523/132/65, December 1, 1922, Curzon to Crowe; DBFP, XVIII, No. 228, 246; 
Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I. No.25. November 25, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No,40. November 27, 
1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No. 59. November 30, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; F0839/17; 
F0839/9, 22; FO371/7964/E13286/13003/44; CON123/670.
49. simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I. No. 44. November 28, 1922, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; No. 57. 
November 29, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; Grew, Turbulent Era, p. 502.
50. child, A Diplomat Looks at Europe., p.95; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I. No. 57. November 29, 1922, 
Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.
51. See: Chapter V, p. 156.
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work on November 27th upon the suggestion of Curzon. To organise the work of 
the Commission, which would have to deal with delicate technical problems, it was 
suggested that the work should be distributed among a number of sub­
commissions. The chief questions to be dealt with by the Commission would be the 
distribution of the debt^2 of the former Ottoman Empire among the countries in 
whose favour parts of that Empire had been detached, and reparation for the damage 
caused by the Greeks. Considering the fact that Turkey’s economic and financial 
development depended on its full and complete independence, on its being released 
from all restrictions which interfered with its full economic liberty, these questions 
were of capital importance.
It was evident that the solution of the problems would require very 
considerable work, which would prolong the negotiations and thus delay the 
conclusion of peace. After deciding the procedure of the Conference Barrere was 
about to postpone the continuation of the discussion to the following day when 
Curzon spoke and stated that since 'he would not be able to join in the discussions 
of the sub-commissions, he would very much like to hear in the full commission 
statements of the views held by the various parties, and particularly by the Turkish 
delegation'.^ Curzon's suggestion that economic and financial matters ought to be 
discussed before the main commission had one objective: to control the course of 
the negotiations and prepare his strategy accordingly. When the 'intransigent* 
attitude of the Turks concerning the territorial questions was displayed, more 
precisely over Mosul and the Straits, he would be in a position to put pressure on 
Ismet Pasha. On November 28, at the second meeting of the Economic and 
Financial Commission, Ismet Pasha presented the arguments of Ankara respecting
33 The decaying Ottoman Empire had been in a state of permanent insolvency, and had to be supported 
by continual loans from the European governments interested in Ottoman survival. The Turkish aim in 
1923 was to make a long term plan for the liquidation of the enormous debt in such a way that the 
economic life of the new state should not be crippled in the process. Edward Reginald Vere-Hodge., 
Turkish Foreign Policy. 1918-1948. (Geneva, 1950), pp. 44-45.
53. Cmd. 1814, XXVI, p. 540.
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the issues of the Ottoman Debt and of Reparations and, on December 1st, the 
question of the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey, including the 
return of prisoners of war and civil hostages. Curzon, having listened to the Turkish 
thesis on the matters concerned and taken notes where necessary for his counter­
attack, needed one last card which he could play should the necessity arise: the 
Capitulations.
The first meeting of the Second Commission, namely the Commission on 
the Regime of Foreigners, to discuss the Capitulations took place on December 2 
under the presidency of Marquis Garroni. After the opening speech read by Garroni 
in Italian, three sub-commissions were set up to deal with judicial capitulations, 
economic capitulations and nationalities and antiquities. Both sides were determined 
to carry their point and expected that they would encounter great difficulty in the 
discussion of the subject. Not surprisingly, the matter was discussed more or less 
continuously from December 1922 to July 1923.
While Ismet Pasha was under immense pressure from the rigid instructions 
from Ankara and a very strong national feeling at home, the Allies on the other hand 
were not about to relinquish easily the privileges they had held for many centuries. 
Garroni's statement, laying down the necessity of substituting for the existing 
Capitulations some other variety that would be consistent with Turkish independent 
sovereignty, while guaranteeing necessary protection for foreigners, received no 
support from the Turkish delegation. In view of the incompatibility of the 
Capitulations with a nation's independence and with its concern for its existence and 
sovereign rights, Turkey would not agree to negotiations with a view to the 
Capitulations being suppressed in form and in name, but still maintained in 
substance. The Ankara government maintained the stance that Turkey had the same 
rights as every nation that was sovereign, independent and master of its destinies'^
54. Ibid. p. 469.
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and it regarded its system of justice as equal to that of the best governed countries. 
Any proposal to modify it in the interests of foreigners was consequently regarded 
by it as an effort to abridge its sovereign i n d e p e n d e n c e . ^
However, the question of the Capitulations was an issue in which each of 
the Allies had an interest and they were able to present a solid front in the face of the 
Turkish argument. In a telegram to Ankara on December 2, Ismet Pasha expressed 
his pessimistic view on the situation: We disagree on everything. We have grave 
differences between u s '.^  His pessimism was not unfounded. The subsequent 
negotiations would prove that this was only the beginning of a long battle. 
However, what Ismet Pasha did not know was that the fragile Allied unity was 
already crumbling. 'Behind the scenes Italians are giving great trouble putting 
forward outrageous demands for commercial or other concerns, as a price of their 
remaining in the conference,' wrote Curzon to the Foreign Office on December 1. 
He called the Italian attitude a 'shameless attempt at blackmail which seemed to be 
inseparable from Italian conception of policy.'^
Although when the question of the Dodecanese Islands came up for 
discussion at the Conference Curzon succeeded in preventing it from being raised 
with the Turks, it did not seem enough to satisfy the Italians, who desired 'a 
friendly understanding with Great Britain in regard to Italy's position in the 
mandated territories' and believed that 'a formula which would give satisfaction to 
the desires of the Italian government’ could be agreed upon.^®
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F0371/9058/E100/1/44, December, 30, 1922, Secretary of State for Colonies to Dominions.
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On December 4, Curzon, in order to keep Allied unity intact and drive a 
wedge between Turkey and Russia, chose to bring the Straits question on to the 
agenda of the Conference. Discussion of the Straits question would test the strength 
of the Turco-Russian alliance as well as the success of Curzon’s diplomacy. 
Furthermore, the issue would mark a turning point in the future relations of Turkey 
and Russia.
The Straits settlement was by no means a purely Turkish affair and it had 
never been, considering the history of the question.^ Ever since the eighteenth 
century the Straits as an international waterway had formed the tension point 
between Britain and Russia and were the subject of a rivalry which would last for 
many years to co rn ed  During the Lausanne negotiations it was British and Russian 
interests which clashed, as always in the past, rather than Turkey’s interests and 
Britain’s. But this time the roles of Russia and of the Western Powers were 
reversed. While Britain was in favour of the freedom of the Straits, Russia was 
determined to close them. The attitude of the Turkish delegation was naturally 
swayed by a number of conflicting aims, though Turkey had proclaimed its view 
four years before in the National Pact.
Erik Lance Knudsen., Great Britain. Constantinople, and the Turkish Peace Treaty. 1919-1922. 
(New York, 1987); Aralov, Bir Sovvel Dinlomatinin Turkive Hatiralari. pp. 191-213; Herbert A. 
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On the opening discussions of the Straits question, Ismet Pasha made a 
statement in which he repeated the principles laid down in the National Pact. This 
did not satisfy Curzon who called it 'half a dozen sentences of purely general 
character affirming Turkish sovereignty in the abstract and indicating sympathy with 
commercial freedom of Straits but containing no proposals or arguments and 
formulating no plan'.62 in fact, this time Ismet Pasha used the same tactic as 
Curzon, deliberately declining to continue the discussion in order not to reveal the 
whole position of Turkey before the views of the other states were heard. In Child's 
words, 'he [Ismet Pasha] camps patiently outside, saying little, doing nothing, 
estimating comparative realities of f o r c e ' . 63 He was convinced that Curzon would 
again, as he had done on numerous occasions, try to get the Turkish view f i r s t ,64 
which would enable him to prepare his reply. But this time Ismet Pasha was 
determined not to give further precise details despite immense pressure from 
Curzon.
After hearing, to quote Child, 'cat-paw [sic] nations which had been 
primed to set forth in substance the British and French viewpoint^, Curzon 
invited Chicherin to state the Russian case. Although Russia was in favour of 
permanent freedom for commercial navigation and for peaceful maritime 
communications in the Bosphorus, the Sea of Maimora and the Dardanelles without 
any restriction, it opposed the British thesis by demanding that the Straits must be 
permanently closed both in peace time and in war time to warships, armed vessels 
and military aircraft of all countries except Turkey. In Curzon's terms the Russian 
thesis had only one objective: To convert the Black Sea into a Russian lake with
62. F0371/7965/E13660/13003/44, December 5, 1922, Curzon to Crowe; DBFP, XVIII, No. 255; A. L. 
Macfie., The Straits Question; The Conference of Lausanne, November, 1922-July 1923' Middle Eastern 
Studies. 15 (1979), pp. 211-238.
63. Child, A Diplomat Looks at Europe, p. 99.
64. inonu, Hatiralar. p. 69; Nicolson, Curzon. p. 308.
6^. Child. A Diplomat Looks at Europe, p. 100.
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Turkey as the faithful guardian at the gates'.^ Naturally, Chicherin's statement was 
bound to cause tension in the conference room and it did. Curzon, without a 
moment's hesitation, rose and in solemn tones replied to the Russian delegation: 'It 
seems remarkable that this programme, which provides chiefly for the defence of 
Turkish interests, should be put forward by Russia. While listening to this 
proposal, I imagined that M. Chicherin must have mistaken his role and assumed 
the kalpak of Ismet Pasha'.67
Turkish support for the Russian thesis was not permanent and proved to be 
for tactical purposes only. Ismet Pasha had no intention of allowing Chicherin to 
speak on behalf of the Turkish delegation, although the Russian proposal 
corresponded most closely with the Turkish point of view. His main concern was 
that the disappearance of the Turco-Soviet front at this stage of the negotiations 
might endanger the Turkish position vis-^-vis Britain before any matter was settled 
to Turkey's advantage. But he realised that the time had come to make a choice 
between the old friendship for which no basis any longer existed and a new 
potential friendship based on the peace presently under negotiation. When asked by 
Curzon 'whether he accepted the Russian case as the case of the Turkish 
government', his reply determined the basis of Turkey's relations with Britain and 
Russia in the future. He declared that he would be willing to consider any other 
proposals made by the Allied Powers 'in close connection with the sovereign rights 
and the absolute independence o f  T u r k e y ' 6 8 .  This was a most significant indication 
in terms of showing on what side Turkey's preference would lay.
On the following day, December 6, at the second meeting of the Straits 
Commission, Child made what Curzon came to describe a 'well phrased and
66. Cmd.1814, p. 141.
67 Nicolson. Curzon. p. 310; Cmd.1814, p. 133; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I. No.82. December 2, 
1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.
68. Cmd.1814, XXVI, p. 135; Nicolson. Curzon. p. 311.
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effective declaration of American views’, particularly with regard to freedom of 
access, both for ships of war, to the Black Sea, viewing the Straits as an 
international highway and claiming the right of every state to protect its 
commerce.^ The American statement was a significant one in terms of timing since 
it was thought that Turkey should face the United States' individual position as well 
as the joint position of the Allies before taking a definite stand. However, Ismet 
Pasha still declined to discuss the question before the Conference until he had seen 
the detailed proposals made by Curzon in the name of the Allies and he joined 
Chicherin in asking for a postponement of the discussions until December 8. 
Nevertheless, by the end of two sessions the Turkish position was almost certain 
and the Americans soon recognised the fact that the Russian pressure for the 
fortified Straits and the Black Sea to be closed to all war craft had been 'almost lost' 
on the Turks who were inclined to be conciliatory.
The key question is whether Ismet Pasha's unexpected change of attitude 
was, as generally claimed, the result of Curzon's successful policy or whether there 
were other considerations affecting the Turkish viewpoint. Undoubtedly, Curzon's 
statesmanship was a contributing factor, but at the heart of the matter lay Turkey's 
willingness to reach a compromise with Britain. First of all, the Turkish point of 
view, as laid out in the National Pact, was not altogether far from the British thesis. 
Second, Ismet Pasha was convinced that the Straits question formed one of the main 
obstacles on the way to peace. If Turkey were to get a satisfactory settlement it 
would have to come to an agreement with the Allies in general, and with Britain in 
p a r t i c u l a r , ^  Third, Ismet Pasha, having believed that the only way to Mosul was 
through Britain, renewed private conversations through Riza Nur, the second 
Turkish delegate. Not only did Riza Nur offer to support the British thesis on the
69. Cmd.1814, XXVI, p. 145-146; FRUS, II, 1923 pp. 913-914; DBFP, XVIII, No. 260; Grew, 
Turbulent Era, pp. 506-508; Child. A Diplomat Looks at Europe, p. 101.
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question of the Straits but he also offered to sign a peace treaty on British terms if 
only Turkey got Mosul. It was indeed very difficult for Curzon to ignore such a 
peace proposal. He informed the Foreign Office in the following terms: Turkey 
would meet us on every point, conclude satisfactory treaty and even break with 
Soviet, if only we would give them vilayet of M o s u l ' . 7 1  Whether the proposal had 
the desired effect on the British delegation will be examined in detail when the 
Mosul question is dealt with, later in the chapter.
The considerable change in the attitude of the Turkish delegation had very 
much to do with their suspicion of future Russian motives, even though Ismet 
Pasha knew that Russian support at Lausanne was a factor of extraordinary 
importance. He also knew that he could not rely on Russia's support in case of a 
likely war with Britain. When he discussed the question with Chicherin in Lausanne 
and asked him whether Russia would be ready to fight beside Turkey if he were to 
reject the Allies' proposal, Chicherin gave him an evasive answer and suggested that 
the proposal could be negotiated in M o s c o w .72 Furthermore, Ismet Pasha came to 
believe that acting together with Russia on the question under discussion would, in 
fact, isolate Turkey from the Western World which it was determined to join. Last, 
but not least, economic considerations, as discussed above, played an important role 
in Turkey's policy change. Owing to the economic position of Turkey it was 
absolutely necessary to make peace with the Allies.
Since the Straits discussion, relations between the Turkish and the Russian 
delegation had been very strained and an open rupture had been avoided with
71. Nur, Havatim ve Hatiratim. Cilt III; F0424/255; CON12330 No. 737; CAB23/32 No. 80; 
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difficulty.73 Russian disappointment was expressed in Ankara on January 11, in a 
private meeting74 between Rauf Bey and Aralof, and also in Lausanne, through 
Chicherin’s attempt in Lausanne to discredit Ismet Pasha before the Muslim 
delegations of India and other countries. Chicherin stated that 'the Turks were not 
only selling the interests of Russia, but of all Oriental countries, and that they were 
merely playing into the hands of England and helping her',75 and urged the 
'oppressed Moslem nations' to take immediate steps to lodge a very strong protest 
to the Ankara government against the policy of the Turkish delegates in Lausanne.
The death of Mustafa Kemal's mother was to produce another opportunity 
for Chicherin who, on January 22, sent a private letter to Mustafa Kemal in which 
he offered his condolences and sought co-operation on the Straits question.76 gut 
the actual object of the letter was to secure Mustafa Kemal's support for the Russian 
thesis, the closure of the Straits to warships. These assertions and suggestions on 
the part of Chicherin, along with the contemplated entrance of Turkey into the 
League of Nations, resulted in a very definite wave of anti-Turkish feeling among 
the Muslim delegations in Lausanne and increased Ismet Pasha's difficulties.
When the Straits question was, in principle, settled in favour of Britain, the 
problem of the Minorities was placed upon the agenda of the Conference. As 
Turkey took a limited part in making the agenda and no part in planning the subjects 
to be discussed, the Turkish delegation was sometimes in the dark, even the night 
before, as to the subject to be discussed the next morning and consequently found 
itself unprepared. In other words, while the Allies had ample time to prepare their 
case, before the agenda was communicated to the Turkish delegation it often
73. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I. No. 107. December 10, 1922, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; No. 120. 
December 11, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Mustafa Kemal; No. 128. December 13, 1922, Rauf Bey to Ismet 
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74. Ibid. No. 326.
75. FO371/9058/E262/1/44, January 5, 1923, SIS Report, No. 1030.
76. simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I. No. 424. January 24,1923, Ismet Pasha to Mustafa Kemal.
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happened that the latter received the agenda only a few hours before the meeting and 
was compelled either to answer hurriedly or to reserve its r e p l y . 77 This was 
precisely the case in the Minorities discussions. The Turkish delegation was 
informed by the British only after midnight about the discussions of the next day 
and Ismet Pasha was not woken up by the clerk due to the late hour. He, 
nevertheless, managed to save the situation by presenting a lengthy report 
previously prepared in A n k a r a  .78 Furthermore, the Minorities question was to be 
originally dealt with by the Second Commission under the presidency of M. 
Garroni, who proposed referring the issue to a sub-committee of the Capitulations 
Commissions. Having called Garroni's proposal ’wholly inconsistent with 
importance and world wide interest of subject' Curzon protested against it 
vigorously in private; Garroni was forced to transfer the issue, in the course of 
proceedings, to the First Commission presided over by Curzon, without any 
consultation with the Turks. 'I knew in his hand it would never be properly argued 
or pushed,' wrote Curzon to Crowe on December 3, and added: 'I shall take it at an 
early date and will press it with all (? force) at my c o m m a n d ' . 7 9
On December 12, Lord Curzon opened the discussion by explaining the 
past history and present position of the minorities which was challenged by Ismet 
Pasha in a long speech containing extracts from histories, encyclopaedias and 
official publications, French, English and American, in support of his theme. The 
Turkish thesis was simple: Turkey was willing to accept the provisions laid down 
by the international treaties signed after the First World War and the League of 
Nations resolutions concerning the Minorities. A National Home for Armenians 
was out of the question since it would involve the dismemberment of Turkey and
77 Cmd. 1814, p. 277; Inonu, Hatiralar. p. 79; Child, A Diplomat Looks at Europe, p. 108; Nur, 
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was inconsistent with independent sovereignty. The idea of an independent body or 
organisation to supervise minority protection in the future was also categorically 
rejected.
The discussions on the Minorities were the most heated that the Conference 
was to witness. The Turks and the British had different interests in the matter and 
each was determined to settle the issue to its advantage. Ismet Pasha's instructions 
were extremely rigid and he was given every authority to break up the Conference 
and return to Ankara if the Allies insisted on the National Armenian Home. There is 
no question upon which the Turkish delegates are more unyielding,' reported the 
Americans to Washington on January 7, The American delegation has received no 
evidence that Ismet or any other Turkish delegate privately is in sympathy with the 
proposal for an Armenian national h o m e . ' ^ O  Therefore Curzon's attempt to press on 
Ismet Pasha the question of agreeing to assign a tract of territory in Turkey for the 
purpose of creating a National Home for the Armenians was bound to fail. As Ismet 
Pasha knew well, any solution which gave way to the Allied proposals would be 
totally rejected by Ankara. Therefore, under no circumstances could Ismet Pasha be 
induced to accept an independent Armenian State within the boundaries of Turkey.
In a private conversation with a Swiss professor, who was an ardent 
supporter of Armenian claims, Ismet Pasha expressed his feelings on the matter. 
'You propose to dismember my country.' said Ismet Pasha. 'We, after fighting for 
four years throughout the First World War in order to prevent the dismemberment 
of Turkey, struggled for another four years to keep it intact. Your organisation's 
efforts are nothing compared to the states we defeated and the difficulties we 
overcame'.^!
80. FRUS (1923) II, No. 184, p.948. 
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Turkey’s resolution not to tolerate any compromise in regard to the 
Armenian Homeland was also indicated by Riza Nur's behaviour in the course of 
the discussions held by the sub-commission. On January 6, Riza Nur, despite 
Garroni's objection, left the meeting room refusing to listen to Armenian c l a i m s . ^  
Rumbold, who was present at the meeting, was greatly disturbed and described it 'a 
most insolent scene' .83
Deadlock Looms
As the negotiations progressed, the situation seemed to be reaching a point 
where in spite of the desire for peace the negotiations threatened to came to a 
standstill owing to the opposing and irreconcilable demands of both sides, and 
chances of concluding a peace seemed rather slim. Pessimism began to increase. 
'What they want is peace on a National Pact basis to which they imagine they have 
worn us down,' commented Ryan in a personal telegram of December 19 to 
Henderson, 'they might perhaps drop one or two outlying things in the Pact, and 
come to terms on the Strait question which the Pact is elastic but I do not from my 
general knowledge or from indications here see any real sign of their wavering on 
Mosul or the Capitulations. They are also very strict about Minorities.' He 
concluded that there was no sign as yet of the smallest departure from the 
'watchwords of complete independence and non-interference.'^
After a conversation of more than one and a half hours with Ismet Pasha, 
Curzon was worn out. 'He is impervious either to argument, warning or appeal, 
and can only go on repeating the same catchwords, indulging in the same futile 
quibbles, and making the same childish complaints', Curzon complained on
82 Nur, Hayatve Hatiratim, pp. 1062-1063; Inonu, Hatiralar. pp. 83-84; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I. 
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December 26 .'One might just as well argue with the Pyramid of Cheops.’^  Ismet 
Pasha's report to Ankara was no different from that of his adversaries. In his 
telegram of December 23, he expressed himself in pessimistic terms regarding the 
prospect of a settlement. As the Allies still held their position on the Straits, the 
Minorities and other questions, ’a sudden rupture of negotiations had to be 
expected. Turks had got their backs to the wall on all questions,' and they could not 
yield on questions vital to their independence. In a reply dated December 24, the 
Prime Minister assured Ismet Pasha that the Turkish army was prepared for all 
emergencies.^
Curzon was well aware of Ismet Pasha's difficulties in regard to the 
rigidity of his instructions and he would try to exploit it to the very end. The 
Minorities question was not of prime interest to Britain but constituted a useful tool 
for Curzon who used it with skill to bring the Turks into line when their attitude on 
the Mosul question proved to be difficult. He had no intention of carrying the 
demand for a territorial home beyond using it as a trading p o i n t . i t  was, to quote 
Ryan, 'a "put up" merely for window dressing’88 in his memoirs, Ismet Pasha 
recalls a private conversation with one of the British delegates to whom he
85. DBFP, XVIII, No. 293, December 26, 1922, Curzon to Crowe; F0371/7968/E14625/13003/44, 
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expressed his profound disappointment about the British stand. When Ismet Pasha 
inquired as to whether Britain would break the Conference up over the Minorities 
question he was assured that Britain was out for peace and its protests should not be 
misinterpreted. 'Over the years we committed ourselves by making so many 
promises therefore it is natural that we should protest vigorously'^ stated the 
British delegate stressing that Turkey's worries were unfounded. The Americans, 
who actually supported the Armenian claims, were also aware of Curzon's approach 
to the question of a National Home for Armenians, '...as I have known all along,' 
wrote Child in his memoirs, 'he plainly intends to abandon the idea.'^
While the formal discussions at the Conference pointed to a deadlock the 
private negotiations gained momentum. Soon after the unprecedented proposal of 
Riza Nur, the private meetings took place on December 7, 8 and 10, where the 
Turks claimed the vilayet of Mosul again and the British stated that on such a basis 
no further negotiations were possible.^ Ismet Pasha's firm attitude, as well as 
Curzon's realisation that the Mosul problem would certainly be the most 
troublesome one, strained the relations between the two and made Curzon more 
combative than ever during the Minorities discussions. He went even further and 
told Ismet Pasha the Conference would be broken up unless the Turkish attitude 
was more conciliatory.^ At the same time, Curzon was certain that it would be 
impossible to induce Turkey to accept any form of servitude or supervision in 
regard to the Armenians, or any other Christian and Muslim minorities for that 
matter. Curzon was also aware that the Turks were deeply conscious about the
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judgement of the world and he on several occasions threatened Ismet Pasha by 
saying that 'the whole world had its eyes fixed on the conference r o o m ' .93
Another tactic used by Curzon was that of provocation. In order to make 
Ismet Pasha agree to join the League of Nations he attacked him by saying that 
'Great Britain did not fear the League of Nations because her hands were clean,' to 
which the Pasha replied that 'there had never been any question of Turkey fearing 
the League of Nations either. The hands of the Turks now at work in their own 
country, which had been devastated and ruined by foreign invasion, were quite 
peculiarly clean. Those hands had never violated, invaded or devastated any foreign 
country, and could without fear sustain comparison with any other h a n d s ' .94 it was 
a war of attrition between the two that made the atmosphere tense, and the 
discussions more contentious than ever. However, Ismet Pasha knew that he could 
not go back to Ankara without peace and Curzon relied on the fact that Ismet Pasha 
could not push the matter further without facing a rupture. A compromise needed to 
be reached.
The problem was to be settled in favour of the Turkish thesis in return for 
Ismet Pasha's declaration that Turkey would join the League of Nations once peace 
was achieved. It was a deal convenient for both sides. Turkey, having already 
decided to become part of Europe and convinced that it was only through Britain 
that peace could be reached, favoured the idea of joining the League of Nations. 
Therefore it was not, as suggested by Nicolson, Curzon's 'victory to widen the 
breach between Turkey and Russia', but purely reflected Turkey's pragmatic 
approach to the matter.
In the following days, the work of the Conference was carried out by 
continuous meetings of sub-commissions. Although these groups discussed the
93 Cmd. 1814, p. 183, 276.
94. Cmd. 1814, XXVI, p. 219.
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various questions before them, by the end of each session innumerable points were 
still left unsettled. It was in these sub-commissions that the detailed negotiations 
were worked out, failing which the issues were carried on in the private rooms of 
the various delegates rather than across the conference table. On December 18, 
following the discussions respecting the question of the Minorities, the sub­
committee of the Territorial and Military Commission prepared a draft ’Straits 
Convention,' and submitted it to the Conference, where it received severe criticism 
from Russia. 'It threatens the vital interests of Russia, violates the most elementary 
requirements of Turkey as regards her safety and independence', stated Chicherin. 
However, he did not get the support of Ismet Pasha, who declared next day that 
Turkey would agree in principle with the Allied Powers on many of the points 
contained in the draft, on condition that some modifications should be introduced 
into it.
Curzon was critical of the French and Italian attitude at the private meetings 
he held with Ismet Pasha. 'Ismet repeats same provisions over and over again, 
refusing to budge an inch,' he wrote to Crowe, 'while I have to fight solitary battle, 
my colleagues overflowing with unctuous civility to the Turks and showing an 
inclination to bolt at every comer from the course...If I were at liberty to deal with 
Ismet alone, I should be more sanguine of definite result'.^  After deep private 
conversations which, according to Curzon, would 'break down the patience of the 
Prophet Job', on December 20, Ismet Pasha delivered a speech, 'in a tone of 
moderation and conciliation’ and accepted the Allies' draft, which would be adopted 
as a final text of the Straits Convention at the last session on February 1.
When the Straits Question was settled there was only one issue left about 
which Britain was concerned: The Mosul Question. Ismet Pasha was absolutely
95. F0839/17; F0371/7967/E14370/13003/44, December 22, 1922, Curzon to Crowe; DBFP, XVIII, 
No. 286.
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convinced that Britain's support for Italy and France over economic issues had the 
aim of gaining Mosul for Britain.^ Child and Grew, the American observers, 
shared this opinion. From December 20, the day on which Turkish acceptance of 
the Straits Convention was secured, to January 23, the day the Mosul discussions 
began, Curzon became engaged in a note-writing controversy with Ismet Pasha over 
the question, and he manipulated the discussions on the Capitulations and the 
Minorities issues depending on the nature of the Turkish reply. On December 28, at 
the second meeting of the Commission on the Regime of Foreigners, under the 
presidency of Marquis Garroni, in which the judicial regime was under discussion, 
Ismet Pasha refused the Allied proposal to institute a regime 'which would 
perpetuate, under a disguised name or form, an aggravation of the capitulatory 
regime.' As Turkey regarded its system of justice as equal to that of the best 
governed countries, any proposal to modify it in the interests of foreigners was 
consequently regarded as an effort to abridge its sovereign independence. Ismet 
Pasha declared Turkey is requested to furnish guarantees for Allied nationals; but 
these guarantees already exist in Turkish laws and institutions, just as they exist in 
those of other independent States. There is therefore no justification for preferential 
treatment of foreigners, which none of the Powers represented here could tolerate in 
its own c a s e ,
Curzon listened to Ismet Pasha's speech with 'much disappointment and 
great regret' and stated that it was 'the most hard and uncompromising speech' that 
Ismet Pasha had delivered since the Conference b e g a n . ^ 8  He was well aware of 
Ismet Pasha's rigid instructions over the Capitulations, and of Ismet Pasha having 
the authority to break off the negotiations without consulting Ankara. The latter 
(Ankara) in its stupid isolation is so intent on the subject that it would probably lose
96 Inonu, Hatiralar. pp. 712-74.
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half its kingdom sooner than yield,' he wrote to the Foreign Office on December 28. 
Curzon also knew Ismet Pasha's 'most profound and sincere desire to attain a 
peace,' and therefore did not refrain from attacking Ismet Pasha at the next meeting, 
on January 6. '...Turks will be very reluctant to leave Lausanne without a general 
agreement,' he wrote on January 10 to Crowe in a secret telegram, 'and that their 
efforts will be increasingly directed not to rupture but to obtaining by relentless 
pressure applied to very last second of maximum that anxieties or fears of powers 
may be persuaded to concede.'^ Because of the settlement of the Straits question in 
favour of Britain, the warlike attitude of Curzon which had been observed 
previously in the Capitulations issue was absent in the Minorities discussions held 
on January 9 and 10. The discussions took place in a conciliatory spirit and an 
agreement was virtually reached between the two parties. But this was not the only 
reason for the moderation of British policy.
When the conference of Allied Prime Ministers in London on December 9th 
proved unsuccessful and the second attempt by Bonar Law in Paris on January 2, 
1923 ended in failure through French rejection of his plan even as a basis for 
discussion, Curzon realised the difficulties lying ahead. On January 4, 1923, 
Curzon's united front was severely shaken by the collapse of the Reparation 
Conference at Paris resulting in the occupation of the Ruhr, Germany's great 
mining and industrial centre, by French troops on January 11.1®® The atmosphere 
at Lausanne was inevitably influenced by the general European situation. Two
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100 Chambers. This Age of Conflict pp. 164-166; Haves. The Twentieth Century, pp. 223-224; For 
American reaction see: Melvyn P. Leffler., The Elusive Quest. America's Pursuit of European Stability 
and French Security. 1919-1933. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), pp. 82-90; 
Orde, British Policy, pp. 237-245; William M. Jordan., Great Britain. France, and the German Problem 
1919-1939: A Study of Anglo-French Relations in the Making and Maintenance of the Versailles 
Settlement. (London, 1943), pp. 68-84; J. Paul Selsam., The Attempts to Form an Anglo-French 
Alliance 1919-1924. (Philadelphia, 1936), pp. 59-69; David Williamson., 'Great Britain and the Ruhr 
Crisis, 1923-1924' British Journal of International Studies. 3 (1977), pp. 70-91; For Curzon's speech on 
April 20, 1920, in the House of Lords, on France's occupation of the Ruhr, see: Joel H. Wiener and J. H. 
Plumb (ed.)., Great Britain : Foreign Policy and the Span of the Empire 1689-1971. (Vol. I. New York: 
Chelsa House Publishers, 1972), pp. 772-783; see also: HANSARD (Lords) 5. s., LIII, pp. 781-789.
113
conferences proceeding at the same time would inevitably affect one another and, as 
Hardinge rightly observed, the failure of the British to support the French on the 
Reparations question would have its repercussions at Lausanne. 101 The French 
invasion, a procedure which Britain regarded as 'illegal' and 'highly undesirable’, 
had a prejudicial effect on the Allied front and put Curzon under intense pressure.
After the failure of the Reparation Conference the French changed their 
attitude at the Lausanne Conference and pressed for immediate peace with the 
Turks. The new French plan rested upon the conception that a treaty was necessary 
at whatever cost. To the French, the British plan proceeded upon the assumption 
that peace was necessary to the Turks and that the Allies could not simply abandon 
the whole of their interests. As Rumbold put it, the French would support the 
British at Lausanne as long as the British supported the French in the reparation 
question. 102 Britain failed to do so and the French were now at liberty to act 
according to their best interests. The significance of the occupation was the fact that 
it was intended as a showdown. Germany was to be taught a lesson and at the same 
time France was demonstrating to Britain that she could act alone if need be and that 
she was prepared to take independent action. 103
The failure of the reparation question in London had its repercussions at 
Lausanne. Curzon considered that he was faced by an 'Allied surrender'. In his 
telegram of January 15 to Lindsay he was critical of the French stand. ' French 
position now is,' he observed, 'that trouble in Ruhr necessitates an agreement here 
at whatever sacrifice, even of French interests, and I truly believe that there is not a 
point on which they will be prepared to s t a n d ' .  104 in order to avoid the French and 
Italians acting separately Curzon promised to them to support their case, i.e. over
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economic matters and the Capitulations, against the Turks, and simultaneously he 
brought the Mosul question to the conference table in order to enlist their support.
The meeting of the Financial Commission held on January 13 proved an 
excellent opportunity for Curzon to follow his strategy. The distribution of the 
Ottoman Public debt was one of the most important financial questions, one on 
which a wide divergence of view between the Turkish and Allied delegations 
existed. The Turkish thesis was that the total amount of the Ottoman Debt to be 
distributed among the successor states of the Ottoman Empire ought to be the total 
debt which existed on October 30, 1918. This was strongly challenged by Curzon, 
who insisted on the 1914 total. Ismet Pasha, in a telegram to Ankara of January 14, 
reported that Curzon had the intention of making things difficult for the Turks in 
order to induce them to accept the British terms respecting Mosul. At a dinner party 
given by the British delegation Ismet Pasha received the impression that the British 
would be willing to discuss the issue at mutual future discussions. 105 He was 
convinced that as long as the question remained unsettled Curzon would block the 
Conference and make it impossible for the others to work out their problems with 
the Turks. 'Peace,' he wrote to Ankara, 'hinged on finding a solution to the Mosul 
question'.
While there had been some progress on other issues, such as the Straits 
and Minorities, the Mosul negotiations failed to dissipate mutual suspicion or create 
confidence between the two sides. Britain was determined not to abandon its claims 
over Mosul, which was one of the fundamental British objectives. Despite Curzon's 
constant denial that Britain's Mosul policy was actuated by economic motives, it 
was a fact generally realised by both delegations and fully acknowledged by the
Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I. No. 345. January 14, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey. 
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world press that the question of oil constituted the primary concern. !®7 His plan to 
accommodate the Turks through non-territorial concessions either by oil or financial 
means was overwhelmed by the substance of Riza Nur's proposal that Turkey was 
ready to sign a peace treaty on British terms in return for Mosul.
On December 6, Curzon informed the Cabinet about the Turkish proposal 
and suggested giving the Turks 'a narrow strip in the mountainous part of the 
Vilayet' which 'did not actually include the land where oil was likely to be 
found.' 108 His compromise was rejected by the Cabinet Committee on Iraq on 
December 8, on the grounds that it did not contain the elements of the real situation 
and that therefore 'the proposed compromise would not furnish acceptable solution 
of difficulty.'!®® Even if accepted by the Turks 'it would be merely a first step 
towards further expansion, which would inevitably lead to our abandonment of the 
whole Mosul Vilayet with all the consequences which that would entail...,' that is to 
say, the subsequent collapse of Iraq. A series of memoranda were exchanged 
between Ismet Pasha and Curzon, stating the historical, political, economic, 
strategic, geographical, and racial grounds!!® why each refused to give up the 
Vilayet.
Before the official discussions were due, Ismet Pasha attempted for the last 
time to win Mosul for Turkey by sending two private Turkish representatives to
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London to negotiate an agreement on oil with the British government or with private 
persons, m  Rustem Bey, a Turkish economic expert with the former Minister of 
Commerce and Railways who was to arrange for a British syndicate to work oil in 
Mosul for the benefit of the Turks, conveyed the message to British officials that the 
'sole point of disagreement which prevented signature of treaty at Lausanne was 
Mosul and that Ismet Pasha would confirm that if question of Mosul was settled in 
favour of Turkey, treaty would be agreed tomorrow'.
Curzon was furious about Ismet Pasha's attempt to search for a settlement 
not in Lausanne but in London. 'Ismet Pasha is endeavouring without success to 
persuade, threaten or force me to surrender to Turkey the Mosul vilayet including of 
course the oil-bearing region,' he complained to Crowe on January 11 and 
continued: 'Recognising his failure here, he sends behind my back some wholly 
unscrupulous and untrustworthy agents to London to try and effect a deal either 
with His Majesty's Government or with private persons in London so that I may, 
by this perfidious manoeuvre, be confronted with an agreement or understanding of 
which I knew nothing, and which is in direct opposition to the policy which I am 
pursuing h e r e ' .  113
Lord Curzon and Ismet Pasha's attempts to settle the problem through a 
private exchange, rather than discussing their claims before the entire Conference, 
did not produce the desired outcome. The only result of this spirited correspondence 
was to reaffirm the positions of the two parties and to increase their determination to
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hold on to the coveted territory. Curzon soon realised that the Turkish and 
British positions on Mosul were irreconcilable and that no progress was likely to be 
made. Therefore he carried the question from private negotiations to the conference 
table and opened the official discussions on January 23. Curzon's decision to 
discuss the question at the conference table rather than in private negotiations had 
two significant outcomes. It forced the French and Italians to side with him, as both 
needed British support for their cases, and committed the British government 
publicly to the policy of remaining in Iraq despite the opposition of the Prime 
Minister, the Cabinet and the Press. 1 ^
After the issue was put on the agenda of the Conference, considerable 
debate developed over the fate of Mosul not only between Ismet Pasha and Curzon 
but also between Bonar Law and Curzon. The French invasion of the Ruhr not only 
jeopardised the British position in Mosul, it also caused tension in Curzon's 
relations with the Prime Minister. Bonar Law, wrestling with the French over 
Germany, was desperately anxious to get out of Iraq and repeatedly sent messages 
to Curzon urging caution. First the Cabinet issued expressions of disappointment at 
the slow progress of the Conference and declared that Curzon's services 'could not 
be spared indefinitely'. 1 16 Then Curzon received a personal warning from the 
Prime Minister himself, on the day the official discussions were due, expressing the 
view that a crisis must not be allowed to arise so suddenly that there would not be 
time for the Cabinet to determine definitely what their policy was to be. 1 ^  In view 
of the breach with France, Bonar Law was determined that Britain should get out of 
Iraq and that it should avoid even the mere appearance of risking a war because of
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British oil interests. He believed that it would be in Britain's best interest to settle 
accounts with the Turks in anticipation of the collapse of the Reparation Conference 
in Paris. In the likely event of the breaking up of the Conference over the question 
of Mosul, 'it would be the most unfortunate thing which could happen in every 
way' he wrote, 'as half of our own people and the whole of the world would say 
that we have refused peace for the sake of o i l 'J ^
When Curzon joined the Prime Minister in Paris just before the abortive 
conference of Allied Prime Ministers on January 2, 1923 began, Curzon wrote: 'I 
found Bonar in great panic, willing to give up anything and everything sooner than 
have a row, astonished at the responsibility I have assumed at Lausanne, prepared 
for me to back down everywhere. He has not the least grasp of Foreign Affairs, no 
instinct for Oriental diplomacy. 'Curzon' s  feelings were shared by his colleague 
Rumbold, who believed that the Prime Minister's attitude towards the settlement 
was far from satisfactory. The latter (Bonar Law) has got cold feet about the Turks, 
which puts us at a great disadvantage' he wrote to Henderson on January 2, 'for in 
the last resort the Turks I am convinced will not shrink from the use of force, whilst 
the mere thought of hostilities is repugnant to Bonar Law's mind.' 120 The breach 
between Curzon and the Prime Minister now seemed complete. Curzon had a very 
short time to bring the Conference to a successful conclusion and he had to do it 
without breaking it over the Mosul question.
There was no doubt that the Anglo-French disagreement over the 
Reparation question as well as the discord between Curzon and the Prime Minister 
raised Ismet Pasha's hopes for a better deal at the Conference since Allied unity 
seemed to have been broken. Although the French government made it clear to the
Bonar Law Papers, 111/12/38; India Office Library; Curzon Papers, FI 12/282, ff. 6-10, December
5, 1922, Bonar Law to Curzon;. ff. 11-13, December 7, 1922 Bonar law to Curzon; Bonar Law Papers, 
111/12/40.
119. Moslev. Curzon. p. 255.
12®. Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 30, ff. 177-180.
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Turkish delegation that if the matter were raised at the conference table they were 
bound to support the British case, Poincare's note of January 30 to Curzon revealed 
the real intention of the French. 'French government' he wrote, 'while desirous of 
maintaining unity of the three Great Powers in concluding separate peace treaties 
with Turkey, cannot put aside every idea of separate negotiations should the 
Lausanne Conference fail.' He continued: 'They consider that the agreement of 
September 1914 that the Allied Governments should not conclude separate peace 
treaties with enemy powers no longer holds in the case of Turkey since the present 
situation is largely result of the Greco-Turkish war. They would, however, inform 
the Allied Governments of any action they took'. 121
The resignation of Barrere, the first French delegate, the day before the 
official Mosul discussions were due, was another sign of the change of French 
policy. Barrere, who had supported the British position all along, was replaced as 
Chief French Plenipotentiary by Louis Maurice Bompard, who Curzon believed 
would display sympathy towards Turkish aspirations. 'He thinks we ought to 
remain here for another fortnight,' he complained to Lindsay, 'reopening every 
discussion, and gradually whittling away every point for which we have hitherto 
stood out in order to obtain signature of a treaty which would constitute an Allied 
humiliation'. Curzon was very much disappointed with the departure of Barrere 
who, had he believed, 'affected an illness which had no real foundation, declining 
to be a party to concessions which he thought disgraceful.' 122 as wen as 
Grew, did not rule out the possibility of intervention on the part of Poincard. 
Curzon was critical of the Italian attitude: 'Italians wobble from one side to the other 
with an invariable preference for retreat, the British are in a constant minority, for
121. FO371/9064/E1472/1/44, (secret) February 3, 1923, Colonial Office No. 5649/23, Duke of 
Devonshire to the Dominions.
122. F 0371/9061/E l009/1/44; January 24, 1923, Curzon to Cabinet; FO371/9060/E868/1/44; 
FO371/9060/E868/1/44, January 22, 1923, Curzon to Lindsay; F0371/9061/El009/1/44, January 24, 
1923, Curzon to Lindsay; DBFP, XVIII, Nos. 338, 343; CON12359/100; F0839/17 No. 1180; Grew, 
Turbulent Era, p. 540; Leeper Papers, LEEP 1/6 January 22, 1923 (Allen Leeper's Diary).
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the two other allies and the Turks may be said to constitute a working a l l i a n c e ’. 123 
In view of this situation, Curzon convened a meeting with Barrere and Garroni in 
order to bring matters to a head and persuaded them that the treaty must be presented 
before his departure. He further proposed that their departure must involve the 
retirement not of a single delegation but of all of them 'in order to avoid on the one 
hand the appearance of Allied disunion, and on the other the risk of a Turkish 
attempt to reopen discussions with the party or parties left behind.' 124
When the discussions were opened his views were, to quote Curzon, 
'strongly and loyally' supported by Bompard and Garroni. Curzon's promise of 
active assistance for their economic and financial claims had produced fruitful 
results. He now had to work out a solution which would enable him to get out of 
the present impasse without causing a rupture over the Mosul question. The 
Colonial Office's proposal to refer the case to the League of Nations could not have 
come at a better time. Curzon, grabbing the opportunity, pressed for Ismet Pasha's 
acceptance of the League, and by referring to articles 4 and 17 of the C o v e n a n t  125 
he pointed out that Turkey would not only become a member of the League, but also 
a member of the Council for the Mosul dispute. To this, Ismet Pasha responded 
with a line of argument in which he refused arbitration in any form and insisted that 
Mosul was a part of the Motherland, urged a plebiscite to determine the fate of the 
territory, and once again asked Curzon to recognise the restoration of Mosul to
123 DBFP, XVIII, No. 343; CON12359 No. 100; Simsir, Lozan Telsraflari I. No.431.January 25, 
1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; FOS39/17.
124 F0839/17, January 24, 1923, Curzon to Lindsay.
*23. Article 4: 'Any member of the League not represented on the Council shall be invited to send a 
representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the Council during the consideration of matters 
specially affecting the interests of that member of the League.1
Article 17: '...State or States not members of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations of 
membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may 
deem just. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles 12 to 16 inclusive shall be applied 
with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the Council'.
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T u r k e y .  1^6 q might as well have appealed to the Sphinx of Egypt or apostrophised 
the mummy of Tuthankamen,'127 Curzon complained.
Although Curzon was furious about the stand taken by Ismet Pasha, he 
was pleased with the way in which he had conducted the proceedings. 'I think 
Mosul difficulty has been so steered by proceedings today' he commented in his 
telegram of January 23, 'that public opinion will be unanimously be on our side in 
dispute, and that Turks can hardly now contrive to make it sole or even main cause 
of r u p t u r e ' .  128 With the hoped-for backing of the world public opinion he 
maintained his position in favour of appealing to the Council of the League, which 
he did on January 25, announcing it to the Conference on January 31.
Break-up of Negotiations
On January 27,1923, the official work of the Conference, which had been 
sitting about nine weeks, had come to an end, leaving the Thracian frontier, judicial 
capitulations, financial and economic matters, and the Mosul question still unsettled 
and the prospect of agreement quite remote. The fate of the entire peace settlement 
now depended on the outcome of the last minute negotiations held behind closed 
doors. The tension was high. Nobody was certain what kind of peace could be 
signed, if any. Curzon was openly pessimistic as to the outcome of the Conference 
and Grew was sceptical about the validity of Curzon's tactics and blamed Curzon 
for the deadlock which was reached at that stage of the Conference. He wrote in his 
memoirs:
'A really clever man would not, I think, have adopted 
the browbeating tactics which he has followed since the
126 Cmd. 1814, p. 398; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I. No.419. January 24, 1923 Ismet Pasha to Rauf 
Bey; DBFP, XVIII, No. 340; F0424/256 No. 109; Mss Eur FI 12/285, Curzon Papers; Leeper Papers, 
LEEP 1/6 January 23, 1923, (Allen Leeper's Diary).
127. FO 371/9060/E959/1/44, January 23, 1923, Curzon to Lindsay.
128. FO371/9060/E932/1/44; FO371/9060/E959/1/44, January 23, 1923, Curzon to Lindsay; DBFP, 
XVIII, No. 340; Mss Eur FI 12/285, Curzon Papers.
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very opening of the conference. I do not know much about 
the inherent nature of the Turk, but I believe that a really 
clever and adaptable man would have used other methods 
of approach, less derisive, more r e s p e c t f u l . '129
Curzon's tactic, however, did produce a satisfactory result, contrary to
what Grew had supposed. By making issues more problematical it actually hindered
the concrete progress of the Conference, which was just what Curzon had desired.
The time now had come when only informal talks outside the conference hall could
influence the eventual result.
On January 27, the same day that official negotiations ended, Ismet Pasha 
was paid a visit by Bompard, who informed Ismet Pasha that the Conference had 
failed and that the Allies would present a draft treaty unofficially to the Turks on 
January 29, and formally on January 31 at the last joint meeting of the Conference. 
If the draft treaty were to be rejected by the Turks the Conference would be 
suspended, but in the event of the Turkish delegation returning to Ankara for 
consultation with their government, this step would be treated as adjournment and 
negotiations would resume in a month or two. 'In fact,' pointed out Ismet Pasha, 'it 
is a break down and to resume the talks is a matter of convenience'.^®
Ismet Pasha was now faced with a difficult choice: either to break off the 
negotiations and return to Ankara, or to seek peace at the price of Mosul. There was 
no unanimity amongst the Turkish delegation as to the right policy to be adopted and 
the British were aware of the situation. A secret intelligence report dated January 20 
ran on the following lines: 'Ismet Pasha appears to be drawn in two directions. 
While on the one hand his personal inclinations are in the direction of pro-British 
policy, he feels obliged to carry out the policy dictated by A n g o r a . '131 As the report 
correctly revealed, Ismet Pasha was in favour of a compromise on the Mosul
129, Grew. Turbulent Era, p. 526.
1^0. Simsir. Lozan Telgraflari I. No. 443. January 27, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.
131. FO371/9060/E877/1/44, January 20, 1923, Secret Intelligence Service Report, No. 1048.
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question - since he was convinced that French and American support would not be 
f o r t h c o m i n g  132 _ while Riza Nur categorically refused to yield and argued that the 
detachment of the Vilayet would create a Kurdish problem and that, more 
significantly, its oil resources were of vital importance for the development of 
Turkey. The third delegate, Hasan Bey, was undecided but he agreed with Riza Nur 
as to the importance of the V i l a y e t .  133
In reply to Ismet Pasha’s telegram asking for instructions about the policy 
to be followed, Rauf Bey stated on January 27 that the matter would be discussed at 
the Grand National Assembly. The very next day he sent another telegram to Ismet 
Pasha in which he pointed out that the Grand National Assembly had decided that 
the Allies' draft treaty consisted of unacceptable clauses and that Ismet Pasha should 
return immediately to Ankara after issuing a press communique for public opinion in 
Europe and in the United States elucidating the reasons for his departure. 134 
Mustafa Kemal, however, urged that a very careful judgement be made between the 
losses which could be incurred by accepting the treaty and the benefits of a possible 
military campaign. 'If the question were to find a specific method to fix the frontier 
of Mosul Vilayet and the Allies were really genuine in their other demands,' he 
wrote to Rauf Bey, 'I would advise modesty'. 135 Mustafa Kemal was clearly
132. Turkey, in view of the "Ankara accord" had appealed to France to support its proposal for a 
plebiscite for Mosul Turkey had expressed the wish to have a reply before January 27 but did not receive 
any assistance in the matter on the grounds that it was a matter to be settled between Turkey and Britain. 
Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I. No.59. November 30, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No.97.December 7,
1922. Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No. 257. January 2, 1923 Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; No. 438. January 23,
1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No. 442. January 27, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.
Ismet Pasha knew that he could not rely on American support either. On January 14, during Ismet 
Pasha's private conversation with Grew, Turkey's desire to discuss a treaty of amity and commerce with 
the United States was to be turned down. Grew rejected the proposal on the ground that Americans 'should 
not feel justified in commencing negotiations for a treaty until it was evident that peace was going to be 
concluded between the Turks and the Allies' but they should 'keep the matter in mind.' Ismet Pasha's 
conversation with Child on January 30 was equally fruitless. Child tried to convince Ismet Pasha to 
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swayed by the Turkish delegation's joint telegram of January 31 stating that in order 
to conclude peace, it was both 'fundamental and imperative to find a common 
ground for agreement with the British over the Mosul q u e s t i o n . ' 136 The 
delegations' preference and the possible 'common ground' was to settle the question 
between Turkey and Britain within one year of the signature of the peace treaty. 137
In the meantime, the French and Italians were engaged in a series of private 
talks with the Turkish delegation to ensure Turkish acceptance of the draft treaty. 
Garroni's 'friendly advice' to Ismet Pasha on January 28 was that Ismet Pasha 
should not return to Ankara immediately, but should instead ask for eight or ten 
days to consider the Allied offer and prepare a counter-proposal. Thus the Italian 
delegation would stay at Lausanne, Curzon would leave his delegation behind, and 
the Conference would continue its w o r k .  138 On the other hand, Poincar€ in his 
private l e t t e r ! 3 9  to Mustafa Kemal - which was communicated to the latter by the 
French Consul, Izmir, on January 27 - urged him to use his influence with the 
Grand National Assembly to secure the peace. At the same time Colonel Mougin, 
the French High Commissioner in Istanbul, had a private meeting with Rauf Bey, 
who seemed anxious about the possible breakdown and asked for Poincare's co­
operation.!^ However, Poincare's appeal to Mustafa Kemal met with a cool 
reception from Rauf Bey, who pointed out that the 'Grand National Assembly, even
136. Ibid. No. 470.
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if it wished, had no power to accept judicial capitulations.’ He also accused French 
of 'serving capitalist interests'. 141
It was not only the French which had been engaged in negotiations with 
Ankara. The Russians, too, were trying to gain influence in the Grand National 
Assembly with a view to protecting their interests. According to a British Secret 
Intelligence Report of January 5, Chicherin had received a secret communication 
from Moscow in which he was given to understand that 'although the situation in 
Angora did not seem to be as satisfactory as might have been hoped, the Soviets had 
the support of certain influential deputies in Angora who gave them ample 
assurances that no treaty would ever be ratified by the National Assembly against 
the interests of Soviets'.The letter also advised Chicherin 'to keep on friendly terms 
with the Turks in Lausanne and to use the utmost diplomacy in dealing with
them.'142
As to the Americans, they were cautious about taking definite action and 
beginning their own talks with Ismet Pasha since it was not yet clear whether the 
Conference was terminated or suspended. However, the State Department was of 
the opinion that it might be 'desirable to have an exchange of notes with the Turks, 
in case they showed themselves "well disposed" towards American commercial and 
philanthropic enterprises in Turkey'. If possible the delegation was asked, 'without 
seeming to cast doubts on American rights' to get a "written declaration" of the 
Turks' friendly intentions. 143
On January 30, the day before the official presentation of the draft treaty, 
Ismet Pasha, in a private conversation with Bompard, declared This inability to 
accept the treaty' but also announced Tiis unwillingness to return to Ankara without
141. F0371/9063/El273/1 /44, January 29, 1923, Henderson to the Foreign Office; CON12359/174.
142. F0371/9058, January 5, 1922, SIS Report No. 1030.
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a treaty /  That was precisely what Curzon had expected to hear. On January 31, he 
wrote to the Foreign Office: 'Ismet's refusal to return to Angora is conclusive proof 
that he has powers to sign and that he does not mean to go without a treaty. We 
should indeed be ill-advised if we did not take advantage of this discovery.' 144 
Intercepted telegrams also pointed to the fact that Ismet Pasha, to quote Curzon, 'not 
only has authority but means to sign../ and he concluded, 'It is to my mind clear 
that Turks do not mean fighting and must have a treaty.' 145
Henderson's telegram to the Foreign Office on January 30, based on 
information from 'a well informed source' was another significant element in 
reassuring Curzon about presenting the draft treaty at his convenience. 'After final 
secret session held yesterday morning/ reported Henderson, 'Grand National 
Assembly decided that war must at all costs be avoided...and that Ismet has been 
instructed to ask for adjournment rather than accept rupture of conference and to 
give undertaking, if necessary, to refrain from military action of any sort during 
adjournment'. 146
With these assurances Curzon was, now, prepared for a showdown if it 
had not been for the 'Havas Incident' which darkened his 'grand finale '. The day 
before the official presentation of the draft treaty, the Havas agency issued 
Poincare's statement - which he called an 'unauthorised communique' - to the effect 
that the French government did not regard the Treaty to be presented to the Turkish 
Delegation on the following day as a final document but merely 'a basis of future 
discussion.' Curzon was understandably furious at the 'astonishing communication' 
to Ankara without previous reference to the British government or the Allied 
delegations at Lausanne. He called it 'a breach of the most definite pledges and
144 FO371/9064/E1453/1/44; F0839/17; CON12359/164; F0371/9062/El 214/1/44, January 31, 
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understandings' and a 'flagrant violation of an agreement arrived at between the 
principal Allied Plenipotentiaries' and urged his government to call the attention of 
the French government to its obligations. 147 But Bonar Law's reply was not what 
Curzon had hoped for. Anxious to prevent further deterioration in Anglo-French 
relations, Bonar Law sent a telegram to Curzon on February 2, in which he wrote: 
There is no proof of French government having sent any official message to 
Angora in sense complained of, and it seems better to avoid representations to 
which French can return an ostensibly complete answer.' 148 Despite the lack of 
support from home and the Allies, Curzon, unaware of the new challenge he was 
yet to face, adhered to his original plan of submitting the draft treaty.
On January 31, 1923, at Curzon's suggestion, matters were brought to a 
head. A draft of the treaty 149 and of all its subsidiary conventions was prepared, 
embodying all the points on which agreement had already been reached. The 
Turkish and Allied versions of the numerous points on which the deadlock seemed 
complete. Curzon commenced the joint meeting by a speech of some length 
introducing the treaty, explaining its general character and object, and indicating the 
immense concessions which had been made to the Turks in respect of subjects dealt 
with in his commission. At the end of the session at which all these instruments - 
except for the Straits Convention, which was reserved for the following day - were 
formally submitted for acceptance on take it or leave it terms, Curzon explained that
147'. F0371/9063/E1340/1/44; F0371/9063/E l342/1/44; F0839/47 No. 1390; Nicolson, Curzon. 
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the British delegation would leave the following Sunday night, February 4, if no 
agreement on the draft had been reached by that date. He made it clear, however, 
that he was prepared to return at any time should Ismet Pasha desire an adjournment 
of the Conference to consult his government before signature. Peace now depended 
on the reply from the Turkish delegation. Curzon's original intention had been to 
give Ismet Pasha a more definite ultimatum, but neither the French nor the Italians 
were prepared for so drastic a l i n e .  150 Yet, while the treaty was being presented to 
the Turks, he was handed a note from Poincare addressed to Robert Crewe the 
British Ambassador, to the effect that France considered itself free to sign a separate 
treaty with the Turks, as that agreement applied only to the Great War and not to the 
present situation in which peace was being negotiated with the government of the 
Grand National Assembly. He maintained that France would reserve all rights to 
negotiate and sign a separate treaty after the British left Lausanne if it were found 
impossible to sign one en bloc. Curzon was greatly disturbed and annoyed at the 
note announcing Poincare's break away from Allied unity at this most critical 
moment. 'A deliberate and unpardonable attempt on the part of France to jettison 
treaty presented at Lausanne,' he commented in a telegram of February 2 to the 
Foreign Office. Having called the French action an 'act of treason,' he accused them 
of violating their solemn engagements, and of entering upon an independent course 
of action in the interests of France alone. 151
In a letter of January 1, Amery, First Lord of the Admiralty, wrote that the 
fundamental issue had not really been changed, and that it remained at the present, 
as it had been from the first, a question of a settlement between Curzon and Ismet
150. F0371 /9062/E 1214/1144, January 31, 1923, Curzon to Lindsay; DBFP, XVIII, No. 356; 
CON12359 No. 169.
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Pasha. This letter came at the right time and gave Curzon the assurance he needed. 
’If they (Turks) really want peace, as is clear from all the secret telegrams,' wrote 
Amery, 'it is peace with us they want, and their desire to get it will not be weakened 
by the overt declaration of the French that they do not care what the terms of peace 
are and that they are prepared to make a separate peace and leave us in the 
lurch.' 152 jn the face of French and Italian pressure there was not much Curzon 
could do but climb down and agree to further negotiations with the Turks. By doing 
so, he was guided by two principles: the situation was not as desperate as Amery 
pointed out and the Turkish reply was yet to come.
The draft treaty was, to quote Busch, a 'considerable retreat from the 
Treaty of Sevres, but it was not the treaty which Ismet Pasha was prepared to take 
back to A n g o r a . ' 1 5 3  it had too many points which ran counter to Ankara's 
determination to achieve full judicial, financial and economic independence. To 
Ismet Pasha's dismay, it contained not only articles that had been agreed upon but 
also articles that had not been agreed upon in the committees, and some entirely new 
proposals which had neither been presented nor discussed. 'It is full of new and 
some evil matter,' stated Child, though his reaction was more due to the 'clauses on 
concessions and economic matters' which were 'inimical' to American interests, 
rather than to his sympathy for the Turks. 154 He was joined by Giulio Cesare 
Montagna in expressing dissatisfaction with the draft treaty and not blaming the 
Turks for their anger. When the Allies informed the British about their objections to 
certain clauses the reply was: 'Too late to do anything! Too late to write anything
new n o w ! '155
Curzon Papers, FI 12/282 ff. 51-55, February 1, 1923, Amery to Curzon.
Busch. Mudros to Lausanne, p. 382.
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A rupture and a renewal of hostilities was feared. Allied representatives in 
Istanbul and the Allied military and naval authorities there debated the respective 
merits of holding their ground or of a total or partial evacuation of the occupied 
areas. 'I hope that before Lausanne conference breaks up instructions may be given 
me as to military policy the Government wishes [to be] pursued here,' wrote 
General Harington, General Officer Commanding in Istanbul on January 28, 'if 
Turks refuse to sign treaty it would be quite wrong to suppose that British force will 
be able to remain as at present...We are in a thoroughly unsound military position 
here...', and he concluded, '...My considered military opinion , if we are going to 
have definite break or war with Turkey, is that our military force should be 
withdrawn from Constantinople and Ismid to Gallipoli peninsula. From there we 
could sweep Turks out of Europe if necessary which is what they fear m o s t . '1^6
But a military solution was not what Ankara had in mind. The Council of 
Ministers' decisive instructions to Lausanne were that the final action of the Turkish 
delegation was to depend on how much the Allies were prepared to meet the Turks 
on economic and judicial matters. In the event of substantial modification in favour 
of the Turkish thesis, the delegation was advised to stay on; if not, an immediate 
return was expected. 1^7 jn the full note which Ismet Pasha sent to the three Allied 
delegations on the morning of February 4, nearly all the outstanding territorial and 
military questions - the frontiers, Thrace, the Islands and the Straits - were settled or 
offers made which enabled a solution to be reached before the British delegation 
departed. The Conference finally broke down at the historic session in Lord 
Curzon's room at the Beau Rivage late on the afternoon of February 4, mainly over
156. CAB24/158 CP.55(23); WO106/1431; F0371/9121/E1147/35/44, January 28. 1923, Henderson 
to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 348; Simsir. Lozan Telgraflari I. No. 495. February, 4, 1923, Rauf Bey to 
Ismet Pasha; CON12359/150.
*^7. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I. No. 476. February 2, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; No. 491. 
February 3, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha.
131
the question of the judicial regime for foreigners, Greco-Turkish reparations and the 
economic clauses.
The period of the greatest strain at the Conference was from the 3rd to the 
5th, the 4th being the decisive day. On the receipt of Ismet Pasha's note the Allies 
met in Curzon's room at 2.45 on February 4, when, after obtaining further 
information from Ismet Pasha regarding the economic clauses, they decided to meet 
him at 5.40 pm and to offer him certain additional concessions regarding Mosul and 
the economic clauses as a final inducement to securing his signature to the terms of 
peace. Curzon, knowing that this was his last chance of avoiding a rupture over 
Mosul, sought a compromise. While declining the article in the Treaty which 
referred the question of the Iraq frontier to the League of Nations, he made a 
declaration to be attached to the treaty to the effect that the British Government 
would consent not to pursue the application to the League for the space of a year, in 
order to allow discussions with the Turkish government in the interval. 1^8 upon 
the judicial and economic questions with which the French and the Italians were 
mainly concerned, a firm policy was adopted. Curzon was confident that Ismet 
Pasha would refuse to meet the Allied proposals on these matters since the Foreign 
Office memoranda, secret intelligent reports and the private negotiations with 
various delegations along with the Turks, all pointed to the same conclusion. As it 
was impossible for Ismet Pasha to make peace on the terms proposed, a rupture was 
inevitable.
Shortly after the meeting started, Ismet Pasha left the room with his 
delegation to consider the Allied proposal. When he returned to the room after a 
brief retirement he accepted Curzon's proposal regarding Mosul but rejected the 
judicial and economic clauses. He pointed out that if Turkey were to accept the
158. F0371/9064/E1509/1144, February 5, 1923, Curzon to Lindsay; DBFP, XVIII, No. 370; Quincy 
Wright., The Mosul Dispute1 American Journal of International Law. 20 (1926), pp. 453-464.
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economic clauses of the treaty as now proposed by the Allies it would be placed in a 
position of economic servitude. Turkey,' he insisted, 'could not be deprived of its 
economic and judicial liberty'. Equally, he refused the judicial formula as an 
infringement of Turkish independence and sovereignty. Curzon, relieved at Ismet 
Pasha's reply, pressed his terms, along with Bompard and Garroni, leaving no 
room for Ismet Pasha to manoeuvre. He also refused to accept Riza Nur's statement 
that the Turkish delegation had done all they could and that if they gave further on 
the points under discussion the treaty would not be ratified. Bompard and Garroni, 
with the support of Curzon, bombarded Ismet Pasha with appeals and threats to 
such an extent that Ismet Pasha lost his temper and threatened: 'I shall return to 
Angora and tell my people that the Conference, under the presidency of Lord 
Curzon, desired w a r . '1^9 Outraged by Ismet Pasha's remark, Curzon defended 
himself and tried one last emotional appeal. 'You have,' he said looking at his 
watch, 'only half an hour, Ismet Pasha, in which to save your country.'
Ismet Pasha was faced with a dilemma, as Aydemir has aptly put it: 'If he 
signed the treaty as it is he would find himself in a situation which would jeopardise 
what had been won by the National Struggle for Independence. If he did not sign it 
the peace negotiations which had been going on for months would be interrupted; 
whatever the outcome it would not be satisfactory'. 160 He took the decision not to 
sign the treaty without further consultation with Ankara though risking a rupture and 
losing a treaty that was desperately needed. At this point the Turkish delegation left 
the room and the meeting closed at 7.45. The Conference was dispersed.'During the 
nine months of struggle' Ismet Pasha wrote in his memoirs, 'the time when I felt 
most depressed was February 4, the day on which the conference s u s p e n d e d ' .  161
1 ^ . inonu, Hatiralar. pp. 92-93; Nicolson, Curzon. pp. 347-348.
1^0. Avdemir. Ikinci Adam, p. 241.
161. Inonu, Hatiralar. p. 92; For more detailed account of the closing day, see; Leeper Papers, LEEP 1/6 
February 4, 1923 (Allen Leeper's Diary).
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On his return to the hotel he was surrounded by journalists who were 
anxious to know what had happened. 'Nothing.' Pasha replied, 'We refused 
servitude'. 162 Curzon's train left Lausanne half an hour later than scheduled so that 
he could hear Ismet Pasha's views on the session with Bompard. But the deadlock 
remained. Failing to secure Ismet Pasha's signature to the treaty Curzon 
sarcastically remarked: Perhaps the most characteristic sequel was that within the 
next hour Ismet Pasha twice telephoned to find out whether I had really gone. Like a 
true Turk he thought that he could still catch me before I turned the comer of the 
street in order to have a final transaction over the price of the c a r p e t . '163
Following Curzon's departure, Lausanne witnessed extremely intense 
diplomatic activity between the leadership of the French and the Italians, who were 
trying to find a common ground with a view to settling the remaining points with 
Ismet Pasha. Bompard's long conversation with Ismet Pasha on February 5, at 
which the latter had accepted a formula relating to the regime for foreigners in 
Turkey prepared the day before by Montagna and had agreed that economic clauses 
in the dispute should be discussed later, raised hopes once more about the signature 
of the treaty. However, both Garroni's abortive attempt to persuade Ismet Pasha to 
confirm in writing his statement to Bompard and to delay his departure, which was 
to take place via Bucharest 164 on February 7, and Child's interviews with Pasha 
produced no result. Both the assurance of Massigli, Secretary General of the 
Conference, that the Allies were prepared to sign the treaty provided that Ismet 
Pasha stated in writing his agreement with Bompard and Montagna and General
162 Ali Naci Karacan., Lozan. (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1971), p.293; Aydemir, Ikinci Adam, p. 
248.
163. CON12359/ No. 214, 220; F0371/9064/E1509/1/44, February 5, 1923, Curzon to Lindsay; 
DBFP, XVIII, No. 370; Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, p. 383.
164. On his way to Ankara Ismet Pasha stopped at Bucharest where he had a press interview through 
which he found an opportunity to express his views on the situation. He affirmed that there had been 'no 
rupture of negotiations'. There had been 'no official notification' of the fact. What had occurred at 
Lausanne was 'a suspension of the work of the Conference.' He could not state when the negotiations 
would be renewed, as the work did not depend on the Turks. F0371/9066/E1843/1/44, February 11, 
1923, Dering (Bucharest) to the Foreign Office.
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Pella's appeal that there was no reason why the treaty should not be signed, failed to 
convince Ismet Pasha. He maintained that he would return to Ankara to obtain the 
assent of his government to draft the treaty subject to modifications elaborated by 
Montagna. The declaration regarding the judicial regime for foreigners in Turkey 
which was strengthened by amendments inserted by Montagna eliminating foreign 
interference from the judicial system was to become known as the ’Montagna 
Formula' and cause great controversy in the second phase of the n e g o t i a t i o n s .  165
Ismet Pasha added that the Turkish delegation had already made their 
reply to the Allies' proposal on February 4, and that it was now up to the Allies to 
inform the Turks in writing of the present Allied point of view. 166 Poincare's 
proposal to Curzon, asking for the consent of the British government to a formula 
under which the Allies would express their willingness to continue the discussions 
with Ismet Pasha received a lukewarm reception from the British who were now 
satisfied that a rupture on account of Mosul had been avoided. 167 They called the 
proposal 'a complete surrender to the Turks on matters held to be vital by the 
unanimous opinion of the allies' and declared that the British were 'unable to agree
165 xhe declaration in which Montagna's insertions can be seen in parentheses stated as follows: The 
Turkish government proposes to take immediately into its service, for such period as it may consider 
necessary and which will not be less than five years, European Legal counselors, who shall be selected by 
it (from a list drawn up by the Permanent Court of International Justice of the Hague) among the jurist 
citizens of countries not having participated in the war of 1914-18, and who will be (engaged as) Turkish 
functionaries.
These legal counselors will be attached to the Ministry of Justice where they will participate in the labors 
of the Commissions on legislative reforms and it will be their special duty to follow in the cities of 
Constantinople and Smyrna, the functioning of civil, commercial and penal Turkish jurisdiction and to 
receive all complaints which may arise either from the administration of civil, commercial or penal 
justice, or the execution of penalties or the applications of laws (as well as domociliary visits, searches 
or arrests) with the duty to report to the Ministry of Justice with a view to assure the strict observance of 
Turkish legislation.
Cm. 1814, pp. 852-853; For the full text of the Declaration see: FRUS, 1923, II, pp. 995-996; DBFP, 
XVIII, No. 397, February 14, 1923, Graham to Curzon.
166. FO371/9064/E1459/1/44, February 6, 1923, Bentinck to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 371; FRUS, 
1923, II, No. 242; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I. No. 508. February 6, 1923 Adnan Bey to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs; No. 510. February 7, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; Grew, Turbulent Era, p.555.
*67 CAB23/45, Appendix to Cabinet, 6, (23).
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to any formula which would imply that the conference would be resumed on the 
basis of further allied concessions.’
In the light of these developments Ismet Pasha sent a telegram to Ankara in 
which he related his last meeting with Bompard, and informed them that the 
'negotiations were not broken off and that he was returning on February 7 to 
deliberate the outcome. Aware of the difficulties he would encounter in the Grand 
National Assembly for failing to conclude a peace, Pasha felt that he should send a 
telegram to Rauf Bey and ask for a government communique to be released stating 
that the Conference had not broken down and that the Turkish delegation's return to 
Ankara was a direct result of the 'suspension' of the Conference. On the same day, 
February 5, he once more communicated with Ankara and declared that he had 
settled all questions outstanding with the British delegation and urged that 'friendly 
relations should be entered into with them and a mild attitude adopted everywhere 
towards them.'1^9 As stated in Ismet Pasha's telegram, the Turkish delegation left 
for Ankara on February 7.
A detailed account of the closing stages of the first phase of the Conference 
is not possible due to the unavailability of the official documents covering the last 
moves of each side. 170 Nevertheless, in the light of the data available it may well be 
concluded that in this war of attrition both Curzon and Ismet Pasha succeeded in 
realising their original plans. Curzon, despite criticism from home, almost secured 
the British desiderata such as the Straits, and to a certain extent Mosul, on which the
F0371/9064/E 1514/1/44, February 6, 1923 Record by Sir Eyre Crowe of a conversation with the 
French Ambassador; FO371/9067/E2304/1/44, February 28, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, 
No. 373, 421; CAB23/45/623; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I. No. 509. February 6, 1923, Paris 
Representative to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; No. 510. February 7, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey. 
169 simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I. No 503. February 5, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No.503 bis. 
February 5, 1923 Ministry of Foreign Affairs to all Representatives; No.504.Fcbruary 6, 1923, Ismet 
Pasha to Rauf Bey; F0371/9065/E1631/1/44, February 9, 1923, Minute; F0371/9065/E1689/1/44, 
February 12, 1923, (Minute) Near East Situation'.
1^°. The number of documents which are not available in F0371 files is significantly higher towards the 
end of the conference. Equally, a collection of official telegrams exchanged between Ankara and Lausanne 
shed little light on details. Therefore notes and diaries of the various delegations prove a valuable source 
of information at this stage.
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much feared rupture was successfully avoided*^; in addition, Turco-Russian 
discord was confirmed, though not as a direct result of his policy. Ismet Pasha, on 
the other hand, succeeded in reaching an agreement with Britain as originally 
intended and now England, the largest opponent and obstacle for peace, was out of 
the picture so that he could concentrate on France and Italy to settle die remaining 
points without so much interference from Britain. Moreover, the Conference was 
not broken off but suspended, which was of vital importance for Ismet Pasha so far 
as his relations with Ankara went.
From the outset of the Conference, Ismet Pasha's policy was to reach a 
peace accord with the Allies in general, and with Britain in particular. If he could 
meet the Assembly with an assurance of British goodwill in the settlement of 
outstanding points he was convinced that he could get the GNA’s approval. He 
counted on Britain's goodwill in respect to economic clauses in order to obtain the 
approval of the Grand National Assembly. Britain was appeased and Turkey was 
left face to face only with France and Italy who, unlike Britain, presented no threat 
of war. 172 Although they were bitterly disappointed at their failure to secure 
Turkish acceptance of the points that interested them, the British, to Ismet Pasha's 
dismay, after all the points which especially interested them had been settled, 
showed themselves more uncompromising than the French and the Italians. While 
they expressed their willingness to reserve economic clauses in order to secure the 
signature of the treaty, Curzon maintained his position on the treaty being signed as
*71. 'Question of Mosul will only appear in the form of a clause to the effect that section of the Turkish 
frontier is referred for decision to the League of Nations' pointed out Curzon with satisfaction and added, 'I 
think I shall have carried out my promise to the Prime Minister, that if we split, it will not be on that 
rock either primarily or alone.' F0839/17, January 24, 1923, Curzon to Lindsay; Mss Eur FI 12/285, 
January 1, 1923, Curzon to the Foreign Office, Curzon Papers; Anonymous., 'Lausanne Conference' The 
Round Table. 13 (1923), pp. 342-355.
'Lord Curzon handled the situation in a masterly way’ commented Allen Leeper, Assistant Private 
Secretary to Curzon, in a private letter to his father, 'for he succeeded in settling or making the Turks 
agree to all the questions on which public opinion in France and Italy might have been weak and then at 
the end defended French and Italian interests most strongly and loyally, so that the Turks broke on this 
issue.' Leeper Papers, LEEP 3/14, February 7, 1923, (Private Letters).
172. F0371/9064/E1500/1 /44, February 6, 1923, Henderson to the Foreign Office; CON12359 No. 
223; Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 30, ff. 181-184 Child. A Diplomat Looks at Europe, p. 89.
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a whole. The entire British delegation was instructed to leave Lausanne for London. 
Ismet Pasha did not agree to settle the question of Mosul to Curzon’s convenience, 
and Curzon did not give the treaty to Ismet Pasha who, he knew, was desperately in 
need of peace. But Ismet Pasha's difficulties were by no means over, and the 
biggest test was yet to begin on his return to Ankara.
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yTHE INTERVAL 
(February 4, 1923 - April 23, 1923)
Turkey went to Lausanne determined to win its territorial integrity, its 
judicial and political freedom, and to secure financial and economic liberation. The 
suspension of the Conference from February 4 to April 23, 1923 put a temporary 
halt to that goal. Perhaps it was not wholly unfortunate for Turkey to experience 
such an interruption, since to ensure the execution of these principles, some 
adjustment was required to improve Ismet Pasha's negotiating position. However, 
these policy adjustments were not limited to Turkey itself; Britain too revised its 
position and took the necessary steps to ensure that its desired terms were fully 
materialised. Therefore it would not be wrong to say that the period which elapsed 
between the collapse of the first phase and the opening of the second phase of the 
Conference was a period during which each side endeavoured to secure a more 
favourable start for the second round of the negotiations.
Turkey
Turkey Stiffens its Stance: The Izmir Incident
The initial reaction to the suspension of the Conference was mixed. While 
Ismet Pasha was strongly criticised in the Grand National Assembly because of his 
compromise over the National Pact, the press took a moderate line. They put the 
blame on the French and the Italians and expressed satisfaction at what they
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regarded an Anglo-Turkish rapprochement The comparatively successful attempt of 
Ismet Pasha to settle the main political questions of interest in Britain was 
immediately reported in the Istanbul press, which was as loud in its expressions of 
satisfaction over Anglo-Turkish friendship as it was in its denunciation of the 
French and Italian schemes to enslave Turkey financially and economically. So far 
as the press was concerned, the roles of France and Britain had been reversed and 
the latter was now looked on as a mediator. For the first time, a distinctly anti- 
French feeling was almost generally displayed. 'According to news from 
Lausanne,' reported the semi-official Vakit, on February 6, in an unusually 
outspoken article,
'the roles have suddenly changed and it is France and 
Italy who have assumed a threatening and domineering 
attitude towards the Turks, notwithstanding the friendship 
which they have professed since the Armistice. In the dark 
days Britain was regarded as the mortal enemy of Turkey; 
today there is no question in dispute between the two 
countries, while with Greece there is nothing but the 
question of reparations...in the opinion of the world, the 
obstacle to peace is no longer London but Paris.'
Other newspapers like Tevhid-i Efkar and Aksam, provided further 
support to this tone; the latter called the attitude taken up by France 'treacherous'. 
But on the whole, the papers confined their comments to plaintive utterances 
concerning the economic slavery which was being forced on Turkey by the Allies. 1
Nevertheless, in spite of these comparatively peaceful declarations of the 
Istanbul press, there existed a party in the Assembly in Ankara which was prepared 
for more extreme measures; there were also signs of a certain nervousness in 
government circles. The Allies were anxious that military extremists would 
overpower moderates in the Grand National Assembly and make it difficult for the 
treaty to be signed. Their fear was not unfounded. The breakdown of the 
negotiations caused great disappointment in Ankara. The break up was regarded as
l . F0371/9121/E1726/35/44, February 7. 1923, Henderson to the Foreign Office.
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a definite rupture and the government took the decision that the Izmir port would be 
closed to all foreign warships of 1000 tons and over. Rauf Bey's telegram of 
February 6 to Paris, demanding that 'all foreign warships of more than a thousand 
tons must leave Izmir harbour before midnight,'2 was to be explained not only by 
the prevailing tension in the Assembly but also by the determination of Ankara not 
to risk a resumption of hostilities. Ankara's decision was communicated on 
February 6 to the Allied High Commissioners in Istanbul where it met with a joint 
protest by the Allies.
The French, having been disappointed with the non-signature of the treaty 
and the Turkish attacks on the French in the Turkish press, were keen on a firm line 
of action at Izmir and adopted a rather belligerent attitude by refusing to withdraw 
and declaring that they would resist if attacked by the Turks. The tension gained 
momentum with the Turkish declaration that the port of Izmir was closed by a 
barrage of mines as from February 7 and that any foreign interference would be 
resisted.^ The British, however, did not retreat. Henderson warned the Turkish 
authorities of the despatch of British warships on the ground that the Allies 
maintained their position under the Armistice of Mudros and could not submit to 
restrictions of movements of their warships. Although the British wanted to avoid 
the risk of an incident, they were convinced that yielding to Turkish demands would 
merely encourage the Turks to go one step further and request the evacuation of 
Istanbul which was held as a trump card. In a telegram of February 7 to Istanbul, 
Curzon instructed that the Turkish summons could not be accepted, and that ships 
were not to withdraw and if attacked they were to defend themselves. The
2. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I. No. 506. February 6, 1923, Rauf Bey to Paris Representative; 
FO371/9107/E1508/16/44, February 6, 1923, Henderson to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No.372; F0800/157; 
FO371/9065/E1681/1/44.
3. CON12359/244; Simsir. Lozan Telgraflari I. Nos. 514-515. February. 7. 1923, Paris Representative 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; No. 516. February 7, 1923, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Paris 
Representative; No. 518. February, 8, 1923, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Paris Representative; No. 
519. February 8, 1923, Paris Representative to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; No. 521. February 10, 
1923, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Paris Representative.
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evaluation of the situation by Admiral Brock, General Harington and Henderson 
was that the Izmir incident had created 'another point at which at any moment 
precipitate action of Turkish, possibly subordinate, authorities might lead to 
outbreak of hostilities’ as all the indications pointed out to the fact that the extremist 
military party in Ankara was having the 'loudest say'.4
Britain did not want to withdraw in the face of the Turkish threat and 
perhaps wanted to know the real intention of Turkey. The day the British battleship 
Curagao entered the port of Izmir Adnan Bey paid a visit to Henderson and gave 
him Rauf Bey's 'formal assurance that demand for withdrawal of warships had not 
been inspired by any hostile intention particularly against British.' He also added 
that whatever Turkish attitude had previously been towards Britain, Turkey was 
now sincerely anxious for British friendship and instructions were given to that 
effect.^ The Secret Intelligence Reports also confirmed Adnan Bey's message. 
Henderson became convinced that Rauf Bey had not sent written proposals since he 
was 'unwilling officially to adopt standpoint' which was the 'only one possible for 
him in the present temper at Angora.' He welcomed 'a certain measure of 
satisfaction' for Ankara from which he believed Britain would gain more than it 
would lose considering that it might strengthen Ismet Pasha's hand at Ankara when 
he returned with the treaty.6 It was through Rauf Bey's personal intervention that 
the crisis was avoided.
Ismet Pasha himself, worried that the peace for which he had worked for 
eleven weary weeks was about to be destroyed, appealed directly to Mustafa Kemal 
and Rauf Bey in his telegrams of February 10 from Bucharest, in which he urged 
that there was still a good chance of concluding peace and that the situation should
4 FO371/9065/E1639/1/44, February 9, 1923, Henderson to the Foreign Office.
CON12359/273, February 11, 1923, Henderson to Curzon.
6. FO371/9107./E1676/16/44, February 10, 1923, Henderson to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No.383; 
CON12359/266
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not be allowed to get out of hand until his return to A n k a r a . ^  On February 12 Adnan 
Bey, in a private meeting with Henderson, once again stressed that Ankara had 
taken the first step towards legitimising the situation by showing that it had no 
hostile intentions, and that therefore it was now for Britain to show some sign of 
goodwill by withdrawing its warships with a view to liquidating the difficulties. 
Henderson's telegrams of February 12 and 13 to the Foreign Office expressing his 
anxiety on political grounds that the ships should withdraw before the Economic 
Congress at Izmir opened and before Ismet Pasha left Istanbul seemed to have the 
desired effect on government circles.** Thus Britain, having considered Rauf Bey's 
assurance and the possibility of a serious risk of irreparable incidents in the event of 
the extremists gaining the upper hand at Ankara, and doubtful of the efficiency of 
French and Italian support, modified its line of action. London decided by way of a 
friendly gesture to reduce its own naval forces at Izmir to their previous strength, 
and expressed readiness to discuss the whole question diplomatically if Ankara 
wished.^ Ankara continued to maintain in principle its right to regulate the access of 
Allied warships to the gulf of Izmir, but, for practical purposes, the matter lapsed 
into a modus vivendi, which remained in force until the Allied forces evacuated 
Turkish territory.
T Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I. No. 522. February 10, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No. 523. February 
10, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Mustafa Kemal.
Ismet Pasha's telegram contributed, more than anything, to the tension in the relations between the 
Prime Minister and himself. In reply to Ismet Pasha's telegram Rauf Bey did not hide his discontent. He 
clearly justified the decision taken by the government and stressed that if there had been a mistake the 
responsibility did not lie with Ismet Pasha but with the deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs who held the 
office in the absence of Ismet Pasha However, he assured him that the crisis would not be allowed to 
escalate until his return. Simsir. Lozan Telgraflari. I. No.531. February 12, 1923, Rauf Bey to Adnan 
Bey.
8. FO371/9107/E1754/16/44, February 12, 1923, Henderson to Curzon; F0371/9107/E1784/16/44, 
February 13, 1923, Henderson to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, Nos. 390, 393; F0424/256 No.284; 
CON12359/293, 353.
9. FO371/9107/E2139/16/44, February 24, 1923, Curzon to Rumbold; DBFP, XVIII, No.413; 
CON12359/287, February 12, 1923, Curzon to Henderson.
The French government were annoyed at the decision taken by Britain to withdraw extra warships from 
Smyrna without previously consulting them. They showed their displeasure by expressing their regret 
that 'Britain had not given the French government the opportunity of associating themselves with the 
communication on the subject and that gave the impression that the Allies were not acting in solidarity 
as regards the question of ships at Smyrna' CON12359/373.
143
Uncertainty Prevails as the Crisis Fades Away
While the crisis was escalating Curzon, anxious about the possible refusal 
of the treaty by the Grand National Assembly, tried to secure Ismet Pasha's 
signature to the treaty by exerting pressure on him through Duca, Romanias' 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. Duca's intention was to keep Ismet Pasha in Bucharest 
as long as possible and urge him to sign the t r e a t y .  Curzon himself twice 
communicated with Ismet Pasha, expressing his confidence in his securing the 
peace which at the present seemed closer than at any time. In addition to this 
'friendly' message, which Ismet Pasha received while he was in Bucharest,^ 
Curzon sent a second message to Istanbul on January 9, which was communicated 
to Ismet Pasha by Henderson, Acting High Commissioner, on January 17, the day 
he arrived at Istanbul. Curzon still hoped that the treaty could be signed as presented 
on January 31. He instructed Henderson as to the line to be adopted in order to get 
Ismet Pasha to sign the treaty before he arrived at Ankara where the final decision 
would be reached. The message was based on the assumption that the Turks had 
made 'a gross mistake' at Lausanne in not signing the treaty, but that there was still 
time 'to rectify that error' since the Allies were 'willing at any time to sign treaty in 
that form'. ^  But Henderson himself was of the opinion that Ismet Pasha would not 
sign it. 'After leaving without signing,' he wrote in a private letter to Vansittart on 
February 14, 'it will be difficult, if not impossible, knowing the foolish obstinate 
nature of the beast, to get him to sign exactly what he refused a week or so ago.'^  
Thus Henderson communicated to Curzon, once more, inquiring whether Ismet 
Pasha might be told that while further discussion was otherwise out of the question,
I®. F0371/9065/E 1674/1/44, February 12, 1923, Dering {Bucharest) to the Foreign Office;
CON/12359/270, 271.
11. Inonu, Hatiralar. p. 94.
12. F 0371 /9065/E1644/1/44; F0371/9065/E l644/1/44, February 9, 1923, Curzon to Henderson; 
F0371 /9065/E1639/1/44, February 12, 1923, Curzon to Henderson; F0371/9066/E 1929/1/44, 
February 17, 1923, Henderson to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 380, 388, 402; F0424/256 No.257; 
CON12359/257; Inonu, Hatiralar. p. 95.
13. F0800/157, February 14, 1923, Henderson to Vansittart.
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if the National Assembly accepted all the points of the treaty to which Ismet Pasha 
had already agreed, the British government would be prepared to resume 
negotiations ’on basis of remodelling economic clauses only.' Curzon replied in the 
negative to the proposal of Henderson on the grounds that economic clauses and in 
particular article 94 were of importance to British as well as to French and Italian 
interests, although it might be true that, as a whole, the economic clauses were more 
essential to France and Italy. ^
Henderson's judgement proved accurate. Although Ismet Pasha stated that 
he had great admiration for and confidence in Curzon and that his opinion was the 
only one that counted for him, he had no intention of signing the treaty before 
consulting with the Assembly and Mustafa Kemal. However, as Ismet Pasha 
pointed out to General Harington, he himself was in favour of peace and anxious 
about any delay in concluding peace 'owing to danger and expense of keeping 
armies looking at each other,’ especially as there were 'no real differences between 
Turkey and Britain.'^ Curzon too was concerned about the perilous military 
situation and General Harington was instructed 'to avoid every appearance of 
uneasiness or action which might give the hostile element at Angora 
encouragement.'16 He was also reminded that in case of active hostilities the British 
Government had no intention of holding on to Istanbul.
Ismet Pasha was convinced that before his return to Ankara a private 
meeting with Mustafa Kemal would be beneficial, as it might result in a common
*4. F0371/9065/E 1717/1/44, February 12, 1923, Henderson to the Foreign Office; February 13, 1923, 
Curzon to Henderson.
Article 94 of the Lausanne treaty relating to the confirmation of concessions, agreement whether 
formally ratified or not, was of particular importance to the British. The article was to settle the 
controversial issue of the validity of the Turkish Petroleum Company's concession. For more 
information see: DBFP, XVIII, Appendix III, pp. 1021-1022, Cmd. 1814, pp. 686-772; FRUS, (1923), 
Vol. II, pp. 1005-1009.
15. F0371/9067/E 1952/1/44, February 17, 1923, Harington to the Foreign Office;
FO371/9067/E2125/1/44, February 22, 1923, Rumbold to the Foreign O ffice;
FO371/9067/E2217/1/44, February 26, 1923, Crewe to the Foreign Office.
16. WO 106/1432, February 23, 1923, War Office to Harington.
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policy concerning relations inside and outside the A s s e m b l y . ^  Mustafa Kemal was 
also inclined to think that a meeting with Ismet Pasha would be desirable, to find out 
whether there was still a chance for peace and to remove any differences of opinion 
between them before facing the Assembly. He had been touring Anatolia since the 
middle of January. The objects of his tour were both military and political: to 
improve the morale of the army, and to prepare the way for elections, which were 
likely to be held after the conclusion of the peace, if not sooner. ^
The most significant event of his tour was the press conference in Izmit on 
January 16-17, which was given to prominent members of the Istanbul Press. This 
meeting was more than a mere press conference held with the columnists of the 
Istanbul newspapers, which had given their warm support to Mustafa Kemal during 
the turbulent years of the Independence War. It was in the fprm of an informal 
conversation in which Mustafa Kemal had the chance to assert his views on the 
present stand taken by the Ankara government as well as on the future form that the 
country was likely to take. He also obtained the view of the columnists on these 
matters. 19 Before he met Ismet Pasha in Eskisehir he stopped at Izmir on February 
15, where he inaugurated an economic congress with a long speech in which he 
emphasised, as he had done on previous occasions, Turkey's need of foreign 
capital, for which it would give guarantees. The Izmir Economic Congress, like the 
Izmit Press Conference, was an important event, indirectly related to the Lausanne
*7 Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, No.522. February 10, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No.523. February
10, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Mustafa Kemal; No.524. February 10, 1923, Adnan Bey to Ismet Pasha; 
No.535. February 13, 1923, Mustafa Kemal to Ismet Pasha; No.536. February 13, 1923, Ismet Pasha to 
Adnan Bey; Inonu. Hatiralar. p. 97.
Mustafa Kemal's tour of inspection caused curiosity in the British circles, if not suspicion. 
Henderson reported to Rumbold on January 16 in the following lines: The variety of its objects, as 
reported in the Press, seem to indicate that it is a kind of "ready for all eventualities" trip. Inspection of 
his army, opening of an all-Turkish Economical Congress at Smyrna on February 15th, and an 
explanation to the people of the aims of the Popular Party which Mustafa Kemal has announced that he is 
going to form. Altogether it is a curious mixture of war and peace, military preparedness and post-war 
party politics and economic recovery.' Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 30, ff. 217-222, January 16, 1923, 
Henderson to Rumbold; Ryan Papers F0800/240, January 23, 1923, Henderson to Ryan.
19 Arar. Ataturk'un Izmit Basin Toplantisi. pp. 7-71; Zurcher. Political Opposition, pp. 23-25; Yakup 
K  Karaosmanoglu., Politikada 45 Yil. (Ankara: Bilgi Basimevi, 1968), pp. 13-17.
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conference as it conveyed to the West the economic policy and the peace terms of 
the Ankara government. Rumbold interpreted the speech as 'rather defiant though 
not categorically adverse to peace.'^O When Mustafa Kemal interrupted his tour to 
join Ismet Pasha at Eskisehir he was accompanied by Fevzi Bey, the leader of the 
military party which had been pressing for a drastic line as regards the Izmir harbour 
incident. The Eskisehir meeting proved to be a success for Ismet Pasha. Having 
secured the support of Mustafa Kemal, the President of the Grand National 
Assembly, and of Fevzi Pasha, representative of the hard-liners, on February 21 
Ismet Pasha returned to his post as Minister of Foreign Affairs and was ready for 
his big challenge: facing the Assembly.
The Grand National Assembly Gives its Verdict
On the same day as he returned to his office, Ismet Pasha faced for the first 
time a hostile Assembly to which he gave his account of the Lausanne Conference 
and his reasons for finding himself unable to sign the peace treaty. However, he 
considered that, though the proposed treaty did not completely satisfy Turkish 
desires, it would, with some small concessions on both sides, result in as 
satisfactory a settlement as Turkey could obtain. 'War is a fine game', he stated, 
'but they who play at it too often and too long are bound to tire in the long run, and 
to meet with disaster.'21 It was apparent that the Opposition was dissatisfied with 
Ismet Pasha's report and had been preparing to attack his policy of peace. Despite 
the growing opposition however, it was well recognised that Mustafa Kemal still 
held the majority in the Grand National Assembly.
20. F0371/9067/E2030/1/44, February 19, 1923, Rumbold to the Foreign Office.
21. T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabitlari. Cilt III, (6 Mart 1922- 27 Subat 1923), Ankara, 1985 pp. 1290- 
1301; F0371/9121 Secret Intelligence Report, February 12, 1923, Misc/26; FO371/9068/E2526/1/44 
Secret Intelligence Report, March 7, 1923, No. 1106, Appendix, A.I.; FO371/9068/E2331/1/44, March 
1, 1923, Rumbold to the Foreign Office.
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Prior to the general discussion in the Grand National Assembly, the 
Council of Ministers with the participation of Mustafa Kemal and the members of 
the delegation at Lausanne held two important meetings to negotiate the policy to be 
adopted in the face of an expected attack. After discussions, Mustafa Kemal and the 
Council of Ministers, owing to the strength and fierceness of the Opposition, had to 
abandon Ismet Pasha's original plans and policy, which was to recommend the 
signing of the treaty excepting the financial and economic clauses which would be 
discussed within the next six months. Leaving aside the hard liners, the deputies' 
enthusiasm for the National Pact proved such that the government had to draft more 
comprehensive counter proposals. It took the line of deferring economic and 
financial questions until after the conclusion of peace, of accepting other clauses 
which were decided upon after discussion of the draft of the peace treaty, and of 
demanding further concessions regarding the other points not already settled.^ 
However, the government preferred to withhold its opinion and not to express it 
before the Assembly, which it believed was not in the frame of mind for a 
dispassionate examination.23
When the Allied draft treaty was brought before the Grand National 
Assembly for general discussion on February 27, feelings were already running 
high. The government and the delegation came under severe attack from the 
deputies, who regarded the articles of the treaty as being in violation of the National
22 F0371/9067/E2217/1/44; FO371/9068 Secret Intelligence Report, March 7, 1923, No. 1106; 
F0371/9067/E2217/1144.
2 .^ The delay on the part of the Council of Ministers in presenting their proposals to the Assembly 
originated from the fact that these proposals were now taking the form of a whole counter draft treaty. 
While the Allied draft treaty was being discussed by the Ministers, Britain was observing the 
developments with great cautiousness and anxiety. A state of tension prevailed in the Turkish press 
against Rumbold and Ryan as the obstacles to a settlement on which Turks and French were agreed and 
which even the British would agree to were it not for their machinations. In the interest of peace Ankara 
played down the importance of the publications calling them 'defects in censorship1. However the main 
concern was not so much personal confrontation but whether Ankara would agree to what Ismet Pasha 
agreed to at Lausanne, subject to further discussion of what was left in dispute on February 4, or whether 
they would seek to reopen all the questions that Curzon thought settled. FO371/9068/E2304/1/44, 
February 28, 1923, Rumbold to the Foreign Office; FO371/9068/E2284/1/44, February 28, 1923, 
Rumbold to the Foreign Office; FO371/9068/E2485/1/44, (letter), February 27, 1923, Ryan to Forbes 
Adam.
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P a c t . 2 4  ismet Pasha’s conduct at the Conference, particularly over the question of 
Mosul, was subject to severe criticism from the deputies, who feared that by 
accepting the proposal for direct negotiations and by referring the matter to the 
League of Nations Turkey was throwing away its claims over Mosul. Having 
witnessed the acrimonious criticism Rauf Bey and Ismet Pasha came under, Mustafa 
Kemal thought that it was time to intervene on the side of the government. He was 
equally critical of the manner in which the Assembly had been conducting the 
discussions and particularly dismissive of criticisms regarding the territorial 
settlement. He stated that the National Pact had never had a map and 'the boundaries 
were to be determined according to high interests of the nation.' According to 
Mustafa Kemal, the Turks had to make a choice between war and the postponement 
of the Mosul question. He explained to the Assembly that the postponement of the 
question did not necessarily mean giving up the Mosul Vilayet but perhaps only 
deferring it until Turkey was in a stronger p o s i t i o n .25
But Mustafa Kemal's intervention on the side of the Government and his 
solution based on peace did not ease the dissatisfaction among the sceptics, who 
maintained that once Mosul was referred to the League of Nations it would be naive 
to expect its restoration to Turkey. As widely acknowledged by the Assembly, the 
League of Nations was, in reality, Britain itself and if Turkey could not recover the 
Vilayet now, when its army was at the zenith of its power, it would be very unlikely 
to do so in the next year or so. More significantly, the postponement of the question 
was regarded, by the Assembly as an attempt designed to separate Mosul from
24 The same day in his despatches to the Foreign Office, Rumbold described the negotiations which had 
been going on at Ankara as 'a great struggle.' He stated that it was impossible to say what view the Grand 
National Assembly would take of the draft treaty, however he was 'fairly optimistic' about the outcome of 
the discussions. 1 can not think that the Turks will go to war and I suppose that they are weighing in the 
balance the advantage or disadvantage between agreeing to the few financial and economic concessions 
asked of them or losing the whole treaty and risking complete ruin by going to war.' He concluded with 
the hope that Mustafa Kemal who was a 'real statesman' still had 'enough authority to influence the 
National Assembly in the direction of moderation.' Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 31, ff. 11-12, ff. 13-14; 
Curzon Papers, FI 12/283; Avdemir. Ikinci Adam, pp. 253-254.
25. T.B.M.M. Gizli Cclsc Zabitlari. Cilt III, pp. 1317-18, 1321.
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Turkey and as the end of Turkish-Kurdish unity, which would lead to the creation 
of a Kurdish question in Turkey. An autonomous Kurdish state, which it was 
believed would be eventually pressed for by Britain, would create yet another 
source of conflict within the Islamic world.26 At a closed sitting of the Grand 
National Assembly on March 2, Ismet Pasha, while repudiating the accusation that 
he was out for peace at any cost, emphasised that since the greater part of the 
National Pact had been attained, there was no need for the army to make further 
sacrifices and that the nation was tired and wanted peace.27
Given the delicate situation at Istanbul, which was under Allied occupation, 
the Prime Minister, Rauf Bey, was anxious to obtain a quick decision from the 
Grand National Assembly. The government's efforts were also subject to strong 
criticism and the deputies blamed Rauf Bey for hampering a proper discussion of 
vital questions.28 Towards the end of the discussions, which lasted almost two 
weeks through secret sittings, the tension seemed to be building up. On March 5, 
the tension reached a point where deputies were openly critical of the outcome of the 
Lausanne negotiations, calling it 'a sell out' and 'colony peace' and urging Ismet 
Pasha to return to his military post since it was proved 'impossible to secure 
Turkey's independence and integrity with this delegation'.^ Finally, at a secret 
session on March 6, during the discussions on the question of Mosul, criticism of 
the government rose to a high pitch. Mustafa Kemal took part in this final debate 
and threw his weight behind the government:
'Our delegation had fully and completely fulfilled the 
duty entrusted to them. They have maintained the dignity of 
our nation and Assembly. If you are desirous of bringing 
the Peace question to a successful issue the Assembly must
26. Ibid. Cilt in, p. 1309; Cilt IV, pp. 93, 118, 163, 180.
27’. FO371/9069/E2569/1/44; F0371/9070/E2802/1/44, Secret Intelligence Report, March 15, 1923, 
N o .l l l l ,  Appendix, A.I.
28. T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabitlari. Cilt ID, p. 1314; Cilt IV, p. 68.
29. T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabitlari. Cilt IV, p. 118, 126, 127, 159; Inonu, Hatiralar. p. 101.
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also morally support the delegation to enable them to 
continue their work.'30
Mustafa Kemal’s remarks led to the collapse of the opposition which had 
been so vociferous up to the eve of the final decision. According to a Secret 
Intelligence Report, the Grand National Assembly was also largely influenced in its 
decision by a 'rather dramatic pronouncement' of Ismet Pasha to the effect that 'the 
clamour of war was absurd and ruinous', in view of what had been obtained and of 
the state of the army. He was prepared to resign his post as Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and that of Commander of the Western F o r c e s . ^  1
It was clearly evident that there was a strong movement among the 
Ministers and that the government was averse to resorting to decisive action until all 
avenues leading to a peaceful settlement had been explored. After a lengthy debate, 
the opposition was defeated on the peace issue, perhaps not unwillingly, and the 
government obtained a vote which practically left them a free hand in the further 
conduct of the negotiations. The Assembly acted on the principle of the necessity for 
absolute unity at home if the victory abroad was to be won. In the face of external 
pressure, internal dissensions were as far as possible relegated to the background. 
But to a certain extent friction was unavoidable between a Grand National 
Assembly, increasingly jealous of its own prerogatives, and the government and 
Mustafa Kemal, who were firmly determined to introduce a peace policy based on 
the avoidance of excessive military expenditure, the pursuance of a rational 
economic policy and a policy through which the recovery of the country could be 
secured.
Nevertheless, so long as the main purpose of the government was not 
accomplished, the parties showed a singular capacity for sinking their political
30. Kemal. Speech, p. 601-602; CON12359/479.
31. CON/12359/503; FO371/9071/E3057/1/44, March 21, 1923, Secret Intelligence Report, No.1115.
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differences and put up a united front. The Grand National Assembly gave its 
decision that although the draft treaty drawn at Lausanne was unacceptable as 
contrary to the National Pact, the government was authorised by an important 
majority to continue negotiations in order to secure peace. The conditions of peace 
were as follows: The Mosul question, being of vital importance, must be settled 
within a provisional period; the financial, economic and administrative questions 
must be settled in accordance with the complete independence of the nation; and the 
occupied territories must be evacuated rapidly after the signing of p e a c e . 3 2  On 
March 6, the Turkish government released the following communique:
'Draft treaty presented by Entente Powers to our 
delegation as a result of Lausanne conference has been 
considered unacceptable as it contains stipulations 
damaging to our independence; If Entente Powers should 
insist on acceptance of this draft as it stands we are free 
from responsibility for results which will ensue; Authority 
was given to government by great majority for continuance 
of peace negotiations on basis of solution within limited 
period of very important and vital Mosul question, full and 
secure attainment of vital and independent rights of our 
nation and country in financial economic and administrative 
questions and speedy evacuation of our occupied territories 
immediately after p e a c e . '^3
The decision of the Ankara government was received with great relief in 
British political circles which had feared that the extremist elements in Ankara might 
win the day in the Assembly. 'Moderate party...gained great victory at Angora in 
the teeth of strenuous opposition,' commented Rumbold, expressing his relief on 
the existing doubtful situation at Ankara. Only a few days before, on March 2, in a 
telegram to Curzon, he had been fairly pessimistic about the outcome. 'Political
32 T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabitlari. Cilt IV, pp. 181-182; CON12359/404; Inonu, Hatiralar. p. 101.
33 . F0371/9068/E2508/1/44, March 7, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 427; Simsir, 
Lozan Telgraflari II. No.4. March 7, 1923, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Paris Representative, (official 
communique)
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situation appears to be chaotic and decision of Assembly is impossible to
forecast.'34
Rumbold appeared to be satisfied with the terms of the communique. In his 
view, the communique, 'though evidently designed to placate extremists’, had left 
much discretion to the Turkish government, who were 'most anxious to avoid 
war1.35 As he rightly observed, the outcome was largely due to Mustafa Kemal's 
personality and influence. Soon after the result was announced Rumbold wrote to 
Curzon: ’The personality of Mustafa Kemal has been so predominant that it is 
hardly an exaggeration to say that main line of cleavage in the Assembly is that 
between his supporters and his opponents. It is however impossible to draw this 
line too definitely as his personal prestige is still so great as to make it difficult even 
for opponents to criticise him o p e n l y . '36
Ankara's Efforts to Strengthen its Position
The government's difficulties were, however, far from being over. 
Towards the end of the month the political situation became very tense due to the 
murder of the deputy for Trabzon, Ali Sukru Bey, who had become identified with 
the opposition party known as the 'Second Group'. The already simmering 
opposition boiled over as a result of Ali Sukru Bey's death. Mustafa Kemal and his 
party, The Defence of Rights Association, turned the situation to their account by 
taking advantage of the disarray created in the ranks of the opposition by this 
incident to destroy the opposition altogether. On March 29, 1923, an amendment to 
the Hiyanet-i Vataniye Kanunu (High Treason Law) of April 19, 1920, making it 
illegal to oppose the government of the Grand National Assembly or to campaign
34 CON12359/384; FO371/9069/E2627/1/44, March 11, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, 
No. 433.
35. FO371/9068/E2525/1/44; CON12359/405; FO371/9068/E2508/1/44, March 7, 1923, Rumbold to 
Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 427.
36. CON12359/425; FO371/9130/E2664/199/44, March 7, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon.
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for a return of the Sultanate, was introduced into the Assembly. This was followed 
by a decision to dissolve the Assembly, hold new elections within a maximum 
period of two months and introduce changes in the Electoral Law. However, the 
present Assembly was to continue to exercise all its functions until the new 
Assembly was elected. This was a move with the object of paralysing the 
Assembly, without dissolving it, while peace negotiations continued, as it became 
gradually apparent that there was little chance of making progress with the existing 
Assembly .37 Ismet Pasha justified this on the grounds that, although the Assembly 
had, on March 6, given the government a mandate to proceed with the peace 
negotiations, elections were necessary in order to elicit a new and up-to-date 
expression of the national will.38
The Second Group disintegrated and on April 15, the High Treason Law 
was accepted by the Assembly. The way was now open for Ismet Pasha to resume 
the negotiations at Lausanne with a freer hand. This would also strengthen the hand 
of the Defence of Rights organisation in the forthcoming elections. Not only did 
these measures secure Ismet Pasha's position at home, but they also enabled him to 
pursue negotiations with the Powers without fear of criticism by his opponents, 
with the prospect of being able to submit the results to a new Assembly composed 
of his supporters. Mustafa Kemal's initiative, aimed at crushing the opposition 
which he thought was a great hindrance to peace, was welcomed by the British, 
who had been following the developments with a great deal of anxiety. 'If as at 
present seems probable, Mustafa Kemal succeeds in bringing together a new 
Assembly committed to his programme', wrote Rumbold, 'I think that the chance of 
peace will be affected favourably rather than o the r w i s e .Bu t  the road to peace 
had already been cleared by the determination of Ismet Pasha, Rauf Bey and
37 Inonu. Hatiralar. pp. 106-109.
38. Ibid p. 107.
39. CON 12404/32, April 3, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon.
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Mustafa Kemal, who took a realistic view of the situation and of the costs and risks 
of a resumption of hostilities, and who fought for peace without showing overt 
signs of disagreement. It would not be an exaggeration to say that Mustafa Kemal's 
intervention on the side of Ismet Pasha and the government greatly contributed to 
ending this confrontation, accelerated the elaboration of a new Turkish position and 
soon resulted in counter proposals to restart the Conference.
On March 8, Ismet Pasha addressed a no te^  of 115 pages to the Ministers 
for Foreign Affairs of France, Britain and Italy, enclosing a memorandum couched 
in moderate language in which the amendments and additions desired by Ankara 
were shown side by side with the Allied draft of January 31. The counter proposal 
showed that Ankara, in the main, accepted the political and the territorial agreements 
provisionally reached by Ismet Pasha in the early days of February - notably on the 
questions of Mosul, Kara Agatch, and the Thracian frontier convention - and it 
confirmed the Turkish acceptance of the Straits Convention as drafted before the 
suspension of the Conference. While the territorial claims such as Castellorizo and 
the island of Adah-Kale in the Danube were put forward as bargaining counters, the 
adoption of the 'Montagna formula'll for the judicial declaration, the maintenance 
of the proposal to separate the economic clauses from the treaty, and some 
amendments of the financial clauses ran counter to the Allied draft of January 31.
40. FO371/9069/E2624/1/44, March 10, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 431; The text of 
the Turkish counter-proposals is printed in Recueil (I), Vol. IV, pp. 33-69 and in Seha L. Meray., Lozan 
Baris Konferansi: Takim I, Cilt V), pp. 69-70; Inonu. Hatiralar. p. 105-106; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari
II. No.6. March 8, 1923, Ismet Pasha to the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of France, Britain and Italy. 
(Memorandum).
4 V Ismet Pasha had committed himself in the Grand National Assembly to the Montagna formula but 
Britain's refusal to accept it shook his position at a critical moment and complicated his task in Ankara. 
He was greatly upset over the misunderstanding arisen in connection with the Montagna formula (see: 
Chapter III, footnote, 164). He had been misled into believing that all Allies had been willing to accept 
the formula and had in fact been told so by Montagna and Bompard who had specially declared that they 
were putting it forward in the name of the three Allies. Britain maintained that the Montagna formula had 
never been an official draft and that 'anything put forward by M. Montagna on the evening of February 
4th could only have the character of a personal suggestion,' since Montagna had 'no authority' from the 
British government to  propose or agree to any charges in Allied draft declaration of February 3'. Thus 
Britain's position with regard to the treaty was as it was at the end of final meeting in Curzon's room on 
February 4. The British government was in no way committed to what had passed subsequently between
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The arrival of the Allied note and Ismet Pasha's reply to it coincided with 
another event at Ankara which needs to be briefly examined because of its bearing 
on the course of the peace negotiations. In addition to the measures stated above 
taken by the government to strengthen Ismet Pasha's position, a further step was 
taken. The Assembly approved on April 9, 1923, an agreement with Chester and 
K ennedy^ conferring a monopoly of railway construction over a wide area, 
including Mosul, to an American syndicate. The United States, never having gone 
to war with Turkey and not sharing in the Allied administration of Istanbul, was 
viewed more favourably by Turkey than were the rival British and French 
companies. More importantly, Ankara pushed the Chester scheme through the 
Assembly with the deliberate object of securing American support over Mosul, as 
well as American aid for the reconstruction of the country. The concession gave the 
Americans far-reaching rights in the development of Anatolia which conflicted with 
French and British interests.^ The British, who had inside information about the
Bompard and Montagna and the Turkish delegation and therefore would retain full liberty of action on the 
subject.
42. in his memoirs, Joseph Grew gave a brief summary of the origin of the Chester concession as 
follows: The inception of the Chester project dated from the years 1908-1909, when Rear Admiral Colby 
M. Chester began negotiations with Turkey for oil concessions for Anatolia, Syria and Mesopotamia. 
Although the Grand Vizier approved the project, the Turkish Parliament never officially granted the 
concession. The original American company which was to have taken over the concession became 
defunct, but a group of engineers and capitalists holding stock in the company held the project together 
informally. In 1920 interest revived among the group, and Admiral Chester and his partners sought the 
aid of the Department of State in an effort to "obtain a confirmation of his old project." At this time the 
American company met with the conflicting claims of other companies, particularly those of the French 
company.1 Grew, Turbulent Era: Evans, United States Policy, p p . 344-348; Edward M. Earle., Turkey. 
The Great Powers and the Baghdad Railway: A Study in Imperialism.tLondon: The Macmillan Comp., 
1923), pp. 339-350; Yahya Sezai Tezel., 'Birinci Buyuk Millet Meclisi Anti-Emperyalist miydi? Chester 
Ayricaligi' Sivasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Dergisi. 25, No.4, (Aralik, 1970), pp.314-316; Lawrence Martin., 
The Chester Concession1 Annals o f the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 112 (1924), 
pp. 186-188; Anonymous., The Lausanne Treaty1 The Atlantic Monthly. 134 (November 1924), pp. 
693-700; Clair Price., The Chester Concession' The Fortnightly Review. 113 (June 1923), pp. 901- 
908.
FO371/9149/E2104/2104/44; FO371/9150/E4354/2104/44, April 30, 1923, Henderson to the Foreign 
Office; FO371/9150/E4388/2104/44, April 30, 1923, Parliamentary Question on Chester Concession; 
FO371/9150/E4447/2104/44, May 3, 1923, Henderson to the Foreign O ffice;
F0371/9149/E2234/2104/44, February 26, 1923, Geddes to the Foreign Office;
F 0371/9149/E 2662/2104/44, March 6, 1923, Rumbold to the Foreign Office;
F0371/7969/E13898/13898/44; F0371/9124/E1577/199/44, February 3 1923, Secret Intelligence
Report, No. 1068; CON12404/64.
43. F0371/9149/E3384/2104/44; FO371/9150/E3843/2104/44, April 10, 1923, Rumbold to the 
Foreign Office; FO371/9136/E8906/343/4; Howard. The Partition of Turkey, p.301; Taner Timur., Turk 
Devrimi ve Sonrasi. (Ankara: Dogan Yayinlari, 1971), p.51.
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Assembly's proceedings, were hopeful that the concession would not be approved 
by the Grand National Assembly. Therefore it was not surprising that Rumbold 
expressed his astonishment at the result. 'It is remarkable' he pointed out, 'even in 
Turkey that a government already committed to a general Election should have had 
the audacity, and a moribund Assembly the levity, to rush through a measure 
which, if effect is ever given, will tie up the economic future of the country for 100 
years.'44 But the statement of Dr. Ibrahim Fuat Bey (member of the GNA), given 
on his arrival in New York on April 7, to the effect that the 'concession had been 
favourably reported both by financial and public utility committees and would now 
go before the Grand National Assembly as a government not a private measure1 was 
a clear indication that the concession would go through.45
Although as early as September 1922, the Minister of Public Works at 
Ankara had entered into negotiations with the Ottoman American Development 
Company for the renewal of the Chester concession, Ankara held back the 
concession while it considered the different options in conjunction with the Mosul 
negotiations at the Lausanne Conference, where the prime object of the Turkish 
delegation was to reach an agreement with Britain on the matter. The basis of 
Ankara's policy was that the oil concession was available in exchange for 
recognition of its sovereignty in the Mosul Vilayet. When it became clear that under 
no circumstances would Britain give up M o s u l  ,46 the government was left with no 
choice but to approve the American concession. When Curzon refused to consider 
any proposal made by the Turks, and when the French failed to give the Turks their 
support in the Mosul dispute, and adopted an intransigent attitude towards the 
Capitulations in violation of the Ankara accord, Ismet Pasha informed Ankara on
44 FO371/9150/E3843/2104/44, April 10, 1923, Rumbold to the Foreign Office.
45. F0371/9149/E3650/2104/44, April 9, 1923, Geddes to the Foreign Office.
46. FO 839/50 Tel Nos. 267, 181, 287, 410, 1247; HANSARD, Vol. 163 (1923), p. 1345; FRUS, 
Vol.II (1923), pp. 1200-1201 Memo by State Department.
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January 25 that it would be more appropriate to grant the concession to the 
Americans.^
The Chester concession had repercussions on the peace negotiations simply 
because it clashed with certain concessions - first among them, that for the 
construction of the Samsun-Sivas railway- granted to the French Regie Generate in 
1914 48 xhe French were very much concerned about financial and economic 
matters, owing to their immense economic interests in Turkey. It would not be easy 
for Ismet Pasha to face the French at the conference table, especially after the grant 
to the Americans of the Chester concession, of which the French had claimed to be 
the rightful owners. By giving railway and other concessions of a comprehensive 
character to Chester, Turkey directly threatened the interests of three Allies and 
particularly antagonised the French.
The indignation of the French government over the granting of the Chester 
concession was exceptional. They vigorously protested against Ankara’s conduct. 
Furthermore, the net result of Ankara's policy was to be clearly seen in the 
stiffening attitude of the French in the second half of the negotiations. They attended 
the second phase in a very different mood from that in which they had originally 
come to Lausanne in November. The concession also gave rise to considerable 
press discussion. The French press deplored the weak policy of their government 
resulting in the 'Turks openly defying France as in the case of Chester concession 
which was promised and practically granted to F rench .^  The concession was a
47 Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I. No.250. January 1, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No.270. January 4, 
1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; No. 281. January 5, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No.289. January 6, 
1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No.426. January 25, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; No.438. January 
26, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.
48. The French and the Ottoman government had in that year reached a general agreement which worked 
out, among its arrangements, facilities for the raising of a loan, and which included an agreement with a 
French group by which the group were to secure the concessions just referred to. Although these 
arrangements were regarded as definitive, they never took effect as a whole since the Ottoman Parliament 
had not given formal ratification. It was rendered null and void soon after the First World War broke out
49  F0371/9100/E1428/6/44, February 2, 1923, SIS Report, No. 1068; FO371/9149/E3743/2104/44; 
F0371/9150/E3940/2104/44, April 17, 1923, Parliamentary Question, April 18, 1923, Foreign Office
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turning point in Turco-French relations and from that moment the French completely 
reversed their policy towards Turkey and like Britain, played the role of the 
uncompromising Ally.
Not only did the concession jeopardise French economic interests but it 
also conflicted with British interests. It purported to give the Chester group the right 
to construct railways and to exploit minerals and oil in parts of Mosul which were 
claimed by Britain.^ The arrangement was bound to cause alarm in the British 
government since it disregarded the rights claimed by the Turkish Petroleum 
Company,51 rights which had not formed the subject of a concession in form, but 
which were held by the British government to be established by a binding promise 
given by the Sublime Porte. On April 13, Curzon informed Rumbold of the British 
stand over the granting of the concession to the Americans in the following 
telegram:
'His Majesty's Government have heard of the alleged 
grant by the Turkish government of a concession to an 
American company to construct railways in Asia Minor and 
that it is said to include the development of the Mosul oil­
fields as well as the construction of railways in Irak.
to Rumbold; CON12404/47, 56. 57; FO371/9074/E3718/1/44, April 11, 1923, Phipps to Curzon; 
DBFP, XVIII, No. 468; F0371/9149/E3692/2104/44.
50. F0371/9149/E3693/2104/44; FO371/9150/E3775/2104/44, April 13, 1923, Geddes to the 
Foreign Office; F0371/9150/E3807/2104/44, April 13, 1923, Geddes to the Foreign Office.
 ^V The Turkish Petroleum Company was formed in 1912 as a result of an agreement between the 
Deutsche Bank and the National Bank of Turkey for the purpose of acquiring all claims to the oil deposits 
in Mosul and Baghdad, as well as of prospecting for oil in the other parts of the Empire. [The National 
Bank of Turkey was founded in 1909 by the initiative of the British government and with British 
capital]. The British government constantly claimed that the note addressed on June 28 1914, by Sait 
Halim Pasha, the Turkish Grand Vizier, to Sir L. Mallet, British ambassador at Istanbul, secured for the 
Turkish Petroleum Company a definite right to the concession of all petroleum springs in the vilayets of 
Mosul and Bagdad and that it similarly bound the Turkish government. Although the German and the 
British governments pressed for the concession it was never granted and with the outbreak of the First 
World War the issue was dropped to be taken up after the war. The Lausanne Conference, however, 
constituted a good platform to settle both the future of the oil fields in Mosul and the question of the 
Turkish Petroleum Company's concession.
For more detailed information see: Benjamin Shwadran., Middle East Oil and the Great Powers. 
(London: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs, 1956), pp. 193-197; Helmut Meicher.. Imperial Quest for 
Oil: Iraq 1910-1928. (London. 1976), pp. 1-13; Marian Kent., Oil and Empire: British Diplomacy and 
Mesopotamian Oil 1900-1920. (London: Macmillan, 1976), pp. 33-113; S. Housley Longrigg., Oil in 
the Middle East: Its Discovery and Development. (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 27-32; 
Fiona Venn., Oil Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986), pp. 32-34; M. 
Edward Earle., The Turkish Petroleum Company: A Study in Oleaginous Diplomacy1, Political Science 
Quarterly. 39 (1924), pp. 265-271.
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Whatever may be the truth in this statement, it is not 
customary for the authorities of one State to grant 
concessions in territory administered by another, nor could 
such grant have the slightest validity .'52
Curzon also vigorously supported the French claims over the concessions, 
as he was well aware that if the French concession was considered null and void so 
was the Turkish Petroleum Company. At the same time he was apprehensive about 
the American intentions. 'It is inconceivable' he protested to the State Department on 
April 23, 'that the United States government should countenance any action which 
would tend to prevent one ally, after a victorious war, from providing in the treaty 
that the enemy state should make this just measure of reparation to the citizens of the 
said Ally.'53 A certain amount of mistrust and lack of cordiality which existed 
between Britain and the United States at the first phase of the Conference was 
intensified by the Chester concession and reached a point where Curzon suggested 
to the French government that it should not send any communication to the United 
States notifying the resumption of the Conference and leave the initiative entirely to 
Washington.54 However, Rumbold intervened and pointed out that the Turks had 
already communicated their counter proposals to the United States and that if this 
was the continuation of the discussions at Lausanne, the Americans might claim 
with some reason that they should be invited; he argued that there was nothing to 
lose by inviting the Americans, who otherwise would work against Allied
52. CON 12404/66.
53. FO371/9074/E3852/1/44, April 23, 1923, Curzon to Geddes.
5 4  The representation of the United States in the second half of the conference proved to be a 
controversial issue which required a great deal of discussion and persuasion in British political circles. 
Curzon was categorically against the presence of any American observers in the second part of the 
negotiations; his efforts to bar American participation in the development of the Near East could be 
explained by the ongoing struggle between Britain and United States for commercial supremacy in the 
Near East. The injection of an American influence into the section of the world which lay between 
Istanbul and India was recognised as detrimental to the policies of British imperialism. However, the 
Cabinet felt 'some concern at the possibility of no invitation being sent, both on general grounds and 
more particularly in view of recent reports that the Chester concession had been recognised by the 
Ankara government'. This tendency was echoed in Rumbold's telegrams to Curzon expressing the view 
that as the Grand National Assembly had passed the Chester scheme, the Turks could consider any 
omission to invite Americans as a direct encouragement to make further economic or political 
arrangements with them.
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interests ^5 The Foreign Office sympathised with his view that the United States 
representatives might do more harm outside the Conference, especially if they knew 
an invitation had been deliberately withheld from them.
Curzon eventually calmed down and the invitation was sent to the 
American delegation but he was still dissatisfied. He communicated to Rumbold on 
April 26: 'Negotiations means settling terms with the Turks and it is not reasonable 
that the United States, who have not been at war and are not concluding peace with 
Turkey and will neither be bound nor have any responsibility for the treaty, should 
actually claim the right to negotiate its term s.'^ The Foreign Secretary, who had 
been following the issue with increasing unease, sent another telegram on May 27 in 
which he insisted that the State Department should be made to understand clearly 
that the British government 'could not consider as valid any agreement whereby 
British rights in Mesopotamia are infringed'.^ The United States, as Curzon 
suspected, would seek for more active participation at the second half of the 
Conference by protesting against the principle contained in the Allied draft protocol 
on concessions, by which protocol incomplete pre-war concessions - the Turkish 
Petroleum Company and the R6gie Generate - were confirmed and validated. 
Grew's conversation with Rumbold was a clear indication that he would abandon 
'passive observance for active intervention' which, from the perspective of the 
Foreign Office, meant that America was 'coming into the open over the Chester 
concession by backing the Turks over the economic clauses.' ^
However, the State Department still maintained its cautious attitude, 
avoided any 'involvement' in the territorial questions in the area and resisted being
55. CON 12404/39, 45, 132; FO371/9074/E3774/1/44, April 12, 1923, Phipps to Crowe; DBFP, 
XVIII, No.473; F 0371/9074/E3969/1/44, April 4, 1923, Rumbold to the Foreign Office; 
FO371/9074/E3726/1/44, FO Minute, April 11, 1923; CAB23/45.
56. F0371/9075/E4147/1/44, April 26, 1923, Curzon to Rumbold; FO839/50.
57. CON12404/137.
58. FO371/9075/E4147/1/44; FO371/9075/E4278/1/44, April 27, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, 
XVIII, No.485; CON12404/139; FRUS (1923) Vol. ii pp. 988-991; Ryan Papers, F0800/240.
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drawn into issues of a 'purely political or territorial nature'.^9 Admiral Bristol, 
American High Commissioner in Istanbul, made several attempts to secure the 
Department's support for the Chester concession but was turned down by the US 
government, which accused Ankara of failing to make any serious attempt to obtain 
assurances before granting the concession, of seeking to further its own political 
purposes and of endeavouring to obtain American economic assistance.^ When 
American diplomatic support failed to materialise and the company was unable to 
fulfil the necessary conditions, the Ankara government felt it necessary to cancel the 
concession. On December 18,1923, five months after the signature of the Lausanne 
Treaty, Fevzi Bey, the Minister for Public Works, informed the Company that the 
Turkish government had annulled the Chester concessional The concession proved 
a disappointment for Ankara, which failed to get the support it expected from the 
Americans over the question of Mosul, but more significantly it marked the 
American entry into the Middle East. As Admiral Chester aptly put it, 'the spheres 
of influence' had thrown every kind of obstacle in his way since he had been 
endeavouring to secure concessions in Turkey; for a score of years the United States 
government had been trying to get into Asia by the back door, because these spheres 
of influence had barred the front door.62 But now the front door was no longer 
closed. Britain realised that the Americans were in the game too and it had no choice 
but to come to an arrangement with the Americans on their terms.63
59. F0371/9150/E3777/2104/44; FO371/9150/E3807/2104/44, April 13, 1923, Geddes to the Foreign 
Office; FRUS. 1923. II, pp. 1200-1207.
60. FRUS, 1923, II, pp. 1248- 1249.
61. Ibid. pp. 1248-1249.
62 FO371/9150/E4206/2104/44, April 24, 1923, Morning P ost.
6 3 . F o l l o w i n g  the First World War , after having secured the control of Baghdad and Mosul Vilayets 
Britain was in a position to negotiate with its ally France the exploitation of the Mesopotamian oil 
resources at San Remo in April 1920. This provoked outraged in the United States calling it the violation 
of the Open Door policy. United States felt very strongly that because of a material contribution to the 
Allied victory it was also entitled to the fruits of victory. The State Department stated that if the 
Company's claim was to be asserted, the question ought to be settled by arbitration. The Lausanne 
Conference was to witness the finesse of American diplomacy in settling the question of the Turkish 
Petroleum Company's concession. The British feared that if the Americans were not met in the matter 
they were quite likely to take independent steps with the Turks at Lausanne and it was decided that the 
settlement of American participation was essential. See. Chapter VI.
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Britain
While Ismet Pasha was exhausted by the opposition at the Grand National 
Assembly and distracted by social and financial chaos in the country, Curzon 
received a more welcoming reception on his return to London.^4 However, various 
indications of dissatisfaction were expressed in the Press about his handling of the 
Conference. The press, particularly the Daily Mail, was, to Curzon's dismay, 
openly critical of his performance at the Conference. 'Failure of Lord Curzon. The 
British negotiators are returning under the cloud of a humiliating blunder1 was the 
huge headline spread across the front page. Although he had come without a treaty 
having been signed, his labours were acknowledged by the Cabinet. However, he 
met some criticism in Parliament, though nothing to compare with what his 
adversary had to encounter. In a speech in Parliament, Aubrey Herbert, M.P., gave 
his account of the failure of the Conference. After stressing the effects of the 
friendly attitude of the French towards Turkey, he criticised Curzon's attitude. 
'With all his brilliant qualities, Lord Curzon did not carry good will to Lausanne and 
when he spoke to the Turks...with whom he was negotiating, [he spoke] as he 
speaks to us very often. We are his countrymen and we put up with it, though we 
do not like it.'65 On the other hand some M.P.'s were critical about the Allies rather 
than Curzon. To Ryland Atkins the 'continuous and progressive concessions to the 
Turks' made possible 'day after day and week after week the slow surrender of 
many things that have been held priceless by Europe for the last 300 years.' This 
was what he called 'the disappointment of, and humiliation to Western 
civilisation.'^ Despite certain criticism in the Press and in Parliament, Curzon 
succeeded in securing the backing of the Cabinet.
^4 . Leeper Papers, LEEP 1/6 February 5, 1923 (Allen Leeper's Diary).
65 HANSARD, (Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons) 1923, Vol. 1G0 p. 202. 
66. Ibid. p.204.
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Soon after he returned to his post at the Foreign Office Curzon was 
engaged in domestic politics besides his duties as Foreign Secretary. The immediate 
issue was the uncertainty over Bonar Law’s Premiership. Bonar Law had never 
taken a very close interest in the Premiership. In fact, he was a rather 'reluctant' 
Prime Minister. His ill-health was now to provide him with a good excuse for 
retiring from his official duties and a good opportunity for Curzon to realise his 
lifelong dream of obtaining the office. It was perhaps the most appropriate time for 
him to turn his achievement at Lausanne into a trump card in the contest for the 
leadership of the Conservative Party. After all, Bonar Law was 'only an interim 
Premier keeping the seat warm until the more rightful occupant, himself, was called 
upon to occupy it.'67 The time to fulfil his ambition came when on May 21, he 
received a letter from the Prime Minister announcing that the had placed his 
resignation in the King's hand. On the next day, however, he was shocked to learn 
that the King had appointed Stanley Baldwin as Prime Minister. 'A man of no 
experience' Curzon commented, 'and of the utmost insignificance.'^ After the 
initial shock, however, he managed to brush aside the feelings of humiliation and 
defeat and addressed a letter to Baldwin in which he thanked him for his invitation 
to continue in the Office although he had every desire to retire. He nevertheless 
stayed on as his retirement at the time 'might be thought to involve distrust' in the 
new government.^ The question of whether Curzon's chances at gaining the 
Premiership would have been increased had he returned to London with a treaty can 
only remain speculation.
In the meantime, Curzon had two important foreign policy issues with 
which to tackle. On the one hand, he dealt with the Reparation question by 
mediating between Germany and France, particularly by pressing the latter agree to
67 Mosley, Curzon. p. 254.
68. Nicolson. Curzon. p. 355.
69. ibid. p. 356; James. The British Revolution, pp. 451-454.
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easier armistice conditions. By doing so he tried to minimise the detrimental effects 
of the Reparation question on Anglo-French relations in particular, and the 
European situation in general. On the other hand, he was preoccupied with the Near 
Eastern Settlement since the incomplete Lausanne Conference posed a threat to the 
peace and stability Britain needed in the Near East. However, the outlook was not 
as bad as it appeared; as the situation in the Ruhr dominated all other questions in 
France, Curzon was left in complete control of the Eastern situation. The 
developments concerning the Mosul question, however, were posing an increasing 
threat to British interests and unless something drastic was done immediately Britain 
might well lose control of the territory.
Britain Bolsters its Position
As will be remembered, at the end of the first phase of the Conference 
Ismet Pasha and Curzon had agreed to settle the Mosul question through direct 
negotiations and failing that, to refer the matter to the League of Nations. However, 
the Iraq Committee’s Report on Mosul, which came out soon after the Conference 
was suspended, determined future British policy in Iraq; the Cabinet, following the 
lead of the Committee, decided to stay in Mosul. The argument was that if the 
British troops left Mosul 'Britain would have fought the Asiatic war in vain. Turkey 
would have been the victor, not in Europe alone, but in Asia also and her triumph 
would not be a mere status quo ante’70 Therefore it was time for Britain to show 
its determination regarding Mosul, or, more accurately, oil. Turkey, by granting to 
the Americans the Chester concession, showed Britain that it would not easily let 
Mosul go. This was a direct threat to British economic interests in the region and it 
provoked angry reaction on the part of the British. Britain disregarded the Lausanne 
agreement requiring the postponement of the reference of the Mosul question to the
70. CAB27/206/IRQ41.
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League of Nations and in the meantime maintenance of the status quo, and gave 
permission for the military operation in Southern Kurdistan, in the Mosul Vilayet.71
The military operation was aimed at pacifying the Kurds in the Vilayet with 
a view to preventing the formation of a 'pro-Kurdish block', to neutralising Turkish 
activities in the region, and finally to expelling the Turks from the Vilayet in order to 
extend the British rule up to the Sevres frontier of the Mosul Vilayet 72 The result 
was achieved a day before the second phase of the Conference opened at Lausanne.
By this military operation Britain was underlining the fact that any decision 
involving territories under her mandate must be referred to her rather than to the 
Ankara government which now had no control over the territories that it claimed 
belonged to it. Turkey had the right to give the concession in the Vilayet as the 
rightful owner of the territories whereas Britain had the military might to prove that 
was not necessarily the case. Ankara's protests against the British government for 
violating the status-quo for which provision was made under Article 3 (2) of the 
Lausanne Treaty had no conclusive effect on the British government, which 
regarded Mosul as remaining under its effective control and as being under its de 
facto administration. The British government played down the importance of the 
operation, calling it 'a local administrative measure necessitated by a menace to 
public security' and in no way directed against any Turkish interests 73
The British military operation could well have led to a war between Britain 
and Turkey but Ankara, whose need for peace was far greater than that of Britain, 
chose, though most reluctantly, to accept the fait accompli and remained silent in
71. F0371/9149/E1985/1985/44, February 19. 1923, Foreign Office to the Colonial Office.
72. FO371/9009/E5237/1190/65, May 22, 1923, Colonial Office to the Foreign Office, Irak 
Intelligence Report; F0371/9004/E3620/1019/65, 'Situation in Kurdistan1, April 9, 1923, Colonial 
Office to the Foreign Office; CO730/45/36913; Colonial Office Intelligence Report, 1923 No. 9/338.
73. CON12878/41; FO371/9009/E9847/1190/65, Irak Intelligence Report, September 6, 1923; 
F0371/10097/E723/292/65; FO371/10097/E291/291/65; FO371/10113/E8024/5711/65; Colonial 
Office Intelligence Report, 1923, No. 25, 914.
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the face of British efforts to restore its influence and prestige in the area. Ankara’s 
decision could be explained not only by the need for peace but also by the fear that 
in the event of hostilities Turkey would find itself isolated and in danger of 
intervention and by the fear of jeopardising British ’neutrality’ if not actual support, 
on which Turkey rested its strategy for the second half of the Conference. In 
addition to this there was the realisation that there was no longer any justification 
for military expenditure on the scale necessitated by the National Struggle; the 
avoidance of excessive military expenditure and the pursuance of a rational 
economic policy would be more beneficial for Turkey which, in the future, would 
be in great need of stability and prosperity.
Britain Prepares for the Second Phase
The first phase of the Lausanne Conference had failed to deliver the long- 
overdue peace treaty, but, in the course of the official and private negotiations had 
settled a number of outstanding questions and finally produced a draft on which 
further discussions were possible. In view of the urgency on every ground of 
effecting the Lausanne settlement, Curzon lost no time in taking up the issue. In the 
interest of rapid and effective negotiations, he at once took up the ideas contained in 
the Ankara communique and invited the Allied powers to meet in London to 
consider Ismet Pasha's note. He communicated to Crewe in Paris and Graham in 
Rome, in the following terms: 'In view of the length and importance of the Turkish 
counter proposals and in order to preserve that complete Allied unity, which the 
three allied governments agree to be essential, His Majesty's Government find it 
veiy desirable that there should be an early meeting of French, Italian and British 
experts to discuss the Turkish note'. The object of the meeting, he explained, 
'would be to arrive at an understanding (a) as to the answer to be made to the
167
Turkish note and (b) the line to be followed in regard to further negotiations with 
Turkey, and the place of meeting.'^
Upon Curzon's request that the first meeting of the Allied experts should 
take place in London on March 21, a brief conference with Bompard and Garroni 
present was held at the Foreign Office, from the 21st to the 28th of March, where an 
accord was quickly reached between the Allies on the attitude which they would 
attempt to maintain in the second phase of the Conference. For Curzon, who was 
now feeling rather content about what he had obtained in the first half of the 
negotiations, the meeting ’was not a conference but merely friendly discussions 
between the experts of the Allied governments’. He saw it as a formality rather than 
as a crucial meeting that would determine the fate of the second half of the 
Conference as far as British interests were concerned. He did not take much interest 
in the details as most of the time, due to his office engagements, he was absent from 
the discussions. However, he was determined to stand firm on the principles upon 
which British policy was based.
The first issue was the detachment of the economic clauses from the main 
treaty, as had been requested in the Turkish note. He managed, with no difficulty, 
to persuade Bompard and Garroni that the detachment of the economic clauses from 
the treaty would be a difficult task since 'many of the economic clauses were of 
great importance for all Allied nationals, not only French and Italian, but British 
also' and if they were detached from the treaty altogether and postponed for 
settlement for a later date, the result would be a further long delay. He suggested 
that the best method for the procedure of the conference was to constitute three
74. FO371/9069/E2682/1/44, March 12, 1923, Curzon to Crewe; FO371/9069/E2777/1/44, March 15, 
1923, Curzon to Phipps; FO371/9072/E3162/1/44, March 21, 1923, Minutes of an Inter-Allied 
Meeting held at the Foreign Office on March 21, 1923; DBFP, XVIII, Nos.435, 442, 451; Simsir, Lozan 
Telgraflari II. No. 10. March 22, 1923, Paris Representative to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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committees^, as informal as possible, which would deal with financial, economic 
and general questions. Knowing all too well the atmosphere in the Grand National 
Assembly and Ismet Pasha's delicate position in it, Curzon was anxious not to take 
any risk which would endanger the British achievement in the first part of the 
Conference. He suggested that it would not be 'worthwhile' in the Allies' reply to 
go into details; it would be 'quite sufficient to draw it up on general lines in friendly 
terms and to express readiness to resume negotiations'. However, this should be 
done on the understanding that the economic clauses could not be detached from the 
treaty and that the Allies were in no way committed to any amendments which had 
been added after the departure of the British delegation.
Having badly suffered from the lack of unity among the Allies at the first 
Conference, Curzon attached the utmost importance to the matter and stressed the 
importance of constituting a really solid Allied front so that there should be no doubt 
on the general lines of policy. Thus, when the Allies arrived at Lausanne, they 
would be 'in a position to lay down the guiding principles to be followed on all 
questions, and the Turks must not have any pretext for thinking that each power 
was ready to make separate concessions.'^
The further question which required to be settled, and one of 'capital 
importance’ for Curzon, was that of the meeting place for the second round of 
negotiations.^ As early as February, he knew from a 'secret source' that Arlotta,
7 .^ FO371/9072/E3279/1/44, March 26, 1923, Report of Inter-Allied Committee (General Questions) 
regarding Turkish Peace Negotiations; FO371/9072/E3280/1/44, March 27, 1923, Report of the 
Turkish Economic Sub-Committee; FO371/9072/E3282/1/44, March 26, 1923, Report of the Financial 
Committee on the Turkish Counter-Proposals; DBFP, XVIII, No.455, 456, 457; Simsir, Lozan 
Telgraflari II. No.10. March 22, 1922, Paris Represantative to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
7 .^ FO371/9072/E3162/1/44, March 21, 1923, Minutes of an Inter-Allied Meeting held at the Foreign 
Office at March 21, 1923; DBFP, XVIII, No.451.
77. FO371/9069/E2630/1/44, March 11, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; FO371/9071/E2891/1/44; 
FO371/9071/E2902/1/44; F0371/9071/E30001/1/44; FO371/9071/E3136/1/44, March 19, 1923, FO 
Minute by Forbes Adam; FO371/9072/E3162/1/44, March 21, 1923, Minutes of Allied Meeting held in 
the Foreign Office; DBFP, XVIII, Nos. 412,424, 433,458; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II. No.7. March 7, 
1923, Paris Representative to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; No. 14. March 24, 1923 Paris 
Representative to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; No.22, March 28, 1923, Paris Representative to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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the Italian Secretary, had been informed by Serif Bey, who was left in charge of the 
Turkish delegation at Lausanne, that it would be more advantageous for Turkey to 
resume discussions at Istanbul, since their return to Lausanne 'would imply moral 
obligations to accept Allied demands'. However, Curzon and Rumbold, who was to 
succeed Curzon in the second half of the Conference, held entirely different views 
from the Turks and were both inclined to favour Lausanne.
Curzon defended the choice of Lausanne on several grounds. In a telegram 
to Rumbold he argued that the atmosphere at Istanbul would not be favourable for 
the Allies, who would be 'surrounded by a crowd of fanatical Turks who knew 
nothing of what had been done at Lausanne, and would be violently prejudiced', 
that the 'danger of agitation, possibly against the Allied themselves' should not be 
ruled out, and that the safety of Venizelos in Istanbul was threatened. He concluded 
that at Lausanne it would be easy to give the Turks the impression that the 
Conference was merely a continuation of the original Conference.
Rumbold argued that if Istanbul were to be chosen the Turks would regard 
it as a triumph over the Allies. The Turks would assume that the Conference would 
take place in a Turkish building, and this would imply that the principal Turkish 
delegate would preside. Furthermore even if the Allies agreed to meet at Istanbul but 
insisted on an Allied presidency the Conference should be held in some outlying 
place since Ismet Pasha would 'feel it beneath his dignity as Minister for Foreign 
Affairs to sit under chairmanship of High Commissioner anywhere on Turkish 
soil'. Rumbold concluded: 'We have every interest in inducing Ismet whom we 
know to be committed to peace policy to come to the conference'.^
78. CON12359/479, 508; DBFP, XVIII, No.458, F0371/9071/E3006/1/44; Rumbold Papers, 
Rumbold 31, ff. 23-25, ff. 33-34, ff. 35-47.
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While Curzon's preference for Lausanne was accepted by G a r r o n i ,79 
Bompard declared that he favoured Istanbul because he deemed its atmosphere more 
favourable to the Allies. The Foreign Office immediately consulted Rumbold, who 
accused Bompard of protecting himself since he had been 'violently attacked' by the 
Turks and it would suit him to leave the French High Commissioner in charge of the 
situation, whereas if the negotiations took place at Lausanne he could not 'escape 
without appearing to ran away'. Rumbold's following point seems more realistic: 
'In adopting his view French government may be animated by desire to please 
Turks by deferring to their expressed preference for Constantinople and by hope 
that if French lose ground in one Turkish centre, Monsieur Steeg (Director-General 
of the Imperial Ottoman Bank) will be able to retrieve it at Angora by private 
negotiations regarding French economic and financial interests.'^ Whatever the 
real motive was, in the face of a firm stand by Curzon, Bompard accepted his 
proposal and did not pursue the matter further.
When the date of the meeting was discussed Curzon suggested that it 
would be best not to specify any particular day but merely to request that it take 
place as soon as possible. Thus, he declared, the Allies would 'throw the 
responsibility for any dilatoriness upon the Turks themselves'. As Curzon knew 
well, there were signs of dissatisfaction in the Turkish Press about the delay and 
Ankara was anxious to resume negotiations at the earliest possible date. Rumbold
79 To the Italians 'there was no alternative but to make peace on best terms possible.1 Although 
Mussolini had no strong views as to meeting place for further negotiations or procedure generally, he 
would take a firm stand on the question of Castellorizzo and adopt an 'intransigent' attitude. DBFP, XVIII, 
No. 443; F0371/9070/E2802/1/44, March 14, 1923, Meeting of Allied Representatives; Simsir, Lozan 
Telgraflari II. No.22. March 28, 1923, Paris Representative to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The cession of the Island of Castellorizo to Italy was agreed on at the first Conference of London and 
the question was not discussed at San Remo but the Treaty of Sevres confirmed the island to Italy on 
account of the danger to Adalia if the island remained Turkish. In the final inter-Allied meeting of March 
27, the Italians insisted that Italy's prestige would suffer if they abandoned it although Castellorizo was 
of little value to them. Curzon was of the opinion that the Allies could not go to war on a point of so 
little importance. However, he agreed to support the Italian claim after he was persuaded by Garroni that 
there was hardly any chance of war breaking out over the question of the island's future, as it was of no 
importance to the Turks, who only feared that the island might come under Greek sovereignty.
DBFP, XVIII, No. 458, Minutes of an Inter-Allied Meeting held at the Foreign Office on March 27, 
1923.
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informed Curzon on March 24 that Adnan Bey had paid him a call in the course of 
which he had inquired about the Allied meeting in London and expressed his 
concern about the delay, the army being on tenter-hooks and there being disquieting 
reports of Greek military activity.81 All indications pointed in one direction: the 
sooner the negotiations started, the better it would be for all parties concerned.
Soon after the final inter-Allied meeting, which was held at the Foreign 
Office on March 27, where the work of the three committees as well as the above 
mentioned questions were discussed, a note was sent to Ankara to the effect that the 
Allies were not bound by anything which had taken place after the close of the final 
meeting in Curzon1 s room at Lausanne on February 4. They declined to separate the 
economic clauses from the rest of the treaty but declared that they were prepared to 
discuss what was the best method of reaching agreement on them, whether by 
examination and possible amendments of clauses in Allied draft or whether by 
shortening the whole section and leaving many details for later negotiation. 
Furthermore they stated that they would not accept the draft declaration, the 
Montagna formula, but were prepared to discuss Ismet Pasha’s draft of the judicial 
declaration of February 3, to see if it could not be made acceptable.82
Ismet Pasha replied to the Allied note of March 27 on April 7, accepting the 
proposal to resume negotiations at Lausanne, and naming April 23 as the date. 
However, he refused any reopening of the discussion on the "Montagna Formula" 
which, he emphasised, had been confirmed immediately following its proposal on 
February 4:
'Turkish government cannot conceal its surprise that 
inviting powers by promising to exert themselves to 
reconcile Turkish counter draft declaration regarding
81. FO371/9072/E3166/1/44, March 24, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, Nos. 454, 458.
82. DBFP, XVm, Nos. 405, 421, 425; 460; 465; FO371/9067/E2217/1/44; F0371/9071/E3000/1/44, 
March 14, 1923, FO Memorandum by Forbes Adam; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II. No.23. March 28- 
April 1, 1923. (Allied Note to Ismet Pasha).
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administration of justice in Turkey with allied draft, should 
have displayed tendency to reopen discussion of an 
important question which it was entitled to consider already 
settled in agreement with allied powers concerned.'
He stressed that Turkish counter proposals were not 'properly speaking a 
Turkish draft' but, on the contrary the 'result of utmost joint efforts of delegates 
acting on behalf of allied and of Turkish delegations to harmonise respectively drafts 
of both contracting parties; all the more as this arrangement known as "Montagna 
Formula" was several times confirmed in the course of both oral and written 
suggestions of allied powers subsequent to February 4th.'83 The Allies refrained 
from answering any of the points in Ismet Pasha's note, confining themselves to a 
message stating that they would resume negotiations on the named day. The 
"Montagna Formula" threatened trouble.
With the aim of avoiding trouble, Curzon, perhaps unwisely refrained from 
stating a precise opinion about it.84 As he knew well that Ismet Pasha had 
committed himself to the 'Montagna Formula' before the Grand National Assembly, 
any move to undermine this assurance at that stage would create a stir at Ankara and 
ruin the chance of reaching a peaceful solution. Political despatches and secret 
intelligence reports from Istanbul clearly pointed to the precarious position of Ismet 
Pasha and to the growing opposition to the government. In his despatch of March 
30, Rumbold was fairly pessimistic about the internal political situation in Turkey: 
'Atmosphere of Grand National Assembly is unhealthy. Army is said to be
83. FO371/9074/E3585/1/44, April 8, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 466; Simsir, 
Lozan Telgraflari II. No.30. April 7, 1923, Ismet Pasha to the Foreign Ministries of the Allied 
Government; IOR L/PS/10/854, March 8, 1923, Ismet Pasha's and Turkish counter draft of the treaty.
As early as February 27, Rumbold had written to Curzon pointing out that the last minute 
negotiations among the Turks, French and Italians would cause disagreement between Allies and the 
Turks in the future. After the negotiations broke down he returned to his post in Istanbul where he wrote a 
letter to Curzon conveying his opinion as to possible difficulties resulting from the "Montagna 
formula”. 'I am afraid that the 11th hour negotiations of our Allies with the Turks at Lausanne after we left 
may create some difficulties for us, and I am extremely sorry that all the delegations did not leave at the 
same time, thus leaving the position with the Turks as it was at 7.45 in your room on February 4. I 
suppose that it is only human that Montagna should have wished to conclude his labours by some 
sensational success such as the settlement of the judicial regime question, I am inclined to fear that in his 
eagerness he presented his formula on behalf of the Allies, which he had no right to do.' Rumbold Papers, 
Rumbold 31, ff. 8-10; FI 12/283 Curzon Papers
For the Allies note see: Meray, Lozan Baris Konferansi. Takim I, Cilt V, pp. 66-68.
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discontented with policy of Angora and Russians are reported to be working against 
peace on basis of Lausanne proposals.'^ In the light of this information, the Allies' 
reply to Ismet Pasha's note was formulated in such a way as to minimise the risk of 
any premature controversy. Nevertheless, it was a miscalculated step and it 
inevitably led to a bitter controversy in the second half of the negotiations.
Britain, having once more secured 'Allied unity' and bolstered its position 
in Mosul, seemed to be putting an effective brake on Turkey's aspirations. By 
gaining control of the entire Mosul Vilayet it improved its position and constituted 
a considerable challenge to Turkey's territorial control in the region. The adoption of 
an active military policy in Mosul Vilayet, which was quite inconsistent with the 
spirit of the proposed article, relating to the maintenance of the status quo in the 
Lausanne Treaty, resulted in Turkey losing its grip in the Vilayet. By this move, 
Britain gained a more favourable position for negotiating the validity of the Turkish 
Petroleum Company's concession.
Turkey, on the other hand, tried to balance this move by stabilising its 
position through internal adjustments as well as potential external support. Ismet 
Pasha entered the renewed Conference at Lausanne in the confident expectation of 
obtaining all the demands that he put forward in his counter-proposal. With the full 
backing of Mustafa Kemal, he was freed from the pressure being exerted upon him 
by the Opposition, and his negotiating position was strengthened. He could now 
look to the future more confidently with elections on the way and a new Assembly 
possibly more amenable to his policy. Moreover, the expected American support 
constituted another source of strength for Ismet Pasha, especially since Turkish 
practical acceptance of the Straits Convention at the beginning of February had 
marked a very definite stage in the cooling of Turco-Russian relations. Ismet Pasha 
was fully prepared to confront three months of strenuous negotiations with the
85. FO371/9073/E3351/1/44, March 30, 1923, Rumbold to the Foreign Office.
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Allies when he left Ankara for Lausanne on April 10. On the eve of the second 
round of the negotiations, neither side had clear predominance over the other. 
However, as Britain’s needs had been satisfied to a great degree in the first phase of 
the Conference and it was now expected to play the role of the mediator, the 
possibility of obtaining more satisfactory terms for Turkey seemed even closer.
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VI
THE SECOND PHASE 
(April 23, 1923 - July 24, 1923)
Opening of the Conference
The Anglo-Turkish rapprochement of the first phase had settled all the 
questions in which Britain was mainly interested and this settlement prepared the 
ground on which Turkey could conclude peace with the Allies generally. The 
disadvantages of a possible rupture were far greater than the possible gains from the 
negotiations, as neither side desired or could afford to become involved in a military 
confrontation with unpredictable consequences. Britain and Turkey would act, 
though for different reasons, to bring the conference to a successful conclusion.
The British delegation was in a unique position to play the dual role of 
leader of the Allied front and of mediator between its allies and Turkey on matters 
which did not primarily concern its interests. The Turkish delegation thought they 
could rely on British neutrality (if not actual support) on certain questions, 
especially in financial and judicial matters. It was against this background that the 
second phase of the Conference opened, and it became soon apparent that almost all 
the questions on the agenda were inter-related in one way or another.
On April 23, Sir Horace Rumbold, who replaced Curzon as the chief 
delegate for Britain, took the chair 'in virtue of seniority in rank' and persuaded the 
three Allied representatives that the work of the Conference should be divided in
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accordance with the London programme.! It was decided to set up three 
committees, Rumbold taking the presidency of the First Committee which was to 
deal with the outstanding territorial clauses and the judicial regime for foreigners. 
General Maurice Pelle took the Second Committee dealing with financial and 
sanitary matters, while Montagna took the Third Committee, which was responsible 
for economic questions. Shortly afterwards, ’in order to meet the susceptibilities of 
Ismet Pasha', who appeared to be ’somewhat disconcerted' at the absence of the 
Turkish plenipotentiaries at the Allied session, Rumbold invited him and Riza Nur 
to a private meeting to give information about the procedure and the division of 
work . It was also made clear to Ismet Pasha that there was no question of 
reopening discussion of articles already agreed to during the first C o n f e r e n c e . ^  
After almost an hour of talk with Ismet Pasha a full meeting of all the delegates 
followed at which Rumbold presided and made a welcoming speech. Ismet Pasha's 
speech, in contrast to his opening speech in the first Conference, was moderate and 
described by Rumbold as 'appropriate'.^
The Conference opened with a long discussion in the First Committee with 
regard to the Thalweg of the Maritza river, during which Ismet Pasha insisted that it 
should be the frontier between Turkey and Greece. Two days later, the Italians 
claimed the island Castellorizo ( M e i s ) 4  and it soon became apparent that unless the 
two questions of the Maritza frontier and Castellorizo island were settled, other 
territorial clauses of the treaty could not be finalised, Rumbold believed that Ismet
1. Ryan Papers, F0800/240; FO371/9075/E4146/1/44, April 23, 1923, Rumbold to the Foreign 
Office; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II, No. 54.
2. The Mosul Question was an exception to this. Despite the agreement which had been reached between 
Ismet Pasha and Curzon during the first phase of the conference which fixed the time limit for settling the 
Question within 12 months through direct negotiations between Turkey and Britain, Rumbold was 
instructed by Curzon at the beginning of the second phase 'to reduce a year's delay before reference to the 
League of Nations to six months'. In line with his instructions Rumbold proposed to Ismet Pasha a six 
month period and subsequently they agreed on the period of nine months. F 037119149/E4062/1985/44; 
F0371/9005/E5503/1019/65; FO371/9005/E5438/1019/65; FO371/9005/E5628/1019/65, May 18, 
1923, Ismet Pasha to Ankara; Lozan II, No. 295.
3. F0371/9148/E4224/1767/44; FO371/9075/E4147/1/44; FO371/9075/E4146/1/44, April 23, 
1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No.477.
4. F0371/9075/E4147/1/44, April 24, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 478.
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Pasha, however great his desire for peace, was unlikely to give way on both these 
questions, as he had to have 'something to show on credit side’ on his return to 
Ankara. According to Rumbold, what was needed was a bargain and i t  should take 
the shape of 'agreeing to the Turkish proposal that Thalweg of Maritza should be 
the frontier in return for the Turks giving up C a s t e l l o r i z o ' . ^  There was no easy 
solution for the territorial questions and they soon became linked to other questions.
A day before the Italians placed their claim for Castellorizo on the 
conference table they had decided to raise, though not directly, the question of 
Allied reparation during the discussions of the Third Committee** Confused by the 
incident, Ismet Pasha immediately arranged a meeting with Rumbold in which he 
complained that this question had already been settled and the Turks had Britain's 
word for it. Indeed, the Foreign Office was of the opinion that it could not be 
'honourably re-open' on the grounds that it would be both 'futile and dangerous' to 
do so^ .While Rumbold was trying to explain to his French and Italian colleagues 
why the British government could not allow the question to be raised again, he 
learned that General Pelle too had definite instructions to the contrary from his 
government. Under the circumstances Rumbold could not but give Ismet Pasha an 
evasive reply, which could only add to Ismet's growing suspicion of Allied 
intentions.
In his search for support Ismet Pasha also visited Grew, the American 
observer, and told him that he had come to Lausanne again 'on the basis of 
complete suppression of demands for reparations' and if the Allies persisted in these 
demands he would be left with no choice but go back to Ankara.^ Ismet Pasha
5. FO371/9075/E4218/1/44, April 26, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 480; Rumbold 
Papers, Rumbold 31, ff. 90-91, April 28, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; FO371/9075/E4235/1/44.
6 . F0371/9075/E4215/1 /44, April 25, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; FO371/9075/E4251/1/44, April 26, 
1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, Nos. 479, 481.
7. FO371/9076/E4488/1/44, Foreign Office Memorandum, May, 17, 1923; DBFP, XVIII, No. 482.
Grew. Turbulent Era, p p . 562-563; FO371/9075/E4446/1/44, May 2, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon;
DBFP, XVIII, No.491; CON12404/172.
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believed that the early commencement of negotiations for a Turco-American treaty 
not only would strengthen the economic relations between the two countries but 
also could hasten a settlement with the Allies. Nevertheless, the Americans seem to 
have been more interested in the Capitulations than in a treaty with Turkey and their 
support for reparation very much depended on a compromise which would provide 
for some satisfactory arrangement to replace the Capitulations even if it were only a 
transitoiy r e g i m e . ^  Grew was prepared to support Ismet Pasha to a certain extent 
but did not give him the assurance he sought on the abrogation of Capitulations.
It was rather unfortunate for Ismet Pasha to return empty-handed from his 
visits, for neither the British nor the Americans were willing to support the Turks 
on the question of reparations. According to Rumbold, Ismet Pasha was Very 
uneasy at being faced with the alternative of either returning without a treaty, or of 
having to give way on certain questions. In private his attitude is one of appeal; 
rather than of intransigence, and would seem to reflect the more unfavourable 
situation in Turkey herself at the present moment and her extreme need for 
peace.’lO
On April 27, the meeting of the Third Committee was about to witness a 
serious crisis when Montagna (who was determined to preserve eveiything in order 
to secure Castellorizo) started the meeting by disregarding Article 79^  altogether 
and proposed the discussion of the next article, a move which could well have led to 
the reopening of the entire reparation question. When the French intervened on the
9. Grew, Turbulent Era, p.563-564: FO371/9075/E4428/1/44, May 1, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; 
DBFP, XVIII, No. 489; FRUS (1923) Vol. II, pp. 956-957. 970, 987, 989.
10 . F0371 /9075/E4251 /1 /44, April 26, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 481.
* V Article 79 of the Economic Clauses of the Draft Treaty of Peace stated: "If the property, rights and 
interests of Allied nationals (excluding Greek nationals) which were in territory under Ottoman 
sovereignty on the 1st August, 1914, no longer exist or have suffered damages resulting from acts of 
war, measures of requisition, measures of sequestration, transfer or confiscation or any harmful act or 
decision, the owner shall have the right to compensation which the Allied Powers will grant him out of 
the sums allocated for his object by Article 57 (Financial Clauses) and in accordance with procedure fixed 
by them." Cmd. 1814, (1923) p. 724; Karacan, Lozan. pp. 364-369.
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side of Montagna, Rumbold asked for the suspension of the meeting and declared 
that his government was 'not prepared to reopen reparation question with Turks, 
and that in no case would article 79 be n e c e s s a r y ' . ^  Rumbold's initiative proved 
successful and on resumption of the sitting Montagna announced that the Allies 
were prepared to drop Article 79. The incident was a clear manifestation of 
disagreement among the Allies on the question, but not a satisfactory result for 
Ismet Pasha who still insisted that the reparation question had been settled at the 
previous Conference and that this should now be officially recognised. His call was 
left unanswered. The reparation question continued to loom throughout the 
conference. Although Pelld joined Rumbold in recognising the grave effects of 
reviving the demand for reparation, Poincare, the French Premier, was determined 
to raise the question for internal purposes, to show something concrete to the 
simmering opposition, even if it meant falling out with Britain. In order to avoid 
further disagreement among the Allied ranks it was decided to proceed with the next 
item on the agenda: The Montagna formula.
The Montagna formula, which was drafted as a compromise solution 
regarding the judicial capitulations in the closing stages of the first phase, was to 
prove one of the most controversial issues in the second phase of the Conference. 
Britain had already refused to recognise Montagna's initiative on the grounds that 
the formula had been presented to Ismet Pasha after the departure of the British 
delegation and did not refer to the issue properly in the Allied note of March 27. 
Rumbold's statement that the 'Montagna formula had never been an official draft' 
and that 'it had been produced at the last moment in the hope of rendering possible 
the immediate signature of a peace treaty on February 4,' gave rise to a long
12. FO371/9075/E4235/1/44, April 27, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 482.
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discussion in an atmosphere of considerable tension^ which in the end produced 
the new Allied proposal drafted as an alternative to the Montagna formula.
Although the Allies, together with the United States, displayed absolute 
unity on the subject, none of their arguments was successful in moving Ismet Pasha 
from his position. 14 As the Montagna formula had been presented to him in the 
name of all the Allies he was now convinced that they were going back on their 
word. According to Ismet Pasha, the problem was directly related to Turkey's vital 
interests and the new proposal failed to give the required guarantee that Turkey 
would be treated equally with other states. He also accused the Allies of seeking to 
substitute a new form of capitulations for the old. 15
In a private meeting with Rumbold, Ismet Pasha did not hesitate to express 
his disappointment with British policy. All the questions in which Britain was 
mainly interested had already been settled in its favour and this settlement had 
constituted a basis on which Turkey could obtain the signature of the treaty without 
much difficulty. This basis was now disturbed by the insistence of the British 
delegation on bringing up again the Montagna formula about which Turkish opinion 
was very sensitive, and which Ismet Pasha had declared in the Grand National 
Assembly had been settled. 16
Ismet Pasha was greatly disturbed by this setback. However, on May 8, he 
arranged a private interview with Rumbold in which he brought up the issue again 
stating that it had already been resolved. Two days prior to this meeting he had been 
firmly instructed by the Prime Minister to break the negotiations and go back to
13. FO371/9076/E4541/1/44, May 4, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No.496;
CON12404/185, 192 Inonu. Hatiralar. pp. 134-137.
14 Inonu, Hatiralar. pp. 133-138.
15.It was related to the range of powers to be conferred by Turkey on legal counsellors whom it was 
prepared to engage. May 4, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 496.
16. F0371/9076/E4543/1144, May 4, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 498.
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Ankara if the Allies were insistent that the formula did not constitute a legal draft.17 
Rumbold was convinced that Ismet Pasha had committed himself in the Grand 
National Assembly to the Montagna formula and that nothing could induce him to 
accept anything else. The British delegate nevertheless urged him to instruct his 
legal experts to examine the legal draft. The same day Rumbold telegraphed to 
Henderson: The rock of the "judicial safeguards of foreigners" looms ahead, 
Ismet... is evidently committed to the Montagna formula, which is a rotten formula 
but which we may have to accept after all.’ He also appealed to Henderson not to 
'breathe a word of this.'1**
The Montagna formula created difficulties not only for Ismet Pasha and 
Rumbold but also for Montagna, the producer of the formula. He was now 
discredited, and his power to make the Turks drop their demands for Castellorizo 
was weakened. He did not get much encouragement from Rumbold, who 
maintained that the time was not ripe for the intervention of the plenipotentiaries as 
there were still many other articles to be discussed before the Allies decided on their 
course of action.^ Based on information obtained also from 'secret sources', 
Rumbold warned the Foreign Secretary that if they insisted on going beyond the 
Montagna formula, Ismet Pasha was instructed to break off the negotiations and 
leave the Conference. 'It is therefore,' he concluded, 'for our Governments to 
decide whether they are prepared for a rupture on this question.'^
Rumbold throughout the Conference was well aware of Ismet Pasha's 
impatience to obtain peace as soon as possible. Henderson's 'correct diagnosis' of 
the present state of Turkey provided ample information for Rumbold. 'Desperate 
keenness of Ismet to get peace' he wrote on May 5, 'is, to my mind, the best
1 7 . Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II. May 6, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha.
18. Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 31, ff. 111-113; FO371/9079/E5425/1/44.
19. FO371/9076/E4554/1/44, May 5, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 501.
Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 31, ff. 114-118.
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guarantee of our success.'21 As the negotiations progressed it became increasingly 
apparent to Rumbold that Ismet Pasha's priority was to ensure the speedy 
conclusion of peace. 'My impression of Ismet's attitude, which is corroborated by 
what Pelle has gathered,' he wrote to the Foreign Office, 'is that Ismet is 
determined to get peace as he feels that he can not return to Angora empty-handed 
for the second time.'22
It should be stated that the British perception of Ankara's keenness for an 
immediate peace depended very much on the intercepted telegrams between 
Lausanne and Ankara, and the intelligence reports rather than impressions driven 
from private negotiations. Moreover Ismet Pasha's own assurances constituted a 
valuable source in this process. Yet there seemes to have been some scepticism on 
the part of the British about whether the Turkish delegation was deliberately 
prolonging negotiations. It was asserted that the failure of the Turkish delegation to 
sign the treaty was mainly related to the internal political situation in Turkey. 
Mustafa Kemal's political position in Ankara had prompted him to postpone peace, 
as he considered that peace would result in internal disruption. In the face of 
external difficulties some unity was maintained and the opposition could to a great 
extent, be controlled; but once the question of peace was settled, the passions of the 
opposition group would be set free and the position of Mustafa Kemal and his party 
would be seriously jeopardised. Therefore the Turks wished to delay peace until the 
consolidation of the Kemalist position or the disruption of the opposition.23 The 
logical implication of this theory was that in the second phase of the Conference the 
Turks would slow down the negotiations as they intended to have the treaty ratified 
by the new Assembly. If the treaty had been signed earlier the Turks would have
21. Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 31, ff. 99- 101; 111-113; 124-127; CON12404/320
22. FO371/9075/E4148/1/44, April 23, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon.
2 .^ FO371/9130/E2141/199/44, February 21, 1923, Bennet to Forbes Adam and SIS Report February 
21, 1923, No. 1089; F0371/9121/E1625/35/44, February 9, 1923, SIS Report; F0800/157 Curzon 
Papers.
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had to rush the elections so as to get a quorum capable of ratifying early in July. 
They did not, however, wish to provoke war, but they intended to postpone the 
conclusion of peace until they could control the internal political s i t u a t i o n .24
These assertions, although they have some valid points, fail to reflect the 
whole picture. It would be too simplistic to conclude that the opposition played the 
most crucial part in the decision making process at Ankara. It was true that the 
opposition was achieving a greater degree of unity and that its activities were 
making Mustafa Kemal's position increasingly difficult. It should also be 
remembered that it was the same opposition which severely criticised the 
government for failing to come to a satisfactory agreement with the Powers and 
which demanded the resignation of the Council of Ministers. It would have been 
rather unwise to lose time and wait for the opposition to grow by prolonging the 
negotiations rather than work for speedy progress and decrease the element of risk. 
Further, the financial difficulties of the country necessitated an immediate peace 
settlement. At the beginning of the Conference it was ascertained that, although the 
War Department had been granted extraordinary credits, the revenues of the Ankara 
government were not sufficient to balance the normal budget of expenditure and that 
it was not possible to meet the credits granted to the War Department by subsidies 
from Russia and credits from France for the supply of war material and 
contributions from other Muslim countries, particularly from India. Therefore 
immediate peace, as opposed to adventurous policies, was a priority. Lastly, the 
morale of the army was another consideration affecting Ankara's policy. The 
government was not able to rely on the whole support of the army in the event of a 
decision in favour of military operations. There was a growing demand among the 
troops for demobilisation on the grounds that the enemy had been driven from the 
country and that there was no reason why men who had been a long time under
24. Oliphant Papers, F0800/253 Tu/23/25; Ryan Papers, F0800/240; FO371/9130/E2141/199/44 
Secret Political Report, No. 1089.
184
arms should not be permitted to return to their homes. There was thus little 
enthusiasm among the army for war, but it could be used as a last r e  s o r t .  25 in the 
light of these arguments it seems incomplete to suggest that the policy of Ankara 
was motivated by the opposition and based on the postponement of the peace 
settlement. Rumbold, however, seemed to ignore these factors and concentrated on 
Ismet Pasha's position with regard to Ankara. 'Ismet Pasha is worried over the 
whole business,' he remarked, 'he is so bound down by his instructions from 
Angora that he dare not w a v e r . ' 2 6
Greek Reparation vs Allied Reparation
As the negotiations progressed it became clear that peace depended on the 
solution of five main questions: Greek reparation, the interest on the pre-war 
Ottoman public debt, the concessions, the judicial declarations, and the early 
evacuation of the territories under Allied occupation. Of these questions, the 
outcome of the Greek reparation question was to play a decisive role in the success 
or the failure of the conference.
The Greek reparation question had been a serious threat to peace, since 
both the Turks and the Greeks were equally determined in their demands. Venizelos 
had been under pressure at home for a military solution rather than to pay anything 
to the Turks and, exasperated by the delay, he had decided to bring the question to 
the conference table. His message to Ismet Pasha was clean it was materially 
impossible for Greece to pay anything in the shape of an indemnity and unless this 
question was speedily settled the Greek army would become restive.27 In his
25 In the event of a breakdown of the Conference, the Turkish General Staff had prepared a secret plan 
for a military offensive. For more information see: Ihsan Ilgar., Turk Genel Kurmayi'nin Gizli Harekat 
Plani' Beleelerle Turk Tarihi Dergisi. Savi 36, pp. 33-44.
26. FO371/9076/E4541/1/44, April 27, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No.496; FRUS 
(1923) Vol. ii pp. 1001-1002; Inonu, Hatiralar. p. 135.
27. Inonu. Hatiralar. p. 129; Simsir. Lozan Telgraflari II. No. 249. May 17, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf 
Orbay.
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reply, Ismet Pasha displayed a firm attitude stating that Turkey would not tolerate 
any military threat on the part of Greece and would not hesitate to take military 
action if necessary. 2 8
The Allies were alarmed at the prospect of a new Greco-Turkish war. Their 
representatives and military authorities at Istanbul were preparing contingency plans 
in case the Greeks crossed the Maritza line and they found themselves obliged to 
maintain a precarious neutrality in the centre of a potential field of Greco-Turkish 
operations. The British were particularly concerned about a Greek advance on 
Istanbul with its possible ramifications^ and they decided to act immediately. On 
14 May Rumbold had a meeting with Ismet Pasha during which Rumbold was 
finally able to convince Ismet of the Greeks' inability to pay anything at all. 
According to Rumbold, the Turks could not 'get blood out of stone.'30
Ismet Pasha was open to suggestions on the subject, but Greece had to 
make a 'gesture of good will'. It was now left to Rumbold to get the Greeks to do 
so. On May 18 he was informed, in response to his earlier suggestion, that the 
Greek government were ready to give up Karagatch but only as a last resort. 
Thereupon Rumbold and Venizelos worked out a detailed plan: Venizelos was first 
to inform Pelle, without consulting the Greek government, that he was prepared to 
cede Karagatch and a small triangle between the Maritza and Arda rivers to the 
Turks as a condition for the immediate settlement of the reparations question, and 
General Pelld was to present the proposal to the Turks as coming from himself. In 
the event of Ismet Pasha accepting the proposal, Venizelos would then inform PellS
28. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II. No. 238. May 14, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Orbay.
29 DBFP, XVIII, Nos. 517, 518, 520.
30. F0371/9102/E4949/6/44, May 15, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; FO371/9102/E5069/6/44, May 18, 
1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, Nos. 516, 524.
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that he would telegraph the Greek government for authority to confirm it.31 The 
plan seems to have worked and Ismet Pasha telegraphed the proposal to Ankara. 32
Ismet Pasha however, had a different solution in his mind. The Greek 
reparation question provided an indispensable opportunity for Ismet Pasha to bring 
the Allied reparation question to the centre of discussions at the Conference. He 
argued that both the Greek and the Allied reparation questions were connected, even 
though the Allies claimed otherwise. As he was now considering dropping his 
claims on Greece he wanted to know whether the Allies in return had abandoned 
their demand for reparation from Turkey. His question was to remain unanswered.
The Allied Reparation question became linked with the question of Greek 
Reparation in a way that may be described as a vicious circle; The question of Greek 
reparation could not be settled until Ismet Pasha was assured that the Allies would 
not demand any reparations from Turkey, yet there seemed to be no unity among 
the Allies as to the policy towards Turkey. The breach between Britain and its Allies 
was widening since the latter were reluctant to agree with Rumbold's inclination to 
drop the demand for reparations from Turkey, thus giving rise to a situation which 
was, as Rumbold put it, 'increasingly awkward and unfortunate.'^^ Moreover, 
everything pointed to their inability to come to settlement by compromise. Rumbold 
was bitterly critical of his colleagues' attitude. The French and Italians are hanging 
us up over one or two articles and their obstinacy in not consenting definitely to 
drop the demand for reparations from Turkey has already created a difficult situation 
and threatens to bring the work of the Conference to a stand-still.'34
31. F0371/9148/E5296/1767/44, May 23, 1923, Secretary of States for Colonies to Dominions; 
FO371/9103/E5Q94/6/44, May 18, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 527.
32 Simsir, Ijozan Telgraflari II. No. 256, May 19, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No. 271, May 22, 
1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No. 273, May 22, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.
33. F0371/9103/E5097/6/44, May 20, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII. No. 535.
34. Rumbold Papers, Rumbold, 31, ff. 133-134; ff. 141-144.
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In view of the situation the British were anxious to get the reparation 
question out of the way and were trying to induce the French and Italian 
governments to drop their d e m a n d s  .35 Rumbold, who was following the 
developments step by step, believed that a further delay in the settlement of the 
reparation question would produce undesirable consequences and decided that the 
time had come for forceful action. On May 21, in a meeting with Bompard and 
Garroni, he urged the immediate settlement of the Allied reparation question; he 
made it clear that if they revived their claims he should be bound to remain silent, 
thus giving Ismet Pasha a clear indication that the Allied front had been broken. 
'Everyone agreed that there is now no chance of obtaining reparation from Turks', 
wrote Rumbold to Curzon on May 22, 'and only question is whether my French 
colleague and Italian colleagues shall put forward without my support a demand 
which they will ultimately have to drop a g a i n . '36 Rumbold's threat proved effective 
and resulted in the French and Italian delegates asking their governments for fresh 
instructions.
On May 24 events took a dramatic turn when the Greeks announced that 
they would leave Lausanne two days later unless the Greek reparation question was 
settled. Rumbold had to warn Venizelos against 'criminal folly of any adventurous 
policy'. The solution, however, did not lie with Venizelos, who was contemplating 
the cession of K a r a g a t c h ^ ^  to the Turks in return for the withdrawal of Turkish 
demand for reparation. Rumbold believed that Ismet Pasha would accept the 
Karagatch proposal once the Allies definitely decided to drop their reparation 
claims. However, he was worried about both the possibility of a separate Turco- 
Greco agreement on the basis of the Karagatch proposal before the settlement of the
35. F0371/9104/E5382/6/44, May 23, 1923, Curzon to Rumbold; FO371/9103/E5363/6/44, May 25, 
1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII. Nos. 554, 557.
36. F0371/9078/E5196/1/44, May 22, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 537.
3^.During the first phase of the conference Ismet Pasha had accepted in the face of the strong action 
taken by Cuizon the surrender of Karagatch to Greece. See: Chapter III.
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Allied reparation question between the Turks and the Allies, and about the delay 
over the Allied reparation question which might precipitate the renewal of hostilities 
between Turkey and Greece. Therefore, while he put pressure on Montagna by 
threatening him that he would not take up the question of Castellorizo until the 
settlement of the Allied reparation question , he appealed to Curzon to take 'strong 
and immediate action' in Paris and Rome. 38 'My colleagues and I,’ he wrote to 
Curzon on May 25, 'are straining every nerve to prevent situation from developing 
from one of grave anxiety into one of real d a n g e r ' . 3 9
On the same day, Curzon urged the Italian and the French governments to 
drop their claims for reparation against Turkey on the grounds that the settlement of 
the Turkish claim for reparation against Greece, and the contingent issue of peace 
and war, might be dependent on the earliest possible settlement of this question. He 
also sent an urgent telegram to Rumbold in which, after reviewing the situation, he 
underlined that if the breakdown of the Conference was inevitable, it might be of 
'advantage' that it should come on the grounds of the Montagna Formula, as on this 
issue they could count on American support and the general approval of public 
opinion.
Ismet Pasha was under strong pressure both from the Allies and his own 
government concerning reparations. In the meantime, the Greeks were insisting on 
the immediate settlement of the Greek reparation question; otherwise, they declared, 
they would leave the conference. Rauf Bey's telegram of May 23 clearly stated that 
the Turkish claim for reparation could not be renounced in return for Karagatch and 
that if the Allies upheld the Greeks' inability to pay they should equally admit the 
Turks' inability to do so. Rauf Bey maintained that rather than hold up peace on 
account of the Greeks, Ismet Pasha should conclude peace between Turkey and the
38. FO371/9074/E5323/1/44, May 24, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 545.
39. F0371/9104/E5382/6/44, May 25, 1923, Curzon to Rumbold; DBFP, XVIII, No. 554; 
CON12404/327.
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Allies, and later with Greece.40 In his reply to Ankara, Ismet Pasha urged the 
acceptance of the Karagatch proposal and expressed his conviction that peace could 
not be achieved within the instructions laid down by the government.41 Thereupon, 
in a meeting under the presidency of Mustafa Kemal, the Council of Ministers 
arrived at the decision that if any sacrifice was to be made on the Greek reparation 
question, the questions of public debt interest, the early evacuation of the occupied 
areas, the judicial regime and the compensation of Allied companies should be 
brought forward with that of Greek reparations and only in the event of the 
settlement of these questions in favour of Turkey being guaranteed could a sacrifice 
be made in regard to reparations.42
Riza Nur recalls these critical days in his memoirs and states that after 
having received Ankara's definite instructions not to give way on the questions of 
reparations, he and Ismet Pasha assessed the situation. Under the assumption that 
the Greek threat to leave the conference was serious, they sent a second telegram to 
Ankara asking for authorisation to renounce Greek reparations. Riza Nur claims that 
they received no instructions for three days and when Ismet Pasha wished to return 
to Ankara to get things straightened out, he strongly advised Ismet not to do so. In 
consultation with each other they decided, despite the government's instructions, to 
accept the Karagatch proposal. 4^ It was a step which gave rise to considerable 
criticism at home.44
4 0  Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II. No. 278, May 23, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha.
4 4 . ibid. No. 295, May 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.
4 2 . ibid .No. 301. May 25, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha.
4 .^ Nur, Havat ve Hatiratim. pp. 1200-1203; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II. No. 296. May 24, 1923, 
Ismet Pasha to Mustafa Kemal; No.305, May 25, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No. 310, May 26, 
1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.
4 4  Ismet Pasha's telegram to Ankara , to communicate that he had accepted the offer, caused great 
dissatisfaction in the government and made the already strained relations between Rauf Bey and himself 
worse. His second telegram, justifying his decision by arguing that it was a necessary concession which 
would enable success in other areas, did not have the desired effect in Ankara. Nevertheless, Mustafa 
Kemal intervened on Ismet Pasha's behalf, and the issue was resolved according to the wishes of the 
latter. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II. No. 312, May 27, 1923, Mustafa Kemal to Ismet Pasha; No. 313. 
May 27, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; No.314. May 27, 1923, Mustafa Kemal to Ismet Pasha.
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The acceptance of the Karagatch proposal by the Turkish delegation was a 
critical move to which the Allies could not fail to respond. On May 25, to 
Rumbold's relief, the expected French answer was received and Pelle informed 
Rumbold that Poincar6 had definitely agreed to renounce the French claim for 
reparation from Turkey 45 On May 26, at a private meeting between Venizelos, 
Ismet Pasha and the Allies, Ismet Pasha agreed to the Karagatch proposal but asked 
for definite assurances as to the rapid settlement of the question of Allied 
reparations. He succeeded in obtaining the Allies' 'promise' on the subject since the 
instructions of the Italian government had not been received at that point. Two days 
later he was informed by Montagna that the Italian government too had sent 
instructions to drop demands for reparations.^ Thus, the question of Greek 
reparations and that of Allied reparations were settled simultaneously. The peaceful 
solution of this perilous situation was due to the qualities of the two principal 
opponents, to the skill with which Venizelos played his cards against his own 
government, the Allies, and the Turks, to Ismet Pasha's sincere desire for peace, 
and to the courage with which he stretched the not too elastic instructions of his 
own government. Ismet Pasha acted on the same principle as he had in the first part 
of the Conference. He tried first to eliminate the most dangerous opponent, the 
menace of the Greek army, which could be used as a weapon against Turkey. Once 
the reparation dispute was settled, even if a rupture occurred, the Greeks would 
have no ground for military action, nor would the Allies have the means of using 
this military action as a threat against Turkey. His strategy, however, failed to 
obtain the support of the Council of Ministers at Ankara who were irritated by his 
exceeding their instructions.
45. CON12404/322.
46. FO371/9079/E5426/1/44, May 27, 1923, Rumbold to the Foreign Office.
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Decisive Steps towards Peace: Debt and Concession 
Questions
The settlement of the Greek reparation question was a sacrifice on the part 
of Turkey and was obtained only after Ismet Pasha 'considerably exceeded his 
instructions' and placed himself in a difficult position vis-a-vis Ankara.^ Ismet 
Pasha felt that his accommodating attitude required some sort of Allied move to 
settle the remaining issues in favour of Turkey. On May 27, a day after the 
settlement of the Greek reparation question, in a meeting with Rumbold, Ismet 
Pasha pushed the question of the early evacuation of Istanbul into the forefront. 
The same day, Rumbold warned Curzon against what he believed to be 'the danger 
of mad intransigence at Angora overriding Ismet's strong desire for peace' and 
advised him to show generosity towards the Turks on the question of early 
evacuation. Rumbold argued that by early evacuation Britain would gain 
economically as well as politically since the delay meant continuing expenditure and 
the risk of incidents in the occupied area. Furthermore, early evacuation might 
produce a favourable effect on the course of the negotiations and on Britain's future 
relations with the Turks. Nevertheless, Curzon was of the opinion that the 
evacuation would constitute so important a concession that 'it ought not to be lightly 
granted', as it furnished the Allies with a 'most powerful lever'. 'We ought not 
therefore' he told Rumbold on June 13, 'to proceed with discussion of this question 
until we are satisfied that an acceptable peace is on eve of being concluded, and that 
presupposes a settlement of the important questions still outstanding especially the 
debt, commercial concessions and Mosul.
47. F0371/9079/E5581/1/44, May 29, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; FO371/9080/E5671/1/44, May, 31, 
1923, Henderson to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 571. 576; CON12404/375. Henderson's report of May 
30, based on the intercepted telegram sent to Ismet Pasha by Mustafa Kemal, clearly illuminated Ismet 
Pasha's position.
48. FO371/9082/E6101/1/44, June 13, 1923, Curzon to Rumbold; DBFP, XVIII, No.606; F0800/240 
Ryan Papers; CON12404/484.
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In principle Ismet Pasha agreed with Curzon on the questions to be 
urgently solved, but with one exception. From the Turkish point of view, beside the 
evacuation of Istanbul, judicial capitulations took priority over other issues.^ On 
May 29, after long and wearisome discussions, Ismet Pasha declared that it would 
be useless to take up any of the three remaining questions until that of judicial 
declaration was settled.50 He delivered practically an ultimatum, that of settling one 
of the questions before proceeding to the consideration of another. Ismet Pasha 
could not afford to make another concession since his position regarding Ankara 
was delicate. The difficulty in reaching an agreement over the judicial capitulations 
shifted attention to the debt problem. However it was soon discovered that the 
Ottoman debt question proved even more inconclusive.
By the beginning of June, the prospect of peace seemed distant. Rumbold, 
who played the role of a mediator, described his situation as one of 'trying to square 
the circle.'5  ^ 'Both French and Turks are quite intransigent on the subject, and I 
have exhausted my energy and ingenuity in trying to effect a compromise between 
the two.' In his view, the French seemed 'almost ready to push the matter to the 
point of presenting an ultimatum to the Turks', and that would mean a r u p t u r e . 5 ^  
Rumbold's formula to overcome the deadlock was based on the solution of two 
other questions: Judicial capitulations and the evacuation of Istanbul. He was 
convinced that the combination of these two would consolidate Ismet Pasha's 
position vis-&-vis Ankara and that he would have 'greater courage to meet Allies 
half way over question of debt and concessions.'55 Indeed, Ismet Pasha was open 
to recommendations and finally sent to Ankara for the consideration of the Council
49. CON12404/369; FO371/9081/E5884/1/44, June 4, 1923, Rumbold to the Foreign Office.
5 0  Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II. No. 326, May 29, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.
Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 31, ff. 197-199, July 19, 1923, Rumbold to Crowe.
Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 31, ff. 194-196, June 19, 1923, Rumbold to Henderson.
53. FO371/9080/E5836/1/44; FO371/9080/E5676/1/44, June 1, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP,
XVIII, No.578.
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of Ministers three possible solutions: Payment in francs; No mention in the treaty 
either of conditions of payment or of confirmation of the Muharrem Decree^; 
Confirmation of the Muharrem Decree and old loan contracts with a reservation 
respecting settlements with bondholders and, after peace, discussion of conditions 
of payment.55 Ankara found the first solution preferable, the second acceptable, 
but the third one Ismet Pasha was instructed 'definitely to reject'. Ankara's rejection 
originated from the fear that if payment in francs was not admitted the Muharrem 
Decree would place the largest part of state revenue under foreign control.5^ On 
June 2, Ismet Pasha clearly explained to Rumbold that Ankara would under no 
circumstances agree to pay in sterling, giving Rumbold the impression that he 
would carry the matter to the point of rupture.^
This was a bilateral agreement concluded between the Ottoman Empire and its creditors for the 
resumption of service on the foreign debt and received the sanction of Royal irade on December 20,
1881. The contract became known as the Decree of Muharrem (from the Turkish month in which it was 
signed) and consisted of twenty one articles of which Blaisdell examined them in three general groups; 
'those which refer to the reduction, conversion and consolidation of the internal and external debt, but 
excluding the Russian indemnity; those which deal with the service of the consolidated debt and the
revenues ceded to the administering body; and those which are concerned with the erection of an 
executive body known as "The Council of Administration," the organisation to function under its 
direction, and the relations between the Government and the Council.' Donald C. Blaisdell., European 
Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire: A Study of the Establishment Activities, and Significance of 
the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt. (New York: Colombia University Press, 1929), pp. 88- 
89.
5 5 . Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II. No.329. May 30, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.
5 ^. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II. No. 334. May 31, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; No. 347. June 1, 
1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; No. 348. June 2, 1923, Mustafa Kemal to Ismet Pasha; No. 358. June 3, 
1923, Mustafa Kemal to Ismet Pasha.
Ismet Pasha's firm stand was due to the persistent attitude of the government His relations with Rauf 
Bey were already strained over the status of Ferit Bey, Turkey's Paris representative. Towards the end of 
the first phase of the conference, Ferit Bey's initiative of engaging in private negotiations with the 
French without consulting the Prime Minister caused deep concern in the government and in particular to 
Rauf Bey, who immediately asked for Ferit Bey's resignation from his post and return to Ankara. Ismet 
Pasha's telegram defending Ferit Bey and criticising the Prime Minister's decision caused friction 
between the Prime Minister and himself through an intense private correspondence over a long period of 
time and finally resulted in Ferit Bey's leaving office. Dissatisfaction with the manner in which Ismet 
Pasha handled the conference became increasingly apparent to Rauf Bey, especially in the second part of 
the conference. A deep conflict between Ismet Pasha, who was accused of disregarding instructions, and 
the government was clearly noticeable. Despite definite instructions from his government about the 
payment of debts in French francs, Ismet Pasha seemed to hesitate and was almost willing to give in to 
the Allies suggestion of payment of debts in gold or sterling. In the face of the unyielding attitude of the 
government, he refused the Allies' proposals.
There were several reasons behind Ankara's determination. It needed money for reconstruction and for 
maintenance of the military situation and it could have no better grounds from the point of view of 
internal politics than to be able to say that it had broken off the Conference rather than leaving the 
country's revenues in the hands of foreigners. It would also facilitate the government's purpose in the 
election campaign.
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Rumbold believed that if the Allies met Ismet Pasha on the question of the 
evacuation of Istanbul this would not only ease the tension and strengthen Ismet 
Pasha's hand vis-a-vis his government but also facilitate the Allied task in resolution 
of the other outstanding questions, particularly that of the Ottoman debt.58 
Rumbold's views were shared by Pelle, who also considered that it would be a 
better policy to strengthen Ismet Pasha's position with his own government by 
informing him of the acceptance of the judicial declaration in question rather than to 
defer its acceptance for bargaining purposes in connection with other outstanding 
questions. The French proposal was that the evacuation of the occupied territories 
should begin immediately after ratification of the treaty by the GNA and that it 
should end after the treaty came into force subject to its ratification by Britain, Italy 
and Japan and the demobilisation of the Turkish army to proceed pari passu with 
evacuation.'59 From Rumbold’s point of view spinning out evacuation until three 
Powers other than Turkey had ratified the treaty was both 'dangerous and 
impractical'.^ Curzon and General Harington agreed, the latter stating that the 
Allied Generals were unanimous in the opinion that once evacuation began it should 
be carried out completely. 'It would be exceedingly dangerous and unsound to leave 
small detachments exposed to incidents and insults with Turks in their present 
uppish mood, which will be accentuated when we are actually going' wrote General 
Harington to the War Office on June 6. 'In my opinion, evacuation should be
5 8  FO371/9080/E5726/1/44, June 2, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 581.
5 9 . Poincare's position, however, was understandable. He was afraid to weaken his insecure internal 
position by backing down on the coupons. So long as external pressure was there he was supported. His 
administration survived because the Chamber felt that it must support his policy in the Ruhr and he 
shrank from giving way on the coupons question for fear of antagonising the numerous French 
bondholders. Considerable effort was expended by the British in getting the French government to drop 
this condition and it was not until July 7 that the Allies were in a position to take up these three 
outstanding questions with the Turks.
60. F0371/9080/E5806/1/44, June 4, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 585; Rumbold 
Papers, Rumbold 31, ff. 168-173.
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started on ratification by Angora and the time limit should be fixed by Lausanne, 
say 6 weeks, by which it will be c o m p l e t e d . ' ^ !
On June 4, the Conference focused on the question of concessions. The 
Allied strategy was that they would make the announcement of their assent to the 
judicial declarations at the outset of the meeting with a view to preparing the 
necessary ground for the favourable outcome of the concession question. 
Nevertheless, Ismet Pasha was determined not to give way on the question until he 
had made further progress over the debt and the evacuation of Istanbul. But Pelle 
too was insistent that the Allies should decline to discuss the evacuation of Istanbul 
until Ismet Pasha had settled the questions of debt and concessions. Ismet Pasha's 
endeavours to gain the sympathy of the Romanian, Serbian and American delegates 
on the issue ended in failure, leaving him alone to face French obstructiveness. 
After some strenuous sittings, agreement in principle was reached on the night of 
June 8-9, but when details of the evacuation and the concessions questions came to 
be examined by experts in the sub-committees, fresh difficulties arose. Ismet 
Pasha's attitude stiffened on June 10 at a private meeting during which the question 
of debt was discussed. He had received confirmation from Mustafa Kemal that the 
Turkish government would under no circumstances pay interest on debt in gold. If 
franc payment could not be obtained, the declaration confirmed by the Muharrem 
Decree could not be accepted, since Ankara regarded the Muharrem Decree as 
contrary to national sovereignty .62
Ismet Pasha declared that Turkey had recognised its debt but was unable to 
pay in full. If the Allied governments would agree to payment in francs Turkey 
would agree to recognise its engagements as legally valid but it would not confirm
^Vf O371 /9081 /E 5965 /1 /44 , June 6, 1923, Harington to the Foreign Office;
F0371/9080/E5806/1/44, June 4, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 585.
62 CON12404/334; F0371/9082/E6030/1/44, June 9, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 
595; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II. No. 348. June 2, 1923, Mustafa Kemal to Ismet Pasha; No. 358. June 
3, 1923, Mustafa Kemal to Ismet Pasha; Inonu. Hatiralar. pp. 143-144.
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its engagements by a proposed declaration in return for a vague promise that 
bondholders would examine its financial situation and discuss modalities of 
payment after peace. Alternatively, Turkey would agree to make no declaration and 
to leave both sides of the matter to be discussed with bondholders.^ After a 
lengthy discussion it became clear that there was no possibility of reaching an 
agreement and breakdown seemed inevitable. Rauf Bey’s press declaration showed 
serious signs of dissatisfaction. Turkey has reached limit of her sacrifices,' stated 
the Prime Minister, 'and can on no account accept peace which does not give her 
complete independence. If there be a rupture, it will have been brought about by 
those who have presented proposals calculated to entail economic and financial 
slavery of Turks.'64
On June 11, Rumbold asked for definite instructions as to whether the 
British government was prepared to face rupture on this question. A long and 
wearisome discussion on June 12 only worsened the already complicated problem 
and everybody was convinced that until the debt question was settled further 
progress would be blocked.^ As for the concessions, no immediate settlement 
seemed possible either. Ismet Pasha's instructions were that the matter was to be 
dealt with at Ankara, that there were other matters such as debt and evacuation still 
outstanding, and that the moment had not arrived for the settlement of the 
concessions q u e s t i o n s .66 The Debt question held the key to progress.
63. F0371/9082/E6030/1/44, June 9, 1923 Rumbold to Curzon; FO371/9082/E6033/1/44, June 10, 
1923, Rumbold to Curzon; F 0371 /9082/E6059/1/44, June 11, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; 
FO371/9082/E6103/1/44, June 12, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; FO371/9082/E6217/1/44, June 14, 
1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 595, 597, 598, 602, 615; CON12404/463.
64 C0N12404/478, June 12, 1923, Henderson to Curzon; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II. No. 421. June 
11, 1923, Rauf Bey to Paris Representative; No. 426. June 12, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha.
65. FO371/9082/E6217/1/44, June 14, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; FO371/9083/E6252/1/44. June 15, 
1923, Rumbold to Curzon.
66. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II. No. 360. June 3, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; No.372. June 5, 
1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; No.388. June 7, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; No. 432. June 12, 
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By mid-June, the situation reached a point where, in spite of the desire for 
peace on both sides, negotiations threatened to come to a standstill. The Allies knew 
that the Turkish delegates had lost credit with their government since the settlement 
of the Greco-Turkish reparation question and were no longer in a position to 
persuade their government to accept the solution of any question on its merit. The 
British and Italian delegates were convinced that in the event of a rupture over the 
debt question Ankara would not be deterred from resuming hostilities. However, 
Pell6 still maintained that if the Allies showed a firm front the Turks would give 
way over the debt and concession questions and not dare to go to war again. 
Rumbold eventually disclosed that his government would be reluctant to see the 
Conference break down on the question of debt and by a skilful manoeuvre he put 
Pell6 in a difficult position by asking him whether, if the positions were reversed, 
the French Parliament would be willing to see France engaged in hostilities on 
account of British b o n d h o l d e r s . ^  Pelle, though he refrained from answering 
Rumbold, still held a view diametrically opposed to that of his British colleague and 
dissension between them seemed complete. The British effort to get Pelle to go to 
Paris to try and get things straightened out also failed when Poincare turned down 
the proposal. 'We are all in a state of great depression here' wrote Rumbold in a 
private letter to Henderson on June 19, The conference had reached a complete 
dead-lock over the Debt question.'^
The situation in the conference was undoubtedly one of complete deadlock 
pending agreement between the French and British governments regarding the 
further course to be pursued, since the Italians seemed to be amenable to falling in 
with any plan not involving rupture. Britain wished to avoid at all costs a rupture
6 7 F0371/9083/E6252/1/44, June 16, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; FO371/9083/E6356/1/44, June 18, 
1923, Rumbold to Curzon; FO371/9083/E6406/1/44, June 20, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, 
XVin, No.617,621, 624; ; Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 31, ff. 194-196; CON 12404/499.
68 F0800/240 Ryan Papers pp. 1106-1109; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II. No. 443. June 14, 1923, 
Ismet Pasha to Prime Minister; No. 465. June 19, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Prime Minister; No. 475. June 
21, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha.
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and a possible resumption of hostilities on questions which were mainly French 
interests, and deemed that the only course to be followed was to bring the French 
into line. According to Curzon as this matter was predominantly a French interest, 
Britain was prepared to be largely guided by the French view and to support it. But, 
he emphasised, that as ’relatively unimportant British interests' were involved, 
Britain was 'reluctant' to see peace negotiations finally break down on that 
particular p o i n t . 6 9  'I know it is humiliating to give way to the Turks,' commented 
Rumbold in his telegraph to Crowe of June 19, 'but if we are not going to use 
force, we must take the best bargain we can. If we threaten to use force without 
intending to carry out our threat, the Turks might very well call our bluff and then 
our position would be considerably worse than before .'^  For Rumbold the Allies 
no longer had any basis for negotiations.
The British, who were not unsympathetic to the Turkish view over the debt 
question, turned their attention to the concession question. Therefore, before 
plunging into the debt problem, which did not directly concern Britain, Curzon 
asked Rumbold 'to bring Ismet into the open on the Concession question'. The 
degree of Britain's satisfaction over the concession question would determine the 
degree of pressure to be exercised upon the French to bring them into line as well as 
Turkey's chances of settling the debt question to its satisfaction. Nevertheless, 
Ismet Pasha maintained that the concessions question was one to be settled in 
Ankara through negotiations between the Turkish government and individual 
c o n c e s s i o n a i r e s .71 At present his government took the view that the question was
69. FO371/9082/E6101/1/44, June 13, 1923, Curzon to Rumbold; DBFP, XVIII, No. 606; 
F0371 /9081/E5884/1/44.
7®. Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 31, ff. 197- 199.
Inonu. Hatiralar. pp.141-142; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari n. No. 434. June 13, 1923, Ismet Pasha to 
Prime Minister; No. 440. June 14, 1923, Prime Minister to Ismet Pasha.
During the second part of the Lausanne Conference the British companies and the Turkish government 
were involved in negotiations at Ankara. The British position was that unless the Foreign Office was 
assured by the British companies themselves that they had obtained satisfaction at Ankara, it would not 
drop the treaty provisions as required by the Turks.
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not within the competence of the Conference. Ankara believed that negotiations with 
the concessionary companies would succeed if the companies themselves 
entertained no hopes of intervention from the Allies on their behalf at Lausanne. 
Ismet Pasha also pressed for the immediate settlement of the coupons question since 
his instructions allowed him to discuss the concessions only after the coupons 
question was settled in favour of Turkey and the evacuation of Istanbul was 
promised.^
On June 2 3 ^ , at a meeting of the Third Committee, Ismet Pasha 
underlined the fact that once the debt and the evacuation questions were solved 
Ankara would then consider the question of concessions and send him instructions. 
Riza Nur confirmed that at present the Turks were not empowered to negotiate the 
concessions, but that the modification of their view could later be put on the 
agenda.74 Rumbold responded that a discussion of the conditions of evacuation 
could not be embarked upon until all other important questions had been 
r e s o l v e d  75 There seemed to be no way out of this vicious circle unless one of the 
parties relented. Ismet Pasha felt that, under the rigid instructions of Ankara, he had 
no option - apart from breaking off negotiations - but to convince Rumbold to settle 
the debt question first. He therefore met Rumbold in private on June 26, and gave 
him a positive undertaking that if the solution to the debt question was found
FO371/9084/E6547/1/44, June 23, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II.
No.475, June 21, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha.
The coupons question created another bone of contention between Ismet Pasha and Rauf Bey. The limit of 
the government's tolerance was reached when Ismet Pasha did not follow the clearly stated instructions 
that nothing should be discussed before the dispute over coupons was solved, and the government 
rebuked him accordingly. He responded with a telegram to Ankara, saying that the attitude of the 
government was like that of the Palace in the conduct of the Turco-Russian War, 1877-1878', and 
challenged Rauf Bey and the deputy Finance Minister, Hasan Fehmi Bey, to come to Lausanne and secure 
the peace treaty themselves. Orbay, 'Rauf Orbay'in Hatiralari'; Ataturk, Nutuk. p. 785; Karaosmanoglu, 
Politikada 45 Yil. p. 40; Nur, Ha vat ve Hatiratim. pp. 1239-1240; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II. 
No.506. June 25, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No. 506. June 25, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No. 
510. June 26, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha.)
7 .^ Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II. No. 486, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.
7 4  Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II. June 24,1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha.
75. F0371/9084/E6547/1/44, June 23, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 632; Simsir, 
Lozan Telgraflari II. No. 490. June 23, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Prime Minister.
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immediately he was ready to settle the question of concessions in a manner 
satisfactory to the Allies.^
Rumbold was not entirely convinced and was reluctant to risk the claims of 
the companies as he believed that if the Turkish concessionaire companies were 
excluded from the treaty and not 'fairly treated' in the arrangements made with them 
at Ankara, he would be left with no choice but to accept the decision. But, as 
Curzon rightly observed, everything depended on the French decision on the 
coupons question. Rumbold was uneasy about the whole affair: The Turks do not 
mean to pay them [coupons] in anything but francs and we know that quite well.... 
It seems to me a matter of getting the French into line on a programme of action.'^ 
An ultimatum, which the French believed should be delivered, was not regarded as 
a favourable option by the Foreign Office, which believed it might lead to a rupture. 
The disadvantages of a possible rupture were far greater than Britain's gains from 
the debt and concession questions. If a breakdown occurred they would have to be 
prepared for a prolonged period of uncertainty and for possible hostilities and they 
would also have to make their occupation of Istanbul more effective than it was at 
present. This was bound to result in Britain having to ask the French and Italians to 
share the burden of occupation more equally. Although the French could hardly 
refuse this, the Italians were reluctant to contribute more than they were at present. 
The whole problem, therefore, would inevitably lead to another division in the so- 
called Allied unity.
Curzon's telegram to Rumbold on July 21 clearly illustrated the 
apprehension of the Foreign Office regarding the ultimatum. He argued that there 
was no certainty that the Turks would yield to an ultimatum and that public opinion 
would not tolerate an inflexible policy. He also pointed out that the points over
76. CON12404/548.
77’. FO371/9082/E6448/1/44; FO371/9084/E6731/1/44, June 28, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, 
XVIII, No.640.
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which Britain could break up the Conference were, though important, not 
’absolutely vital', and a prolongation and possible extension of a military 
occupation would be 'very unpopular' and might even be ' d a n g e r o u s ' . " ^  Ryan and 
Henderson too were of the opinion that the ultimatum meant rupture. 'If the 
ultimatum is too stiff and the French would want it pretty stiff,' commented Ryan in 
a private letter to Henderson on July 26, 'the Turks, in their folly, will break away 
rather than y ie ld .'^  In his letter of June 27 to Rumbold Henderson was 
pessimistic:
The Turks would rather face a rupture, even with the 
ultimate possibility of war, than agree to pay the Debt 
coupons in gold. 'Therefore, in my opinion,... an 
ultimatum would mean a rupture, unless possibly the Allies 
said that they were going to and meant to use force.
By the beginning of July the Conference had made no significant progress 
and still met the same difficulties as in June except that the Allies were now ready to 
give Ismet Pasha satisfaction on the question of early evacuation. They refused, 
however, to make this concession formally or to discuss it in detail until Turkey 
gave satisfaction on the other two points. In the concessions question, considerable 
British and French interests were at stake. Direct negotiations with the Ankara 
government were believed to be on the verge of a breakdown and, as a result of 
this, the Allies insisted on the inclusion in the treaty of a special protocol laying
78 F0800/253, Tu/23/48; FRUS (1923), Vol. II, p. 1028.
79. F0800/240, July 26, 1923, Ryan to Henderson (Private letter), Ryan Papers.
8®. F0800/253 Tu/23/46; Tu/23/50; Oliphant Papers; F0800/240 Ryan Papers; Rumbold Papers, 
Rumbold 31, ff. 192-193, 216-219.
However Henderson and General Harington's reports on Turkey confirmed the fact that the 'growing 
internal disunion, increasing administrative disorganisation' and 'waning influence of Mustafa Kemal 
'could well provide a unique opportunity for the Allies to impose their terms. If the ultimatum was to be 
delivered, there could be no better time than the present since all the indications pointed that the Turks 
were hardly in a position to resume open hostilities and were incapable of active resistance to force. 
Therefore it was for the Allies to decide whether they could afford to face this risk in the belief that the 
Turks would yield to the Allies' last word. General Harington and Henderson believed that Ankara would 
be reluctant to run the risk of losing what they had hitherto gained and be exposed to the grave danger of 
ruining personal position as a result of internal troubles.' F0839/52 No. 184-185, June 25, 1923, 
Henderson to the Foreign Office.
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down the principles on which the future settlement of these concessionary questions 
was to be achieved.
The questions of the Decree of Muharrem and the currency in which the 
interest on the pre-war debts was to be paid were of interest mainly to the French 
though there was an important holding of unified bonds in London. On the one 
hand, the French plenipotentiaries were bound by a principle to which the French 
government attached great importance, namely the refusal to diminish in any way by 
a treaty stipulation the full rights of individual French bondholders; on the other 
hand, the Turkish delegates, with a budget which hardly balanced and inflexible 
instructions from Ankara, were determined not to commit themselves to anything 
which might risk the ratification of the treaty by Ankara and endanger Turkey's 
future economic and financial prospects. The continued state of stalemate posed a 
considerable danger to the successful conclusion of the Conference although none 
of the parties felt they were likely to gain by a fresh outbreak of hostilities. In the 
struggle that ensued, the British position was, by the nature of the case, that of 
mediator.
Ankara was getting impatient about the inconclusive negotiations at 
Lausanne. On July 2 Ismet Pasha addressed a note to the Allies in which he 
criticised the slow progress and urged the Conference to proceed without any delay 
with the discussion of essential questions, more particularly the question of 
coupons, which he believed constituted the principal obstacle to the conclusion of 
peace.81 Rumbold was furious with Ismet Pasha's note, which he called 'a tissue 
of misrepresentations seriousness of which is aggravated by its premature 
publication.1 In his protest of July 3, he was equally critical of the Turkish attitude, 
declaring that it was 'intolerable' to be accused of dilatoriness on the grounds that
8 1 . Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II, No.539. July 2, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.
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the Allies had not accepted the Turkish view of how the questions should be 
settled.'^2 Nevertheless, Ismet Pasha's note of July 3, led to the clearance of minor 
points if not of the principal questions.
The main feature of the conference at the beginning of July was the 
isolation of the French due to their attitude regarding the debt question. On July 3, a 
visit of Romanian and Serbian delegates to Rumbold was a reflection of the general 
atmosphere in the Conference. The delegates were uneasy about the present state of 
the Conference and about reports of an intention to present the Turks with a mise-en 
demeure which would lead to the failure of the conference. Although they did not 
wish to criticise any action which the Allies would take to defend the financial and 
economic interests of their subjects, they considered a rupture of the Conference for 
the sake of the bondholders difficult to justify. The Serbian delegate, who had 
spoken with Ismet Pasha on the previous day, reported Ismet Pasha's view that any 
prolongation of the occupation would mean war and that the Turks would never 
sign peace unless they were assured beforehand that their territory was to be 
evacuated. 'Allowing for a certain amount of bluff on Ismet's part,' commented 
Rumbold in his telegram to Curzon, 'I have little doubt that Turks would view 
prolongation of occupation in manner stated by Ismet.' He saw grave danger in the 
French attitude^ on the debt question and he believed that the French action would 
in effect amount to creation of 'another Ruhr question at Constantinople'.^
On July 4, in a telegram to Curzon, Rumbold was bitterly critical of the 
French position. 'French are...seeking to involve us in policy which means rupture
82 FO371/9085/E6978/1/44, July 5, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No.655.
8 .^ The French proposal regarding the debt question was to confront the Turks with two alternatives: 
Either the acceptance of the draft of February 4, maintaining the decree of Muharrem which should be 
embodied the Paris formula, or the abandonment of the declaration of the bondholders, subject to 
reservation of the right to protect the interests of the bondholders in so far as they were Allied subjects. 
However, they demanded that the evacuation should take place only six weeks after the Turkish 
ratification if in the meantime an agreement had been reached with the bondholders.
84. FO371/9085/E6937/1/44, July 3, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; FO371/9085/E6956/1/44, July 4, 
1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVHI. No.651, 653.
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of Conference but they refuse to face the consequences of such rupture.' He 
enumerated the consequences as an indefinite postponement of peace, the probable 
necessity of tightening the Allied hold on Istanbul and the possible resumption by 
the Turks of hostilities in one or more of three directions such as Istanbul and 
Chanak, Syria or Iraq. He then argued the first of these consequences was enough 
to add a serious danger to the already existing state of unrest in the Balkans and the 
Near East and that the second necessitated a 'large measure of responsibility for 
administration of Istanbul and some measure of responsibility for Eastern Thrace' 
unless the Allies asked Greece to take over. Considering the Turco-Greek 
rapprochement this alternative seemed rather unlikely. The third meant war, the 
ultimate extension of which nobody wished to happen. Moreover, there was the 
problem of justifying the rupture of the Conference to British public opinion 85
At this moment Curzon had to intervene by communicating to the French 
government that their proposal still contained elements which the governments of 
Britain and Italy believed would meet with refusal from the Turkish government and 
that it was likely to produce a breach, since the French confronted the Turks with a 
choice between 'integral acceptance of the French formula or a postponement of 
evacuation.' Curzon urged the French government to reconsider their decision by 
reminding them of the serious warning of the Romanian and Serbian delegations, 
and of the statement by Ismet Pasha that Turkey would not pay interest in gold, that 
a rupture would mean a renewal of hostilities and that they would not sign peace 
without an assurance of evacuation. He also stressed the inconsistency of French 
policy by pointing out that while Poincare had stated that the last thing he desired 
was to despatch reinforcements to Istanbul, he insisted on a solution which was 
likely to lead to a rupture. He finally asked the French government to reconsider 
'the possibility of omission of any declaration on the subject of the debt from the
8 5 .DBFP, XVin, No.653. July 4, 1923, Rumbold to Cuizon.
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treaty, full reservation of the bondholders' rights in a letter to Ismet Pasha but no 
corresponding postponement of e v a c u a t i o n . ' ^
It should also be noted that there was another consideration behind 
Curzon's strong appeal to Poincare: The Turco-Greek peace threat. In the later 
stages of June, the unforeseen Greco-Turkish rapprochement embarrassed the 
Allies, who were faced from time to time with a threat from both sides to conclude a 
separate Greco-Turkish peace if the negotiations, in which the Allies were mainly 
concerned, were not expedited. When Venizelos visited Rumbold on June 28, he 
criticised the Allies for failing to come to an agreement, saying that a fortnight had 
elapsed since the Greeks had received the note from Allied delegates foreshadowing 
the end of peace negotiations and that they could not contemplate with equanimity a 
prolongation of the present state of t h i n g s . ^  When Venizelos met Rumbold on July 
5, the Greek representative declared that unless something could be settled before 
Sunday, July 8, he could no longer refrain from making separate terms with 
Turkey. To the relief of all involved, the French reply of July 6, which was 
immediately communicated by Crewe to London and Lausanne, was 'generally 
satisfactory,' thus opening the way to discussions of the three remaining questions, 
namely debt, concessions and evacuation.
The private meeting of July 7, between the Allied and Turkish delegates 
which lasted nearly six hours produced no result but only more friction. 
Nevertheless it prepared the basis for the discussions of July 10, during which 
tension rose to the highest pitch. Private discussions on the next day, July 11, 
proved also to be inconclusive. Rumbold's formula providing for the maintenance 
of the maximum number of allied warships in Turkish waters inside the Straits 
between the end of the evacuation and the enforcement of the Straits convention,
86. FO371/9085/E6937/1/44, July 5, 1923, Curzon to Crewe; DBFP, XVIII, No. 656.
87. F0371/9105/E6790/6/44, June 30, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 643.
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subject to unlimited right of passage during the same period, was rejected by Ismet 
Pasha who maintained that he could accept no evacuation proposal which did not 
include the complete withdrawal of allied warships from Turkish waters, and that 
the Turks had always understood evacuation in this sense. When he asked 
instructions from Curzon as to whether in the last resort London would agree to 
leave no ships stationed in those waters provided he could secure unlimited right of 
passage, the reply, to his relief, was in the affirmative. Curzon, having consulted 
with the Admiralty, sent a telegram to Rumbold authorising him to proceed with his 
formula but stressing that the withdrawal should only be made in the last resort and 
as part of an absolutely final settlement covering concessions and any other points 
that Ismet Pasha could raise afresh.*® Relieved by Curzon's reply but disappointed 
with Ismet's refusal, Rumbold communicated to Curzon on July 12: Things are 
going more slowly than I expected. At present it is difficult to see whether Turks are 
moving back, playing for time in hope that Anglo-French relations may deteriorate 
owing to Ruhr question, or merely testing allied position in order to see what they 
can screw out of us before finally coming to terms.
Following months of discussion there was still no prospect of completing 
the treaty and it seemed almost certain that there would have to be a last-minute 
compromise since neither side wanted to risk a war at the expense of the issues still 
needed to be settled.
Final Bargaining: The TPC Concession
At the beginning of July, while there was little or no progress regarding the 
other issues before the Conference, the question of concessions came to the
88. F0371 /9087/E7217/1/44, July 12, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 669; F0424/258; 
CON12560/65, 76.
89. CON12560/77; FO371/9086/E7191/1/44, July 12, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, 
No.668.
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forefront, and the full weight of American diplomacy started to be felt. On July 8, 
the Americans were alarmed at the news that the meeting between the Turkish and 
Allied experts had produced a discussion in favour of a new formula which was to 
delete the second article^ of the draft protocol on concessions and replace it with 
the following provisions:
"1. The ’juridical’ validity of the French concession 
made in 1914 to be confirmed by Turkey and compensation 
to be given to be determined if necessary by arbitration. 2.
The Vickers-Armstrong Company to be compensated by 
Turkey for work which it had actually undertaken. 3. The 
Alleged Turkish Petroleum Company concession to be 
confirmed by Turkey. ”
The Allies’ new formula for the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC)91 
would have meant that the rights acquired by the TPC should be valid and 
maintained. The proposal, which had been objected to by both the Turks and the 
Americans in the first part of the Conference, thus came up again, and the Turks 
appeared to be relinquishing their former position. The US. State Department 
renewed its objections to any formula proposing to validate the TPC's controversial 
concession on the grounds that unless the British gave up their position in 
’Mesopotamia' the Turkish territories would not include ’some of the important 
rights claimed by the Turkish Petroleum Company.' Since the American 
government regarded the TPC's concession 'as monopolistic in its application to 
Mesopotamian oil fields,' the Department argued, the British government was not 
'entitled to a monopoly of the fruits of a victory to which American arms have 
contributed, and to secure now monopolistic privileges for the Turkish Petroleum 
Company to the exclusion of American enterprise.' The State Department was 
concerned that if the Allied formula was incorporated in the treaty it would mean a 
great diplomatic victory for the British. 'Such victory should not be won by our
90 The Article 93-94 of the Draft Treaty dealing with the concessions was transferred to a special 
protocol in the second part of the conference.
9 1 . See Chapter V, pp.159-162.
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own surrender,' the Department instructed Grew, 'and any reservation we make 
should be contrived as effectively as p o s s i b l e . ' ^
At Lausanne, Grew believed that Rumbold and Ismet Pasha might have 
entered into a private arrangement by which the latter would agree to satisfy the 
TPC's claims 'as a return for British support on the issue regarding Ottoman Debt 
coupons.' After receiving the view of the State Department on the matter, Grew was 
determined to fight alongside Ismet Pasha and do everything in his power to 
strengthen his resistance to these 'entirely inequitable provisions'. He assured Ismet 
Pasha that if he stood firm he would win since the Allies' position was 'unsound' 
and they could not justify themselves before world opinion .93 Nevertheless, 
Ankara would have to follow a cautious policy which would ensure American 
support and not antagonise the British. They could neither support the TPC's 
concession, since the GNA had granted the Chester concession in April, nor oppose 
it in strong terms since they still needed British support at Lausanne. The formula 
was elaborated to the effect that Ankara was prepared to allow the question of the 
TPC's concession to be referred to a neutral arbitrator, thus relieving itself from 
responsibility for any possible infraction of the Chester concession. However, 
Ismet Pasha was to 'stand fast' on the principle that the GNA had the right to grant 
concessions to whom they p l e a s e d . 9 4
American pressure began to increase. On July 12 Grew visited Rumbold to 
stress the importance which his government attached to the matter and declared that 
the United States would not be able to acquiesce in the validation of an agreement 
which had not at the time fulfilled all legal requirements; he concluded that if 
Rumbold maintained his position he would be reluctantly compelled to make a
92. FRUS, 1923, II, pp. 1029-39; Grew, pp .582-584.
9 .^ Grew. Turbulent Era, pp.585-589; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II. No. 618. July 13, 1923, Rauf Bey to 
Ismet Pasha.
94. F0371/9088/E7527/1/44, July 19, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No.680.
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protest in the committee.^ On July 14, Rumbold asked for further instructions 
from Curzon about the British position, that is, about the ultimate limit of 
concessions he could make. In return he was not given any precise instructions 
concerning the TPC and the matter was left to his discretion. The instructions 
regarding the evacuation were the same. When he asked whether, in view of the 
risk of a break in negotiations, the recognition of unlimited right of passage by 
Turkey was essential for Britain, the Foreign Office replied by transmitting 
intelligence information disclosing Ismet Pasha's instructions from Ankara with the 
hope that Rumbold, on the basis of this information, would find it unnecessary to 
make the concession.^
Ismet Pasha agreed to the meeting proposed by the A llies^ for July 17 
and which was the final meeting of the Conference. Rumbold knew that he did not 
have much time left to bring the negotiations to a conclusion. After the preparation 
and rejection of some dozen formulas, the French consented to leave the question of 
the decree of Muharrem and the interest of the debt outside the treaty, while 
expressing in the committee a strong reservation as to the Allied view of the matter 
and the possible subsequent Allied action. Ismet Pasha eventually accepted a 
protocol regarding concessions which met some, if not all, of the Allied conditions, 
while Britain made a final concession by agreeing to omit from the treaty Turkish 
confirmation of the rights of the TPC. In view of Ismet Pasha's determined 
opposition, strengthened by the intervention of Grew on Ismet Pasha's side, it 
proved impossible for Britain to obtain a satisfactory formula with regard to the 
TPC. Considering the controversial nature of the question and the possibility of a 
breakdown of the negotiations with the risk of further points being reopened on a
95. FO371/9087/E7258/1/44, July 13, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, No.672; CON12560/78; 
F0424/258.
96. FO 371/9087/E7308/1/44, July 14, 1923 Rumbold to Curzon, DBFP, XVIII, No. 674.
97  On July 15 , the Allies sent a note to Ismet Pasha in which they recapitulated the position of the 
discussions and expressed their readiness to examine the outstanding points. On the next day Ismet 
Pasha agreed to meet them and the meeting took place on July 17.
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question on which Britain could have received little or no support from its Allies, 
Rumbold's decision seemed justifiable. However, he was badly shaken when he 
received Curzon's telegram of July 18, which criticised the stand taken by him. 'I 
am most uneasy at learning' wrote Curzon, 'that you jettisoned case of Turkish 
Petroleum Company whose claims I repeatedly emphasised in discussion when at 
Lausanne regarding Mosul.' After referring to the intercepted telegrams between 
Ankara and Ismet Pasha which disclosed Ismet Pasha's intention to avoid a 
complete rupture in negotiations, Curzon continued:
'It appears to me that mere unilateral reservation, 
however strongly couched by you, cannot but prejudice 
materially our position in forthcoming negotiations about 
Mosul, and will also weaken most seriously Company's 
claims to rights under 1914 concession.'
He concluded by advising that Rumbold should insist on putting back the 
Turkish Petroleum Company into the p r o t o c o l .98
Although Curzon's telegram caused Rumbold 'deep concern' it did not 
alter his conviction that the course which he had taken was the only one open to him 
if rupture was to be avoided. He explained the considerations and circumstances 
that governed his decision to accept the omission of any mention of the Company's 
concession in the treaty and defended his action on the grounds that Ismet Pasha 
had definite instructions from Ankara to break rather than yield, in which case the 
Allies and world opinion would accuse Britain of 'destroying certainty of peace for 
the sake of British oil interests.' After having referred to Curzon's own statement in 
the first phase of the Conference that oil considerations had nothing to do with the 
British attitude regarding Mosul, he added his conviction that rupture, which would 
commit Britain to an 'open and unpleasant dispute' with the United States, was 
most undesirable. He maintained that he had left the 'question of Turkish Petroleum
98. FO371/9087/E7398/1/44, July 18, 1923, Curzon to Rumbold; FO371/9088/E7527/1/44, July 19. 
1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, Nos. 679, 680; CON12560/110; F0424/258.
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Company intact as between Turkish and British governments’ and his action had 'in 
no way enhanced the validity of the Chester concession.’ He was, however, very 
much disturbed by the whole affair. 'I  deeply regret that after three months' arduous 
negotiations in the course of which you have more than once been good enough to 
express appreciation of my proceedings,' he remarked, 'I  should have failed to 
obtain your approval on the last remaining question which stood in the way of 
p e a c e . '9 9  Curzon's telegram of July 2 0  settled the problem. ' I  accept your 
explanation and agree that matter must be left as it stands.' 100
In comparison to Rumbold's difficulty in justifying the settlement to 
London, Ismet Pasha was in a relatively comfortable position. In early August, 
before he returned to Ankara, Rauf Bey left the capital for Sivas, his home town. 
This was, in fact, the retirement of Rauf Bey from the political a r e n a .  101 His 
departure from Ankara and relinquishment of office were the first public indications 
of dissension between him and Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Pasha. The acuteness of 
the quarrel almost certainly dated from the first phase of the Conference, during the 
last stage of which relations between Ismet Pasha and Ankara had suffered a severe 
strain. The tension was caused by the different and conflicting political views held 
by Ismet Pasha and the Prime Minister Rauf Bey and by Ismet Pasha's disregard of 
the latter's instructions and finally manifested itself in the form of protest by the 
government by not authorising Ismet Pasha to sign the treaty. In other words, 
permission to sign the treaty did not come from the government, but from Mustafa 
Kemal, despite Ismet Pasha's two telegrams asking for authorisation.
" .  FO371/9088/E7527/1/44, July 19, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 680; F0424/258; 
CON12560/113.
10°. F0371/9088/E7527/1/44, July 19, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 680; 
CON12560/118.
Nur. Havat ve Hatiratim.p. 1247; Aydemir, Tek Adam, pp. 132-134; Avdemir. Ikinci Adam, p. 
266; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II. No. 711. August 2, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; CON12560/174; 
F0424/258.
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In a telegram to Ankara on July 18, Ismet Pasha was critical of the 
government’s attitude; he declared that although it had been three days since he had 
reported to the government the mode of settlement, he still had received no reply. 
'In the event of government insisting on rejection of conditions accepted by us we 
cannot do more,' he declared, and warned the government that the 'only course 
open to me would be to address a communication to High Commissioners in 
Constantinople informing them that we divest ourselves of authority to sign treaty,' 
and concluded ’I am not waiting to be thanked by Government but history will 
record our l a b o u r s . ' 102
Finally the evacuation protocol, after presenting some difficulties, notably 
in the matter of the right of Allied warships to remain in and pass freely through the 
Straits pending enforcement of the Straits Convention, was agreed upon on the 
same day as the Concessions Protocol. It was agreed that the evacuation was to be 
completed within six weeks of the ratification, that is by October 4, and that under 
article 3 of the treaty, and by the provisions of the Evacuation Protocol, the period 
of nine months during which Turkey and Britain would endeavour to settle by 
amicable negotiation the frontier between Iraq and Turkey would run from that date.
Ratification of the Treaty
Ismet Pasha returned to Ankara on August 13; his task was now to see the 
treaty of Lausanne through the Grand National Assembly. There was no reason to 
anticipate dangerous opposition, as the elections had created a new Assembly which 
was amenable to the government, with Mustafa Kemal as President. The opening 
sitting took place on August 11 but it was not until August 21 that the discussion of 
the treaty of Lausanne in the Assembly commenced. The public debate which began
102 FCB71/8995/E7665/91/65, July 21, 1923, G. H. Q. Istanbul to the War Office; Simsir, Lozan
Telgraflari II. No. 643. July 18, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Mustafa Kemal.
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on August 21 lasted three days and a certain amount of criticism was observed by 
the deputies who devoted themselves principally to the question of the southern 
frontier. After the recommendation of the treaty by the Foreign Affairs 
Commission, the debate was continued on the 22nd when the other points of the 
treaty were raised, though in a moderate tone, and it was adjourned until the 23rd, 
when Ismet Pasha delivered a lengthy speech in which he defended the treaty. 
Mustafa Kemal, when acknowledging his election as President on August 13, 
recommended the treaty highly and on August 23 it was accepted by a large 
majority. The great inducement to Turkey to ratify the treaty without delay was the 
provision in the evacuation protocol that territories occupied by the Allies should be 
evacuated within six weeks of their High Commissioners in Istanbul being notified 
that the Grand National Assembly had ratified the treaty. At the beginning of 
October 1923, Ankara found itself for the first time in unrestricted control of all the 
territories left to Turkey by the peace treaty.
The ratification of the treaty by Britain came much later. When Ismet Pasha 
pressed for an early ratification of the treaty by Britain, Henderson's reply was 
enough to raise suspicions about Britain's intentions. Ismet Pasha was told that the 
question of ratification could not be raised in Parliament before the middle of 
November and that even if submitted to Parliament at once, the formalities in 
connection with it would take some t i m e .  1^4 it would be naive to say that it was 
sheer coincidence that the ratification of the treaty by Britain and the settlement of 
the Mosul question occurred at the same time. Britain was the last country to ratify 
the treaty and the explanation lay in the fact that it was ratified on the very same day 
that the Mosul question was referred by Britain to the League of Nations August 6, 
1923.
103 F0424/258; CON12560/213.
*04. F0800/253 Tu/23/69, Oliphant Papers, September 3, 1923, Henderson to Oliphant.
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To sum up, the second phase of the Conference, which lasted more than 
three months after long delays and various crises, ended with the signature of the 
treaty on July 24. At the outset, the Conference was threatened with rupture owing 
to the Greeks’ refusal to accept the Turkish demand for the payment of reparation, 
one of the main questions which had been left outstanding at the end of the first 
phase of the Conference. Greek troops threatened to cross the Maritza and reopen 
hostilities, but the matter was finally settled by the rational diplomacy of Venizelos 
and Ismet Pasha. The latter waived Turkey's claims against the concession of 
Karagatch by Greece to Turkey and the return of Turkish ships seized by Greece 
since the Armistice.
The last six weeks of the Conference were spent in endeavouring to settle 
the three outstanding questions: the currency in which the interest on Turkey's pre­
war debt was to be paid, the terms on which Turkey was to satisfy the Allied 
holders of pre-war concessions in Turkey, and the provisions for the evacuation by 
the Allied troops from Turkish territory. The evacuation was not in itself a difficulty 
but it was held as a trump card by the Allies, who refused to discuss the question 
until the other two disputed points were on the way to settlement. The other 
financial and economic questions concerned mainly France, although there was 
substantial British interest in the matter of concessions. During the first phase of the 
Conference the French were prepared, under the inspiration of Franklin-Bouillon's 
policy, to come to terms with Ankara, sometimes contrary to their previous 
arrangements with their Allies. But they entered the second part of the Conference 
feeling resentful about the outcome of the Chester concession and the concentration 
of Turkish troops on the Syrian frontier. A complete change in their attitude was 
now obvious. After failing to obtain the expected French support on the question of 
Mosul, the Turks went to Lausanne for the second time determined to have a 
serious diplomatic battle with the French. Therefore it would not be wrong to say
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that the real diplomatic battle was fought on the Franco-Turkish front and the 
conclusion of peace very much depended on Britain persuading France to drop 
those demands which Turkey would never accept. Largely through British 
mediation, the French were forced to accept the settlement of the pre-war debt 
question. This left the question of the currency outside the treaty and postponed it to 
future discussion between Ankara and the bondholders, while the concession 
question was settled as a result of a united front displayed by the Americans and the 
Turks.
Towards the end of the Conference the American representative Grew, 
with the aim of maintaining the 'open door' policy, intensified his efforts to make 
the Turks harden their attitude, and eventually, despite British opposition, this led to 
the omission from the treaty of any mention of the TPC's concession. However, 
one should also remember that once Ismet Pasha manoeuvred the TPC's concession 
into the position of being the only question between peace and war there was not 
much the British could do but accept the defeat. As Rumbold aptly put it: 'The 
Allied delegations on resuming negotiations found themselves in the position of a 
man entering a fight with one arm strapped to his side; for there was no longer 
anything they were prepared to fight about and Turkey knew it.'lO^ It could also be 
argued that the British delegation was guided by the consideration that the area on 
which the company's concessionary rights fell would almost certainly not be 
included within the new frontiers of Turkey. Therefore it was not truly a defeat but 
a temporary withdrawal. The psychological victory belonged to the Turks.
105. FO371/9089/E7722/1/44; FO371/9088/E7527/1/44; FO371/9088/E7660/1/44, July 24, 1923, 
Rumbold to Cuizon; DBFP, XVIII, No.683.
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VII
CONCLUSION
The Lausanne Conference which met in November 1922 to conclude a 
definite peace between Turkey and the Allies was the final phase in the long­
standing Eastern question. After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the Great War 
the break up of the Empire seemed inevitable; the Sevres Treaty of 1920 dealt the 
final deadly blow to the 'Sick Man of Europe'. Meanwhile, while Britain and its 
war-time Allies were busy with the dividing up the Ottoman Empire,among 
themselves a nationalist movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal emerged 
in Anatolia; it set up a de facto government with an Assembly sitting at Ankara, 
rejected the peace terms imposed upon Turkey and adopted the National Pact, which 
gradually became the Turkish desiderata for any acceptable peace. Nevertheless, it 
was not until after their final victory against the Greeks that the Turks were able to 
force the Allies to negotiate on the basis of the principles contained in the National 
Pact.
The success of the Turkish forces provoked intense diplomatic activity. 
The Allies realised that they were no longer in a position to dictate the terms of peace 
despite their strong desire to attain what had been envisaged in the Sevres Treaty. 
Britain took the lead in the formulation of a common policy, built up Allied unity 
and established itself at the outset of the Lausanne Conference in such a position that 
it was able not only to speak in the name of the Allies but also to control the 
proceedings of the Conference.
The Lausanne Conference provided the necessaiy ground for reconciliation 
between Turkey and Britain for the first time since the outbreak of the First World 
War. Conflicting nationalist interests were accommodated through mutual
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compensations and concessions. The impulse which drew Turkey towards Britain 
appears to have stemmed from three major considerations. First, Turkey urgently 
needed peace and stability and Britain was regarded as the only power which could 
provide this; a settlement with Britain became therefore a foregone conclusion. 
Second, having suffered many years from the destructive effects of a capitulatory 
regime, Turkey was particularly sensitive about issues involving its sovereign rights 
and independence; it would not accept any solution even remotely suggestive of any 
kind of foreign interference in the conduct of its internal affairs. Britain was mainly 
interested in territorial and political questions which did not pose a direct threat to 
the independence and sovereignty of Turkey. Mosul presented a special case and it 
was agreed to postpone consideration of it. Although the postponement of the 
Mosul question was considered unsatisfactory by the Turks, it was overridden by 
the Turkish desire for an immediate peace and possible Anglo-Turkish friendship. 
Third, Turkey needed economic and financial assistance for the reconstruction of its 
economy, devastated after many years of war. Financial difficulties played an 
important role and prompted the Turks to conclude peace as early as possible in 
order to seek assistance from abroad. In this context, Britain was regarded as a 
potential creditor which could provide assistance to meet the country’s pressing 
needs.
As for Britain, the Anglo-Turkish rapprochement was fundamental since a 
war with Turkey would be detrimental to Britain's interests. First, war weariness, 
strained resources and economic weakness made it extremely difficult for Britain to 
commit itself to a cause which was most likely to fail. Moreover, in the likely event 
of a war, Britain was convinced that no help would be coming from its Allies. The 
lack of unity among the Allies meant that Britain would have to fight alone should 
war prove unavoidable. Furthermore, war would mean the end of the Conservative 
Government, which had committed itself to the cause of peace. As far as Curzon
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was concerned, it would put a stop to his chances of gaining the premiership: 
Success at Lausanne would increase his chance of becoming the next Prime 
Minister, a dream which had become his life's ambition and which he could not 
afford to see unfulfilled. Second, as Britain secured most of its territorial and 
strategical claims, it was relatively satisifed. Given the circumstances in which 
Britain had to negotiate, the least unsatisfactory terms possible were obtained. As 
far as Mosul was concerned, it could be argued that Britain might well have been 
guided by the consideration that it was not wise to resume hostilities with Turkey on 
a question which, given British influence in the League of Nations, was most likely 
to have a result in favour of Britain. Last, Britain concluded that a friendly Turkey 
would provide a buffer zone against Russian encroachment and better serve British 
interests in the Middle East. In other words, Britain, by securing Turkish co­
operation, endeavoured to gain effective control over any developments which 
would jeopardise its long term interests in the region.
Once everybody agreed on the principle of peace it was left to the tactical 
skills of the respective delegations and their strategies to determine what kind of 
peace was to be concluded. Britain's strategy was based on Allied unity, which it 
tried to keep intact in order to secure its own interests. Britain fought the Turks 
with utmost effort in the first phase of the Conference until it obtained its objectives. 
It also blocked the Conference in such a way that no progress was made until the 
issues concerning itself were settled. It prevented both the Conference from 
progressing and the Turks from making separate agreements with the other Allied 
member countries. Britain did this by supporting the Allies' claims against the Turks 
and reassuring them that British support was behind them. By the end of the first 
phase of the Conference British claims were by and large conceded by the Turks 
and in the second phase the British played a mediatory role pressing for the 
immediate settlement to protect what they had already gained.
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Turkey's initial strategy was to isolate Britain and enter into separate 
engagements with the other members of the Allied union. Turkey believed that by 
satisfying the Allies' demands it would be able to enlist their support for Turkish 
demands vis-a-vis Britain. Nevertheless, Ismet Pasha was soon convinced that it 
was neither possible to satisfy the Allies' demands nor to secure their support 
against the British. He decided to change his tactics and set on a new course, that is, 
to come to terms with the British first. Having settled all the substantial questions 
between Turkey and Britain at the end of the first phase and removed the British 
obstacle to peace, Ismet Pasha strengthened his hand during the interval and 
prepared for a fierce fight against the French and the Italians in the second phase. 
He was convinced that once Britain was satisfied, Turkey would be in a better 
position to deal with the rest of the Allies freely and effectively. It was this 
consideration which dominated Turkish strategy throughout the Conference and led 
the Turks to adopt a more conciliatory attitude on the questions which directly 
concerned the two parties.
The further the Lausanne Conference of 1923 recedes into history, the 
more clearly we see how great a turning point it was in Turkish history. The success 
of the Nationalist Movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal demonstrated 
that the vanquished Empire could be transformed into an independent state able to 
reverse the Treaty of Sevres, to negotiate with the victorious Allies on its own 
terms, and to replace the Treaty of Sevres with the very different Treaty of 
Lausanne. The treaty that was signed on July 24, 1923 confirmed the international 
recognition of a new independent Turkish state and incorporated Turkey into the 
family of Western nations as an equal partner. The Allies were forced to recognise 
this independent, and sovereign nation state.
The Conference was the first step on the way to a fundamental shift in 
Turkish politics internally as well as externally towards the West, which defined
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Turkey's new role in the world. The treaty sealed the fate of the former Ottoman 
territories, putting an end to Turkish influence in the territories under the provisions 
of the National Pact. It closed the chapter of the long war years and introduced 
security and stability into Turkey's foreign relations.
The Turks to a great extent achieved their major goals, and that was due to 
the fact that their aims were legitimate, obtainable and realistic. What had been 
achieved by military means was confirmed by diplomatic success at Lausanne. The 
National Pact almost materialised; apart from Mosul, the Thrace and Southern 
borders were as described in the National Pact. There were no war reparations and 
no creation of an Armenian state. The Capitulations were abolished, leaving the 
Italians and the French unable to win the favourable economic and financial 
provisions for which they had hoped. Although Turkey did not have ultimate 
control over the Straits, many clauses threatening her ultimate independence and 
sovereignty were removed. The mandated population exchange of Greeks and 
Turks was carried out; the Ottoman Public Debt was divided among the successor 
states. Only Mosul question was left unsolved; it was referred to the League of 
Nations for further deliberations.
As for Britain, the Lausanne Treaty was a significant turning point in the 
process of establishing British influence in the former Ottoman territories. If the 
treaties of Sevres and Lausanne are compared, it would not be wrong to conclude 
that the British suffered a political defeat but lost hardly anything of importance. On 
the whole they were able to protect their interests and retain control over much of the 
Middle East. In other words, the Turkish success at Lausanne did not defeat the 
underlying aims of British diplomacy. Britain's two main objectives were achieved: 
the Straits were internationalised; the Mosul settlement was successfully kept out of 
the Conference and referred to the League of Nations, where the Vilayet was 
subsequently given to Iraq.
221
The Lausanne Conference also represented a landmark in the history of the 
Middle East. It changed the map of the region by creating a new international 
system in its midst. As the Ottoman Empire came to an end Turkey and Britain 
opened a new chapter in their relations and set to adjust themselves to their new 
roles in world affairs.
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APPENDIX A
Brief Biographies of Leading Figures
Adam, Eric Graham Forbes: Bom October 1888. Clerk in Foreign Office, 1913. 
Third Secretary in Diplomatic Service while employed at Peace Conference in Paris 
1918-1919. Promoted to First Secretary in the Foreign Office, June 1,1922.
Adivar, Adnan: 1882-1955. Graduated from Medical School. Member of last 
Ottoman Parliament Minister of Health and Social Services in GNA. Minister of 
Interior for a short period of time. Shortly after the Lausanne Conference, due to a 
falling out with Ataturk, left Turkey to reside in Europe 1926-1939.
Baldwin, Stanley: 1867-1947. Became MP in 1908. President of the Board of 
Trade, 1921-1922. Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1922-1923. Succeeded BonarLaw 
as Premier, office which he filled three times, 1922-1924, 1924-1929, 1935-1937. 
He resigned from politics in 1937.
Beklr Sami Bey (Kunduh): 1855-1933. Studied at the Galatasaray lycee and at 
Political Science Faculty in Paris. Worked first for Foreign Ministry in several 
different embassies, then as governor of Van, Trabzon, Bursa, Beirut and Aleppo. 
Elected to last Ottoman parliament in 1920. Joined Nationalists after closure of 
Parliament. Commissar of Foreign Affairs (1920-1921). Resigned 1921.
Cebesoy, Ali Fuat: 1882-1968. Graduated from Military Academy. Involved in 
Nationalist Movement. Member of GNA and Commander of the Western Front. 1920 
Ambassador to Soviet Union. Held numerous ministerial positions as well as that of 
President of GNA. Involved in the founding of Progressive Republican Party.
224
Churchill, Winston: 1874-1969. Elected Conservative member of Parliament 
1900-1906. Liberal member 1906-1912. Served as under Secretary of State for 
Colonies 1905-1908, President Board of Trade, 1908-1910. Home Secretary 1910- 
1911. First Lord of the Admiralty 1911-1915. Minister of Munitions 1917-1919, 
Secretaiy of State for War and Air 1919-1921, Secretary of State for Colonies 1921- 
1922. Member of Parliament 1945-. Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1924-1929.
Crewe-Milnes, Robert Offley Ashburton (Marquees Crewe): Bom 1858. 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1883-84. Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
1908. Lord Privy Seal, October 20,1908. Secretary of State for India, November 7, 
1910. Appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Paris, December 
31, 1922.
Crowe, Sir Eyre: Bom July 1864. Appointed clerk 1 June 1900. Promoted to 
senior clerk, February 10, 1906. Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, January 11,1912. Given diplomatic rank of Minister Plenipotentiary at Peace 
Conference in Paris, January 11, 1919. Permanent Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, November 27,1920.
Curzon of Kedleston: Bom January 11, 1859. MP Lancashire 1886-1898. 
Assistant Private Secretary to 3rd Marquess of Salisbury, Prime Minister. Under­
secretary of State for India 1891-1892. Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs from June 30 1895 to October 14,1898. Governor General of India, 
December 3,1898-1904, resigned 1905. Lord Privy Seal, May 27, 1915. During the 
absence of Mr. Balfour acted as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Peace 
Conference at Paris, January 1919 and was appointed to that office October 29,
1919.
Graham Sir Ronald William: Bom July 1870. Assistant Under Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, November 1, 1916 during absence of Lord Hardinge at 
Peace Congress at Paris. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Rome, 
November 25, 1921.
Hardinge of Penshurst (Charles Hardinge): Bom 1858. Appointed to 
Istanbul, February 2, 1881. 3rd Secretary, 1882. Transferred to Istanbul 1888. 
Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1903. Permanent Under 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1906. Governor-General of India 1910-1916.
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Superintending Ambassador at Peace Congress Delegation at Paris, 1918-19. 
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Paris, November 27, 1920. Retired 
January 1, 1923.
Henderson, Nevile M eyrick : Bom 1882. 3rd Secretary, 1907. Second 
Secretary, November 1911 and 1st Secretary, November 1918. Transferred to 
Istanbul, October 14, 1920. Acting Counsellor, December 1916, 1921 and 
Counsellor of Embassy at Istanbul, May 1, 1922. Acted as Charg'e d’Affaires, July 
1-30 1922, November 1922-February 19,1923, April 20, 1923.
Inonu, Ismet: 1884-1973. Graduated from the military academy in 1906. Served 
as Chief of Staff under Mustafa Kemal on Eastern front in 1916. Worked for 
Nationalists underground while serving at War Office in 1919-20. Appointed 
Commander of Western Front in 1921. Led Turkish delegation at peace negotiations 
in Lausanne. First Prime Minister of Republic. (1923-24).Prime Minister again, 
1925-37. Succeeded Mustafa Kemal as President of Republic 1938-1950.
Law, Bonar: 1858-1923. Became a member of Parliament 1900. Succeeded 
Balfour as Unionist leader 1911. Colonial Secretary 1915-1916, member of the War 
Cabinet, Chancellor of the Exchequer 1916-1918. Lord Privy Seal 1919, Leader of 
House of Commons 1916. Prime Minister 1922-1923.
Leeper, Alexander Wigram Allen: Bom 1887. Department of Information and 
Foreign Office, 1915-1918. Attached to British Delegation to the Peace Conference at 
Paris 1918-1920. Second Secretary, March 19,1920. Served on British Delegation at 
Lausanne Conference, 1922. Assistant Private Secretary to Lord Curzon of 
Kedleston, 1920-1924.
Lindsay, Ronald Charles: Bom 1877. Assistant Private Secretary to Sir Edward 
Grey, 1908-1909. First Secretary, December 1, 1911. First Secretary and Acting 
Assistant Counsellor at Washington, May 7, 1919. Counsellor at Washington, 
September 1919. Paris Charg'e dAffaires 1920. Principal Assistant Secretary, 
January 1, 1921.
Lloyd-George, David: 1863-1945. Liberal statesmen and Prime Minister 19116- 
1922. President of the Board of Trade 1905-1908, and Chancellor of the Exchequer
4
1905-1915. Minister of Munitions 1915, Secretary for War 1916. Superseded
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Asquith as coalition Prime Minister. Continued as head of coalition government after 
World War I. Reigned as Prime Minister in October 1922 following the withdrawal 
of the Conservatives from the coalition.
Okyar, Ali Fethi: 1880-1943. Graduated from Military Academy in 1903. Military 
Attache to Paris 1908. Member Ottoman Parliament 1912, Minister of Interior 1917. 
Representative in GNA, later President of GNA. Prime Minister 1924-25. 
Ambassador to France 1925.
Oliphant, Lancelot: Bom 1881. Clerk in Foreign Office, 1903. Acting 3rd 
Secretary in the Diplomatic Service, September 5, 1905 and employed at 
Constantinople (Istanbul) until August 1906. Employed in Tehran 1909-1911. 
Promoted to Assistant Clerk, September 30, 1916. Acting Assistant Secretary, 
December 19,1920.
Orbay, Ranf (Bey): 1881-1964. Naval Officer, national hero as commander of 
crusier Hamidiye in 1913. Member of Ottoman delegation at Brest-Litovsk peace 
talks. Leader of delegation which negotiated Armistice of Mudros. Head of 
Nationalist group in last Ottoman parliament (1920). Deported to Malta in 1920. After 
his return in 1922, Commissar and Prime Minister of Nationalist government. 
Ambassador in London, 1942-44.
Osborne, Francis D'archy Godolphin: Bom 1884. Appointed to Rome 1909. 
3rd Secretary, 1910. Transferred to Washington, 1913. Second Secretary, November 
27, 1918. 1st Secretary, November 15,1919. Foreign Office, January 1, 1920.
Nur, Riza: 1879-1942. Graduated from Military Medical Academy 1903. Member 
of Committee of Union and Progress before joining Liberal opposition. Arrested in 
1910, exiled 1913-1919. Set in last Ottoman Parliament, fled to Ankara 1920. 
Minister of Education 1920, Minister of Health 1921-1923. Second Turkish delegate 
at Lausanne Conference. Member of GNA 1923- 1927. Opposition to Government 
led to his exile until 1938.
de Robeck, John Michael : Second in command to Admiral Carden at 
Dardanelles, 1915. Succeeded Admiral Carden, 1915. Commanded Second Battle 
Squadron, Grand Fleet, 1916. Vice-Admiral, 1917. Commander-in-Chief,
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Mediterranean, and High Commissioner, Istanbul, 1919. Admiral, 1920. 
Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic, 1922-24. Admiral of the Fleet, 1925.
Rnmbold, Horace George: Bom 1869. 3rd Secretary, 1893, 2nd Secretary, 
1896 and 1st Secretary 1904. Foreign Office, 1914-1916. Ambassador at Istanbul 
with title of British High Commander, November 1, 1920. Second British 
Plenipotentiary at Lausanne Conference, November 22-Februaiy 1923, and Chief 
British Delegate at resumed Conference April to July 1923. Signed treaty on behalf 
of the British Empire.
Ryan Andrew: Dragoman in the British Embassy in Istanbul between 1899-1914. 
After the Armistice of Mudros, in November 1918, appointed Chief Dragoman and 
political adviser in British Embassy in Istanbul. During Lausanne Conference adviser 
to the British Delegation on Turkish internal affairs.
Saka, Hasan Hosnn: 1886-1960. Graduated from the civil service, academy in 
1908. Elected to the last Ottoman Parliament in 1920. After April 1920, member 
Grand National Assembly. Member of Lausanne Conference delegation. Minister of 
Economic Affairs (1923), Minister of Trade (1924), Minister of Finance (1925). 
Foreign Minister in September 1944. Represented Turkey at San Francisco 
Conference in 1945.
Tengirsenk, Yusuf Kemal: 1878-1968. Graduated from the Paris Law School in 
1913. Member of GNA 1920-23 representing Kastamonu and Sinop while at the 
same time filling the office of acting Minister of Foreign Affairs. Signatory of 
international agreements between Turkey and Soviet Union and Turkey and France. 
Ambassador to Great Britain in 1924. Minister of Finance, Foreign Affairs and 
Justice between 1930-1933.
Tevfik Pasha (Grand Vizier): 1836-1936. Graduated from Military School. 
Pursued career in foreign affairs. Served as Minister of Foreign Affairs and as Grand 
Vizier numerous times. Last Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire.
Townshend, Charles Vere Ferres: 1861-1924. British soldier. Joined the 
Indian Army and held Chitral Fort for 46 days (1895). As major-general in 1915, in 
conjunction with naval forces up the Tigris he took Amara. Defeated at Ctesiphon, he
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fell back upon Kut, where he held out for a month before surrendering. M.P. from 
1920.
Tyrrell, William George: Bom August 17, 1866. Clerk in Foreign Office, April 
26, 1889. Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, July, 25, 1896. 
Private Secretary to Sir Edward Grey 1907-1915. Assistant Under-Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs, October 1, 1918. Minister Plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace 
Conference.
229
APPENDIX B 
Maps
230
Edirne
Sinop BatumKastamonu
Istanbul SamsunFRANCE Ereglii— TC
MARMARA SEA Merzifon Trabzon
Ankara
Bursa Sivas ErzurumEski§ehir YozgatQanakkale
Erzincan
GREECE
Izmir Afyon
Mu§ VanElazig
Kayseri
Malatya Bitlis
Konya
*  FRANCE
Adana f ! {
Cizre
Urfa MardinBodrum
AntalyaMarmaris Antep
7 TTI I f 1,1 I 1 : Musul
GREAT BRITAIN j
K
Mersin
Fethiye
X\  :Antakya '.jf KerkiikHalep
MEDITERRANEAN
Fig. I. 30 OCTOBER 1918.
BOUNDARIES OF TURKEY FOLLOWING THE MUDROS ARMISTICE.
Source: T.C. G enelkurm ay Ba§kanligi. Harp Tarihl D airesl R esm i Yayinlari. 
Turk istik la l Harbl I. M ondros M iitarekesi v e  Tathikati.
Ankara: G enelkurm ay Basim evl, 1962.
K>
Ui
K>
Fig. II. 10 AUGUST 1920  
BOUNDARIES OF TURKEY FOLLOWING THE TREATY OF SEVRES.
BULGARIA S BLACK SEA
ArtvioSo maun
oZcngyldcilc oKotfomonu
w m #  i
MARMARA
'lu  SEAiiid
litonfcol • 5 QKo^ya Bolu
P ° 0 ^ <'0C0#b
Gircsuno Amotya>
Corum Q-R>k»!
Cankiri
rrurum
ArJtaro Y o ig o t
o  KiMafcya
ohkftwr func«ti
Ktr^ehir
pUVJk
1 I I I 
ITALY
oMalioIya
Oiyartwkir
KURDISTAN
oAdiyam an lAordn,0*n a fi Otoora$FRANCE
Garioaiip oUrlo  
°  . ^  •
^  SYRIA
AEGEAN
SEA A daho
STRAITS COMMISSION GREECE
AODOSM FRANCE
ARMENIA KURDISTAN
MEDITERRANEAN
Source: T.C. G enelkurm ay Ba§kanligi.
Turk istik la l Harbl. Bati C en hesi (4  Evlul 1919 - 9 Kasim 1920.) 
Cilt II. K isim  II. Ankara: G enelkurm ay B asim evl, 1991. Kroki 27.
U>
u>
Fig. m. 24 JULY 1923.
BOUNDARIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY FOLLOWING THE LAUSANNE CONFERENCE.
Kib ns
BULGARIA
S i n o p
IneDolu ^
S a m  s un
T r a b z o n Ardahan
Marmara
Bo lu
/ /  /V^/Mubanya '4 
Qanakkale s'sC S /s'
masya
Kutahya
E ISzl z
Ma lat ya  V ,
K o n y a / . M a r d m
Antalya
I s k e n d e r u n Musul
H a l e p
SYRIA
MEDITERRANFAN
Source: B elgelerle T u rk^ arlh l P erg isl.
Cilt  6, I s t a n b u l :  T cm m uz 1970, Sayi 34, P 9 .
BIBLIOGRAPHY
PRIMARY SOURCES 
Unpublished Archival Sources
Official Papers
United Kingdom. Public Record Office. Cabinet Qffice.CAB16.
United Kingdom. Public Record Office. Cabinet Office. Cabinet Minutes. CAB23
United Kingdom. Public Record Office. Cabinet Office.Cabinet.Memoranda. CA
United Kingdom. Public Record Office. Colonial Office. Correspondence, Iraq. 
C0730
United Kingdom. Public Record Office. Foreign Office. Confidential Prints. CON, 
F0424, F0426.
United Kingdom. Public Record Office. Foreign Office. General Correspondence, 
Turkey 1922-23. F0371
United Kingdom. Public Record Office. Foreign Office. Lausanne Conference, 
1922-23. F0839
United Kingdom. Public Record Office. War Office. Registered Papers, General 
Series. W032
United Kingdom. Public Record Office. War Office. O and A Papers,Prints and 
Memoranda exc. W033
United Kingdom. Public Record Office. War Office. Papers Directorate of Military 
Operations and Intelligence. WO 106
United Kingdom. The British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections. India 
Office Records.
234
United Kingdom. The British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections.India 
Office Political And Secret Department. IRO L/PS/11. Political and Secret 
Annual Files.
Private Papers
United Kingdom. Cambridge University Library. Baldwin Papers.
United Kingdom. House of Lords Library. Bonar Law Papers.
United Kingdom. Public Record Office. Crowe Papers.
United Kingdom. India Office Library. Curzon Papers.
United Kingdom. Public Record Office. Curzon Papers.
United Kingdom. Public Record Office. Henderson Papers.
United Kingdom. Churchill College Library, Cambridge. Leeper Papers.
United Kingdom. House of Lords Library. Lloyd George Papers.
United Kingdom. Cambridge University Library. Lord Hardinge Papers.
United Kingdom. Cambridge University Library. Lord Crewe Papers.
United Kingdom. Public Record Office. Oliphant Papers.
United Kingdom. Public Record Office. Private Office Papers from Various 
Sources.
United Kingdom. Churchill College, Cambridge. Robeck Papers.
United Kingdom. Bodleian Library, Oxford. Rumbold Papers.
United Kingdom. Public Record Office. Ryan Papers.
235
Published Sources
Parliamentary Papers
United Kingdom. Parliament. Terms of Armistice Concluded between the Allied
Governments and the Governments of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey.' 
Cmd. 53. 1919.
United Kingdom. Parliament. Agreement between France, Russia, Great Britain and 
Italy.' Cmd. 671. 1920.
United Kingdom. Parliament Treaty of Peace with Turkey, signed at Sevres, August 10, 
1920.' Cmd. 960. 1920.
United Kingdom. Parliament. Tripartite Agreement between the British Empire, France 
and Italy Respecting Anatolia.' Cmd. 963. 1920.
United Kingdom. Parliament. Treaty of Peace with Turkey signed at Sevres, August 10,
1920. Cmd. 964. 1920
United Kingdom. Parliament. Treaty of Peace with Turkey.' Cmd. 964. 1920.
United Kingdom. Parliament.'Correspondence between His Majesty's Government 
and the United States Ambassador Respecting Economic Rights in Mandated 
Territories.' Cmd. 1226. 1921.
United Kingdom. Parliament. 'Correspondence between His Majesty's Government and 
the French Government Respecting the Angora Agreement of October 20,1921.' 
Cmd. 1570. 1922.
United Kingdom. Parliament. The Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 
1922-1923: Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace.' Cmd. 1814.
1923.
236
United Kingdom. Parliament. Turkey. Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 
1922-1923.' Cmd. 1914. 1923.
United Kingdom. Parliament. Treaty of Peace with Turkey and Other Instruments Signed 
at Lausanne on July 24,1923 with Agreements between Greece and Turkey Signed 
on 30th January 1923 and Subsidiary Document Forming Part of the Turkish Peace 
Settlement.' Cmd. 1929. 1923.
United Kingdom. Parliament. 'Concessions. Notes Exchanged between the British and 
French Delegates at Lausanne Regarding Certain Concessions in Territories Detached 
from Turkey.' Cmd. 1946. 1923.
United Kingdom. Parliament 'Treaty between the United Kingdom and Iraq and Turkey 
Regarding the Frontier between Turkey and Iraq Together with Notes 
Exchanged.'Cmd. 2679. 1926.
United Kingdom. Parliament 'Draft Mandates for Mesopotamia and Palestine as 
Submitted for the Approval of the League of Nations.'Cmd. 1176. 1921.
United Kingdom. Parliamentary Debates, 1922-1923. HANSARD. House of Commons 
Vol. 159-180; House of Lords, Vol. 52-59.
Other Published Documents
Ataturkile Yazismalar. 1920-1939. (ed. Bilal Simsir) 2nd Edition. Ankara, 1992. Turk 
Devrim Tarihi Enstitusu.
Ataturk'un Sovlev ve Demecleri. 1918-1937. Vol. II. Ankara: Turk Devrim Tarihi 
Enstitusu, 1952-54-61.
Ataturk'un Tamim Telgraf ve Bevannameleri. 1917-1938. Turk Devrim Tarihi Enstitusu. 
Ankara: Turk Devrim Tarihi Enstitusu,1964.
Ataturk'un ToplanmamisTelgraflari. (ed. Utkan Kocaturk) Ankara: Edebiyat Yayinevi,
1971.
237
British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office
Confidential Print. Part II. From the First to the Second World War. Turkey-Iran and 
Middle East 1918-1939. University Publications of America. (ed.by Robin Bidwell) 
(General eds. Kenneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watt).
Documents on British Foreign Policy. 1919-1939. (ed. E. L. Woodward and R. Butler) 
Vols. IV, XVII, XV, XVIII. London: HMSO, 1963-1972.
The Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Year Book. London: HMSO, 1921, 
1922-1927, 1924.
Ingiliz Belgelerinde Ataturk 1919-1938. (ed. Bilal N. Simsir) Ankara: Turk Tarih 
Kurumu Yayinevi, 1973.
Inonu'nun Sovlev ve Demecleri.. Cilt, 11919-1938. Ankara: Turk Devrim Tarihi 
Enstitusu, 1946.
Lozan Baris Konferansi. Tutanaklar. Belgeler. (Cev. Seha L. Meray). Ankara 
Universitesi Basimevi.
Takim I, Cilt I, Kitap II, No.300. Ankara, 1970 
Takim I, Cilt IV, No.331. Ankara, 1972 
Takim I, Cilt, I, Kitap I SBF. No.291. Ankara, 1969 
Takim II, Cilt, II, No.348. Ankara 1973.
Lozan Telgraflari 1.1922-1923. (ed. Bilal Simsir) Ankara: Ataturk Kultur Dil ve Tarih 
Yuksek Kurumu, 1990.
Lozan Tel graflari II. 1922-1923.(ed. Bilal Simsir) Ankara: Ataturk Kultur Dil ve Tarih 
Yuksek Kurumu, 1994.
Misak-i Milli ve Lozan Sulh Muahedenamesi. 24 Temmuz 1923. Ankara: T.C. Disisleri 
Bakanligi K.T.Y.M. Burosu. Yunan Isleri Subesi, 1966.
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. Vols. 1921-1924. 
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1936-1939.
Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy. Vols. I. 1917-1924. (ed. Jane Degras) London: 
Oxford University Press, 1951-1952.
238
Turk Istiklal Harbi. II. Cilt Bati Cephesi VI. Kisim. IV.Kitap. Istiklal Harbinin Son 
Safhasi. Ankara: Genel Kurmay Basimevi, 1995.
Turkive Cumhuriveti'nin Akdettigi Milletlerarasi Andlasmalar. 20 Nisan 1920-1 Kasim 
1966. (comp, by Yavuz. Ahmet). Ankara: T.C. Disisleri Bakanligi ,1967. 
Turkive Buvuk Millet Meclisi Gizli Celse Zabitlari. Cilt III, IV. Ankara: Is Bankasi 
Yayinlari, 1985.
The War Office List and Administrative Directory for the British Army. London. 1920- 
1924.
239
SECONDARY SOURCES
Books
Abadan, Yavuz. Harp Sonu Muahadelerine Nazaran Lozan'in Hususivetleri. Istanbul, 
1938.
Abbott, G. F. Greece and the Allies 1914-1922. London: Methuen, 1922.
Ahmad, Feroz. The Making of Modem Turkev. London: Routledge, 1993.
Akyuz, Yahya. Turk Kurtulus Savasi ve Fransiz Kamuovu. 1919-1922. Ankara: Turk 
Tarih Kurumu, 1988.
Albrecht-Carrie, Rene. A Diplomatic History of Europe since the Congress of Vienna. 
London: Methuen, 1965.
Albrecht-Carrie, Rene. Twentieth-Centurv Europe. New Jersey, 1973.
Allen, H. C. Great Britain and the United States. A History of Anglo-American Relations 
(1783-1952). London: Odhams, 1954.
Anderson, Matthew S. (ed.). The Great Powers and the Near East. 1774-1923. London: 
Edward Arnold, 1970.
Anderson, Matthew S. The Eastern Question. 1774-1923. London: Melbourne, 1966.
Andrew, Christopher M., Secret Service. The Making of the British Intelligence 
Community. London: Heinemann, 1987.
Arar, Ismail. Ataturk’un Izmit Basin Toplantisi. (16-17 Peak 1923). Istanbul: Istanbul 
Matbaasi, 1969.
Armaoglu, Fahir H. Sivasi Tarih 1789-1960. Ankara: Sevinc Matbaasi, 1975.
Armaoglu, Fahir., Belgelerle Turk-Amerikan Munasebetleri. Ankara: Turk Tarih 
Kurumu, 1991.
Armstrong, Harold Courtenay. Turkey in Travail: The Birth of a New Nation. London: 
John Lane the Bodley Head, 1925.
240
Arnold, David. Britain. Europe, and the World.. 1870-1955. London: Edward Arnold, 
1966.
Aster, Sidney (comp and ed.). British Foreign Policy 1918-1945. A Guide to Research 
Materials. Wilmington Del: Scholarly Resources: 1991.
Ataov, Turkkaya. Turkish Foreign Policy 1923-1938. Ankara: Ankara Universitesi 
Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Yayinlari, 1961.
Ataturk, M. K. Nutuk. Cilt. II, Ankara: Basbakanlik Basimevi, 1984..
Avcioglu, Dogan. Milli Kurtulus Tarihi. Istanbul: Istanbul Matbaasi, 1974.
Barber, James. Who Makes British Foreign Policy? Milton Keynes: Open University 
Press, 1976.
Barnett, C. The Collapse of British Power. London: Eyre Methuen Ltd, 1972.
Bartlett, C. J. British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century. London: Macmillan 
Education, 1989.
Baytok, T. Ingiliz Kavnaklarindan Turk Kurtulus Savasi. Ankara: Basnur Matbaasi, 
1970.
Bayur, Hikmet Yusuf. Yeni Turk Devletinin Harici Sivaseti. Istanbul: Milli Mecmua 
Basimevi, 1934.
Beaverbrook, Lord. The Decline and Fall of Lord George. London: Collins, 1966.
Bennett, G. H. British Foreign Policy during the Curzon Period. 1919-24. London 
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995.
Bill, J. A. and Leiden C. The Middle East: Politics and Power. Boston: Little, Brown, 
1984.
Bilsel, M. Cemil. Lozan. Istanbul: Ahmet Ihsan Matbaasi, 1933.
Birch Reginald Charles. Britain and Europe 1871-1939. Exeter. 1966.
Birge, John Kinsley. Turkey between the Two World Wars. New York, 1944.
Bisbee, Eleanor. The New Turks- Pioneers of the Republic 1920-1950. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Pr, 1951.
Biyiklioglu, Tevfik. Ataturk Anadoluda 1919-1921. Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1981.
241
Biyiklioglu, Tevfik. Turk Istiklal Harbi: Mondros Mutarekesi ve Tatbikati. Cilt, I.
Ankara, 1962.
Biyiklioglu, Tevfik. Trakvada Milli Mucadele. Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1955. 
Blaisdell, Donald C. European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire: A Study of the 
Establishment. Activities, and Significance of the Administration of the Ottoman 
Public Debt. New York: Colombia University Press, 1929.
Blake, Robert. The Unknown Prime Minister: The Life and Times of Andrew Bonar Law 
1858-1923. London: Eyre and Spottiswood, 1955.
Blake, Robert. The Decline of Power. 1915-1964 London: Granada, 1985.
Blythe, Ronald. The Age of Illusion. England in the Twenties and Thirties 1919-1940.
London: Hamilton, 1963.
Bond, B. British Military Policy between the Two World Wars. Oxford: Clarendon,
1980.
Bruce, Maurice. British Foreign Policy. London, 1938.
Bullard, Sir Reader. Britain and the Middle East from the Earliest Times to 1963.
London: Hutchinson, 1964.
Burcak, Rifki Salim. Turk-Rus-IngilizMunasebetleri 1791-1941. Istanbul. 1946.
Busch, Briton Cooper. Mudros to Lausanne: Britain's Frontier in West Asia 1918-1923.
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976.
Canning, Paul. British Policy towards Ireland 1921-1941. Oxford, 1985.
Carr, E. H. Britain: A Study of Foreign Policy from the Versailles Treaty to the Outbreak 
of War. London: Longmans, Green, 1939.
Carr, Edward H. Great Britain as a Mediterranean Power. Nottingham, 1937.
Carr, E. H. International Relations between the Two World Wars 1919-1939. London: 
Macmillan, 1985.
Carr, E. H. The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939. An Introduction to the Study of 
International Relations. London: Macmillan Press: Papermac, 1946.
242
Cassels, Alan. Mussolini’s Early Diplomacy. Princeton: N J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1970.
Ceadel, Martin. Pacifism in Britain 1914-1945: The Defining of a Faith. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1980.
Celik, Edip. 100 Soruda Turkive'nin Pis Politika Tarihi. Istanbul: Gercek Yayinevi, 
1969.
Chambers, Frank P. This Age of Conflict. A Contemporary World History from 1914 to 
the Present. London, 1950.
Clayton, Anthony. The British Empire as a Superpower 1919-1939. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1986.
Clayton, Gerald D. Britain and the Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli. London: 
University of London, 1971.
Connell, John. The Office: A study of British Foreign Policy and its Makers 1919-1951. 
London: Allan Wingate, 1958.
Cowling, Maurice. The Impact of Labour 1920-1924. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1971.
Creasy, Edward S. History of the OttomanTurks: From the Beginning of Their Empire to 
the Present Time. London: R. Bentley, 1963.
Cremona, Paul and Maxwell, Macartney. Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy. 1914-1937. 
London: Oxford University Press, 1938.
Criss, Bilge. Isgal Altinda Istanbul. 1918-1923. Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 1993.
Cumming, Henry H. Franco-British Rivalry in the Post-War Near East - The Decline of 
French Influence. London: Oxford University Press, 1938.
Darwin, John. Britain. Egypt and the Middle East. Imperial Policy in the Aftermath of 
War 1918-1922. London: Macmillan, 1981.
Davenport, E. H and Cooke, Sidney R. The Oil Trusts and Anglo-American Relations. 
London: Macmillan and CO. Ltd, 1923.
243
Davison, Roderic H. Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History 1774-1923. Texas: 
University of Texas Press, 1990.
Davison, Roderic H. Turkey. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1968.
De Novo, John A. American Interests and Policies in the Middle East. 1900-1939. 
Minneapolis, 1938.
Dilipak, Abdurrahman. Ataturk Donemi. Istanbul, 1989.
Dilks, D. Curzon in India. London, 1969.
Dimbleby, David and Reynolds David. An Ocean Apart: The Relationship between Britain 
and America in the Twentieth Century. London: BBC Books, 1988.
Dockrill, Michael L. and Goold J. Douglas. Peace Without Promise. Britain and the Peace 
Conferences. 1919-1923. London: Bastford Academic and Educational, 1981.
Dockrill, Michael L. and Me Kerscher Brian (eds.). Diplomacy and World Power: studies 
in British Foreign Policy Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press,
1996.
Dodd, Clement H. Politics and Government in Turkey. Manchester. Manchester 
University Press, 1969.
Drummond Ian M. Imperial Economic Policy 1917-1949: Studies in Expansion and 
Protection. London: Allen and Unwin, 1974.
Drummond, Ian M. British Economic Policy and The Empire 1919-1939. London: Allen 
and Unwin, 1972.
Earle, Edward M. Turkey, the Great Powers and the Baghdad Railway: A Study in 
Imperialism. London: The Macmillan Comp, 1923.
Edwards, William. British Foreign Policy from 1815 to 1933. London, 1934.
Ellison, Grace Mary. An Englishwoman in Angora.. London: Hutchinson, 1923.
Esmer, Ahmet Sukru. Sivasi Tarih. 1919-1939. Ankara, 1975.
Euding, X. J. and Fisher, H. H. Soviet Russia and the West 1920-1927. A Documentary 
Survey. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957.
244
Evans, Laurence. United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey 1914-1924. Baltimore: 
John Hopkins Press, 1965.
Evans, Stephen E. The Slow Rapprochement- Britain and Turkey in the Age of Kemal 
Ataturk 1919-1938. London: The Eathen Press, 1982.
Eversley, Lord and Chirol, Sir Valentine. The Turkish Empire from 1288 to 1924. 
London: Dood, Mead, 1924.
Ferris, John Robert. The Evolution of British Strategic Policy. 1919-1926. London
1989.
Fitzsimons, Matthew A. Empire by Treaty: Britain and the Middle East in the Twentieth 
Century. London, 1965.
Foot, Michael M. Armistice 1918-1938. London, 1940.
Foot, M. R. D. British Foreign Policy since 1898. London: Hutchinson's University 
Library, 1956.
Frasure, Carl. British Policy on War Debts and Reparations. Philadelphia: Dorrence and 
Company, 1940.
Fred, Israel (ed.). Major Peace Treaties of Modem History 1648-1967. 4 Vols. New 
York, 1967.
Fry, Michael G. Llovd George and Foreign Policy. Montreal, 1977.
Gathome-Hardy, G. M. A Short History of International Affairs. 1920-1939. London: 
Oxford University Press, 1950.
Gatzke, Hans W. (ed.). European Diplomacy between Two Wars. 1919-1939. Chicago,
1972.
Gencosman, Kemal Zeki. Ihtilal Meclisi. Istanbul, 1980.
Genel Kurmay Basimevi. Tarihte Turk-Ingiliz Iliskileri. Ankara: Genel Kurmay 
Basimevi, 1975
Gilbert, Bentley B. Britain since 1918. London: Batsford, 1967.
Gilbert, Martin. The European Powers 1900-1945. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1965.
245
Gilbert, Martin. Britain and Germany between the Wars. London: Longsman, 1964. 
Gokalp, Ziya. Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilisation. Selected Essays of Ziya 
Gokalp. (ed. and trns. by Niyazi Berkes) London: Allen and Unwin, 1959. 
Gokbilgin, M. Tahir. Milli Mucadele Baslarken. Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1959. 
Goldstein, Erik. Winning the Peace. British Diplomatic Strategy. Peace Planning, and the 
Paris Peace Conference. 1916-1920. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.
Gologlu, Mahmud. Erzurum Kongresi. Ankara: Tekin Yayinevi, 1968.
Gonlubol, Mehmet and Sar Cem. Ataturk ve Turkive'nin Pis Politikasi. (1919-19381 
Ankara: Ataturk Kultur Dil ve Tarih Yuksek Kurumu, Ataturk Arastirma Merkezi,
1990.
Gonlubol, Mehmet and Sar, Cem. Olavlarla Turk Pis Politikasi. 1919-1973. Ankara: 
Ankara Universitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi, Basin Yayin Yuksek Okulu, 1973. 
Gooch, G. P and Ward, W. The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1923.
Gooch, G. P. British Foreign Policy since the War. London, 1936.
Goradia, N. Lord Curzon : The Last of the British Moghuls. New Delhi: O.U.P. 1993. 
Goztepe, T. M. Vahdettin Mutareke Gavvasinda. Istanbul: Sebil Yayinevi, 1969.
Grant, Arthur James and Temperley, Harold. Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries 1789-1939. Vol. II. Europe in the Twentieth Century 1905-1970.
London: Longman, 1984.
Gursel, Haluk F. Tarih Bovunca Turk-Rus Iliskileri. Istanbul: Ak Yavinlari. 1968.
Gurun, Kamuran. Turk-Sovvet Iliskileri (1920-1953). Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu,
1991.
Hacaloglu, Gulden. Lozan. Ankara, 1973.
Haigh, Anthony. Congress of Vienna to Common Market: An Outline of British Foreign 
Policy. 1815-1972. London, 1973.
Hale, William M. (ed.). Aspects of Modem Turkey. London: St. Martin’s Press, 1976.
246
Hale, William M. The Political Economic Development of Modem Turkey. London: 
Croom Helm, 1981.
Hale, William. Turkish Politics and the Military. London: Routledge, 1994.
Hartley, Stephen. The Irish Question as a Problem in British Foreign Policy 1914-18. 
Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with Kings College, London, 1987.
Havighurst, Alfred F. Britain in Transition: The Twentieth Century. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1979.
Hayes, Paul. The Twentieth Century 1880-1939. London: A.and C. Black, 1978.
Hayes, Paul., Modem British Foreign Policy : The Twentieth Century 1880-1939. 
London, 1978.
Helmreich, Paul C. From Paris to Sfevres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the 
Peace Conference of 1919-1920. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 
1974.
Henig, Ruth. Versailles and After 1919-1933. London, 1984.
Hogan, Michael J. Informal Entente: The Private Structure of Cooperation in Anglo- 
American Economic Diplomacy. 1918-1928. Columbia: University of Missouri 
Press, 1977.
House, E. M. and Seymour C. (eds.)., What Really Happened at Paris. The Story of the 
Peace Conference. New York: C. Seribner's Son, 1921.
Howard, Harry N. The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History 1913-1923. New 
York: Fertig, 1966.
Howard, Harry N. Turkey, the Straitss and U.S. Policy. London: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1974.
Hurewitz, Jacob C. Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record: 
1914-1956. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1956.
Igdemir, Ulug. Sivas Kongresi Tutanaklari. Ankara: Ataturk Dil Tarih Yuksek Kurumu,
1986.
Ileri, Suphi Nuri. Sevr ve Lozan. Istanbul: Arkadas Matbaasi, 1934.
247
InanAfet. Turk Istiklali ve Lozan. Istanbul, 1939.
Irmak, Sadi. Milli Mucadelede Ataturk'un Cevresi Ilk Mucahitler. Istanbul: Gene 
Yayincilik, 1986.
Ismael, T. Y. The Middle East in World Politics: A Study in Contemporary International 
Relations. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1974.
Jaeschke, Gotthard. KurtulusSavasiileilgililngilizBelgeleri. Ankara: Turk Tarih 
Kurumu, 1971.
Jaeschke, Gotthard. Turk Kurtulus Savasi Kronoloiisi. I (Mondros'tan MudanvaVa 
Kadar30Ekim 1918-11 Ekim 1922): II (Mudanva Mutarekesinden 1923 Sonuna 
K adardl Ekim 1922-31 Aralik 1923). Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1989.
James, Robert Rhodes. The British Revolution: British Politics 1880-1939. London: 
Hamilton, 1978.
Jeffery Keith. The British Army and the Crisis of the Empire. 1918-1922. Manchester 
Manchester University Press, 1984.
Jeffery, Keith (ed.). The Wilson Letters 1918-1922: The Military Correspondence of Field 
Marshall. Sir Henry Wilson. 1918-1922. Avon, 1985.
Joll, James (ed..). Britain and Europe. Pitt to Churchill 1793-1940. London: Adam & C. 
Black, 1961.
Jordan, William M. Great Britain. France and the German Problem 1919 - 1939: a Study 
of Anglo-French Relations in the Making and Maintenance of the Versailles 
Settlement. London. 1971.
Karacan, Ali Naci. Lozan. Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1971.
Karal, Enver Ziya. Birinci Cihan Harbinden Lozan Muahedesine Kadar Turkive'nin Sivasi 
Olavlari. Istanbul, 1959.
Karal, Enver Ziya. TurkiveCumhurivetiTarihi 1918-1960. Istanbul: Milli Egitim 
Basimevi, 1961.
Kedourie, Elie. England and the Middle East - The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire 
1914-1921. London: Mansell, 1987.
248
Kedourie, Elie. Politics in the Middle East. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Kemal, Mustapha. Speech. Leipzig: Ucdal Pub.Co. 1929.
Kennedy, Paul M. The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British 
External Policy 1865-1980. London: Fontana Paperbacks, 1985.
Kent, Marian. Oil and Empire: British Diplomacy and Mesopotamian Oil 1900-1920. 
London: Macmillan, 1976.
Kent, Bruce. The Spoils of War. The Politics. Economics and Diplomacy of Reparations
1918-1932. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.
Kinross, John Patrick. D .B. Ataturk. The Rebirth of a Nation. London, 1990.
Knudsen, Eric Lance. Great Britain. Constantinople, and the Turkish Peace Treaty (1919-
1922) New York, 1987.
Kocu, Resat Ekrem. Osmanli Muahedeleri. Kapitulasvonlar ve Lozan Muahedenamesi. 
Istanbul: Turkiye Matbaasi, 1934.
Kurkcuer, Orhan Melih. Sivasi Tarih. 1789-1950. Istanbul, 1969.
Kurkcuoglu, Omer. Turk-Ingiliz Iliskileri. 1916-1926. Ankara: Ankara Universitesi 
Basimevi, 1978.
Landau, Jacob M. Ataturk'un Buvuk Nutkunda Pis Politika. Ankara, 1979.
Langsam, Walter C. Turkey for Turks: From Sfevres to Lausanne. New York. 1974.
Layboum Keith. Britain on the Breadline: A Social and Political History of Britain between 
the Wars. Gloucester, 1990.
Leffler, Melvyn P. The Elusive Quest: America’s Pursuit of European Stability and French 
Security.1919-1933.Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979.
Lewis, Bernard. The Emergence of Modem Turkev. London: Oxford University Press, 
1968,
Lewis, Geoffrey. Modem Turkey. London: E. Benn, 1974.
Lloyd, T. O. Empire to Welfare State: English History. 1906-1976. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1979.
249
Longrigg, S. Housley. Oil in the Middle East: Its Discovery and Development. London: 
Oxford University Press, 1968.
Lowe, C. J. and Dockrill, M. L. The Mirage of Power: British Foreign Policy 1902-1922.
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972.
Lowe, C. J., and Marzari, F. Italian Foreign Policy. 1870-1940. London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1975.
Luke, Harry C. Mosul and Its Minorities. London: M. Hopkinson, 1925.
Macdonald, D. F. The Age of Transition. Britain in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries. London: Macmillan, 1967.
Mango, A. Turkey: A Delicately Poised Ally. Washington Papers 28. Beverley Hills, 
Cal: Sage Publications, 1975.
Mansfield, Peter. The Ottoman Empire and its Successors. London: Macmillan, 1973. 
Margach, James. The Abuse of Power The War between Downing Street and the Media 
from Llovd George to Callaghan. London:W.H.Allen, 1978.
Marks, Sally. The Illusion of Peace: International Relations. 1918-1933. London: 
Macmillan, 1976.
Marlowe, John. Perfidious Albion. The Origin of Anglo-French Rivalry in the Levant.
London: Elek, 1971.
Marriot, John. The Eastern Question: A Historical Study in European Diplomacy.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940.
Marwick, Arthur. Britain in the Century of Total War 1900-1967. London: Little, 
Brown, 1968.
Maurice, Sir Frederick. The Armistices of 1918-1943. London: Oxford University 
Press, 1943.
Mazici, Nursen. Bel gelerle Ataturk Doneminde Muhalefet (1919-19261. Istanbul: Dilmen 
Yayinevi, 1984.
Me Elwee, William. Britain's Locust Years. 1918-1940. London, 1962.
250
McKercher, BJ. C., Moss, D.J. Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy. 1895- 
1939: Memorial Essays Honouring CJ.Lowe. Edmonton, Alberta: University of 
Alberta Press, 1984.
Mears, Eliot Grinnel. Modem Turkey: A Politi cal-Economic Interpretation 1908-1923.
New York: Macmillan, 1923.
Medlicott, William N. Contemporary England 1914-1964. London: D. Mckay Co. 1967. 
Medlicott, William N. From Mettemich to Hitler. Aspects of British and Foreign History.
1814-1939. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963.
Medlicott, W. N. British Foreign Policy since Versailles 1919-1963. London: Methuen,
1968.
Mejcher, Helmut. Imperial Quest for Oil: Iraq 1910-1928. London, 1976.
Meram, Ali Kemal. Bel gelerle Turk Ingiliz Iliskileri Tarihi. Istanbul: Kitas Yayinlari,
1969.
Miller, William. The Ottoman Empire and its Successors 1801-1927. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1966.
Minorski, Viladimir F. The Mosul Question. Paris, 1926.
Misiroglu, Kadir. Lozan. Zafer mi? Hezimet mi? Istanbul: Sebil Yayinevi, 1971. 
Misiroglu, Kadir. Musul Meselesi ve IrakTurkleri. Istanbul: Sebil Yayinevi, 1972.
Mohr, Anton. The Oil War. London, 1926.
Monroe, Elizabeth. Britain’s Moment in the Middle East. London: Chatto and Windus, 
1981.
Morkaya, Burhan Cahit Mudanva. Lozan ve Ankara. Istanbul: Kanaat, 1933.
Mowat, C. L. (ed.). The New Cambridge Modem History. Vol. XII. The Shifting 
Balance of World Forces 1898-1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1968.
Mowat, Charles L. Britain between the Wars 1918-1940. London: Methuen, 1955. 
Mowat, R. B. A History of European Diplomacy 1914-1925. London: Edward Arnold 
and Co. 1927.
251
Murray, Arthur Cecil. Reflections on Some Aspects of British Foreign Policy between the 
Two World Wars. Edinburg: Oliver and Boyd, 1946.
Nassibian, Akaby. Britain and the Armenian Question. 1915-1923. London: Croom 
Helm, 1984.
Naylor, John F. Britain 1919-1970. Chicago, 1971.
Nelson, Keith L. Victors Divided: America and the Allies in Germany. 1918-1923.
Berkeley, London: University of California Press, 1975.
Nere, Jacque. The Foreign Policy of France from 1914 to 1945. London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1975.
Nicolson, Harold. Peacemaking. London: Constable and Co.Ltd, 1933.
Northedge, F. S. The Troubled Giant: Britain Among the Great Powers. 1916-1939.
London: London School and Economics: G. Bell, 1966.
Okcun, A. Gunduz. Turkive'nin Taraf Oldugu Milletlerarasi Andlasmalar Rehberi. 1920-
1961. Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Yayinlari, 1962.
Oke, Mim Kemal. A Chronology of the Mosul Question (1918-1926). Istanbul: Bogazici 
Yayinlari, 1991.
Oke. Mim Kemal. Ingiliz Belgelerinde Lozan Baris Konferansi (1922-1923). Istanbul: 
Bogazici Universitesi Yayinlari, 1983.
Oke, Mim Kemal. The Turkish War Of Independence and the Independence Struggle of 
the South Asian Muslims "The Khilafat Movement” (1919-1924). Ankara, 1991. 
Oran, Baskin. Ataturk'un Milli Pis Politikasi. Ankara, 1981.
Oran, Baskin. Turk Yunan Iliskilerinde Bati Trakva Sorunu Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi,
1991.
Orde, Anne. British Policy and European Reconstruction after the First World War. 
Cambridge, 1990.
Orde, Anne. Great Britain and International Security 1920-1926. London: Royal 
Historical Society, 1978.
Ozalp, K. Milli Mucadele. Cilt I, II. Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1971.
252
Palmer, Alan. The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire. London, 1992.
Paneth, Philip. Turkey: Decadence and Rebirth. London: Alliance Press Ltd, 1943.
Peters, Richard F. The Story of the Turks from Empire to Democracy. New York: 
C.S.Pub. Co. 1959.
Petrie, Charles Alexander. Diplomatic History. 1713-1933. London: Hollis and Carter, 
1946.
Petrie, Charles. Twenty Years Armistice and After: British Foreign Policy since 1918. 
London, 1940.
Pink, Gerhard P. The Conference of Ambassadors: Paris. 1920-1931. Geneva, 1942.
Pollard, Sidney and Holmes, Colin. The End of the Old Europe. 1914-1939. London, 
1973.
Porter, Bernard. Britain. Europe, and the World 1850-1982: Delusions of Grandeur. 
London: Allen and Unwin, 1983.
Postgate, Raymond and Vallance, Aylmer. England Goes to Press: The English People’s 
Opinion on Foreign Affairs as Reflected in their Newspapers since Waterloo. 1815- 
1937. London. 1937.
Price, Clair. The Rebirth of Turkey. New York: T. Seltzer, 1923.
Price. Morgan Philips. A History of Turkey from Empire to Republic. London, 1961.
Pugh, Martin. The Making of Modem British Politics. 1867-1939. Oxford: Blackwell, 
1993.
Reynolds, D. Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth 
Century. London, New York: Longman, 1991.
Reynolds E. E. and Brasher, N. E. Britain in the Twentieth Century 1900-1964. London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1966.
Reynolds, Philip. A. British Foreign Policy in the Inter-War Years. London Westport, 
Conn: Greenwood Press, 1974.
Robbins Keith. The Eclipse of a Great Power: Modem Britain 1870-1975. London: 
Longman, 1983.
253
Robinson, Richard D.The First Turkish Republic: A Case Study in National Development
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963.
Rothstein, Andrew. British Foreign Policy and its Critics 1830-1950. London: Lawrence 
and Wishart, 1969. .
Sapolyo, Enver Behnan. Kemal Ataturk ve Milli Mucadele Tarihi. Istanbul, 1958.
Selek, Sabahattin. Anadolu Ihtilali. Istanbul, 1973.
Selsam, J. Paul. The Attempts to Form an Anglo-French Alliance 1919-1924. 
Philadelphia, PA 1936.
Seton-Watson, Robert William. Britain and the Dictators: A Survey of Post-War British 
Policy^ London: Cambridge University Press, 1938.
Sforza, Carlo, Count. Diplomatic Europe since the Treaty of Versailles. New Haven, 
1928.
Sforza, Carlo, Count. Makers of Modem Europe. New Haven: Yale University, 1928.
Shaw, Stanford and Shaw, Ezel Kural. History of the Ottoman Empire and Modem 
Turkey. Reform. Revolution, and Republic 1808-1975.. Vol. II. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1976- 1977.
Shwadran, Benjamin. The Middle East. Oil and the Great Powers. London: Council for 
Middle Eastern Affairs, 1956.
Simsir, Bilal. Bizim Diplomatlar Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1996.
Sipple, C. E. British Foreign Policy since the World War L Iowa City, IA 1932.
Slugglet, Peter. Britain in Iraq. 1914-1932. London: Ithaca Press, 1976.
Smith, Elaine D. Turkey: Origins of the Kemalist Movement and the Government of the 
Grand National Assembly 1919-1923. Washington, 1959.
Smith, M. L. Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor. 1919-1922 London: Allen Lane,
1973.
Soltav, R. H. French Parties and Politics. London, 1930.
Sontag, Raymond J. A Broken World. 1919-1939. New York: Harper & Row, 1971.
254
Sonyel, Salahi R. The Foreign Policy of the Turkish Nationalists 1919-1923. London, 
1971.
Sonyel, Salahi Ramsdan. Turkish Diplomacy 1918-1923. Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish 
National Movement. London: Sage Publications, 1975.
Sousa, Nasim. The Capitulatory Regime of Turkey. Its History. Origin and Nature.
Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1933.
Stark, Freya. Turkey: A Sketch of Turkish History. London, 1971.
Stevenson, David. The First World War and International Politics. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1988.
Stivers, William. Supremacy and Oil: Iraq. Turkey and Anglo-American World Order.
918-1930. Ithaca NY.London: Cornell University Press, 1982.
Swallow, Charles. The Sick Man of Europe. Ottoman Empire to Turkish Republic 1789-
1923. London: Tombridge, E. Benn, 1973.
Tanor, Bulent. Turkivede Yerel Kongre Iktidarlari (1918-1920). Istanbul: Kaynak 
Yayinlari, 1992.
Tansel, S. Mondros'tan Mudanva'va Kadar. Cilt. I-III. Ankara: M.E.B. Yayinlari, 1991. 
Taylor, A. J. P. The Trouble Makers: Dissent Over Foreign Policy 1792-1939. London: 
Oxford University Press, 1957.
Taylor, A. J. P. English History. 1914-1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965. 
Taylor, P. M. The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919- 
1939. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
Teed, Peter. The Move to Europe: Britain 1880-1972. London, 1972.
Temperley, H. W. V., A History of the Peace Conference. Vol. VI, London: H. Frowde,
1924.
Thomson, David. England in the Twentieth Century 1914-1963. London, 1964. 
Thorne, J. 0.(ed.) Chambers Biographical Dictionary New York: S t Martin's Press,
1962.
Timur, Taner. Turk Devrimi ve Sonrasi. Ankara: Dogan Yayinlari, 1971.
255
Toynbee, Arnold and Kirkwood Kenneth P. Turkey. London: E. Benn, 1926.
Toynbee, Arnold J. The Conduct of British Empire Foreign Relations since the Peace 
Settlement London, 1928.
Toynbee, Arnold J. The Western Question in Greece and Turkey.: A Study in the Contact 
of Civilisations. London: Constable and Company Ltd, 1922.
Trachtenberg, Marc. Reparation in World Pblitics: France and European Economic 
Diplomacy. 1916-1923. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980.
Trask, Roger. The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform. 1914- 
1939. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971.
Tulbentci, Feridun Fazil. Cumhurivet Nasil Kuruldu?. Istanbul, 1955.
Tunava. TarikZafer. Turkivede Sivasi Partiler 1859-1952. Istanbul, 1952.
Turan, Serafettin.. Kurtulus Savasinda Kongreler. Cumhuriyet’in 50. Yildonumu 
Semineri. Ankara, 1975.
Turkgeldi, A. Mondros ve Mudanva MutarekelerininTarihi. Ankara: Guney Matbaacilik, 
1948.
Tutengil. Cavit O. DoktorRiza Nur Uzerine Uc Yazi - Yankilar- Belgeler. Ankara:
Guven Matbaasi, 1965.
Ulagay, O. Kemalism and the National Development in Turkey. Manchester, 1977.
Ulubelen, Erol. Ingiliz Gizli BelgelerindeTurkive. Istanbul: Cagdas Yayinlari, 1967.
Ulug, Nasit H., Empervalizme Karsi Turkive. 1922-1924. Istanbul: Beige Yayinlari, 
1971.
Unal,Tahsin. 1700'den 1958*6 kadarTurk Sivasi Tarihi. Ankara: Ayyildiz Matbaasi, 
1958.
Unat, Faik Resit. Lozan Baris Antlasmasinin Imzasina ait bazi Vesikalar. Istanbul, 1942.
Vali, Ferenc A. A Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971.
Venn, Fiona. Oil Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986.
Vere-Hodge, Edward Reginald. Turkish Foreign Policy 1918-1948. Geneva, 1950.
256
Vucinich, Wayne S. The Ottoman Empire. Its Record and Legacy. Princeton: Van 
Nestrand, 1965.
Walder, David. The Chanak Affair. London: Hutchinson, 1969.
Watt, D. C. Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign 
Policy in the Twentieth Century. London: Longmans, 1965.
Watt, D. C. Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain’s Place 1900-1975. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984,
White, Stephen. Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Study in the Politics of 
Diplomacy. 1920-1924. London: Macmillan, 1979.
Wiener, Joel H. and Plumb, J. H. (eds.). Great Britain: Foreign Policy and the Span of 
Empire: A Documentary History. 1689-1971. Vol.I, New York: Chelsa House 
Publishers, 1972.
Willert. Sir Arthur. Aspects of British Foreign Policy. London, 1928.
Williams, Ann. Britain and France in the Middle East and North Africa 1914-1967. 
London: Macmillan, 1968.
Wolfers, Arnold. Britain and France Between Two Wars. Conflicting Strategies of Peace 
since Versailles. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, C. 1963.
Wood, Anthony. Great Britain. 1900-1965. London, 1978.
Wrigley, C. Llovd George and the Challenge of Labour: The Post-War Coalition. 1918- 
1922. Hemel Hemstead: Harvester Wheatsheat, 1990.
Yale, William. The Near East: A Modem History. Michigan: University of Michigan 
Press, 1958.
Yapp, M. E. The Making of the Modem Near East 1792-1923. London: Longman,
1987.
Yerasimos. Stefenos. Turk-Sovvet Iliskileri. Istanbul: Gozlem Yayinlari, 1979.
Zurcher, Erik J. Turkey: A Modem History. New York: I.B. Taurist and CO. 1993.
Zurcher, Erik J. The Unionist Factor. The Role of Union and Progress in the Turkish 
Nationalist Movement. 1905-1926. Leiden: Brill, 1984.
257
Zurcher, Erik J. Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic. The Progressive
Republican Party 1923-1925, Leiden: Brill 1991.
Articles
Abadan, Yavuz. 'Lozan'in Hususiyetleri.' Istanbul Universitesi. Hukuk Fakultesi 
Mecmuasi. Vol IV. No.15 (1938). pp. 401-415.
Altug, Yilmaz., ’Early Foreign Relations of the Turks’, Turkish Yearhook of International 
Relations. Vol. II, (1961). pp. 143-152.
Andrew, Christopher., 'Secret Intelligence and British Foreign Policy 1900-1939', 
Intelligence and International Relations 1900- 1945. (ed.Christopher Andrew and 
Jeremy Noakes) Exeter: University of Exeter, 1987. pp. 9-28.
Ashton-Gwatkin, Frank. Thoughts on the Foreign Office 1918-1939’ Contemporary 
Review. 188 (December 1955), pp. 374-378.
Attrep, Abe. 'A State of Wretchedness and Impotence: A British View of Istanbul and 
Turkey, 1919'. International Journal of Middle East Studies. 9 (1978), pp. 1-9.
Baban, Sukru., ’Lozan Sulhu'nun Yildonumu', Sivasal Bilgiler. No. 52 (July 1935), 
pp. 1-7.
Bayur, Hikmet. 'Birinci Genel Savastan Sonra Yapilan Baris Antlasmalarimiz', Part I 
Belleten. 30 (1966). No. 117, pp. 115-156.
Beck, Peter J. 'A Tedious and Perilous Controversy: Britain and the Settlement of the 
Mosul Dispute. 1918-1926' Middle Eastern Studies. 17 (April 1981), pp. 256-276.
Bilsel, Cemil. 'Lozan'in Yildonumu', Cumhurivet. (July 24,1948).
Brown, Phillip M. 'From Sdvres to Lausanne', American Journal of International Law.
18 (January 1924), pp. 113-116.
Brown, Philip M. The Capitulations' Foreign Affairs. 1 (June 1923), pp. 71-80.
258
Buell, Raymond L. 'Oil Interest in the Fight for Mosul', Current History 22 (1923),
pp. 931-938.
Craig, Gordon A. The British Foreign Office from Grey to Austen Chamberlain', in The 
Diplomats 1919-1939. (ed. Gordon, A. Craig and Felix Gilbert) Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1953, pp. 15-48.
Darwin, J. G. The Chanak Crisis and the British Cabinet', History. 65 (1980), pp. 32- 
48.
Davison, Roderic A. 'Middle East Nationalism: Lausanne Thirty Years After1, The Middle 
East Journal. 7 (Summer 1953), pp. 324-348.
Davison, Roderich H. Turkish Diplomacy From Mudros to Lausanne' in The Diplomats.
1919-1939. (ed. Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert) Princeton, N J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1953. pp. 172-209.
Denny, Ludwell. 'Up in Curzon’s Room', The Nation. 116, 10 January 1923, pp. 40- 
41.
Dilks David. 'Appeasement and 'Intelligence" in Retreat From Power: Studies in 
Britain's Foreign Policy of the Twentieth Century. Vol. 1 1906-1939. (ed. David 
Dilks) London: Macmillan, 1981. pp. 139-169.
Dyer, Gwynne. The Turkish Armistice of 1918.1- The Turkish Decision for a Separate 
Peace', Middle Eastern Studies. 8 (19721. pp. 143-178.
Dyer, Gwynne., The Turkish Armistice of 1918.2- A Lost Opportunity: The Armistice 
Negotiations of Moudros', Middle Eastern Studies. 8 (1972), pp. 313-348.
Earle, M. Edward. The Turkish Petroleum Company: A Study in Oleaginous Diplomacy' 
Political Science Quarterly. 39 (1924), pp. 265-279.
Erisirgil, Emin. 'Lozan Sulhu', Sivasi Ilimler Mecmuasi. 100, (1939).
Eroglu, Hamza. 'Lozan Baris Andlasmasi ve Kapitulasyonlar* Ulus. July 28, 1963.
Esmer, Ahmet Sukru. 'Lozan Sulhu'nun Yildonumu', Mulkive. 28 Vol.3 (July, 1933), 
pp. 1-3.
259
Ferrier, R. W. 'French Oil Policy, 1917-1930' in Enterprise and History in the Honour of 
Charles Wilson, (ed. D. C. Coleman and P. Mathias) Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984 pp. 237-262.
Fritz, Stephen E. 'La Politique de la Ruhr and Lloyd Georgian Defence Diplomacy: The 
Tragedy of Anglo-French Relations, 1919-1923', Proceedings of the Annual 
Meeting of the Western Society for French History. 3 (1975), pp. 566- 
582.
Gauvain, Auguste. 'Five Years of French Policy in the Near East' Foreign Affairs. 3 
(1924-1925), pp. 277-292.
Gibbons, Herbert A. The Freedom of the Straits' Asia. 22 (December 1922) pp. 994- 
998, 1022-1023, 1025.
Giritli, Ismet. 'Ataturk Devrinde Ingiltere ile Iliskilerimiz' Millivet. 1 November, 1967.
Giritlioglu, Fahir. 'Lozan ve Sonrasi’, Ulus. July 1963, p.2.
Goldstein, E. 'Great Britain and the Greater Greece, 1917-1920.' The Historical Journal. 
32, no. 2 (1989), pp. 339-56.
Goold, J. Douglas. 'Lord Hardinge as Ambassador to France and the Anglo-French 
Dilemma over Germany and the Near East 1920-1922', Historical Journal. 21 
(1978), pp. 913-937.
Harington, Sir Charles. 'Mudania and Chanak, 1922' Quarterly Review. 275 (October 
1940), pp. 277-290.
Harkness, David. 'England's Irish Question' The Politics of Reappraisal 1918-1939'.
(ed. Gillian Peele and Chris Cook) London: Macmillan, 1975. pp. 39-63.
Helmreich, Paul C. 'Oil and the Negotiations of the Treaty of Sevres', December 1918- 
April 1920' Middle East Forum. 42 (1966), pp. 75-76.
Hurewitz, Samuel J. The Roots of British Foreign Policy' Current History. 56. (1964), 
pp. 296-299, 307.
Ilgar, Ihsan. Turk Genel Kurmayinin Gizli Harekat Plani', Bel gelerle Turk Tarihi 
Dergisi. Sayi, 36, pp. 33-44.
260
Ibrahim Fazil (Pelin). 'Lozan'in Iktisadi ve Mali Zaferi', Mulkive. Vol. Ill, 28(1933), 
pp. 4*16.
Inan, Afet. Turk Istiklali ve Lozan Muahedesi', Belleten. Vol.II, 7-8 (1938), pp. 277- 
291.
Inonu, Ismet. 'Ismet Inonu'nun Hatiralari' Akis. January-September 1959.
Inonu, Ismet. Tstiklal Savasi ve Lozan’, Belleten. 38 (1974), pp. 1-30.
Jaeschke, Gotthard. "Mustafa Kemal General Harington ile Gorusmek Istemismidir?" 
Belleten. 36, Sayi 142, (April, 1972), pp. 169-171.
Jeffery Keith and Sharp Alan. Lord Curzon and Secret intelligence’, Intelligence and 
International Relations. 1900-1945, (ed. Andrew, C. and Noakes, J.) Exeter: 
University of Exeter, 1987 pp. 103-126.
Jones, Gareth, G. The British Government and the Oil Companies 1912-1924: The 
Search for an Oil Policy’, Historical Journal. 20 (1977), pp. 647-672.
Kent, Marian. ’Great Britain and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1900- 1923' The Great 
Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire (ed. Marian Kent). London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1984. pp. 172-205.
Kent, Marian. 'Guarding the Bandwagon: Great Britain, Italy, and Middle Eastern Oil,
1920-1923' in National and International Politics in the Middle East. Essays in 
Honour of Elie Kedourie. (ed. Edward Ingram) London: Cass, 1986, pp. 144-163.
Kent, Marian. 'British Policy, International Diplomacy and the Turkish Revolution’ 
International Journal of Turkish Studies. 3. (Winter, 1985-86), pp. 33-51.
Langhome, Richard T. B., The Treaty of Lausanne (1923) and the Recognition of
Modem Turkey: The International Context' in Symposium on the Foreign Policy of 
Ataturk’s Turkey (1923-83). Proceedings. Istanbul: Bogazici Universitesi Yayinlari, 
1984, pp. 101-124.
Larew, Karl G. 'Great Britain and the Greco-Turkish War 1921-1922*, The Historian.
35 (1973), pp. 256-270.
261
'Lausanne and the Freedom of the Straits’ The Economist. Decembers), 1922, pp. 1064-
1065.
'Lausanne and Sfcvres' The Economist. February 10, 1923, pp. 252-253.
'Lausanne Conference', The Round Table. 13, (1923), pp. 342-355.
The Lausanne Treaty' The Atlantic Monthly. 134, (1924), pp. 693-700.
The Turkish Victory at Lausanne' Current Opinion. 75 (September 1923), pp. 277- 
278.
Macfie, A. L. The British Decision Regarding the Future of Constantinople, November 
1918-January 1920' Historical Journal. 18 (1975), pp. 391-400.
Macfie, A. L. The Straits Question: The Conference of Lausanne, November, 1922-July 
1923', Middle Eastern Studies. 15 (1979), pp. 211-238.
Martin, L. The Chester Concession' Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science. 112 (1924), pp. 186-188.
Marvin, George. The Greek Military Debacle' Asia. 22 (December 1922), pp. 954,
1006.
Mayer, Amo J. The Problems of Peace Making' in European Diplomacy between Two 
Wars 1919-1939. (ed. Hans W. Gatzke) Chicago, 1972. pp. 14-39.
Mejcher, Helmut. 'Oil and British Policy towards Mesopotamia, 1914-1918' Middle 
Eastern Studies. 8 (1972), pp.377-391.
Mejcher, Helmut 'British Middle East Policy 1917-1921: The Interdepartmental Level' 
Journal of Contemporary History. 8 (1973). pp. 81-101.
Montgomery, A. E. The Making the Treaty of S&vres of 10 August 1920' Historical 
Journal. 15 (November, 1972), pp. 775-778.
Montgomery, A. E. 'Lloyd George and the Greek Question 1918-1922', in Llovd 
George: 12 Essays, (ed. A. J. P. Taylor) London: Hamilton, 1971 pp. 255-285.
The Near East’, The Round Table. 13. (1922), pp. 1-29.
Okyar, Osman. Turco-Biitish Relations in the Inter-War Period: Fethi Okyar's Mission to 
London’ in Four Centuries of Turco-British Relations. Studies in Diplomatic.
262
Economic and Cultural Affairs, (ed. William Hale and Ali Ihsan Bagis) Beverley: 
Eothen, 1984. pp. 62-79.
Orbay, Rauf. 'Rauf Orbay'in Hatiralari’ YakinTarihimiz. Cilt, I, (1962).
Orhun, Mehmet. 'Lozan ve Bati Trakya' Yeni Istanbul. August 5. 1967.
Scroggs, William O. 'American Interests at Lausanne', Foreign Affairs. 10 (1932), pp. 
688-690.
Shuttleworth, D. L. Turkey, From Armistice to the Peace' Journal of the Central Asian 
Society. 11 (1924), pp. 51-67.
Silier, Oya. The Place of Anglo-Turkish Relations in the Foreign Policy of the Turkish 
Republic, 1923-1939' Milletlerarasi MunasebetlerTurk Yilligi 1971, pp. 86-101.
Soylemezoglu, Galip Kemali. 'Basimiza Gelenlen Yakin Bir Mazinin Hatiralari, 
Mondros'tan Mudanya'ya, 1918-1922' Ankara Kutuphanesi Tarih Serisi. 11 
(1939).
Tezel, Yahya S. 'Birinci Buyuk Millet Meclisi Anti-Emperyalistmiydi? Chester Projesi' 
Sivasal BilgilerFakultesi Dergisi. 25 (1970), pp. 287-318.
Townshend Maj_Gen Sir Charles. 'Great Britain and the Turks; Asia 22 (December 22), 
pp. 949-953.
Toynbee, Arnold J. 'Angora and the British Empire in the East', Contemporary Review 
123 (June 1923), pp. 681-691.
Tunaya,TarikZafer. 'Osmanli Imparatorlugundan T.B.M.M. Hukumetine Gecis.'Devrim 
Hareketleri icinde Ataturk ve Ataturkculuk. Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1981, pp.181- 
207.
Tuncay, Mete. 'Misak-i Milli'nin Birinci Maddesi Ustune', Birikim. 17-18 (1976), pp. 
12-16.
Turlington, Edgar. The Settlement of Lausanne' American Journal of International Law. 
18 (1924), pp. 696-706.
Ulug, N. 'Milli Mucadele'de Turk Fransiz Munasebetleri' Havat Tarih Mecmuasi. 10, 
(1972), pp. 23-29.
263
Visvizi-Dontas, Domna. The Allied Powers and the Eastern Question 1921-1923' Balkan 
Studies. 17(1976), pp. 331-358.
Williamson, David G. 'Great Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, 1923-1924' British Journal of 
International Studies. 3 (1977), pp. 70-91.
Woods, H. Charles. 'Lausanne and its Antecedent' The Fortnightly Review. 113 (June 
1923), pp. 136-152.
Woods, H. Charles. 'Lausanne and its Accessories' The Fortnightly Review. 114 (July 
1923) pp. 122-133.
Woods, H. Charles. The Straits-Before and After1 The Fortnightly Review. 113 (June 
1923), pp. 282-292.
Woods, H. Charles. 'Lord Curzon and Lausanne' The Fortnightly Review. 113 (June
1923), pp. 491-502.
Woods, H. Charles. 'Sevres-Before and After1 The Fortnightly Review. 112 (1922), pp. 
545-560.
Wright, Quincy. The Mosul Dispute' American Journal of International Law. 20 
(1926), pp. 453-464.
Yerasimos, Stefanos. Turk Yunan Iliskileri: Mitler ve Gercekler.' Turk Yunan 
Uvusmazligi. (comp. S. Vaner, Istanbul: Metis Yayinlari, 1990.)
Biographies and Memoirs
Adam, Colin Forbes. Life of Llovd George. London: Macmillan, 1948.
Adivar, Halide Edip. The Turkish Ordeal. London: The Century, 1928.
Ali Ihsan (Sabis). Harp Hatiralarim. Istiklal Harbi ve Gizli Cihetleri. CiltV. Ankara: Tan 
Matbaasi, 1951.
Aralov, S. I. Bir Sowet DiplomatininTurkive Hatiralari. Istanbul: Burcak Yayinevi, 
1967.
Aras, Tevfik Rustu. Goruslerim. Istanbul: S.L.Erciyas, 1968.
264
Armstrong, H. C. Grey Wolf-Mustafa Kemal: An Intimate Study of a Dictator. London: 
A. Barker, 1945.
Ataturk, Mustafa Kemal. Nutuk. Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Basimevi, 1969.
Atay Falih Rifki. Mustafa Kemarin Mutareke Defteri. Istanbul, 1955.
Atay, Falih Rifki. Ataturk'un Bana Anlattiklari. Istanbul: Sel Yayinlari, 1955.
Atay, Falih Rifki. Cankava: AtaturkDevri Hatiralari. 2 Cilt. Istanbul, 1958.
Aydemir, Sevket Sureyya. Ikinci Adam. Cilt 1 ,1884-1938. Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi,
1988.
Aydemir, Sevket Sureyya. Tek Adam: Mustafa Kemal 1922-1938. Cilt, III. Istanbul: 
Remzi Kitabevi, 1981.
Baldwin, Stanley. This Torch of Freedom: Speeches and Addresses. London. 1935.
Banoglu, Niyazi Ahmet. Ismet Inonu. Istanbul, 1943.
Bayar, Celal. Ben de Yazdim: Milli Mucadeleve Gidis. Istanbul: Baha Matbaasi, 1966- 
1967.
Beaverbrook, Lord. The Decline and Fall of Llovd George. London: Collins, 1963.
Busch, Briton Cooper. Hardinge of Penhurst: A Study in the Old Diplomacy. Hamden, 
Conn: Published for the Conference on British Studies and Indiana University at 
South Bend by Archon Books, 1980.
Cebesoy, Ali Fuat. Milli Mucadele Hatiralari. Istanbul: Vatan Nesriyat, 1953.
Cebesoy, Ali Fuat. Moskova Hatiralari (1920-1922). Istanbul, 1955.
Chamberlain, Austin. Down the Years. London, 1935.
Chamberlain, Austin. Peace in Our Time: Addresses on Europe and the Empire. London, 
1928.
Child, R. Washburn. A Diplomat Looks at Europe. New York: Duffield and Co, 1925.
Churchill. Randolph S. and Gilbert. Martin. Winston S. Churchill. London, 1966.
Churchill, Winston S. (ed. Robert Rhodes James). Complete Speeches 1897-1963. New 
York, 1974.
265
Churchill, Winston S. The World Crisis: The Aftermath 1918-1928. Vol. V. London: 
Thornton Butterworth, 1929.
Erden, Ali Fuat. Ismet Inonu. Istanbul: Burhanettin Erenler Matbaasi, 1952.
Geddes, Auckland Campell. The Foregoing of a Family. London, 1952.
Gilbert Martin. Sir Horace Rumbold - Portrait of a Diplomat 1869-1941. London: 
Heinemann, 1973.
Gilbert Martin. Winston S. Churchill. Vol. IV, Part 3, Documents April 1921-November 
1922. London, 1977.
Gilmour, David. Curzon. London: John Murray, 1994.
Grew, Joseph (cev. M. Aksin). Ataturk ve Inonu. Istanbul, 1966.
Grew, Joseph C. Turbulent Era. A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years 1904-1945.
London: Hammond, Hammond and Co., 1953 .
Hankey, Maurice Pascal A. H. Diplomacy by Conference. Studies in Public Affairs 1920- 
1946. London: Benn, 1946.
Hankey, Maurice Pascal A. H. Politics. Trials and Errors. Oxford: Pen-in-hand, 1950. 
Harington, Charles. Tim Harington Looks Back. London: J. Murray, 1940.
Henderson, Neville M. Water Under the Bridge. London: Hedder and Stoughton Ltd. 
1945.
Inan, Afet. Ataturk Hakkinda Hatiralar ve Belgeler. Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1984. 
Inonu, Ismet. Hatiralar. 2. Kitap. Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1987.
Karabekir, Kazim. Istiklal Harbimiz. Istanbul, 1960.
Kandemir, Feridun. Hatiralari ve Sovlevemedikleri ile Rauf Orbav. Istanbul: Sinan 
Matbaasi, 1965.
Kandemir, Feridun. Sivasi Darginliklar. Istanbul, 1955.
Karaosmanoglu, Yakup Kadri. Politikada45Yil. Ankara: Bilgi Basimevi, 1968. 
Lees-Milne, James. Harold Nicolson: A Biography. 2 Vols. London: Chatto and 
Windus, 1980-1981.
Lloyd George, D. The Truth about the Peace Treaties. Vol. II, London: Gollancz, 1938.
266
Lloyd George, D. Memoirs of the Peace Conference. 2 Vols. New Heaven, 1939.
Macit, B. Lozan Kahramani Ismet Pasha. Istanbul, 1934.
Macmillan, Harold. The Past Masters: Politics and Politicians 1906-1939. London: 
Macmillan, 1975.
Melzig, Herbert (comp.). Inonu Divor ki. Istanbul, 1943.
Morgan, Kenneth O. Llovd George. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974.
Mosley, Leonard. Curzon: The End of an Epoch. London: Longmans, Green, 1960. 
Nicolson, Harold. Curzon: The Last Phase. 1919-1925. A Study on Post-War Diplomacy. 
New York, 1974.
Nur, Riza. Havat ve Hatiratim. Cilt, III, Istanbul: Altindag Yayinevi, 1968.
Oliphant, Sir Lancelot An Ambassador in Bonds. London: Putnam and Co. Ltd, 1946. 
Owen, Frank. Tempestuous Joumev: Llovd George. His Life and Times. London, 1955. 
Pope-Hennesy, James. Lord Crewe. 1858-1945: The likeness of a Liberal. London, 
1955.
Rendel, Sir George Williams. The Sword and the Olive: Recollection of Diplomacy and 
Foreign Service. 1913-1954. London: John Murray, 1957.
Riddell, Baron (George Allandice). Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference and After 
1918-1923. London: V. Gollancz, 1933.
James, Robert, R. Churchill: A Study in Failure 1900-1939. London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1970.
Ronaldshay, Earl of 2nd Marquess of Zetland. The Life of Lord Curzon. 3 Vols.
London: Ernest Benn, 1928.
Rose, Kenneth. Superior Person. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969.
Ryan, Andrew. The Last of the Dragomans. London: Geoffrey Bles, 1951.
Taylor, A. J. P. Churchill Revised: A Critical Assessment. London, 1968.
Tutengil, Cavit Orhan. Doktor Riza Nur Uzerine Uc Yazi - Yankilar - Bel geler. Ankara: 
Guven Matbaasi, 1965.
Unaydin, Rusen Esref. Ataturk’e Ait Hatiralar. Ankara, 1949.
267
Us, (Mehmet) Asim. Gorduklerim. Duvduklarim. Duygularim: Mesrutivet ve Cumhurivet 
Devrine Ait Hatiralar ve Tetkikler. Istanbul, 1964.
Vansittart Lord (Robert Gilbert V.). The Mist Procession. London: Hutchinson, 1958.
Vansittart, Baron (Robert Gilbert V.). Bones of Contention. London: Hutchinson, 1945.
Volkan, Vamik D., and Itzkowitz, Norman. The Immortal Ataturk: A Psvchobiographv. 
Chicago, 1984.
Yalman. Ahmet Emin. Yakin Tarihte Gorduklerim ve Gecirdiklerim. Cilt, III Istanbul,
1970.
Young, Kenneth. Churchill and Beaverbrook: Study in Friendship and Politics. London: 
Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1966.
Theses and Dissertations
Maier, L. Madge. Allied Imperialism and the Turkish National Movement 1919-1923.' 
Ph.d dissertation, University of Texas, 1957.
Montgomery, A. E. 'Allied Policy in Turkey From the Armistice of Mudros, 30 October 
1918, to the Treaty of Lausanne 24 July 1923.' Ph.d Dissertation, London 
University, 1970.
Skages, Glean Eugene. 'Britain at the Straits: A Study of British Diplomacy Toward the 
Turkish Straits 1900-1923.' Ph.d dissertation, Georgetown University, 1977.
Snodgrass, Nancy. The Chanak Crisis: A Study in British Diplomacy.' Ph.d dissertation, 
University of Illinois, 1971.
Woods, J. F. 'British Railway Investment in Turkey with Special Reference to the 
Imperial Ottoman Railway from Smyrna to Aidin 1856-1935.' Master's Thesis, 
University of London, 1979.
268
